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ABSTRACT 
Bi-yu Chang 
Cultural Chanqe and Identitv Shift 
in Relation to Cultural Policy in Post-war Taiwan. 
with Particular Reference to Theatre 
The issue of identity has become increasingly important in the 21't century. Facing 
the dilemma of being tom between globalisation and indigenisation, our sense of 
identity is constantly changing and in turmoil. This dissertation engages with several 
questions: How does our sense of belonging come about? In what ways and to what 
extent can the state construct culture, regulate our behaviour, and formulate a sense 
of belonging through cultural policy? And, why cultural policy might fail? 
Because the politics of cultural policy has either been overlooked or considered only 
in general terms without thorough examination on a long-term basis, this thesis 
examines the relationship between cultural policy and cultural identity by exploring 
the case of post-war Taiwan. 
The development and dramatic change of cultural identity in post-war Taiwan 
provides a good testing ground to examine the relationship between cultural policy 
and identity construction, especially during the volatile identity crisis in the 1990s. 
There are two parts in this dissertation. Part I focuses on textual research of a 
half-century of Taiwanese cultural policy, alongside the island's historical 
development; Part 11 records and analyses the fieldwork I carried out on Taiwanese 
theatre to substantiate the textual analysis in Part 1. 
This thesis deals with issues in two areas that no other research has explored before, 
and tries to indicate the universal implications of the analysis of Taiwanese identity 
construction and cultural policy. 
Firstly, through the analysis of the politics of culture in Taiwan, this research 
demonstrates how a stable and deeply rooted China-centric identity was overturned 
within only two years. Furthermore, it highlights the politics of culture by displaying 
how an authoritarian regime was challenged, and how cultural hegemony could be 
won in order to grasp political power. 
Secondly, the case study provides evidence manifesting the changing nature of 
contemporary cultural policy, and its hidden politics. Under the name of 'supporting 
the arts', the state uses cultural policy to maintain its cultural hegemony. Although 
Taiwan has carried out a process of democratisation since the 1980s, the state has 
not loosened its control on culture, but has rather changed its strategy of how to 
control. A new alliance between regulation and market forces has formed, and 
becomes the nexus of modem cultural policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The love for the motherland where I have never been, although only an idea, is subtle 
and wonderful. It grips me so tight, like gravity to the earth. The longing is so strong, just like orphans imagining their unseen parents. In terms of what kind of parents they 
would be, it does not at all matter In a kind of instinctive sentiment, I love and long for 
my motherland. (Wu Cho-flu, Wuhua guo, 1988: 40)1 
W, 0909DY 
1988., 40) 
Since martial law was lifted in 1987, people in Taiwan have gone through volatile 
social changes, political reform, and most of all, as I argue inthis thesis, an identity 
CriSiS. 2 In 1992, a survey commissioned by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 
concerning Taiwanese identity (see Appendix 1), showed that 16.7% of the 
interviewees identified themselves as'Taiwanese, 44% as'Chinese'and 36.5% as 
'both (Taiwanese and Chinese)'. 
This perception of one's identity was, seriouslychallenged between 1994 and 1996 
when mainland, China conducted a series of missile tests in waters near Taiwan. 
Since then, the figures for people who considered themselves 'Chinese' had fallen 
consistently from 21.7% in 1994,20.5% in 1996, and 16.3% in 1998. In February 
2000, a similar survey showed that Taiwanese identity had changed dramatically: 
45% of interviewees perceived themselves as 7aiwanese', 39.4% as 'both', and only 
13.9% as'Chinese'. (SHIH CHENG-FENQ 2000) 
' Wu Cho-liu (11900-1976) is a Taiwanese writer, who was educated under Japanese rule and 
wrote mostly in Japanese. His novels described the awkward identity and colonial humiliation 
of Taiwanese, and the misplaced longing for the motherland 
-China. In recent years, his 
, novels 
- 
Asian Orphans (ffMff4VJW and Wuhua guo (AffreA 
- 
are regarded as the first 
indigenous literature dealing with Taiwanese identity, and often being quoted to describe the 
helplessness and sadness of Taiwanese (being abandoned by the motherland and crushed 
by colonial rule). 2 Indeed, there are many sub-identities (e. g. Hakka, aborigines, and gay) in Taiwan other 
than just Chinese and Taiwanese. However, I concentrate on these two because this thesis 
focuses on Taiwanese cultural policy as a whole, and these two identities are the major 
players in Taiwan's hegemonic struggle. Besides, the term Taiwanese identity' now is 
regarded as a multi-cultural mixture, including indigenous, Chinese, and global (mainly 
In the past decade, the debate on Taiwanese identity has gradually constructed a 
new identity, which has reversed old China-centric ideologies. When I started this 
research in 1996, it was at the height of this identity crisis. The identity change and 
its related conflicts in the last decade demonstrated a volatile scene of identity 
struggle in Taiwan's political, social and cultural sphere. This struggle has been 
severe, becoming one of the most important factors influencing Taiwan's 
development in the last decade. Having personally experienced drastic changes and 
self-doubt, my initial interest on starting this research was to find out how the 
Kuomintang (KMT)3 had constructed culture in Taiwan that had made me as 'me'. I In 
other words, I wanted to see how our sense of identity was formed and how much of 
it was influenced by cultural policy. 
During the process of research, a number of other issues began to emerge, such as 
in what ways that policy responded to social change and demands, how and why 
identities changed, what unintended and unforeseeable effects of cultural policy 
emerged and the reasons for this. Eventually, I realised that my quest was not only to 
find out how cultural identity was formed and the influence of cultural policy, but 
cultural change in Taiwan. I started with asking the basic questions: 'what is culture', 
and 'what is cultural policy. 
Traditionally, economics and politics have been allocated a position superior to 
Amedcan and Japanese) influences. 3 The Kuomintang JJUR%k (KMT) is the Chinese Nationalist Party. Its predecessor 
Tongmenghui Mr, 921ft (the United League of China) overthrew the Manchu Ong dynasty (1644 
-1911) and established the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911. Since then, China had 
gone through 15 years of chaotic wadord regime. In 1927, the KMT finally became the party 
in govemment. In 1949, the KMT govemment was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war and fled to Taiwan. 
2 
culture within the hierarchy of the social sciences. It seemed that economic and !, 
political processes provided the hard evidence to understand the world, while cultural 
process dealt with less tangible things. (HALL, 1997a) However, in recent years, the 
- 
significance of culture has finally been recognised by social scientists. Instead of 
being viewed as merely reflective of other processes 
-- 
economic or political 
- 
culture 
- 
is now regarded as equally important and constitutive of the social world. (DU GAY, 
-, 
HALL, et al. 1997) Consequently, cultural policy is comparatively new in policy 
studies4,, - and discourseý on cultural policy is less well developed than discourse on 
social and economic policy. In general, the term'cultural policy'is used to denote 
- -, 
'arts policy', or described as 'a policy dealing with cultural affairs' by the professional 
discourse of arts management (DIMAGGIO, 1983; LEWIS, 1994: 42) ý-1.1 
- 
The European Council gave a detailed definition of 'cultural polic)( at the 1976 Oslo 
Conference that showed a typical official view. The resolution issued by the 
--, 
conference listed eight principles for cultural policy, and stated its general nature.. As 
. 
the guideline for cultural policy, the EC emphasised: "Policy for society as a whole 
should have a cultural dimension stressing the development of human values, 
equality, democracy, and the improvement of the human condition, in particular by 
- 
guaranteeing freedom of expression and creating real possibilities for making use of 
, 
this freedom. " (LANGSTED, 1990: 69-70) 
The EC also asserted that cultural policy should be an indispensable part of 
.,, ýý 
4 The idea of having a policy to deal with cultural affairs is a European one. It first became 
policy after the Second World War, and cultural apparatuses were set up to deal with cultural 
affairs. For example, the UK set up the Arts Council in 1946; France set up the Ministry of 
Culture in 1959. 
5 According to Hall (11 997a), 'discourse' is a group of statements which provide a language to 
talk about a particular topic at a particular historical moment, and the production of knowledge 
through language. 
3 
governmental responsibility. Cultural policy should work in conjunction with policies 
- 
for education,, leisure, recreabon and sport, the environment; social affairs, and town 
planning. Therefore, for the members of the EC, cultural affairs no longer limited itself 
exclusively to the arts, but had a wider scope. This included the need to recognise 
-- 
the plurality of societies and to respect individual dignity, spiritual values, the rights of 
minorities and their cultural expressions. (LANGSTED, 1990) 
This view tries to connect cultural policy with the maintenance of human values and 
freedom. However, even with these idealistic statements about human values, 
democracy, and respect for multi-cultural expression, the problem remains how to 
define what constitutes the'culture'to which policy should be applied. Many in the 
arts management trade have taken it as something straightforward that everybody 
knows about. Therefore, 'it seems that there is no need for explanation or discussion 
about what cultural policy is. It has been taken to be simply the kind of policy dealing 
with culture. But what is culture? Here lies the problematic question. 
According to Raymond Williams (1976a: 87), the immediate forerunner of the word 
Oculture'was the Latin word cultura, being passed into English around the early 15 th 
century. The primary meaning was in husbandry, the tending of natural growth. Later, 
the meaning extended to'a process of human development' from the 16 th century 
onwards until the early 19" century. Since the 1 gth century, there had been 
complicated development of the meaning and usage of this word, which made it even 
more difficult to define. 
From a1 9th century point of view, Matthew Arnold (1869) saw culture as 'high culture' 
(that associated with the best that had been thought and said in the world), involving 
4 
characteristics such as beauty, - intelligence and perfection. This classical way of, 
framing the debate about'culture'carried a strong evaluative charge, which became 
engrained so deeply in society that even today it still carries strong connections with 
'high arts in people's minds. 
However, in recent years, the emphasis in social and human sciences has taken on a 
'cultural turn'. (HALL, 1997a) The new focus on defining culture has moved to its 
importance in 'producing meaning. The idea that'culture was everything' became 
popular. (WILLIAMS, 1958) Clifford Geertz, with an anthropological perspective, 
emphasised the symbolic significance of culture. He said, "man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those 
webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of. 
law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. " (GEERTZ, 1973: 5) Accordingly, 
whatever was distinctive about the 'way of life' of a people, community, nation or 
social group could be seen as'culture'. 
Cultural studies took a similar position, using 'culture' to describe the shared values 
of a group or of society, and taking it primarily as "the production and the exchange of 
meanings". (HALL, 1997a: 2) People in a society/group will not only interpret and 
perceive the world in ways that are roughly similar, but will also make sense of the 
world and communicate with each other meaningfully in similar ways. 
The reference to 'culture' can be primarily to symbolic systems (from the perspective 
of cultural studies), or to material connections (from the perspective of cultural 
anthropology and archaeology). (WILLIAMS, 1976a) The confusion arises from the 
blurring and ovedapping of different definitions from various intellectual positions. 
There are so many different ways of looking at and interpreting this word 'culture', 
that both Williams (1 976a: 87) and Hall (1 997a) agree that it is one of the most 
complicated words in the English language and the most difficult concept in social 
,- 
sciences. Williams puts forward the three most common categodes of usage: 
(i) the independent and abstract noun which describes a general process of 
intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, from C18; (ii) the independent 
noun... indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, 
or humanity in general... (iii)the independent and abstract noun which describes 
the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity. This seems 
often now the most widespread use: culture is music, literature, painting and 
sculpture, theatre and film. A Ministry of Culture refers to these specific activities, 
sometimes with the addition of philosophy, scholarship, history. (WILLIAMS, 
1976a: 90) 
It is exactly the complexity and the flexibility of the word 'culture' that makes defining 
#cultural policy' intricate and difficult. Moreover, the issues of how to definecultural 
policy'and which categories should be included become problematic. 
In comparison with the official view of 'cultural polic)(, social scientists provide a 
critical view taking cultural policy as state control of the'process of meaning 
construction. For example, Winckler (1994: 23) described cultural policy as "any state 
effort directly to manage or indirectly to affect any cultural process", Lewis (1994: '51) 
stressed the means of state intervention, through the regulatory powers of 
government and subsidy, to craft a cultural policy. Dimaggio (1983) defined cultural 
policies in a wider sense as: "those that regulate what has been called the 
marketplace of ideas". (1983: 242) 
According to Dimaggio, direct cultural policies were sometimes the'government 
programmes' that created, mandated, or forbade the production or distribution of 
materials embodying specified values or ideas. Sometimes, it was'a set of 
6 
mechanisms' that provided contracts, grants; fellowship to individuals, or distributed 
., - 
funds to organisations. (DIMAGGIO, 1983: 242-243) In addition, indirect policy could 
also be influential. Both Dimaggio (1983) and Winckler (1994) noticed that cultural 
policy 'worked indirectly by affecting the market for cultural products', especially those 
policies operating indirectly in political, economic and social spheres. 
Apart from the confusion caused by the word 'culture', there were other reasons for 
. 
the problematic tendency of the term 'cultural policy. 
- 
Dominquez (1992) found the 
idea of 'cultural policy' fundamentally flawed from a sociological perspective. He 
believed that the existence of cultural policy was a result of government using culture 
- 
as 'symbolic capital'. Calling something 'cultural policy' seemed to imply "the 
objectification of 'the cultural'... - [and also] that there is an arena of life to which it 
refers that is separable from other arenas for which there might be other types of 
- 
policies. " (DOMINGUEZ, 1992: 23) McGuigan even considered the whole concept of., 
'cultural policy'absurd: "the very idea of cultural policy, which seems to imply 
something so fragile and indeterminate as a'realised signifying system' can be 
consciously regulated, is 
... 
problematical. " (1996: 6) 
Pick & Anderton claimed that artists considered themselves to be 'Dionysian in spirit, 
making them the enemy of orderly government. Therefore, there was an ancientlear 
of the mob'within the government to constrain artistic activities. (1996: 64) McGuigan 
held similar views, and saw the problem arising from the etymological connection 
between 'policy' and 'policing'. He writes, "'Cultural policy'has deeply entrenched 
connotations of 'policing culture', of treating culture as though it were a dangerous 
lawbreaker or, perhaps, a lost child. " (MCGUIGAN, 1996: 6) Because of this typical 
governmental attitude of taking culture as'dangerous and unruly', the idea of 'cultural 
7 
policy-making'was made even more controversial and confusing.!, 
On the one hand, many sociologists have deep scepticism towards cultural policy.. 
., ý-, 
Because meanings regulate and organise people's conduct and practices, cultural 
policy helps the state to set the rules, norms and conventions by which social life is 
governed. (THOMPSON, 1997) However, there has never been a thorough 
examination or case study to substantiate their suspicion. On the other hand, the 
professional discourse of arts management has usually taken cultural policy to be 
straightl'orward as a policy dealing with cultural affairs, and overlooked its 
significance and possible influence. It is indeed a waste to ignore the possibility of 
what cultural policy can do in the culture building process. This mentality limits the 
critical dimension of the arts management field and hides the politics of cultural policy. 
Furthermore, because the result of cultural policy cannot be quantified nor precisely 
measured, 'it is difficult to identify its effect without evaluating on a long-term basis. 
However difficult it is to define 'cultural policy' precisely, its existence is a reality. In 
this thesis, I take Williams' (1 976a: 90) third sense of 'culture' 
-artistic and intellectual 
activities 
- 
as the main content of official 'cultural policy' since it has always been the 
case in official cultural policy. However, my examination will also include areas where 
meanings are produced and exchanged by official policy, both directly and indirectly. 
In order to examine the identity changes in Taiwan without leaving out any important 
factors and influences, I adopted du Gay and Hall's (11997: 3) analysis of the 'circuit of 
culture' (see next page). They described the whole process of producing culture as a 
'circuif, including five major processes: representation, identity, production, 
consumption, and regulation. According to Hall (1997a), these five processes form 
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the basis of the circuit and complete the production of culture at any key moment In ý 
other words, culture is always fluid and changing; any change of the process in the 
circuit would influence and alter the outcome of culture as a whole. An examination of 
culture would not be complete if any of these five processes was neglected. 
- 
, 
. -,, ý,,, -, 
Identity 
Regulation Representation 
Production 
Consumption 
The circuit of culture 
Since meaning is what. gives us a sense of identity, of who we are and to whom we 
belong, the issue of how meaning is constructed will be closely linked to the question 
of how culture is used to maintain identity within groups, and mark out difference 
between groups. (WOODWARD, 1997) 1 am not suggesting that shared meanings 
within, a group/society are always unitary; nor that cultural regulation can definitely 
formulate cultural identity, However, I see cultural policy as an official indicator of the 
state's intention to produce meaning purposefully. It is especially the case when 
forceful implementation and official promotion is imposed. Cultural regulation is an 
important factor in meaning production and identity formulafion. 
Because of the identity crisis I have experienced since the 1980s, when I started this 
research in 1996, my original interest was to solve my personal confusion by asking: 
'Who are the Taiwanese", "how are we, ordinary people, culturally constructed", and 
9 
'What influences our sense of belonging"., Drawing inspiration from Stuart Hall's 
theory ofcultural identity (1 990), -l realised that cultural identity is not merely,, ý, nn-! ýv 
'co'mim6n historical experiences and shared cultural codes'. More importantly, it is 
matterof both 
-'beingý and 'becorning'.,, As Hall comments, 1"Far from being eterpallyjj, ýu:, 
fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history; 
culture and power... identities are the names we give to the different ways we are 
positioned by, and position ourselvesý within; the narratives of the past" (HALL, 1990: 
225) 
In taking this approach I have to consider howa sense of being is manipulated 
through the play of history, culture and power. In other words. ý there is a need to look 
at the politics of culture, and how a history is told in a certain way, and why. My 
"'t P0141" to ý !T 
interest is to examine the politics of culture through the case of Taiwan, and therefore, 
neither pure policy analysis nor an arts management model is my concern. 
'4" 
Choosing Taiwan as the case study indeed reflects my personal inte're'sts. owever, 
ton rrr, 
-er - In nr-, - A0d Taiwan entered the international spotlight after the 1996 Prelsidential Election and 
Chinese missile aggression. Apart from being seen as an economic powerhouse and 
0"", 4c, Vtý+t*1-11-lj ! r, # 141t jý ý#c, '-r- 
diplomatic dilemma6, Taiwan's democratic struggle'and indigenisation has attracted 
increasing international inte re st. Sham ba ugh'('l' 996b)ý claift thi's"6hange fias'brought 
two new dimensions to the Taiwan issue: politics and secu'riti. S6emingly, 'political 
change and social reform have occupied the centre stage of Taiwan's development 
since the 1980s. In reality, these changes were also cultural. 
e, I 1, ý 
,WyI 
-orien. -xe f-ivt. ;. d* lo ezjjfz1 
.9 
6 Although small (36,000 square kilometres), 7aiwan was the world's 14th largest rading 
entity and the e laidestioutbo6nid lnýestor in 1996, 'and possessed the world's V largest-7 
foreign reserves. (YAHUDA, 1996) The relationship between America, China, and Taiwan was 
a delicate and'difficult one, which was essential for the security in the Asia-Pacific region.., ý.,, - (ROBINSON, 1996) 
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In order to explore the relationships between cultural policy and identity,, I have divided my 
dissertation into two parts including textual analysis and empirical research. Part I consists of 
four chapters, analysing Taiwan's post-war development and cultural change. An 
understanding of how culture is regulated and governed is crucial in reading the underlying 
significance of cultural policy. I concentrate on the development of post-war Taiwan's cultural 
policy, and explore what meaning was intended to be produced through cultural policy, and 
how meaning was exchanged and shifted. 
The examination of official cultural policies in Part I provides me with the base to understand 
political intention and cultural change. Apart from direct cultural policy, I also pay attention to 
political and economic changes, the post-war education system, language policy, and indirect 
policies'(e. g. the change of public holidays, academic funding, census, renaming of streets). 
Following the textual research on cultural policies and the analysis of the socio-political 
background of post-war Taiwan, the fieldwork that I carried out in 1999 is the main, content of 
Part 11. Here, I concentrate on the development of the theatre in Taiwan, and examine how the 
theatre responded to, and challenged, the official line. There are several reasons that I chose 
the (both traditional and contemporary) theatre as the case studies. It is partly because that 
the theatre is an area that I am most familiar with because of my work as a journalist covering 
theatre news for many years. More importantly, theatre is a politically sensitive art form. The 
traditional theatre has always had a close connection with the masses and brought a sense of 
continuity and historical memory. The contemporary theatre has been considered subversive 
and politically critical in Chinesefraiwanese modern history. My fieldwork on Taiwan's theatre 
provides a good testing ground to examine the actual effect of cultural policy. 
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The fieldwork was carried out between November 7"' and Decemberl 7 th 1999. In addition to 
20 formal interviews (see Appendix 2), many informal conversations with people from the 
theatre, 'policy-makers and theatre critics were carried out. I also kept in touch with the, 
interviewees during the writing process through emails and phone calls to update materials. 
Through the case studies on the development of Taiwanese theatre, I look at the following 
questions: who and what determines cultural policy, what is overtly stated but not achieved, 
how the theatre responded to official policy, how policy and identity can influence artistic 
expression, and vice versa. The case studies provide me not only with a picture of the actual 
situation in Taiwan's post-war theatre, but also a spectrum of opinion altemative to an official 
perspective, with which to understand Taiwan's cultural change. 
Identity crisis still haunts people in Taiwan today. The conflict between various camps of 
different identities intensifies whenever an election is held 7. In order to understand the cultural 
change and identity shift in Taiwan, I draw upon from Gramsci's theory of 'hegemony8 to not 
only understand the struggle between different discourses and political camps, but also to 
comprehend the nature of Taiwan's identity struggle. 
In contrast to Lenin's notion of hegemony as a strategy of revolution, Gramsci sees 
hegemony as a 'relation' between classes and other social forces, which can be 
' Since there is always some form of election (for mayors, legislators, councillors 
... 
) every 
year, Taiwan seems to be in a constant state of political debate. Issues of 'unification or 
independence' and Taiwanese identity are highly charged during election campaigns. 81 have tried to avoid making a colonialist mistake and have considered whether Gramsci's 
theory is suitable for analysis of the situation in Taiwan. After the fieldwork I carried out In 
Taiwan, I feel that the general principle of Gramsci's theory of 'hegemony' fits in Taiwan's 
situation perfectly. It also provides me a good grounding to approach the relation of forces, to 
understand how 'intellectual and moral reform'functioned in a different light, and to identify 
how'hegemony' is formed through making alliance and compromise (not by coercion) In the 
course of Taiwanese history. Also, I admit that I have omitted the'class' dimension when I 
apply Gramsci, because the class issue in Taiwan is not in the same sense as in Gramsci's 
analysis. 
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ý gained by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion. A hegemonic social 
group is the one who gains the consent of others through making and maintaining 
alliances by ideological and political struggle. In its simplest use, it is a notion of 
political predominance from relations between states to relations between social 
classes. (GRAMSCI, 1971; WILLIAMS, 1976a; SIMON, 1982) The concept of 
'hegemony' has a national-popular dimension and provides a strategy of building up 
- 
a broad bloc of varied social groups. , "- -I., -,... ý. 
.ýI 'I ý. - It-' ý 
Apart from political and economic struggles, Gramsci asserts that the waging of 
. 
-, ,-ý, 
ideological struggle to transform popular consciousness is crucial for gaining 
hegemony. He proposes that there is "a cultural-social unity through which a 
multiplicity of dispersed wills with heterogeneous aims, -are welded together with a 
single aim, as the basis of an equal and common conception of the world". (1971: 349) 
In'orderto win ideological struggle 
-which Gramsci terms as'a war of position' 
(1971"238) 
-he believes that a process of 'intellectual and moral reform' is 
necessary to forge a collective will and create a common concept of the world. , ;. -,, .- 
Gramsci's theory of how hegemony can be maintained and challenged is inspi(ing, 
and is especially important for my analysis of Taiwan's drastic change of political 
regime and identity. Gramcsi writes, "'A social group can, indeed must, already 
exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power... it subsequently becomes 
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must 
-, - 
continue to 'lead'as well. " (GRAMSCI, 1971: 57-68) His concept of hegemony 
explains the fluid and ever-changing condition between competing camps striving to 
gain hegemony. The process always involves compromises and making alliances. 
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In addition, Hall and Williams' ideas of 'culture, 
-'cultural identit)(, and 'cultural regulation' also 
allow me to consider those ideas within a broader frame. Their concepts relating to 'culture! 
provide me with a good foundation to analyse the meaning production process and its 
influence in every aspect of ordinary life. I see cultural policy as a way of formulating and 
disseminating official discourse. Du Gay and Hall's analysis of 'cultural circuit is especially 
useful in terms of examining the production of meaning. It enables me to look at various 
elements in the cultural circuit rather than focus only on policy change. 
Moreover, Hall's analysis on different forms of 'regulation by culture' is also helpful for 
examining the implication and influence of cultural policy. He proposes that there are three 
forms of 'regulation by culture': normative; cultural, and subjective regulations. (HALL, 1997b) 
By giving norms and direction to social practices, 'normative regulations, make our actions 
predictable and regular, and create an orderly world. 'Cultural regulations' define the limits 
between sameness and difference, acceptable and unacceptable, normal and abnormal. 
These two forms of regulations are often used to make out'the otherness', which is the key 
element of identity construction. As to subjective regulations, they try to produce or make up 
new subjects in order to regulate what sorts of 'subjects'we are. Instead of constraining the 
behaviour by imposing social control, this mode of regulations endeavours to get the members 
of a group/society to regulate themselves subjectively. Such regulations are implemented 
through the medium of'culture change'and a shift of the'regime of meanings'. Through Hall's 
analysis, I come to have a better understanding about how we are governed by culture, and 
how culture is regulated. 
Aside from theoretical analysis, there have been many scholars of Taiwan Studies concerned 
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with cultural issues in Taiwan9 in recent years. They have engaged in debates about the 
issues of Taiwan's subjectivity, Taiwan's untold history, and national identity, Most have 
examined political and historical arguments, concentrated on. the issues of Taiwanese identity 
and Taiwan's subjectivity, and have advocated total indigenisation., However, rarely has, 
anyone -paid attention to Taiwan's'recent cultural development, especially not from a prospect 
of national-cUlture-construction and cultural policy-making. 
Among a limited number of'scholars who have concerned themselves with issues of 
culture building in Taiwan, only a few have undertaken research on the change of 
Taiwanese identity through the angle of official culture construction. Winckler (1994) 
published a short paper relating to cultural policy in post-war Taiwan, but this is. only a 
schematic description. Li Yih-yuan'(1996a, 1996b, 2000) published several. short 
essays concerning Taiwan's cultural development. Although these articles 
I 
have been_,.., 
referred to frequently, they are basically simple descriptions or general analyses, of_ 
Taiwan's cultural development. 
Tu Wei-ming (1994,1996) is concerned with Taiwan's cultural identity, nonetheless, 
he views the issue from a China-centric position that does not concern Taiwan's 
subjectivity, or pay attention to cultural policies. The researches of Allen Chun (1996), 
Yang Ts'ung-jung (1992) and HsiaoA-ch'in (1991,2000) note the importance of 
culture and the politics of cultural policy. They analyse the characteristics of KMT 
ideologies, focusing on the KMT strategy on cultural affairs and its moral-oriented 
discourse in the early post-war years, but do not extend their interests further to the 
most volatile period after martial law was lifted. 
9 Many scholars work in this area, including Wachman, Ralph Clough, Ramon Myers, Chang 
Mao-kui, Chao Kang, Chdn Chao-ying, Dal Kuo-hui, HsQ Chieh-lin, Li Ch'in-an, Liao 
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Generally speaking, the politics of Taiwan's cultural policy, its unforeseeable effects, 
and the interactions between different processes in the circuit of culture are rarely 
explored, especially within the context of the drastic cultural changes and severe 
identity crisis of the last decade. In this limited body of work, the political intention of 
constructing cultural identity and cultural discourse through cultural policy has been 
overlooked. My research focuses on fifty years of Taiwanese cultural development 
with literature research and case studies, in order to examine the complex cultural 
change in post-war Taiwan. 
Because my research is based on official documents and case studies, there are 
many Chinese terms and names used in this thesis. I apply the Romanisation 
principle 
- 
pinyin system (without tone/diacritical marks) 
- 
as the norm for translating 
Chinese characters. However, the Wade-Giles system is used when referring to 
names of people and places outside of mainland Chinalo. In order to reduce 
confusion, English translations and original Chinese characters for particular terms 
Will be also added on the first occurrence of each Romanisation. 
Ch'ao-yang, Liao Hsien-hao, Chang Mao-kuel, Shih Chdng-fdng, Wang Ming-k! o. 
10 In general, Taiwan uses the Wade-Giles system, but has never used it systematically and 
constantly. Therefore, many people have special translations of their own names, for example. 
WU Jing Jyi 
_, 
qff#-: 17(should be Wu Ching-chi in Wade-Giles), Chiu Hei-yuan Y41QU(should be 
Ch'O Hai-yUan in Wade-Giles), or Liu Chiwai tFI; tfa(should be Liu Ch'l-wei). In cases like this, 
I respect their own choice and use their translation. The same rule will also apply to names of 
organisations, books, or productions. If they provide an English title (for example, Gang-a Tsui 
tEZ2V Theatre provided its title in Minnan yu pronunciation), I will use this rather than 
translate them directly from Chinese. 
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PART I- CULTURAL POLICY IN TAIWAN 
There are 4 chapters in this part, covering official cultural policies in post-war Taiwan 
at different stages. I concentrate on Taiwan's cultural development and its 
socio-political and economical changes, in order to examine the meaning that the 
government intended to produce and the interaction between cultural policy and 
post-war social changes. According to the historical changes in Taiwan, the chapters 
are roughly divided into: anti-Communist period (1949 
-1967); Cultural Renaissance 
Movement period (1967-1977); the awakening of Taiwanese awareness (the late 
1970s to late 1980s); and the incligenisation trend (the 1990s to date). 
Chapter 1 begins with Taiwan's historical development in the 1950s and 60s, and 
explores the strategy on cultural control, which was promoted as psychological 
reinforcement in the battle against communism at the height of the Cold War. 
Chapter 2 describes the implementation and significance of the Cultural Renaissance 
Movement, which was promoted by the KMT government as a cultural battle against 
the Cultural Revolution in mainland China. In general, these two chapters focus on 
the foundations that the KMT government laid for culture construction in post-war 
Taiwan. 
The 1970s was a crucial period for Taiwan. One the one hand, rapid economic 
growth gave the Taiwanese confidence. One the other hand, Taiwanese society was 
disturbed by diplomatic defeat and started to question the KMT ideology. Chapter 3 
focuses on the awakening process of Taiwanese awareness and the beginning of the 
challenge to the Mrs authority. After martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan's society 
has stepped into a new era. Chapter 4 looks at the severe cultural struggles that 
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Taiwan has gone through since the late 1980s. The longing for Taiwanese identity in 
the 1990s has become an overwhelming cultural phenomenon. There was an identity 
struggle between two different camps, each striving to win public support by 
influencing and re-writing the narratives of the past. Therefore, as well as the 
examination of Taiwanese cultural policy and historical development after the 
mid-I 980s, Chapter 4 depicts a general picture of competing discourses fighting to 
construct consensus. 
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Chapter 1' Anti-commUnist Combat 
During the 1950s and 60s, Sinification and anti-communism were the ultimate goals 
of state policy in Taiwan. Furthermore, cultural policy was taken as part of national 
defence and anti-communist warfare. In this chapter, I will examine what was 
imposed for national security under such circumstances, and how culture I 
communities coped and strove to express themselves under stringent censorship 
and strict thought control. 
1.1. Historical background 
1.1.1. Taiwan's colonial past 
Taiwan is an island located off the eastern coast of China in the Western Pacific 
between Japan and the Philippines. The total area is about 36,000 sq. km. The island 
1 71h was originally populated by Malayo-Polyaesian aborigines. At the turn of the 
Century, not only did Chinese emigration from the mainland increase, but around the 
same time, foreign powers also wanted to occupy the island. 
At the beginning of the 17" Century, the Spanish and Dutch came. The former 
occupied the northern part of Taiwan for 16 years (1627-1642); the latter the south 
from 1624. In 1642, the Dutch East India Company defeated the Spanish and 
colonised Taiwan. During 38 years of fierce Dutch rule, there were over twenty 
rebellions. The most severe happened in 1652, when over 40,000 Taiwanese were 
killed. (KUO ZHAOLIE, 1999: 37-39) 
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In 1662, the Ming dynasty supporter Cheng Ch'eng-kung 9ZjjXjj defeated the Dutch 
and took Taiwan as his base to overturn the Qing dynasty'. In 1683, however, the 
Cling court finally took over Taiwan. As the Ong's purpose of taking Taiwan was to 
put down the Ming rebels, a closed-door policy was imposed to restrain any further 
rebellions. (KIYASU SACHIO, 1999: 61-67) 
It was not until two hundred years later that the Ong court finally realised Taiwan's 
strategic importance as holding the key to the seas of Eastern Asia and its economic 
value as an exporter of sugar and tea. Hence, Taiwan was granted provincial status 
in 1885. However, ten years later, Taiwan was ceded to Japan for China's defeat in 
the Jiawu UPIT War (the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95). From then until 1945, 
Taiwan went through another phase of colonialism. 
During the anti-Japanese war (1937-1945), President Chiang Kai-shek of the 
Republic of China (ROC)2 claimed the sovereignty of Taiwan. (VAN KEMENADE, 
1998: 144) At the Cairo Conference of 1943, and also at the Potsdam Conference of 
1945, Allied leaders agreed that Taiwan would be returned to the ROC after the war. 
On October 25"' 1945, the Japanese surrendered, and Taiwan's population of around 
7 million was then subjected to Chinese rule. The first governor was Ch'6n 1. 
(KIYASU SACHIO, 1999; WACHMAN, 1994) 
The Ming Dynasty was overthrown by the Manchus. who established the Oing dynasty in 
1644. Cheng led Ming supporters to Taiwan and waited for chance to overtum the Qing court. 2 After ten attempts between 1894 and 1911, a Chinese revolution, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
(the founding father of Tongmenghui M" Uq- the United League of China, the predecessor of 
the KMT), finally succeeded. In 1911, the Ong dynasty (1644 
-1911) was overthrown and the 
Republic of China 
- 
the first republic in Asia 
- 
was established. After Sun died in 1925, his 
followers set up a Nationalist govemment in Canton in 1926 and launched the northem 
expedition (1926 
- 
27) to combat wadords. Chiang Kai-shek was the Commander4n-chief and 
became the leader of the KMT 
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Tension between local Taiwanese and their new rulers came to a head in the 228 
.. 
- 
Incidene in 1947. The outburst of hostilities between local Taiwanese and people 
from mainland, at this stage mainly officers and civil servants, brought the tension to 
the boiling point. Many Taiwanese had become dissatisfied with the Ch'C-n 1. 
-ý- 
Administration, 
- 
because of corruption, discrimination against the Taiwanese, and 
stringent and unfair economic restrictions., (KERR, 1966) After the rebellions were 
under military control, measures of brutal repression and mass executions were 
underway. Because the documents relating to these events were locked away or, 
-1ý 
destroyed, the exact number of deaths in this massacre is not known for sure4.. 
Following this, inflamed by the 228 Incident, the conflict and distrust between 
Taiwanese and people from the mainland deepened. s When the Nationalist, 
. 
government fled to Taiwan after their defeat in the civil war5 in 1949, they brought 
with them two million people from mainland China. Original residents in Taiwan called 
themselves 'Taiwanese% and categorised those arriving as 'mainlanders', even. 
though most of their own ancestors also came from China, and even though they 
3 On February 27 th 1947, six Chinese inspectors and policemen bullied a female vendor and 
accused her of selling smuggled cigarettes. During the dispute, the crowd of onlookers were 
annoyed by officers' brutal treatment and joined in the argument. During the conflict, one 
passer-by was shot and killed, and the female vendor was wounded. The next morning, more 
than 2,000 people encircled the police station and demanded justice. The Chinese armed 
forces tried to suppress the protesting crowds. Dispute between armed soldiers and unarmed 
civilians broke out, and many people were killed. Ch'dn I Administration proclaimed martial ý, 
law that evening and reported the incident as'being instigated by Communists! to the central 
government. On March e, Chiang Kai-shek sent armies to Taiwan to suppress the rebellion. 
The incident lasted until mid-March and finally the situation was stabilised. (KERR, 1966; 
WORLD UNITED FORMOSANS FOR INDEPENDENCE, 2001; HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) 
4 General Pai Ch'ung-hsi was sent to investigate the incident. His report claimed that 
the casualties were not as serious as thought. There were 1,860 civilian casualties and 440 
military casualties. However, according to Taiwanese dissidents, over 10,000 Taiwanese died 
in the incident. (KERR, 1966) 
5 After the Second World War, 'a four-year civil war broke out between the KMT and Chinese 
Communists. After President Chiang Kai-shek resigned in January 1949, negotiations 
between the two parties failed. The Communist forces pushed across the Yellow and Yangzi 
Rivers. Beijing and Nanjing fell into Communist hands inApril. The KMTgovemment lost 
, 
control of many areas, and fled to Taiwan. Chiang resumed as the ROC President in Taipei by 
December 1949. 
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themselves spoke Chinese dialecO., 
According to the research of Lin Chung-ch6ng and Lin M-ling (1993), the 
socio-economic status of the Taiwanese and mainlanders differed greatly. In general, 
the minority mainlanders dominated the civil services and had better opportunities in 
education. In contrast the Taiwanese were socially disadvantaged, and politically 
and economically excluded., Because of the discrimination against the Taiwanese, the 
hostility between people of different shengft (Wa, the province of one's birthplace or 
origin) deepened. (Shengfi conflicts are discussed further in Chapter 4. ) 
, 
Looking at four centuries'of Taiwanese history, the fate of the island constantly 
,, 
changing hands from one regime to another had haunted the Taiwanese. It had 
ingrained a deep shame and sense of insecurity in its people. The anxiety of being 
powerless to* determine oneýs fate and the sense of injustice of unfair exclusion and 
. 
degradation proVoked conflicts again and again in the course of Taiwanese history. 
,ý- 
1.1.2. Military threat after 1949 
Defeated in the civil war, the KMT government and army fled to Taiwan in 1948 and 
1949. The Nationalist govemment-in-e)(ile was established in Taiwan, while the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)7 established the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) 
'0 Apart from small proportion of aborigines, the ancestors of most Taiwanese residents of this 
time came from southern China, 
- 
namely Fujian and Canton provinces. Therefore, most 
Taiwanese spoke Minnan yu r-4Mýý-, rf (a dialect of south Fujian Province, the mother-tongue for 
the majority of Taiwanese residents) and the Hakka W* dialect (dialect of the Hakkas). 
'r The CCP was established in 1921 with help from Russia. In 1927, it incited revolt in Nanjing, 
Canton and Changsha. Its forces grew during the anti-Japanese war. In 1945, the 
membership of the CCP increased to around 1.2 million and its armed forces increased from 
92,000 in 1937 to 910,000 in 1945. (GIO, 1993b: 36) Because of the corruption within the 
KMT, the CCP prevailed in the civil war with Russian support. 
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on October 16' 1949. Two governments coexisted, each claiming to be the only 
legitimate government of China. (KIYASU SACHIO 1999: 192-93; KEMENADE, 1998: 
141-45) 
By the beginning of the 1950s, the military threat posed by the CCP put Taiwan in 
imminent danger. Both in 1949 and 1950, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
attempted to invade QuemoV3. It seemed that Taiwan would be taken at any moment. 
., 
(HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) 
It was the opinion of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that the Chinese 
Communists would 'liberate'Taiwan within a year. (KIYASU SACHIO 1999: 207) In 
January 1950, the US President Truman declared a'hands-off policy regarding the 
,ý 
China problem, and indicated America's non-involvement. However, this policy was, 
- 
reversed abruptly because of the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. America 
feared that a Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan would open a 'second front in 
., 
the Korean War. (HSIAO A-CHIN, 1991; HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) Hence, the 
'hands-ofr policy was reversed, and President Truman ordered the American 
. ;ý, 
Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait, as part of American defence. 
Even so, - the military confrontations across the Taiwan Strait never ceased until the 
late 1970s. In 1954, the PRC launched an artillery bombardment in an attempt to 
-- 
prevent Taiwan being included in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) On August 23d 1958, the PRC launched a 
forty-four day non-stop bombardment of Quemoy. China launched smaller scale 
Quemoy(krj, also Chinmen) is a small frontier island off the coast of China. It is actually 
nearer to the mainland than to Taiwan. To attack Taiwan, Quemoy would be the first 
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bombardments twice in June 1960. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) Later, instead of 
bombing Quemoy continuously, China adopted a new strategy 
- 
danda shuang buda.. 
WIT, *, a-, TjT(bombing on the odd dates, and ceasing fire on the even dates). The 
bombing lasted for eighteen years. 
Threatened by constant bombardment and possible invasion, post-war Taiwan was 
under great strain and constant military threat To tacide the threat, the KMT 
government imposed martial law, censorship, and a stringent education system to not 
only secure national stability but also make sure that the construction of ideology was 
un - der control. As a whole, the Mrs cultural policy was considered 'extensive and 
effective'. (WINCKLER, 1994: 22) The main theme of this period wasanti-communist 
ideolog)(. Therefore, culture was considered part of the national security combat 
forces. 
1.1.3. KMrs'early cultural policy model 
To understand the essence of KMT cultural policy in early post-war Taiwan, it is 
necessary to look at previous policies on cultural affairs. As early as 1938, the KMT 
proposed its first party policy concerning culture and the arts. It was at a time when 
the influence of left-wing writers was growing strong (LI LI-LINQ 1995) and the 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) had just started. -The KMT sensed the threat of 
Communist influence on the younger generation, and acknoWedged the importance 
of controlling and policing culture. 
The provisional KMT Standing Committee held a meeting on March 28"' 1938 and 
beachhead the PRC needed to seize. 
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passed the motion Proposal of Setting Tasks for Cultural Policy (queding wenhua 
zhengce an fiZZ3ZjtM%), proposed by Chiang Kai-sheWs left-hand man, Ch'dn 
Kuo-fu In this motion, there were six important clauses concerning culture 
and the arts: 
1, Composing music which can carry minzujingshen PVM I$ (national spirit, 
nationalist awareness) forward and provide clam, healthy, and decent feelings to 
match civil life. 
2, Building up the theoretical system of Sanminzhuyig thit-combined philosophy, 
literature, and social sciences. 
3, Setting up awards to encourage improvements in all areas (such as: literature,, 
social sciences, natural sciences, education and social services). 
4, Drawing up regulations to encourage publications and protect copyright, 
enhancing publishers' sense of morality and improving cultural standards. 
Outlawing any publication that harmed the national consciousness or interests. 
5, Organising all kinds of national societies and selecting talents in literature, 
arts and sciences to be the members, in order to encourage, award and further, 
their academic expertise. 
6, Popularising mass media, radio, films industries, and theatre, in order to-carry 
national consciousness further. (CHIN HSIAO-I, 1978a: 366-369) 
Apart from some statements and regulations that imposed throughout the 1930s, it 
was the first time that the KMT clearly stated its overall cultural policy and its official 
attitude towards culture. These guidelines remained important for KMT cultural policy, 
and were used extensively until the 1970s. On the whole, all these measures 
- 
imposing censorship, managing cultural expression, rewarding the'righteous! and 
'correct art works 
- 
aimed at achieving the goal of "forming a theoretical base of 
Sanminzhuyi through culture construction". (1-1 U-LINGý 1995) By encouraging and 
rewarding the favoured ideologies, the official view on a healthy wenyi_ý, Iv (literature 
and the arts) was tightly linked with national spirit, morality, and Sanminzhuyi. 
Sanminzhuyi was a modified socialist theory, developed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, aiming 
to modernise and clemocratise China. The theory was developed to deal with the 
9 Sanminzhuyi EjjýJA means 'three principles of the people'- a socialist theory proposed 
by Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the blueprint for building the nation. 
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severe problems that China had suffered since the 1 Vh century, and consisted of 
three parts: nationalism (minzu zhuX R&J& principle of the people), civil liberty 
(minquan zhuyiNftla, principle of democracy), and social welfare and economic 
development (minsheng zhuyijR4-: jA, principle of peoples livelihood). 
Sanminzhuyi became the base of KMT ideology and the blueprint for its 
state-building process. However, Sanminzhuyi was promoted selectively in Taiwan. It 
was deliberately moralised and tailored to feed the Mrs need to fight the 
anti-communist war. This will be discussed further in later sections, and we can see 
that the principle of democracy was deliberately ignored, and emphasis was placed 
on the other two principles to divert attention from democratic demands and reinforce 
social control. 
1.1.4. The impact of the May Fourth 
After fleeing to Taiwan, the KMT concJuded that its defeat was due to its failure in the 
arena of culture. The fatal downfall, according to Chiang Kai-shek! s own analysis 
(I 984b; 1984c), was the result of the Mrs inability to carry out party-based 
educationlo. Although party-based education had been in operation since 192911, 
Chiang Kai-shek (1984b: 209) believed that the p. roblem was that it had never been 
10 The KMT started its party-based education in the 1920s. In 1927, the Education Committee 
of the KMT first used the phrase danghuafiboyu (aftRyy party-ised, KMT-ised education) in 
a draft of its education policy. (OU YUNG-SHENQ 1990: 212) In 1929, the motion to base 
education policy on Sanminzhuyi ideology was passed by the KML and the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) started to implement a course called darVy! ClAa party ideology). (ALLEN 
CHUN, 1996; MOE, 1991: 34-54; OU YUNG-SHENQ 1990: 213) 
11 Fostering political culture had always been key to the KMrs education policy. According to 
Ou Yung-shdng, (1990) fostedng political culture and exercising social control were two 
focuses of the KMT education policy. Apart from Sanminzhuyi, similar subjects Oinked to 
social control) included: Social Studies(shehui *lffl, Citizenship (gongmin ! LXR), Common 
, and Life and Ethics Sense (changshi &tjM, Health Education (riankangfiapyu RWAffl, 
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imposed nation--m(ide. 'Therefore,, the goal of instilling the 'core ideas of Sanminzhuyi', 
through schooling was unsuccessful. 
The KMT believed that their political hegemony was lost because literary and artistic 
communities opposed the party; preferring instead to support the CCP. Chiang 
Kai-shek asserted: - 
"Communists 
... 
were very good at embedding thought and inciting class 
struggle through literature and drama. People were instilled with this kind of 
thinking without knowing it. As a result, people were either harmed by yellow [sexual] content, or poisoned by red [communist] ideologies [in literature and 
arts]. " (1984k: 245) 
Most of all, Chiang placed blame on the influence of the May Fourth Movement, 
which introduced Communism and individualism into the minds of young people. 
(HSIAOA-CH'IN, 1991: 79) 
The May Fourth Movement began as a student demonstration held on May 4 th 191912. ' 
Later, it developed into an anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist and anti-traditional 
movement. (TU WEI-Ml NG, 1994,1996; WANG & Yl, 1990: 6) 
This was a time when the Chinese felt ashamed of the country's semi-colonial status 
and were anxious about how China could be rebuilt. A sense of shame regarding this 
status had haunted the Chinese since the Opium war (1840). There had been many 
proposals made by intellectuals to solve the problem, such as wholesale 
westemisation (quanpan xihua grabism (nalai zhuyi *3ý, cja), totalistic 
anti-traditionalism, and zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong mz 
. 
r-njfl Chinese 
(shenghuo yu lunli A-: A0, IfkFD- (OU YUNG-SHtNQ 1990: 71-72) 
12 On the'May 4th 1919, over 3,000 students from 13 Beijing Universities protested the Treaty 
of Versailles, because the Allies decided to transfer the German privilege in Shandong 
Province (China) to Japan. This protest not only inflamed the anger nationwide and triggered 
strikes, but also pressurised Chinese government to refuse to sign the treaty. 
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leaming for the essenfial principles, Westem leaming for the pradcal applicabon). 
(LIN YO-SHENQ 1996) 
Because of this resentment towards tradition, old customs, and traditional values, Un 
YO-sheng (1996: 176) described the May Fourth Movement as the manifestation of 
"totalistic anti-tradifionalism". Its influence is immeasurable and has continued unfil 
-ý 
this day. 
Left-wing activists (such as Lu Xun ZZ and Chen Duxiu IWMnl) in the eady 20'h 
century advocated acute revolutions to reform the people and the polity, an 
abandonment of old traditions and values, and a total westernisation of life style. 
Many intellectuals believed that total reform and complete revolution was the only 
way to achieve modemisation. (CHIANG PAO-CH'Al, 1994, Chapter 2.1) The 
movement inspired many students to follow and aroused self-criticism and 
dissatisfaction Wth old traditions, values and regimes. 
This general dissatisfaction had increased the aversion to the Warlords and helped 
14 the KMT to accomplish the mission of the Northern Expedition 
. 
Ironically, the KMT 
government later became the target of protest for obstructing progress. According to 
the famous scholar Chiang MCIng-lin (1971: 487), the same kind of discontent was 
aroused to pave the way for the Chinese communists to drive the KMT out of the 
mainland in 1949. Little surprise, therefore, that Chiang Kai-shek (1984b) believed 
that "the anti-communist battle was a cultural struggle". (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984a) 
13 They were regarded 'the tutors of the youth' and Ihe standard-bearers of the May Fourth 
Movement'. (HUANG YING-CHE, 1994) 
14 The Northern Expedition (beifa JLN, 1926-1927) was the first civil war since the Republic 
was established in 1911. The Nationalist government created a seemingly unified government 
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This century-long argument (on how to modernise China) entwined with the,, 
development of Chinese modem history, and divided intellectuals into different camps. 
Even today, issues'such as how to catch up with the advanced West and how to 
modernise China are still the main concerns of Chinese intellectuals, at home and 
overseas alike. (LIU LYDIA, 1995; TU, 1994,1996; HUANG, R., 1995,1996) 
Two different political systems straddling the Taiwan Strait embodied two different 
camps of thinking. (LIU LYDIA H., 1995) Two cultural developments manifested two 
typical approaches 
- 
the KMT insisted on a pro-tradition and selective-westernisatiort 
approach, 'whereas, the CCP proposed anti-tradition and total-revolution. Although 
th6'two approaches výere contradictory to each other, the two sides shared the same 
concern of modernisation: 
1.2. Early post-war cultural policy 
1.2.1. Learning tO be Chinese again', 
After the Second World War, Taiwan was officially handed over to the ROC 
government on October 25 th 1945. Before the first governor Ch'dn I and his 
administration arrived in Taiwan, the Ministry of Education (MOE) had already 
-1 
decided on an education policy for Taiwan. In September 1945, a national education 
conference on the return of peacetime conditions (quanguofiapyu shanhou fuyuan 
huiyi J-ý was held to plan for post-war education policy. 
in Nanjing after the expedition had been accomplished. 
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At that conference, the most important principle concerning Taiwan was made. 
Huang Yen-p'ei proposed a motion 
- 
Education Policy in Taiwan AfterTake-over, 
(guangfu hou zhi lahvanfiapyu an :; V). (YANG T&UNG-JUNG, 1992: 
34) He believed that the main task in Taiwanese education was zuguohua jUMft. 
,, 
Literally, zuguo means 'mothedand'; hua is a suffixed compound borrowed from 
.- 
Modem Japanese, meaning ý-isation' (to make 
... 
become 
... 
). 
- 
(LIU LYDIA H., 1995:. 
345) For Chinese officials, zuguohua meansSinificabon'. 
Huang Yen-p'ei proposed a motion in an education conference in 1945 to deal with 
post-war education policy in Taiwan. He asserted that. "In order to make Taiwan the 
-,., 
ROC's Taiwan, the pdodty of education in Taiwan was to educate the Taiwanese to 
know their-motherland and inspire their affection towards China. Hence, two subjects 
- 
Chinese (language and literature), and shidi (, sP-t history and geography) 
- 
are 
,,. 
most important" (HUANG YEN-P'El, 1991: 393) This motion was passed and handed 
to CtfC-n I Administration to put into practice. 
This principle 
- 
Sinification (making the Taiwanese 'Chinese') 
- 
laid the foundations 
for education in Taiwan and remained a priority throughout the post-war period until 
the 1990s. For example, KC- Ching-6n, then secretary-general of the Ch'6n I 
Administration, emphasised 'psychological construction' in his report to the first 
Taiwan Provincial Commission in 1946. He believed that the way to make the 
Taiwa - nese Chinese was to foster nationalism, and the key vehicles were propaganda 
and education. He said, "both should work hand in hand, in order to achieve the 
mission of enhancing and strengthening the national spirit" (KE CHING-ftN, 1989: 
228-230) 
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In a speech that Ch'&n I gaVe on New Years Eve 1946,, this principle was clearly 
stated: "The task of psychological building could be materialised by enhancing 
national spirit (minmfingshen) 
... 
Education, at all levels, should place emphasis on 
subjects such as guoyu (national spoken language, 
- 
Mandarin), guowen'5 (Chinese 
language and literature), Sanminzhuyi, and Chinese history. " (TAIWANSHENG 
WENXIANWEIYUANHUI, 1979: 2)--' 
Apparently, because of Taiwan's colonial past, and the language barner", the 
selection of appropriate textbooks for Taiwanese students was difficult in the early 
stages. According to Ou Yung-sh6ng (1990: 173), several tactics were adopted to 
tackle the problem. Firstly, textbooks of four important subjects (Chinese, Mandarin, 
Chinese history and Sanminzhuyi) were taken directly from the mainland, while the. 
rest were a mixture of rewriting and a compilation of old materials used in Chinese. 
textbooks', and suitable translated'materials from old Japanese textbooks.. 
Militarist and (Japanese) nationalist ideology in Japanese textbooks were regarded-,. 
as 'Poison' by the Chinese government. Therefore, one. of the tasks of education in.. 
- 
early post-war Taiwan was the'sterilisation' of widespread Japanese militarist 
15 For the ROC, Mandarinwas'the national (spoken) language(guoyu). 
- 
It is identical to 
putonghua: ffffj'A8, the common language, in the PRC. Guowen ER_ýZ refers to written 
Chinese. Within Chinese territories, there are around 56 different ethnic groups, 85 different 
spoken languages, and around 27 written languages (only 23 are still in use). In Chinese 
history, Mandarin became the common (spoken) language in, the Yuan dynasty (around 13th 
and 14th century). For the majority Han Chinese, there are 7 major dialects, although they can 
communicate with the same written Chinese (guowen). The dialects that were used in Taiwan 
belong to Hakka and Min dialects. (WANG & Yl, 1990: 644-647) 
16 Under Japanese rule, the daily spoken languages used in Taiwan were Japanese, Minnan 
yu, and Hakka dialect. In 1932, only 22.7% of Taiwanese could speak Japanese. However, 
the Kominka Movement &JjýfbTMA. (the movement to make Taiwanese subjects of the 
Japanese Emperor) was imposed after the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937. Japanese 
authorities in Taiwan not only reinforced Japanese learning, but also banned Chinese learning 
and usage. After this, the figure of Japanese-fluent-speakers among the Taiwanese rose to 
51 % in 1940, and increased rapidly to 71 % in 1944. (HUANG HSOAN-FAN, 1993: 93) 
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, 
ideologies and culture" I ". (OU YUNG-SH LNG , 1990: 170-172; - 1979) The education in 
Taiwan was- chaotic during the first few years, because the compilation of the huge 
., ý, 
amount of material used in the texts, and the intense scrutiny it underwent before 
publication both had to be'carried out vAthin short period of time. 
Beside that, ChC-n I believed, the other priority of Sinification was to unify 'language'., 
Soon after he was appointed as Governor of Taiwan, he expressed his view on 
Taiwan's language policy in an interview with Dagong bao )C! aN(Septernber 2, 
1945). He claimed that the very first thing he would do when he arrived at Taiwan 
was to promote Chinese. ', (HSCJ HSCJEH-CHI, 1991). 
-- 
Although schools were the best agent to carry out Sinification tasks, it was almost, 
impossible however for teachers who had been educated under Japanese rule to I, 
teach Chinese and Mandarin fluently. The process of promoting Mandarin was 
difficult. According to Ch'dn Mei-ju's research (1996: 123 
-124), many teachers at 
that time had to rely on a Mandarin teaching programme broadcast on the radio at 
night to be able to teach the subject the next day. 
Soon after Taiwan was handed over to the ROC in 1945, the Commiffee for Mandarin 
Promotion (guoyu Nixing weiyuanhui was set up. Its members 
, 
understood the difficulties involved and suggested "recovering the local dialects to 
assist Mandarin teaching". (CH'LN MEI-JU, 1995: 89,109) Therefore, local dialects 
- 
Minnan yu and Hakka 
- 
were permitted in lessons. Sometimes, the teachers' newly 
17 The Japanese took education as the vehicle to instil Japanese nationalism and ideology in 
the population. Hence, elementary education was intensively promoted to build consensus. 
Before the KMT took over in 1945,71 % of Taiwanese children were educated to elementary 
level. (TAIWANSHENG JIAOYUTINGý 1955: 1) 
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learnt Mandarin was so elementary that written Japanese was also used cluring 
. 
lessons to support teaching. 
1.2.2. Stringent language policy 
. .ýI 
It was no surprise that the-general picture in Taiwan's classrooms at this time was 
chaotid Ironically, the only way to carry out Sinification in schools was by heavy 
reliance on local dialects and Japanese. In 1946, the Ch'C-n IAdministration 
promulgated a new regulation 
-Measures for Promoting National Language in 
. 
Counties and Cities of Taiwan (Taiwansheng ge xianshi tuixing guoyu shishi banfa 
-c'3, 
, 
41t, 67 
- 
to tighten up language control and get rid of the 
remains of 'Japanese-ness'. 
- 
Ch'&n I emphasised his determination and said: "I hope 
that we promote Chinese with a gangxing Nqlt. (harsh and tough) implementation. 
,, 
There should be no softness... -. in order to improve the efficiency. " (CHtN M EW U, 
1996: 88) 
In October 1946, exactly one year after Taiwan was taken over, all newspapers and, 
magazines in Japanese were abolished. All governmental documents and decrees 
were promulgated only in Chinese (Japanese and Chinese were juxtaposed before 
then). Japanese music was banned from the radio, and Taiwanese writers were also 
forbidden to write in Japanese for publications. (1-1 CHIN-AN, 1997; CHEN MEl-JU, 
1996: 88,196-197) As Ch'dn I claimed, the language policy in Taiwan started to 
tighten up. ' 
When the war had just ended, many Taiwanese welcomed the Chinese government 
and held high expectations of 'returning to the mothedand'. Initially, learning 
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Mandarin was fashionable among intellectuals, and many Mandarin courses were, 
- 
.- 
run by private tutors. (HSO HSOEH- CHI, 1991: 309,320) Although the trend towards 
., 
Sinification and a pro-China attitude was not unilaterally promoted by the authorities, 
it was favoured by some intellectuals. 
However, this harmonious situation soon deteriorated. Many Taiwanese became 
disillusioned vvith Chinese rule because of the corruption of the Ctf dn I Administration, 
its stringent financial restrictions, and most importantly, the financial, political and 
cultural discrimination against Taiwanese. (KERR, 1966) The outbreak of the 228 
incident was a direct response to the harsh and unjust rule of the Ch'&n 1 11 1. 
Administrabon. (WORLD UNITED FORMOSANS FOR INDEPENDENCE, 2001) 
Furthermore, accounts were settled following the incident and the punishment of the 
'unruly Taiwanese' lasted for a long time. Many were arrested, imprisoned, and 
executed, and in particular intellectuals'. The fear generated by the incident was 
referred to as White Terror'. (LIN SHU-YANQ 1992; LAN PO-CHOU, 1998) 
After the 228 Incident, both written and spoken Japanese were totally banned. Many 
books written in Japanese were banned, and it was forbidden to even speak 
Japanese in schools. Many measures were taken to remove traces of Japanese 
influence and tighten thought control. (CHEN MEI-JU, 1996: 87-92) 
During the period between 1945 and 1949, de-Japanisation (in other words, the 
promotion of Sinification) was the highest principle of the ROCs rule in Taiwan. Apart 
- 
from language policy, the Ch%n I administration also paid great attention to reducing 
the influence and traces of Japanese culture. Japanese fihja JVjE(Shinto shrines) 
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were refurbished and changed into zhongfie ci (memorial halls for 
anti-Japanese martyrs). Japanese street names were abolished and renamed after 
Chinese traditional moralities, political leaders, heroes, or places in China. (YANG 
-, -- 
TS'UNG-JUNQ 1992) 
Most Taiwanese who'grew up under Japanese rule, especially intellectuals and 
writers, who'had used Japanese as their tool to express and create, felt out of place 
and infedor. (YEH SHIH-TAO, 1990; LIU CHIEH, 1994; CHANG CHIN-CH'IANG, 
1997; SHIH CHENG-FtNQ 1999) Worst of all, many intellectuals were killed or 
impdsoned following the 228 incident. 
1.2.3. Chiang Kai-shek's involvement 
Early post-war cultural policy in Taiwan (which had been set up by the Ch'&n I 
Administration) was modified as soon as the KMT government fled to Taiwan in 1949. 
The emphasis of Sinification gave way to the nation's most urgent needs: farig, ong, 
fuguo EZJ,:, ý&M 
-(counterattack [against the Communists] and recovery of the' 
mainland), and fangong kange U-#MfR(anti-communism and resistance to the 
USSR). (TSENG CHING-YOEH, 1995; OU YUNG-SHENG, 1990; YANG 
TS'UNG-JUNG, 1992). 
Chiang Kai-shek felt bitter about the KM-Ps downfall. He contemplated the defeat and 
tried to draw conclusions in order to avoid making the same mistakes again. He 
believed that the Mrs defeat was a cultural and educational failure. (CHIANG 
KAI-SHEK, 1984b: 208; 1984e: 35) On'several occasions, he expressed this view: 
'rrhe anti- communist and anti-Russian war today... is a cultural war. " (1984a: 354) 
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"To win the battle of recovering the mainland is an ideological, intellectual 
... 
war, in 
other words, a war of [refining] education. " (I 984e: 37) "Education is the most 
important and fundamental mission for our party. " (1 984c* 266) "Whether we have a 
successful education or not Will determine the future of our country. " (1984b: 209) 
In an important speech given by Chiang in 1951 entitied The relationship between 
education, - revolution, andstate-building (Jiaoyuyu gemingfianguo de guanxigftpl 
. 
he concluded: " Our defeat came from the failure in education and,,,, 
culture... Not like the failure in other areas, such as: politics, military, or economy, 
which would be easily identified and mended 
... 
The fall in education was difficult to 
identify... Its effect extended to the whole nation, and could not be put right in a short 
time. " (1 984b: 208) 
He believed that left-Wing and liberal academics had a bad influence on the youth. 
According to Chiang Kai-shek (1984b: 210-211), in the name of 'academic liberalism 
and neutrality, many party members did not, provide the younger generation Wth 
stable spiritual guidance and strong moral values. This gave Chinese Communists 
the opportunity to grow. 
In 1952, the KMT Political Guideline (zhongguo, guomindivig zhengzhi gangling rpM 
MRJURjAMU was passed in the Ph Standing Committee. It clearly asserted that 
the KMT should "strengthen Sanminzhuyi thought in education, bring traditional 
morality forward, preserve cultural heritage, promote modem science, and foster in 
I 
students a democratic and law-abiding concepts, in order to consolidate the 
confidence to counterattack Communism. " (OU YUNG-SHENGý 1990: 180-181) It 
was the first KMT post-war policy conceming cultural affairs. Apparently, the KMT 
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valued the importance of education, which was the starting point for the KMT to 
reform Taiwan and regain hegemony. ,, -ý -, 'l- 
-, ý". .-, I- 
4- v, ýý, 
- 
-1 zý1.1 , 
Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged the importance of culture and education and 
influenced education policy. His ideas about Sanminzhuyi education expressed in 
writing and speeches were not only compiled and published, (WU CHI-PING, 1969; 
-, 
CKIN HSIAO-I, 1975; CHIANG KAI-SHEK,, 1984a-1984m) but also recited and 
elaborated by many pedagogic scholars. (CH'tNG -PIEN-FANQ 1952; CHANG 
CH'I-YON, 1995; KUO WEI-FAN, 1975). His personal concept of education 
dominated the overall direction of education development., (OU YUNG-SHENQ 1990; 
YANG TS'UNG- JUNG, 
-1992; TSENG CHING-YOEH, 1995) In general, there were 
,- 
three emphases in his educational guideline: Sanminzhuyi, traditional Chinese 
culture, 'and anti-commuhism. In order to achieve these goals, great emphasis was 
placed on minzujingshen (national spirit)18. , 
Minzujingshen was an important phrase, and frequently employed in KMT 
propaganda. Chiang Kai-shek took it as the primary weapon to counterattack 
Communism. He (1984b: 212) said that the Communists used two modem concepts 
- 
democracy and science 
- 
as tools to lure the younger generation into their camp. 
However, he believed that to promote science and democracy without a spiritual 
base 
- 
minzujingshen 
- 
was disastrous. He accused the CCP of betraying the nation ý 
and selling it out to Russia by abandoning Chinese traditions and values. In other 
words, it was an act of giving up minzu fingshen. 
18 When Allen Chun (1996: 129) mentions the similar term minzu yishi RV_qjj, he translates 
it as'societal consciousness. However, according to Chiang Kai-sheWs own words, I believe 
that in his conception, minzu fingshen had a strong nationalist approach, but with an 
emphasis on traditional moralities and values. 
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Chiang Kai-shek tried to make connections between minzujingshen and morality, 
traditional culture, anti-communist position, and patriotism. (1984c: 267; 1984c: 266; 
1984b: 210-21 1) Most of all, however, it was embodied in Sanminzhuyi. In order to 
suit the KM-Ps own ends, Sanminzhuyi was interpreted differently in post-war Taiwan. 
In order to stress its anti-communist essence, Sanminzhuyi had been gradually 
altered during the 1950s and 1960s from the three state-building principles of 
nationalism, of democracy, and of the people's livelihood, into "ethics, democracy, 
and science". (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984g: 67-68) 
This anti-Communist theme was not only reflected in education policy and the - 
content of textbooks (TSENG CHING-YOEH, 1995), it also politicised the moral 
conc . epts and knowledge taught in schools. (OU YUNG-SHENQ 1990: 146) This 
emphasis was especially placed on minzujingshen and dominated the direction of 
, 
Taiwanese education in the 1950s. (KUO WEI-FAN, 1975) It was modified and 
presented more straightforwardly as'nationalism'in the 1960s. (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 
., 
1984e: 34-36) It is fair to say that post-war education policy in Taiwan was drawn up 
totally according to Chiang's vision, which came to dominate every aspect of 
Taiwanese students' school life'9. 
I. Z4. Education and culture 
19 For example, political slogans and banners 
- 
shiking Sanininzhuyi VjffTaRjjj% (carry out 
Sanminzhuyi); xiaomie wane gongfei MMX,,! F M, - (wipe out the extremely evil communists) 
- 
were displayed everywhere, not only in schools and assembly halls, but also in work places, 
cinemas, and buildings. The production of short propaganda films, anti-communist radio and 
TV programmes was encouraged, and anti-communist exhibitions were arranged regularly. (OU YUNG-SHNa 1990) 
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According to Chiang's speeches and the Mrs party statement, it is clear that there 
is an overlap between definitions of 'culture' and 'education, a way of thinking that is 
deeply rooted in Chinese culture: 
The term 'culture' in Chinese 
- 
wenhua 3ý_rjt-- is a kanji term derived from classical 
ChineseP. (LIU, LYDIA, 1995: 312) Wen in Chinese has many meanings, mostly to do., 
with literature and cultivation: language (n. ), phenomena (n. ), articles (n. ), or the 
character of being civilised and gentle (adj. ). (CIHAI, 1995,1990) This particular term 
wenhua first appeared in the Han dynasty classic Shuoyuan : 
-ýM. It said: 'Whenever 
there is an armed rebellion, there is refusal to comply. ý The punishment should only 
be imposed after the attempt to cultivate them by civil administration fails (fan wu zhi 
xin wei bufu ye, wenhua bugai, ranhou fiazhu J; LAZ94, AT-Bg-t. 
(CH'U PO-SSU, 1981; WANG & Yl, 1990) 
Many'philosophers have agreed that the term wenhua is actually short for the phrase 
Wenzhifiaohua'3Zýýogjt '- enlightening the people with civil management. (LI 
. 
TUNG-FANG, 1968; CHEN CH'I-NLNG, 1982) According to Lao Ssu-kwang (1992), 
the concept of fiaohua *I-L(enlightenment by education) was fundamental in 
Chinese philosophy. It included two levels of transformation 
- 
individual and social. 
,, 
Therefore, it was important for Chinese, 
- 
both in Taoist and Confucian ideas, to have 
discipline and order 
-in another words, duty -in order to achieve fiaohua., Li , 
Tung-fang (1968: 1) even refers wenhua directly to dezhijVeO-(rule of virtue and 
- 
morality) because the concept of fiaohua was a top-down enlightenment. Therefore, 
, 
20 According to Lydia Uu (1995: 302), these kinds of kanji terms were classical Chinese- 
character compounds that were used by the Japanese to translate modem European words, 
and reintroduced into modem Chinese. According to U Tung-fang (1968: 2), Chinese 
borrowed the term and turned it into a modem usage (translating the English word: 'culture) 
after the Opium War in the first half of 19th century. 
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wenhua referred to the civil and moral way of ruling. 
According to anthropologist Ch'dn Ch'i-nan (1986a: 53-58), the focus of its original 
meaning was on wen. The word wen could be used not only to describe language 
and writing, - but also the enlightenment of literature, morality, good manners and 
. 
dao2l. Eventually, the term wenhua indicated "the proper way of human life... The 
. 
links between culture, the nature, the dao, and wen, interlock with each other, and 
form the theme of Chinese civilisation. " (CHEN CHMAN, 1986a: 58) 
Since the'earlier usage of wenhua meant"the state managed the people with a--, 
civilised manner, and cultivated them vvith literature", this kind of enlightenment could 
, 
only be achieved through education and the demonstration of good examples of 
virtue by the ruling classes. Hence, education was important in the process of 
enlightenment. The Chinese phrase fiaoyu lift' was seen as the means to 
enhance the quality of the people. The dose relationship between 'ed ucation' and 
'culture' in traditional Chinese society was inseparable. Sometimes, they were 
regarded as the same thing. 
Overall, the idea of wenhua meant enlightenment by education, and indicated a 
top-down cultivating process. The enlightenment was conducted between parents,,. 
and children, teachers and students, and the ruling classes and the masses, through 
education , and demonstrating ethical behaviour. Within a Confucian perspective, 
wenhua was the dao. Because of this rooted connection between education and 
21 According to Ch'6n Chl-nan (1986a), dao refers to both intellectual discourses and the 
course of nature. 
22 Xapyu means education. Uterally, fiao means teaching, and yu means fostering. Both parts 
are equally important in education for Chinese. 
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culture, it becomes clear why the KMPs emphasis on culture was mainly placed on. 
. ýý 
education. 
The post-war education policy in Taiwan was effective, not only because of its harsh 
implementation, but also because of the traditional Chinese nature of obeying the 
authorities and shying away from confrontation. (STAFFORD, 1995) Furthermore, 
. -- 
because of thefiaohua JAI-L(enlightenment by education) mentality, cultural policy in 
Taiwan held a strong sense of top-down guidance' and a moral context. 1. 
This particular nature also made cultural policy in Taiwan more education-oriented, 
and gave cultural apparatus a role of cultural guardian. Therefore, education was the 
core of Taiwan's early cultural policy. As a result it was not surprising to find that 
,, - 
there was no cultural apparatus set up within the government until 1967. Even when 
the first, and short-lived, cultural apparatus 
- 
wenhuaju 3Zjtj@(Cultural Bureau, 1967 
-1973) was setup, it was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education 
., 
(MOE)23. Moreover, early cultural policies were mostly embedded in education 
policies, and designed and implemented by the MOE. It is fair to say that cultural 
,, 
affairs were mainly managed under the educatiop domain in early post-war Taiwan. 
Even today, education is'still weightier than cultural affairs for Taiwanese government. 
For example, 'even after 2 decades of promoting culture, the ROG government spent 
around only 1% of its annual budget (0.91% in 1995,0.92% in 1996,1.1% in 1997, 
0.94% in 1998) on the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) 
- 
the major cultural 
23 The purpose of setting up this new apparatus was to support the Cultural Renaissance 
Movement that was launched in 1967. (CULTURAL BUREAU, 1968: 108) In other words, the 
Cultural Bureau was only a branch of the Cultural Renaissance mechanism placed within the 
education system. 
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apparatu .s in charge of national'cultural planning and development in the central 
government. In contrast to this meagre proportion of the annual budget the ROC 
,, 
government spent 10% on the MOE. (PERFORMING ARTS ALLIANCE, 1997; CCA24' 
1997b) 
-IýIý, I -, I. I11. ý 
I. Z5. China-centric colonisation 
Although the first KMT official policy on cultural affairs was created in 1952, it was 
mainly focused on anti-communist principles, and the importance of Chinese morality 
and traditionAt gave no practical direction on how to develop culture, or set tasks to 
this end. Therefore, some have claimed that Taiwan did not have an obvious cultural 
policy until the Cultural Renaissance Movement was launched by the authorities in 
1967. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a) Some have even claimed that the first positive 
cultural policy was the implementation of the Improvement Programme for Culture,, 
Education and Entertainment (Jiaqiang wenhua yu yule fangan 
in 1979. (CHIU HEI-YUAN, 1985) The most common view has been that the KMT ý, ý 
paid no attention to cultural development and the only principle was an 
anti-communism that dominated every aspect of Taiwanese life. (LI YIH-YUAN, 
1996a ; YANG CHAO, 1995a, 1995b; Ll LI-LI NQ 1995) For example, Winckler 
noticed this ambiguity: "culture was quite important to the Nationalists, but in practice 
most central government funds went to defence and development. " (1994: 28) 
As a matter of fact, these views are not entirely correct, because their definition of 
.- 
Ocultural policy is limited to 'arts policy. Furthermore, a policy can either be positive 
24 In order'to make it easy to read and refer to in the bibliography, I abbreviate many 
. 
government organisations' names in the reference. Similar abbreviations include: GIO, MOE, 
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or negative,, active or inactive., (ANDERSON; 1984: 3-4) The fact that indirect and- 
--, 
negative policies were also part of governmental decisions has usually been 
overlooked. Hence,, it is equally important,, if not more so, to detect why the 
government decided not to take action, or to do nothing; on matters in the cultural 
sphere, when government involvement was sought., 
-, -,, , .- 
.---,, --q 
There was indeed no positive or obvious arts policy, nor any policy encouraging arts 
development before the 1970s. In fact, most early post-war cultural policies were, 
negative and inactive (such as: censorship of the arts; discouraging Taiwanese folk 
arts, suppressing local dialects, etc. ). Even though there were some positive policies, 
theyweý6 mostly imposed to reward 'correct and healthy ideologies', ý or to reinforce 
,, 
sociýl control through schooling: 
Defining cultural policy as arts policy is quite common in the arts management field. 
As a matter of fact, its meaning has long been narrowed down to, arts polic)( since 
.ý 
the term became popular and widely adopted. Giving attention to cultural policy, and 
taking it as part of government policy first began in Europe after the Second World 
Warýs. It became a comprehensive field of politics at the beginning of the 1960s in 
many Western European countries. 'In general, the concept of cultural policy remains 
- 
mainly at the administrative level and stresses the responsibility of the government to 
the arts. (LANGSTED,, '1990: 70), 
I 
This concept of 'cultural policy'was adopted by many countries worldwide, especially 
KMT, etc. 
25 The Arts Council of Great Britain was first established in 1946. France established the 
Ministry of Culture in 1959. America established the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in 
1965 to deal with sponsorship in arts. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 57-66) 
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those long-subjected to direct colonial domination by European powers. In the 
attempt to rebuild their unique identities, many countries imposed cultural policies 
forcefully. By celebrating and highlighting forms of creative expression that were, 
thought to have been developed in the days before colonisation, cultural policy can 
be a good way of building confidence and constructing identity. (DOMINGUEZ, 1992:,., 
25-37) 
This also happened in Taiwan. The KMT tried to'de-colonise'Japanese influence 
with this European tactic once it took over Taiwan, and imposed Chinese culture as 
the'aLithentic tradition. Ironically, Chinese culture seemed somehow foreign to 
Taiwanese after 50 years of Japanese occupation. In other words, post-war cultural 
development in Taiwan was not only constructed under a European framework, but 
also re-colonised by an imagined motherland culture and identity. 
1.3 Intensive education Reform - "ll. IiI. I 
1.3.1. Unifying thoughts through curriculum 
Education in Taiwan had been geared up, after 1949, to prepare students to 
encounter the military threat from mainland China, and to reinforce solidarity and 
loyalty. In general, education policy was the most important cultural policy in Taiwan 
before the mid-1 970s. It was not only because the word wenhua denoted 'education' 
in a traditional sense.. but also because the goal of post-war Taiwanese education 
was to achieve social control in order to construct a pro-KMT political culture. 
According to Apple (1979: 87), there were three dimensions to the influence of 
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education on the formation of ideologies: the design of national curriculum, the 
,--- 
content of textbooks, and the hidden curriculUM26. Countless measures were taken to 
unify thoughts, and the national curriculum was the starting point for the KMT. 
Before martial law was lifted in 1987, 'Taiwan had undergone national curTiculum 
revisions four times (1952,1962,1968 and 1975), which also meant textbooks were 
, 
rewritten and modified four times. (OU YU NG-SHENGý 1990: 174-180) This constant 
revision indicated the KMTs wish to control ideological construction in education. 
Above all, the most influential education policy was the 'unified editorial system of 
textbooks (tongyi bianshen zhie-, Q-V$j)'. It was imposed in 1968. It led to 21,, 
- 
-- 
years (1968 
-1989) of unified knowledge transmission, which Shih Chih-sh&pg 
- 
(1995: 17) described as 'the darkest period' in Taiwanese education history 
Before 1968, there were two kinds -of textbooks. The National Institute for- 
.---ý 
Compilation and Translation (NICT)27 compiled and edited the most important 
subjects, such as Chinese, mathematics, science, and Social Studies (shehui, also 
see footnote 11). The compilation of the other 'not-so-important' subjects (such as ý 
Music, Arts, Health Education) and other supplemental teaching materials, was 
'. 
undertaken by local *governments and pdvate publishers. However, this dual system 
- 
2r' Hidden curriculum is a term in pedagogy, referring to hidden educational intention and 
design. It includes many aspects of school life apart from the 'official curriculum', such as 
school atmosphere, peer groups, school rules, daily routines, the selection of teaching 
materials, how the lessons are arranged, how the classroom is decorated and seated,, how 
behaviour is classified as good or bad... (OU YUNG-SHNa 1990; APPLE, 1979; VALLACE, 
1974) By encouraging or discouraging behaviours and values, reinforcing or degrading 
certain ideologies, the hidden curriculum is a subtle form of social control and a good way to 
make students conform. 
27 Most textbooks were compiled and edited by the NICT from 1953. However, it was not until 
1968 that the NICT took over all compilation and editorial work, and produced standard 
textbooks for elementary and junior high sch . ools. (OU YUNG-SHtNQ 1990: 87-89) 
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was changed, and replaced by a unified editorial system in 1968 in order to tighten 
up ideology construction. (OUYUNG-SHENQ 1990: 87-88) 
This system was designed to work hand in hand with nine-year compulsory 
education that began in 1968. This combination of two systems hied to build a unified 
national consensus Within a longer timescale and confined environment It was not 
until the 1980s that the system was challenged, and then finally abolished in 1989. 
What kind of knowledge was it that was organised, compiled, and uniformly 
transmitted to generations of Taiwanese that suited the KMTs ideology and political 
, 
needs? The research of Ou Yung-sh6ng (1990), Ch'6n Po-chang (199 1) and Shih 
Chih-shdng (1995) sheds some light on this issue. Ou Yung-sh6ng looked at the 
- 
hidden curriculum embedded in Social Studies textbooks in the national curriculum, 
and found that six themes constantly appeared: 1) pro-tradition orientation; 2) 
anti-communism; 3) nation first; 4) leader worship; 5) Han-centric ideology; 6) 
male-chauvinism. (OU YUNG-SHENQ 1990: 141) 
Ch'dn Po-chang (1991: 191-195) concluded that Taiwan's national curriculum was 
over-politicised, over-moralised, and showed an overwhelming male chauvinist 
mentality. Shih Chih-sh&ng (1995: 20-21) argued that three characteristics dominated 
education in Taiwan in this period: centralisation (education totally controlled by the 
MOE and NICT), monopolisation (unified knovAedge and standardised school 
schedule), and instrumentalisation (using textbooks to deliver political ideology). 
As Apple (1979: 26 
-30) rightly said, schools could be seen as'mechanisms of 
cultural distribution'. The control of the knovviedge was "a critical element in 
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enhancing the ideological dominance of certain classes..,. Thus, the 'reality' that 
schools'and other cultural institutions select, - preserve and distdbute.,. can be seen, ý 
as a particular'social construction'. 'ý (APPLE, 1979: 26 : -, 27) The action to unify -ý 
textbooks was trying to achieve exactly this goal 
-ý- a total control of ideological 
_, 
---.. 
construceion. By imposing both new systems, education after-1968 provided only one 
version"of 'the truth'. -,. ... ... 
1.3.2. Military training 
According to the record of the MOE (JUNXUN CHU, 2000), junxunW-01(military 
training) lessons were first advocated by scholar, 
- 
then Minister of Education, Cai 
Yuanpei ýUTGfg in 1912, soon after the Republic was established. At a time of foreign, 
imperialist threat, Cai advocated the idea of jun guomin zhuyi TIWF, -ji-A(the theory., 
of militarising the people). He believed that military training not only strengthened the 
nation, I b6t also enabl6d thd people to fight against any military dictatorship., The. 
---. ý- - 
focus of this assertion was to'develop a strong and healthy constitution through 
physical training'. In 1928, military training became compulsory. Since then, military 
training has been taught injunior and senior high schools, colleges, and universities- I 
Apart from field training and target practice, emphasis was also placed on. 
nationalism, 'military history ind strategy,, and nursing (for gids)., 
Military training %Aiasý forced to stop in the civil war. It was not until 1952 that school 
military, training was, resumed because Chiang Kai-shek (1 984c) believed that military 
training was the key in. fosteriing wenwu heyi 3ZiA-r, "3- (combining the skills of both 
pen and sword)., 
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Chiang regarded military training as the preparatory founclation for anti-communist 
.,, 
battle, which involved matters other than simply giving lessons. Thus, the MOE was, 
not the appropriate body to design military courses and organise activities. A new 
organisation, the China Youth Corps (CYC, zhongguo qingnian fangongfioguo tuan 
was established by the Central Reform Committee, KMT (rpA 
- 
to cultivate KMT ideologies among the youth. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997, 
chapter 29) 
Chiang Ching-kuo2a, Chiang Kai-shek! s eldest son, was the first director of the CYC. 
He was chosen to forge a militarised younger generation. Before 1949, Chiang ý 
Ching-kuo was already in charge of fostering young KMT officers, first in Jiangxi 
. 
province, later chairing the Central College of KMT Officers (zhongyang ganbu 
xuexibo and the youth corps in the General Politics Department. (HSO 
CHIEH-LIN, 1997) Because of his experience and expertise in organising and 
fostering young KMT members in the past, he became useful in Chiang Kai-shek! s, 
- 
education reform. 
The CYC was not merely an organisation that delivered military training in schools, 
. 
but a youth organisation Vith a military and political mission. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) 
In other words, it was a political vehicle disseminating KIVIT ideology to young people 
- 
vvith the support of the party-state. It was clear that the purpose of military training 
was not merely to build up'physical strength'for actual battle, but to forge KMT 
, 
28 Chiang Ching-kuo was famous for his tolerance towards the opposition an'd his initiative 
preparing Taiwan for democratisation and liberalisation in his later life. (KEMENADE, 
1998: 152) However, his working experience and dose connection with secret Intelligence 
made him a controversial figure. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) He was sent to Moscow at the age 
of 16, and was educated in a communist environment. Many of his fellow students were later 
Chinese Communist leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. When the United Front between the 
KMT and CCP broke up, he was put under house arrest. Later on, he was released and came 
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ideology. It Was not until 1960 that responsibility for military training was handed back ý 
to the MOE, because the national safety had been improved. (JUNXUN CHU, 1978, 
2000) 
1.3.3. Language unification 
Apart from the standardisation of textbooks, another way for the KMT to unite the 
, 
Taiwanese was to unify the language. The extensive promotion of Mandarin had 
already begun in 1945. In 1956, a new language policy 
- 
the Mandarin-speaking 
movement (shuo guoyu yundong was imposed. (CHEN M El-J U,, l 996) 
According to a Provincial Report (TAIWANSHENG GONGBAO, 1956), the provincial 
government officially promoted this movement both in campus and government. ý. ,- 
institutions, and advised using Mandarin and avoiding local dialects. It persuaded 
people to comply, in the name ol"national security'-- un-unified language would 
affect the solidarity of the nation (yuyan bu tongyi, yingxiang minzu tuanjie ffi T,; rt 
-1 TMOMMINNIM). 
In 1963, the Education Department (Taiwan Provincial Govemment) demanded 
elementary and junior high schools take up a more aggressive role in promoting. 
Mandarin. (TAIWANSHENG JIAOYUTINQ 1987) Schools were asked to supervise 
studentsý, and to encourage parents to use Mandarin to set an example. It was 
- 
demanded of headmasters that they not only demonstrated themselves to be good 
Mandarin speakers, but also oversaw the teachers and staff to improve their 
Mandarin ability. 
back to China in 1935, and was re-educated by his father. (KEMENADE, 1998: 105) 
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To further language unification, a complete ban on using dialects in public was 
implemented in 1966. The Provincial Government announced the Reinforcement 
,, 
_.,. 
Programme on Mandarin Promotion Ulaqiang tuixing guoyuji-hua bniNff 
which outlawed the usage of local dialects in public places. (TAIWANSHENG 
GONGBAO, 1966) Those found using local dialects in school, even in private. 
conversation, were humiliated and fined. Although local dialects were still used 
privately or at home, this promotion plan had created a sense of shame and 
-ý, - 
degradation for Taiwanese using their own languages. Ch'dn Mei-ju (1996: 93-99), 
calls this period an era of Mandarin monopoly. The restriction was finally lifted in 
1987. 'ýII 
The tightening up of language policy in the mid-1 960s was partly due to increasing 
international isolation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, more and more countries 
-, 
severed diplomatic relations with the ROC, and national morale and unity was in 
crisis. At the same Ume, in order to counterattack and make a distinction from the 
,, 
Cultural Revolution in the mainland, the KMT set up the Chinese Culture Restoration 
Committee (CCRC) in 1967. Taiwanese government endeavoured to construct an 
image of 'orthodox China', hence, the whole island was mobilised to dedicate itself to, 
the Cultural Renaissance Movement Speaking Mandarin was one of the movement' s 
emphases, and speaking Mandarin became a manifestation of pabiotism. (CREN 
MEI-JU, 1996) 
1.3.4. Invisible Taiwan 
The absence of Taiwan in Taiwanese textbooks was another problem in education. 
Even with a befter-revised national curTiculum and the abolition of unified textbooks 
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in 1989, textbooks were still dominated by a China-centric and male chauvinist 
mentality. (SHIH CHIH-SHENG, 1995) 
According to Liu Hsiao-fdn's research, (1991: 107) the average appearance of Taiwan 
. 
in 'Chinese History, (benguoshi 92,1983 edition) textbooks was less than 5% 
(4.03% at junior high level, 4.77% at senior high level) throughout the six-year period 
of secondary education. The focus of this brief coverage was mostly placed on 
Taiwan's 'development', especially 'official achievements after 1945 P29 Periods 
deliberately excluded in history textbooks were pre-history, Dutch rule and Japanese 
occupation in Taiwan. 
For many years, young Taiwanese students did not learn about the place they lived in, 
and were not taught about Taiwanese history. Many of the historical events that 
happened less than fifty years ago were unknown to many. It was especially the case 
in terms of the political dissent and rebellion, such as the 228 incident (1947), the Lei 
Chk T-N Incident (1960), the P'&ng Ming-min WR)JW Incident (1964), and Taiwan's 
independence movement (details will be discussed later). As a result, a whole 
generation of young Taiwanese were educated so that they knew 5000 years of 
Chinese history, but nothing about the Taiwanese past. There was only a motherland 
(China), but no hometown (Taiwan). It produced a generation with no past, no 
memory, and no affection towards the land they were actually living in. 
Because of the educational guidelines and editorial principles set up by the KMT 
government, the textbooks demonstrated a China-centric, Han-superior attitude. Any 
29 The main coverage of Taiwan in the 'Domestic History' textbooks that were used for six- 
year of secondary education focused mostly on post-war development. Such content took up 
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historical reference to Taiwan in textbooks indicated its status as secondaM primitive, 
and marginal. Not only was Taiwan always inferior to China, - but also other ethnic 
- 
groups were taken to be inferior to the Hans, women inferior to men. (OU YUNG- 
SHENQ 1990) 
History education was one of the most effective tools creating a brand new'collective 
memory'. either by enforcing, inventing, editing, or forgetting. In contrast to the long 
- 
and glorious history of China, the humble appearance of Taiwan made it seem, 
marginal and insignificant. On the one hand, the emphasis on Chinese history 
,, ---- 
reinforced national spirit, and created a collective memory; on the other hand, the 
deliberate omission of important Taiwanese history was a way to achieve the goal of 
'structural amnesia'. (WANG MING-ICO, 1994a) Taiwanese history was retold both by 
making up false narratives about Taiwan's history (such as the story of WU Fengn, 
-, 
and emphasising its inferior relationship to the mainland. This version of Taiwanese 
history was plainly the Mrs Taiwan, voiced from a China-centric position. 
.t 
The main intention behind trivialising Taiwans history, according to Shih Chi-sh6ng, 
(1995: 85-87), was to create an impression that the Chinese tradition (both cultural 
,-ý 
I and political) was more important than Taiwanese tradition. Furthermore, the ROC on 
Taiwan represented not just a local power or a government in-exile, but an orthodox. 
. 
83.08% of all coverage about Taiwan at junior high level, and 80.88% at senior high. 
30 The story of WU Feng qJ& circulated in Han society since the Oing dynasty. WU was a 
Han interpreter who communicated with the aborigines for the Oing court. This story of 
self-sacrifice (for the peace between the Hans and aborigines) was actually a modified 
version by Japanese to suit their need for colonial rule. (CH'tN CH'I-NAN. 1986a: 1 13-131) 
This story appeared both in life and Ethics! (Vol. 1) and 'shehui j. Lft (Social Studies)' (Vol. 1) 
textbooks for more than twenty years. The story emphasised Wu's sacrifice for racial harmony, 
though it created a false barbaric imageof the aborigines as head-hunters. Over the years, 
there were debates and protests. In the 1980s, aboriginal activists demanded that the MOE 
take the WU Feng story out of textbooks and apologise. After serious debates, this story finally 
disappeared from textbooks in 1988. (OU YUNG-SHENa 1990: 2,154,228-229) 
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government representing the whole China. Therefore, the absence of Taiwan in 
history textbooks was a deliberate decision, not only to concentrate on building up a 
Chinese orthodoxy, but also to re-invent Taiwanese history and contain it within a 
Chinese historical framework. 
Since the 1990s, there has been acute criticism of the imbalance in content and 
teaching hours concerning Chinese and Taiwanese history education. The view was 
widely accepted that Taiwanese history should be greatly increased in textbooks to fill 
the forty-year gap. (LIU HSIAO-FEN 
, 
1991; CHANG YEN-HSIEN, 1988; HSO 
HSCIEH-CHI, 1990) Finally, in the mid-1990s, the MOE started to deal with the 
imbalance between Chinese history and Taiwanese history in order to comply with 
current needs. 
1.3.5. Value reproduction 
In the social sciences, it has generally been accepted that knowledge is socially 
constructed and that schooling reproduces selected values. (BOURDIEU, 1976,1984; 
BOURDIEU & PASSERON, 1977; APPLE, 1979,1976) In the 1950s and 60s, 
Taiwanese education policy and development clearly demonstrated the intention of 
'social control' and value reproduction. Partly, this was because of Chiang Kai-shek! s 
interest (1984b, 1984c) in constructing a new generation of modem Chinese; partly, it 
was because cultural defeat alerted the KMT to place emphasis on education; and 
also, it was because the military threat across the Strait alarmed the KMT to reinforce 
political ideology. In other words, education in Taiwan was designed to carry out 
culture construction to fight against Communism. 
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Education is taken by-social scientists as a powerful tool in the construction of 
meaning. Raymond Williams (1 976b) asserts that the effect of education is profound; 
and reminds us of the danger of overlooking the fact that education presents a 
selected partial truth as the only reality: wThe selective tradition at an intellectual and 
- 
theoretical level: all these forces are involved in a continual making and remaking of 
an effective dominant culture, and on them, as experienced, as built into our living, 
reality depends. " (1976b: 205) ý .1 11 
The fact that selected knowledge and hidden values in education are not so easy to 
identify means that both students'and teachers are usually unaware of its influence. 
As an educator, Michael Apple (1979) raises the question about what kind of. 
knowledge is chosen to be taught in school. 
Whose knowledge is it? Who selected it? Why is it organised and taught in 
this way? 
... 
Social and economic values, hence, are already embedded in the 
design of the institutions we work in, in the 'formal corpus of school 
knowledge'we preserve in our curricula, in our modes of teaching, and in our 
principles, standards, and forms of evaluation. Since these values now work 
through us, often unconsciously, the issue is not how to stand above the 
choice. Rather, it is in what values I must ultimately choose. (APPLE, 1979: 
7-9) 
Apple's soul-searching quest for his role as a teacher and his doubt about the 
selected values he was going to transmit, indicated that education was not neutral or 
scientific as it seemed. The fact is that schools not only'process people', but also 
'process knowledge. Educational institutions are not only able to disseminate 
knowledge systematically, but are also the main agents in the selection, preservation 
and distribution of knowledge and values of the dominant They are the agent of 
cultural and ideological hegemony., Most importantly, as Apple (1979: 6) pointed out, 
it is the only institution among all elements of the ideological state apparatuses which 
can create people who see no other serious possibility to the economic and cultural 
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assemblage now extant. 
The effect of education is not only fundamental, but it also reproduces a value 
system that the dominant class may benefit from. It was, and perhaps still is, difficult 
for ordinary people to question mass produced and accepted ideologies. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1976,1977,1984) views cultural capital as the currency through 
which domination is purchased. He believes, 'culture'is used to ensure the ruling 
power's social reproduction, and to support class distinction. Most of all, cultural 
capital is produced mainly by the education system. Like economic capital, cultural 
capital is a means to domination and secures the profits of distinction. Taiwan's 
stringent education control supported the KNIT exactly in this way. Through education, 
the KMT cashed in popular support, secured its political legitimacy, and reproduced 
its values. 
The tightly designed education system and curriculum in Taiwan exercised extensive 
control over people. Not only was the curriculum carefully designed and implemented, 
the ideology that textbooks transmitted was also stanclardised for over 20 years (from 
1968 to 1989). It was common that students expected there to be'standard answers' 
for every question, and accepted and took what was taught as the only reality. This 
lack of option and the impossibility of thinking otherwise became a real problem. 
Because of the determination to popularise education and standardise ideology, the 
number of schools, and consequently the educated population, increased drastically. 
In the academic year 1951-52, there were only 1,504 schools (of all levels) in Taiwan. 
This figure had increased to 6,940 by 1989. (MOE, 1990: 8) Because of that, the 
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illiteracy rate for people over 6 years old decreased sharply during the 1950s. It 
-,, 
dropped from 42.1 % in 1952 to 15.3% in 1969, and 5.8% in 1994. (MOE, 1990: 8; 
HUANG CHON-CHIEH, '1998; GIO, 1993: 47) 
1.4. Hidden curriculum 
1.4.1. Political socialisation 
Chiang Kai-shek! s deep involvement and support strengthened the power of the 
education system. (CHUN, 1996: 140) According to the anthropologist Richard Wilson 
(1970: 144-146), the KMT successfully stabilised its power and set up the authority of 
political leaders through education. The Mrs way of achieving this'effecr was to 
control the process of political socialisation. 
Social scientists term the way that children are introduced to the values and attitudes 
of their society and what is expected of their adult roles as 'socialisation'. 
, 
(ALMOND, 
1974) The process of shaping, transmitting, maintaining, or even creating specific 
political values and forming the expectation of how each member is expected to 
. 
participate in the political system, is called 'political socialisation'. The result of the 
political socialisation process, for the individual, is the formation of one's political 
ideology3l; for a political entity, it is the formation of its political culture. 
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'Political ideology' is a political worldview, and includes a set of poliucal beliefs, political 
values, political ideals, and the value-judging atfitude toward political systems and the role 
that government should play. Therefore, it covers "generalisations; about how people and 
governments do behave and how they should behave". (SARGENT, 1990: 3) In other words, 
political ideology is 'the political beliefs of a group. (FUNDERBURK. C& THOBABEN, 1994) 
According to Almond and Verba (1963: 13), political culture "refers to specific political 
orientations 
- 
altitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward 
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Education has always played an important role in the construction of a desirable 
political ideology (in order to create favoured political culture). (YEN CH'ING-HSIANQ 
1997: 35) Many researches (e. g. YANG TS'U-HSIANQ 1992; YEN CH'ING-HSIANQ 
1997) in recent years have touched on this issue 
- 
i. e. what kind of 'political culture' 
the KMT government tried to construct Yang Ts'u-hsiang (1992: 121-141) found a 
high percentage of political content in textbooks 
- 
averagely 22.63% (18.24% in 
elementary school, 26.91 % at junior high level). 
Yen Ch'ing-hsiang compared the political ideologies that the two Chinese 
governments across the Taiwan Strait wanted to foster in history textbooks and found 
interesting differences. The most important political themes in Taiwan's textbooks 
were 'cultural and scientific achievement (17.2%), 'political leaders' (16.1 %) and 
'hostility towards China' (9.9%). On the other hand, textbooks on the mainland also 
showed a high percentage of political content: 'hostility towards Taiwan' (14.7%), 
'achievement in culture and economy' (12.8%) and 'political leaders' (12.1 %). (YEN 
CHING-HSIANGý 1997: 118-121) 
It was evident that the goal to set up national pdde in Chinese history was the same, 
and so was the hostility toward each other. However, Taiwan's textbooks focused 
mostly on the respect and obedience given to the authorities, especially political 
leaders. This emphasis on obedience was a reinforcement of prioritising dawo )ýcR 
(big self, collective self). This logic 
- 
every policy was for the sake of collective good 
and national need 
-- 
had been meticulously elaborated in textbooks. 
The development of education in post-war Taiwan demonstrated the Mrs intention 
the role of the self in the system. " 
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of total control. It not only tried to interfere in every aspect of the socialisation process, 
. 
but also controlled the power to write history and culture, produce selected 
knowledge and values. Worst of all, as Yang Chao (1 995c) said, was the impossibility 
for ordinary people to have a critical view transcending the limitation of dawo, 
.. 
discourse33. Since the way of thinking was confined within the domain of 'collective 
good', there was no discourse, nor language to conduct discussion outside the 
- 
existing framework. 
1.4.2. Formal and informal education 
Of course, 'education outside of school was largely informal. The opportunities for 
informal learning were everywhere, through pervasive; physical, unconscious, or 
non-verbal transmissions of knowledge in all aspects of life. Informal education could 
not be totally organised, nor could the result be achieved totally as planned. Because 
of the highly politicised and moralised content of Taiwanese education system, 
contradictions between formal and informal learning often appeared, and the gap 
between reality and theory deepened. 
This is - well illustrated in the example of moral education. The moral tendency in 
Taiwanese education was overwhelming. Martin (1975) noticed that the Taiwanese 
- 
government was "promoting a revitalisation of the traditional Confucian system of, 
social behaviour and personal mores" (such as filial piety, patriotism, academic 
33 Yang Chao (I 995c) found this ideological limitation even in the debates between two 
prominent Chinese philosophers 
-Yin Hai-kuang and Un YOU-sheng (in Yin Hai-kuang, Lin 
YO-sheng shuxinji AQQ)ý He believed that the lack of afternative thinking 
-a 
more individualist point of View 
- 
prevented the Chinese of thinking beyond the limitations of 
dawo. All the debates were based on aiming to achieve the collective good, a better and 
strong nation. In other words, the nation's need comes first, and the individual's sacrifice is 
always tolerable. 
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achievement and a sense of propriety in interpersonal relations), in order to foster a 
new generation of modem citizens through education reform. (MARTIN, 1975: 260) 
However, the moral emphasis that the KMT government tried to instil in education, as 
Charles Stafford (1995) found out, did not always work: '. 7he content of the moral 
lessons which are so heavily transmitted in schools almost seems to be made 
redundant by the pragmatic concerns of a family-based morality which is 'not 
transmitted' (i. e. not explicitly) in the township. " (1995: 6) 
Stafford argued, Taiwanese children learnt about morality and traditional values in 
other ways. For example, parents rarely discussed moral issues with children, but 
often asked them to study. Both the parents' instruction and the child's compliance 
depended not just on the idea that academic achievement was taken as the most 
"important path to success", but they could also be seen "as a product of the 
traditional morality or filial obedience". (STAFFORD, 1995: 5-6) In other words, the 
learning of values and morality can be implicit and unconscious from daily life. 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1977: 46-47) identified that both formal and informal 
education were ways of transmitting knowledge. One was transmitted through the 
unconscious inculcation of principles; the other through organised education of 
"articulated and even formalised principle". Leaming was irreversible, and the 
unconscious learning that took place during childhood and in a family situation would 
shape the understanding of everything that followed, including 'explicit pedagogy'. 
These two modes of learning and the shaping of one's mind overlapped, intertwined, 
and sometimes contradicted each other but co-existed in the same place at the 
same time. Hence, it was hard to pin down exactly what was learnt in school, what 
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was not. 
- 
There has been much research analysing the polifical ideology of textbooks, the 
design of curriculum, and the education system in Taiwan. However, it was difficult, if 
not impossible, to evaluate the effect or quantify the influence of formal education. 
For example, political socialisation was accomplished through many institutions and 
agencies outside of school, such as the family, peer groups, mass media, and 
occupation. (ALMOND, 1974: 47-49; DAWNSON & PREWITT, 1969: 100) 
Even though the early influence of family life was undeniable, many scholars have 
asserted that school is the core and the most important agent in carrying out political 
socialisation, because schools transmit the values and attitudes of a society in their 
- 
manner of centralisation, unification, and systernatisation. (HESS & TORNEY, 1969: 
219; DAWNSON & PREWITT, 1969: 100) Also, it was the most accessible arena for 
government to control. Small wonder then that the KMT endeavoured to make sure 
that all Taiwanese should be educated. The number of people who were educated 
above high school level in post-war Taiwan rose dramatically from 8.8% in 1952 to 
52.6% in 1994. (MOE, 1990: 8) 
From an anthropological perspective, Wilson's research (1970) on political 
socialisation in Taiwanese education provides an in-depth view of how it went on. He 
found the 'group pressure' in Taiwan was a crucial factor for'compliance'during the 
socialisation process. Considerable emphasis was also put on'correct! behaviour in 
education. Once disobeyed, the price of disobeying was losing-face or facing hostility 
within the group. 
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The most intriguing situation he found was how group pressure and the 
reinforcement of 'correct behaviour in education had been internalised. His 
description aptly depicted how effectively and efficiently the state-run education 
mechanism functioned: 
... 
considerable effort has successfully been expended 
... 
to reinforce a 
congruence between styles of authority in primary groups and those that exist 
between citizens and political leaders... the patterns of authority 
... 
have been 
conducive to political stability. Inter-societal cleavage has been minimized, and 
there is little display of excessively overt forms of control... a great mass of 
teachers cooperating effectively in inculcating in children support of the 
government. Avoidance of under group pressure is sanctioned in accordance 
with traditional norms. (WILSON, 1970: 146) 
It was not surprising that in a society that believed in academic achievement as a 
symbol of a 'better future', students wanted (or at least, were urged) to do well in 
school. Consequently, the desire to do well in school, in the hope of achieving better 
socio-political and economic status, brought deepersocialisation and compliance in 
children. 
1.4.3. Anti-communism 
Sanminzhuyi hua It (Sanminzhuyi-isation) was the editorial principle for all 
textbooks, and the most important guideline for post-war Taiwanese education. (OU 
YUNG-SHENG 1990: 199) In order to realise a Sanminzhuyi education, emphasis on 
anti-communism was taken as the vehicle to achieve the goal and fight the war to 
defend Sanminzhuyi. (OU YUNG-SHLNG, 1990: 180-181; CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 
1984b; 1984c: 266; 1984g: 67-68) In other words, the KMT took party-dominated 
education as a moral crusade protecting Sanminzhuyi against evil Communism. 
The hostility towards communism was not limited to textbooks, but was to be found 
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IF 
everywhere. The official term for Chinese communists was 'gongfei #W-(communist 
- 
bandits)', who were characteristically portrayed as'inhumane', 'cruel', 'evil'. For t: 
example, the common description of Chinese people under communist rule was: 
'shuishen huore 71eMýkpA, (in deep water and scorching fire, which meant that people 
. 
were in an abyss of suffering)'. (TSENG CHING-YOEH, 1995) The comparison made 
between Taiwan and the mainland was that of 'heaven and hell'. 
The anti-communist theme was also embedded in the hidden curriculum and 
extracurricular activities, such as assemblies, competitions, exhibitions, school clubs, 
campus decoration, festivals, sports days, and national celebrations. (TStNG 
CHING-YOEH, 1995; OU YUNG-SHENG, 1990) For example, anti-communist topics 
were constantly discussed in school assemblies, and also featured as the theme in 
competitions and events (e. g. recovering mainland China; unifying China With 
Sanminzhuyi). The slogan 
- 
"It is our duty to keep national secrets and look out for 
spies (baomi langdie, renren you ze RitMia, 
- 
was painted in big red 
letters in assembly halls, in classrooms and offices, and on the outside walls of many 
public buildings. Special exhibitions and documentaries (usually named as feiqing 
zMao W-Ivj jjt+ Communist Today) toured around campuses vvith their frightening 
images of the mainland. (TSENG CHING-YOEH, 1995) Security measures were 
, 
taken as part of the anti-communist battle inside the campus and government 
offices34. - 
34 There was a stringent system to prevent communist spies or anyone else disseminating 
communist ideologies. Security Investigations were conducted by four different organisations: 
the KMT, the police, fingbei zongbu N Irv M,, *, $( garrison headquarters), and diaochaju MAR (investigation Bureau). (TSLNG CHING-YOEH, 1995: 126) The personnel department within 
all institutions also had the responsibility of collecting personal information monitoring political 
opinion, and of conducting 'security checks. 
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Above all, the establishment of Mainland Studies Clubs (dalu wenti yanjid she )cVjrr: j, 
Ebq 
and Sanminzhuyi Clubs was encouraged by the MOE in universities and 
high schools. (TSENG CHING-YOEH, 1995: 105) The first club of this sort was 
established in Mid-Taiwan Medical College in 1967. According to Jui Hd-chC-ng 
(1982), there were 111 such clubs established between 1967 and 1981, in order to 
"reinforce students' patriotism and consolidate Sanminzhuyi belief. 
Another important action was the establishment of the CYC. All students at high 
school level and above automatically became its members, and had to receive 
political and military training and study Sanminzhuyi. (JUNXUN CHU, 1978) Apart 
from students, any young people between the age of 16 and 25 years old were also 
required to join. Wei Ting-ch'ao W_101, a Chenggong High School student, refused. 
Consequently, he was forced to quit school under school authority pressure. (HSO 
CHIEH-LIN, 1997, Chapter 29) It is not surprising, therefore, 'that the CYC was 
criticised and mocked as Chiang Ching-kuo's "brain-washed youth troops". (HSO 
CHIEH-LIN, 1997) 
Wilson (1970) could easily identify the hostility towards the communists when he did 
fieldwork in Taiwan in the late 1960s. However, he did not regard the anti-communist 
atmosphere as a purely political reaction. He noticed that powerful group pressure 
suppressed the expression of disagreement within society, and suspected that the 
emphasis on hostility was not merely a reaction against Chinese military threat. From 
a psychological perspective, he believed that it was an outlet for certain feelings, 
which could not be expressed, within the group. 
Setting up a role of 'others' as targets was justifiable because the 'others' did not 
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understand the 'proper order of things. "Enemies fill an extremely important role in 
Chinese political culture... if there were no such despised group, they would have to 
be invented in order for any emotional balance to be maintained... The control of 
tension in Chinese society in Taiwan is related to the level of deviance which seems 
to be tolerated within group life. " (WILSON, 1970: 138) 
Whether it was a true picture of Taiwan in the late 1960s, or an observation from a 
view of the 'other, who was foreign and alienated from the society, is not my interest. 
However, using hostility against the'other was apparently an important way to 
reinforce loyalty and strengthen control of the group. At the same time, as Wilson 
stressed, it was also an instrument used to release the suppressed emotion within: it 
was the need to release suppressed feelings under the authoritarian regime of 
Chiang Kai-shek. 
1.5. Struggle for cultural hegemony 
1.5.1. Party-supported apparatus 
The danger of military invasion and economic blockade continued through toe 1950s 
to the 1970s. Therefore, self-sufficiency was absolutely essential. In the first few 
decades of post-war Taiwan, developing the economy and improving people's 
livelihood and reinforcing national security were the national priorities. Nonetheless, 
cultural affairs were not forgotten, because they were taken as part of national 
defence and the vehicle to build Taiwan as an antkommunist fortress. Therefore, it 
was not surprising to see that Taiwarf s cultural scene in the 1950s and 1960s was 
full of anti-communist works, described as "Sanminzhuyi arts" by many historians. (LI 
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LI-LINQ 1995; CHENG MING-LI, 1994) 
On the one hand, because of the 228 incident and the language barrier, most 
Taiwanese scholars were either afraid to express their opinions or unable to write in 
Chinese adequately, and therefore, withdrew from Taiwan's literary scene. (1-1 U-LINGý 
1995) On the other hand, the KMT deliberately discouraged the literary tradition 
inherited from the May Fourth Movement. (HSIAOA-CH'IN, 1991) The literary 
community was in a state that was not only cut off from all traditions (both from the 
Chinese and Taiwanese), but also dominated by pro-KMT, rightwing writers from the 
mainland. Post-war Taiwanese culture was harshly removed from its historical 
foundations, and divorced from reality. (LO CHNG-1-11.11,1988). 
In 1950, two organisations 
- 
the Awarding Committee for Chinese Literature and Arts 
(ACCLA, Zhonghua wenyifiangjin weiyuanhui rpV3Zff 
_M- and the 
Association of Chinese Literature and Arts (ACLA, zhongguo wenyi xiehui rýW3ZUta 
ift) 
- 
were established by the KMT35 to encourage Sanminzhuyi artistic works. 
The ACCLA published Creative Literature (Wenyi chuangzuo 3Z*fl1jfIý) Monthly, and 
provided the highest rate of remuneration in Taiwan for writers. Within less than three 
years, it attracted more than 2,000 writers submitting over five million words of 
Sanminzhuyi literary works. (CHANG TAO-FAN, 1953: 1) It became the most powerful 
literary magazine in the 1950s. (YIN HSOEH-MAN, 1982: 149; LI LI-LINQ 1995) 
35 These two were funded and initiated by the KMT. Theiradministration reports were 
presented to the central committee, as part of party administration. (HSIAO A-CHIN, 
1991: 109) 
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The establishment of the ACLA36 was especially unusual. Its opening ceremony was 
chaired by the Primier Chang Dao-fan ýRMM, and attended by many prominent 
writers. This institution became the locomotive of the anti-communist movement in 
culture communities. Although it claimed that nine out of ten writers in Taiwan were 
its members, Taiwanese members were rare. The balance between mainlanders and 
the Taiwanese population in Taiwan was roughly 1 to 7 37 
. 
yet, there were only 58 
Taiwanese among its 1,290 members. (ZHONGGUO WENYI XIEHUI, 1960: 3,248) 
This kind of inequality was commonplace, not only in non-governmental 
organisations, but also within the government. (LIN & LIN, 1993) 
Similar organisations were set up by the CYC to support the dissemination of party 
ideology 
- 
Association of Young Chinese Writing (zhongguo qingnian xiezuo xiehui 
in 1953, and the Association of Taiwanese Women Writing 
(Taiwansheng funO xiezuo xiehui in 1955. (LI U-LINGý 1995) 
Any artistic expression that did not promote anti-communist ideologies was not 
encouraged, nor would be awarded with honour or money. All in all, setting up 
ideological standards, organising cultural apparatus, and providing awards to attract 
artists were common and effective tactics at a time when resources were scarce. 
1.5.2. Total control in culture - 
36 According to its official guidelines, (KU CHI-rANQ 1989: 151-152) its goal was to 
"enhance the establishment of Sanminzhuyi, accomplish the mission of anti-communism and 
the revival of the mainland". 
37 According to the census conducted in 1990, there were 87.11 % Taiwanese, and 12.74% 
mainlanders among the 20,366,325 population. (WACHMAN, 1994: 7,17) However, the KMT 
brought almost 2 million mainlanders to Taiwan. At that time, there were over 6 million people 
in Taiwan. The proportion changed over the years because the older generation of 
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On the surface, the military aggression from the mainland was the obvious reason for 
training students like soldiers and mobilising artists as military forces. In reality, it was 
the lessons the KMT leamt from the mainland (it believed that the loss of cultural 
hegemony was the cause of its loss of political hegemony) that informed cultural 
- 
policy in post-war Taiwan. 
The attempt to regain cultural hegemony was carried out simultaneously with the 
stabilisation of political construction and education reform. (CHIANG PAO-CH'Al, 
1994) A new branch of the KMT 
- 
Fourth Unit of the Central Reform Committee (rP5ý 
later the Department of Cultural Affairs (3ý, rjtT-fýt) 
- 
was established Aa 
in 1950 to deal with cultural affairs. It was responsible for "propaganda, promoting 
party theories, and initiating cultural movement'. (CHIN HSIAO-1,1978b: 2-4) It 
proposed 'Guidelines for the Mobilisation of the Anti-communist Movement' in 1952, 
and initiated the'Cultural Reform Movement (3ý_rJE&MMMb). The goal was to 
promote 'reform in arts and literature' for the purpose of "revolution and 
state-building". (CH'I N HSIAO-I, 1978b: 35-39 - 51) Among all art forms it was 
literature 
-- 
the area that Chiang Kai-shek feared most and paid most attention to (Ll 
LI-LING, 1995) 
- 
that was on the top of the reform list. 
Chiang Kai-shek believed that communists always worked through literature and the 
arts to disseminate communism. In order to tackle the problem, Chiang wrote Two 
Amendments on Education and Leisure for the Principle of the People's Livelihood 
(minsheng zhuyi yule liangpian bushu Rq: 
_J& 
ff! ZAMMA) in 1953, to set up 
guidelines for'correct cultural expression and healthy activities. 
mainlanders died out. 
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After the two amendments were published, a cultural cleansing movement was 
launched in 1954 to promote a cleaner cultural environment; It called for the support 
from the literary community to rid the bad influence of "the yellow harm (the negative 
., 
thought and weakness of the society)", "the red poison (communist ideology)" and 
"the blackness (the sinfulness and darkness of the society)". (LI LI-LINa 1995) 
The anti-communist theme reached its height when the zhandou wenyj' movement 
was mobilised in 1955. (HSIAO A-CHIN, 1991: 85-88) The KMT claimed, "good 
literary works must be militant, because artistic pursuit is also a battle... All works 
that strengthen spirits and consolidate anti-communist concepts are zhandou wenyi. " 
(HSIAOA-CH'IN, 1991: 87) 
For a while, not only all the governmental, party-owned magazines appeared to 
advocate anti-communist ideologies, but most literary magazines and newspapers 
supplements were also full of this kind of work. Anti-communism was the main theme 
in the 1950s. (LIU HSIN-HUANG, 1971: 4M5; CHIANG PAO-CH'Al, 1994) 
A series of restrictions on freedom of speech was imposed in order to dictate what 
zhandou wenyi works should be like and what quality a 'good' art work had. (LI 
LI-LING, 1995) In 1949, the Regulations on the Capital Investment Limits of Taiwan's 
Newspapers and Magazines (Tahvansheng xinwen zazhi ziben xianzhi banta, 
-" 
Mý il Q 
was issued. In the name of economising natural resources, 
the scale of the media and the number of pages of the publications were restricted. In 
3'3 Literally, zhandou wenyi qQM_AZU means "militant literature and arW. This zhandou wenyi 
movement promoted by the KMT authorities was a way to encourage cultural and artistic 
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March 1950, the restrictions were tightened even further. Article 11 plainly restricted 
the freedom of assembly and organising associations. Holding parades and 
petitioning were also forbidden. Anything considered to be harmful to national safety 
in speeches, talks, publications, or on the banners, would be banned. 
In 1951, the Executive Yuan restricted the establishment of new newspapers. In 1952, 
the Publication Law (ffijNM-) was promulgated. In order to control national resources 
for its own usage and restrict free speech, the KMT government imposed censorship 
to legitimise thought control. 
Consequently, most artistic expression before the 1970s had to serve anti-communist 
goals. Otherwise, there would be no opportunity for publication, no space for 
performance and exhibition, no voices being heard. By then, the KMT had 
constructed a cultural control structure, through education, censorship, media control, 
non-governmental cultural apparatus, and the domination of resources. (LI LI-LINQ 
1995) 
1.5.3. Politicised folk arts 
This 'anti-communist demand affected not only writers and artists, but also expanded 
to include popular entertainment. In the 1950s, the KMT considered how to'reform' 
all art forms to fit its own political agenda, and gathered eleven governmental 
departments and non-govemmental organisations to organise how to carry out this 
issue further. (LO SU-SHANGý 1961: 270; LIU HUAN-YOEH, 1990: 71) In this meeting, 
folk art forms were condemned as backward and superstitious. They considered 
expressions to play a role in taking up the cultural battle against communism. 
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imposing a ban on the most popular folk performance 
- 
Gezaixi Taiwanese 
opera). '"" "I I. I 1; 1ý 1, ý. .. 11, .I. 
In order to reverse the decision, LO Su-shang, a Taiwanese theatre theorist, wrote a- 
Gezaixi repertoire NO Feigan (k-W-O, A Woman Communist Bandio in 1951 to prove 
that folk'performances could'carry out propaganda tasks. It saved the folk arts, but 
triggered an anti-communist trend. (CH'tN LUNG-TING, 1998; CHIANG WU-CHANQ 
1990: 107) ' 
To make folk artists more aware of their propaganda tasks, similar tactics were used 
- 
official encouragement,, grants, competitions and restrictions. For example, it was 
compulsory to put on a short propaganda repertoire (at least 20 minutes) before each 
performance; The famous puppet performer U Tien-lu was appointed by the KMT as 
the captain of the folklore propaganda team, touring around Taiwan to advocate the 
anti-communist message. (LITIEN-LU, 1991: 145 
-151) 
Another influential policy to 'encourage' the correct performance was the Taiwanese 
traditional opera competition (Tahvansheng difang xUu bisai -ol' In 
order to win, competitors had to satisfy the basic demand of wanti-communist 
, 
principle', 'uplifting the morale", and "carrying national spirit further". (CH'tN 
LUNG-TINQ1998) 
However, the anti-communist theme was difficult to put into the traditional repertoire. 
Many groups were reluctant to attend because this kind of new, politicised repertoire 
lacked box office appeal. (CHIANG WU-CKANGý 1990: 107) Even though some 
attended the official competition, the most common way to'deal withthe official 
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policy was to include political slogans in the final scene. Therefore, many absurd 
scenarios occurred. Ancient officials on the stage would cry out: "Long live the ROCI" 
Soldiers in a historical sefting marched on stage waving the ROC national flag; 
characters of the Song or Ming dynasty would sing the anti-communist songs out 
loud: "fangong fangong fangong dalu qu ff-j.; k, alýk, alýktR5ý-(counterattack, 
counterattack, let's counterattack the mainland)". (CH'tN LUNG-TING, 1998: 10) 
Finally, the result of the competition was decided by a group of adjudicators who 
came from the KMT or the military. 
1.5.4. Broken down yiyantang39 
Yet, the anti-communist trend in folk arts existed for a much shorter time and had less 
influence than in literature or theatre. Chiang Wu-ch'ang (1990: 106-107) said that the 
anti-communist trend in folk arts was only a response to "deal with the government 
policy... for survival". In fact, all folk art forms were only affected when it came to the 
official level (such as competitions, official performance opportunities, titles, etc. ). 
The'anti-communisf period lasted only a few years in folk arts. Ch'C-ng Lung-ting 
(1998: 3) believed that political intervention had actually indirectly boosted the folk 
arts and their popularity. Before the 1950s, most folk performances were held 
outdoors in Taiwan. The only commercially operated performances in theatre venues 
were played by Beijing opera groups from the mainland. Most folk performances 
39 Wyantang literally, means'a conference hall where one person has all the say'. In 
this period, because of the direct military threat, Chiang Kai-shek! s authoritarian rule 
dominated Taiwan. The phrase was used to describe the condition where no one dared to 
challenge or criticise the regime. 
71 
were part of religious festivals, which were usually free to the public. After the 228 
incident, the restriction on 'freedom of assembl)( was imposed. In order to prevent 
public assembly causing trouble and provoking emotions, outdoor performances 
- 
were banned for a year. (CH'LN LUNG--PINQ1998) 
In 1952, the KIVIT started another policy 
-'reforming folk arts, economising religious 
ceremonies (gaishan minsufieyue baibahýc-ff-jZf16, f6flj njfjf). (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 
1998; LU FEW, 1998) Because of the restrictions on the frequencies and the scale of 
-, 
the religious celebrations, many folk artists had to move indoors and operated 
commercial performances. (CHIANG WU-CH'ANQ 1990; LO LI-CHtNG, 1990),, 
-: - 
According to Ch'dng Lung-Ving's (1998) research, apart from Beijing opera, the 
earliest indoor performance took place incentral Taiwan., He believed that this 
revolutionary change in folk arts was made possible because it started from the 
countryside, away from cities and the KMT control. Gezaixi reached its peak after the 
mid-1 950s, and even under strict ideological restriction, became the most popular ,, ý 
entertainment for the masses. (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1998) There were 367 Gezaixi 
venues all over Taiwan in the 1950s. (MO KUANG-HUA, 1996: 75) 
While the - literature and arts communities went through stringent censorship and 
thought policing, the folk arts had a prosperous decade from the mid-1 950s. (LO 
LI-CHENG, 1990; CHIANG WU-CHANG, 1990: 118) The way that folk artists 
responded to anti-communist policy could be seen as a typical way in which ordinary 
people dealt vvith the political demands, 'muddling through' ideological scrutiny. It 
showed how'flexible' people could be, yielding to temporary policy however absurd it 
might be. 
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Comparatively, it was much more difficult for writers and academics to react in the 
same way. Because of the total control of media and resources, writers had little 
choice but to conform, otherwise they lost out. The opportunities to publish pure 
literary works were limited, because the media were mostly controlled by the KMT. (LI 
LI-LING, 1995) 
The anti-communist theme was officially promoted as the most'rewarding' subject 
matter to work on4o. But by the late 1950s, the zhandou wenyi movement had 
become a spent force, and the tide turned. ( Ll LI-LINQ 1995) The famous scholar 
Hu ShihMA gave acute criticism of zhandouwenyi to the ACLA in 1958: 'We wish to 
have a free literary environment. Literature is not something that can be guided, nor. 
coached by the government... I wish that we bear two goals in our mind: a literature 
of humanity, and a literature of free expression. " (HU SHIH, 1958: 6-11) 
Reacting to the repressive environment, private literary magazines emerged in the 
second half of the 1950s to provide space for alternative views and tastes. (YIN 
HSO EH-MAN, 1975: 88) They included Genesis (chuang shUi PlIftfE) in 1954, 
Modem Poems &ft4,1 (by Chi HsOan kM) in 1956, Literature Magazine 3ý-r m,,. N2= 
(by Hsia Chi-an XZ&g-c) in 1956 and Wenxing 3ý_rg inl957. Their appearance broke 
KMT domination and provided a literary oasis in Taiwan. 
By the end of the 1950s, the urge for freedom of expression had grown stronger, and 
40 As long as the subject matter was anti-communist and patriotic, the author would always 
find it easier to be published. In an environment with very limited resources, writers had to 
consider where to submit, and how to be accepted. The prospect of being published and 
awarded with high remuneration was immensely attractive. (CHIANG PAO-CH'Al, 1994; LI 
LI-LING, 1995) 
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Taiwan's literature community sought refuge in westem theodes and ahistodcal 
subject matters. The best example was the literature pedodical. Xandai wenxue JR, 
ft3Zm: r-. It was established in, 1 960 by students from the National Taiwan University 
(later to become famous novelists, including Pai Hsien- yung n, 4ý-M, Wang ýý - 
Wen-hsing 
-T-3ý, rq4, and Ch'C-n Johsi MýW). Xandai wenxue promoted westem 
literary trends and encouraged 'pure' literary writing, which refused to deal with 
political topics and party propaganda. 
According to Chiang Pao-ch'ai (1994), the significance of Xandai wenxue was its 
- 
crucial position in linking the past and future, and ushering in a modernised and 
non-political literary world. Because it was the first publication providing a haven for 
literary creation under the shelter of western theories, the space it occupied in 
. 
Taiwanese literary history was not just that of a literary magazine, but also a vehicle 
to rebel against the mainstream zhandou wen)! tradition, risking the threat of White 
Terror'. However, because of strict thought control, their way to avoid trouble was to 
cut their work off from the link with troublesome reality, and hide within their ivory 
tower. This divorce from reality was later to become problematic in the 1970s. 
By the 1960s, there were two main literary trends in Taiwan. (YANG CHAO, 1995a: 
112-115) In either avoiding political persecution, or by trying to get into the 
mainstream, two styles co-existed: modernist literature (represented by Mandai 
wenxue Magazine) and anti-communist literature (represented by the party-run 
Creative Literature). 
Anti-communist literature used a hysterical, resounding, and positive tone to assure a 
morally superior final victory. In contrast modernists explored a much more enclosed, 
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personal diaspora experience, divorced from tradition and the past. "They took refuge 
under the modemist shelter 
... 
did not believe in anything familiar and doubted the 
experience from the past... Familiarity, to them, represented an illusion of stability. " 
(YANG CHAO, 1995a: 116-117) Modernist literature became the writers' sanctuary. In 
order to avoid trouble, western literary theories were transplanted to Taiwanese 
literature, but in a manner that deliberately ignored the critical and political aspects of 
modemism. 
In fact, anti-communist and modernist literary styles were two sides of the same coin. 
(YANG CHAO, 1995a: 117) Although taking clearly different approaches, both trends 
were the direct responses to, and a way of coping with, the emotional turmoil 
- 
uncertainty, anxiety, and the diaspora experience of many in Taiwan at that time. The 
atmosphere of Taiwan's literature in the 1950s and 60s was'narcotic!: full of 
memories and alienated from reality and locality. (LIAO PING-HUI, 1995: 129) 
Modernist literature in Taiwan tended to yearn for the past and the motherland, but 
avoided the immediate past and contemporary reality of Taiwanese society. (LIAO 
PING-HUI, 1995: 130) As a result, fragmentation, paleness, and self-indulgence were 
the common characteristics of Taiwanese literature by the end of 1960s. By the 
1970s, the modemist style was gradually accepted by the authorities and became the 
mainstream. (TSIýNG HUI-CHIA, 1998; LIAO PING-HUI, 1995) Partly, this was 
because Taiwanese society had gradually industrialised and westernised, and the 
straightforward anti-communist literature seemed outdated; partly, it was because the 
KMT encouraged this sort of modernist approach, rejecting 'realise paradigms and 
focusing on the world of the individual. (TSLNG HUI-CHIA, 1998: 149) 
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1.5.5. Striving for democracy, 
- 
Even under the Mrs authoritarian rule, there had been a few political incidents 
relating to the demand for democracy and freedom of speech. Some appealed to the 
KMT to accept the international reality that the ROC was no longer recognised as the 
-ý 
legitimate Chinese government, 'and that more effort should be placed on 
-, 
establishing Taiwan. Some demanded independence as well as democratic reform. 
Such opinions were expressed by incidents such as the Su Tung-ch'i Incidenel; 
P'6ng Ming-min Inciden t42... Perhaps most significant of all such incidents was the 
Lei Chbn Inadent in 1960. 
Lei Chdn was an active member of the KMT and was once a trusted friend of Chiang 
Kai-shek. After the KMT fled to Taiwan, he founded the fortnightly magazine Free 
China in 1949, which advocated freedom and called for democracy. At first, Lei's 
main interest was to persuade Chiang to allow the liberal leader Hu Shih to establish 
an opposition, and for the two groups to work together. (LIN HSIEN-CHENG, 2000) 
After the signing of the American-Taiwan Defence Treaty, and the incrimination of 
General Sun Li-jen ]ZAý3 
, 
Lei Chdn became disillusioned by Chiang's 
41 Su Tung-ch'i U*rAwas a councilor of Yunlin V# County. He organised an armed uprising 
in 1961 and failed. There were over 300 people arrested. 42 Pdng Ming-min was the head of the Department of Politics, NTU. In 1964, he proposed a 
Self-determination Declaration of Taiwan's People (taiwan renmin z#iu xuanyan tM), JK- r] R 
1_-ý 
_fLTr) as the solution to the problem of Taiwan's international status. He was arrested for 
'instigation' and jailed for over a year and finally granted a special amnesty in 1965. He left 
Taiwan in 1970 and advocated Taiwan's independence abroad. 
43 To win back American support after defeat in 1949, Chiang Kaiýshek was forced to put two 
figures 
- 
Sun U-jen and Wu Kuo-chen 
_, 
qJMj,, a 
- 
who were trusted by Washington in important 
positions. Sun was recommended by Amedca to replace Chiang's left-hand man Ch'en 
Ch'dng FVR as governor of Taiwan. Eventually, under pressure from Washington, Wu 
Kuo-chen had replaced Ch'dn Ch'6ng by the end of 1949 and Sun was appointed as the 
Commander in Chief of the Army in 1950. Wu left Taiwan in 1953 under threat of death, and 
went into exile in America; Sun was incriminated by the KMT for'protecting his communist 
staff. He was impdsoned for 33 years until 1988. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997, chapter 30) 
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authoritarian style. The opinion of Free China was critical, and the issue of human 
rights gradually became its main concern. 
In 1955, its criticism of the CYC irritated the authorities. The incident started with a 
readers letter arguing that the establishment of the CYC would damage the 
education system. Following it, other discussions of the CYC condemned it as the 
extension of the KMT in schools. Because of this, Lei Chk was expelled from the 
KMT. 
In 1957, Yin Hai-kuang Nn)t-, professor of Philosophy at the National Taiwan 
University (NTU), frankly stated the impossibility of recovering mainland and the 
negative influence of this illusion in the editorial in Free China. 
Many, governmental policies are based on the assumption of mashangfiuyao hui 
dalu (going back to the mainland soon). It allowed many maladies 
and abuses to happen... This mashang fluyao hui dalu mentality has formed a 
psychological status of tolerance and over-leniency for temporariness. Therefore, 
people take many unreasonable and harsh policies as temporary measures, and 
hope things would get better after going back. (quoted from I-I HSIAO-FENG, 
1992) 
This frank analysis of the 'impossibility of going back! irritated the KMT. In 1960, Lei 
Ch8n united Taiwanese politicians, and planned to form the opposition 'Chinese 
Democratic Party'. He was arrested for'disseminating Communist ideas' and was 
jailed for ten years. Free China was then closed down. (LI HSIAO-FENG, 1994: 
347-348) 
In the 1950s, criticism like the articles in Free China was very rare. These were the 
opinions of an older generation of liberal activists. After Lei ChC-n was imprisoned and 
Free China shut down, the liberal camp suffered a heavy blow. However, a new 
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generation of liberal thinkers was emerging. ',,,, -"- :--, 
_.; 
In 1961, an article7he elderly and the sticWwas published in Wenxing 3ZV 
Magazine (No. 49), written by a young PhD historian Lee Ao2p-: jk. This started a, 
second generation demanding democracy and freedom of speech. Lee not only 
bluntly criticised Chinese tradition, but also named and shamed some celebrities both, 
in politics and academia. Later another of his articles in Wenxing 
- 
"The Seed-sower, 
-, ý 
Hu Shih" aroused a further wave of debate about Chinese modernisation, a familiar 
struggle of discourses since the May Fourth Movement. (LEE AO, 1964) 
In 1962, Lee became the chief editor of Wenxing and transformed the magazine into 
-:, 
a political forum. (LEE AO, 2000) Because of its rare frankness and refreshing 
-- 
alternative thinking, it was popular among university students. (HONG HSING-FU, 
1983) New books compiled and published by Wenxing would always aftract many 
readers. Many of their banned publications could be found in bookshops near the 
NTU. (YANG CHAO, 1995a: 131-132) 
Both Free China and Wenxing voiced alternative opinions opposed to orthodox 
official publications. They presented anti-traditional and liberal voices, pursuing 
democracy and freedom in a conservative and closed society. Although the 19 50s 
was an age when freedom of speech did not exist, the desire for and the struggle for 
democracy and freedom had never been put down completely. Their radical thinking 
and criticism managed to pass stringent regulations and censorship. Although liberal 
ideas and radical thinking were in the minority, they inspired the younger generation 
and encouraged freethinking. (CHEN CHIN-YU, 1996, chapter 2) 
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However, suppression did not cease, but became even more severe in the 1960s. 
Wenxing was forced to stop publication for a year in 1966, which then turned into a 
twenty-year ban". Lee Ao was not imprisoned, but was subjected to police 
surveillance for many years. He was finally arrested for treason in 1971. His books 
were banned constantly before the lift of martial IaW45. 
Similar cases also happened among academics and writers in the attempt to silence 
dissent. For example, the NTU yielded to political pressure, and forced professor Yin 
Hai-kuang to stop teaching in 1966 because of his long-time criticism of political 
interference in academic freedom, and his belief in political democracy. (CHILI 
HEI-YUAN, 1999) Another case was writer Po Yang, who was put in jail for a bizarre 
reason in 196846 
Although the culture communities could not resist this suppression directly, in 
contrast to the silenced 1950s, criticism became frequent, and dissent was voiced in 
every possible way by the 1960s. By then, the KMT realised that coercion did not 
always work and its wish for pure domination could not be fully materialised. 
44 The editorial "Our stem protest about the legal system and party power (Women dui guofa 
dangxian de yanzheng biaoshi in Wenxing (No. 98) criticised the 
interference of the KMT in judicial judgement and military operation. It also protested against 
censorship. Because of it, Wenxing was forced to stop publication for a year. However, it was 
not allowed to resume publication until September 1986. 
45 According to Ts'al Han-hs0n(I 995), at least 15 of Lee Ao's books were banned before he 
got out of prison in 1976. Between 1981 to 1987, Lee Ao ran two political magazines (Qianqiu 
Review Wansui Review and 80 issues of them were banned. 
46 Po Yang Mfg was a journalist who worked in one of KIVIT party newspapers 
-Zhonghua 
Daily News ýP* El ýR. In 1968, he was prosecuted as a communist spy becasue of a small 
incident at work. The trouble was casued by a bad translation in the comic Popeye. He 
translated the word 'fellows' used by Popeye into 
- 
quanguojunmin tongbao men 
JAfM(all the army and the people of the nation) 
-a phrase usually used by Chiang Kai-shek to 
begin his speeches. This translation was accused of defaming the leader's image, and Irying 
to attack the state leader'. He was at first sentenced to death, which was then changed to 
twelve years (later reduced to ten years). 
79 
Summary 
Cultural policy in early post-war Taiwan focused on education, language and 
literature, encleavouring "to make the Taiwanese Chinese again", and promofing 
traditional Chinese (especially Confucian) culture. Both the mentality of treating the 
Taiwanese as'lost children raised by the enemy', and the effort of 
Sinification/de-Japanisation, remained unchanged throughout the post-war culture 
building process. However,, the emphasis moved towards anti-communism and 
Sanminzhuyi after 1949. Most of all, it was a culture construction process to 
"nationalise Chinese culture". (CHUN, 1996: 131) 
In order to aggressively construct a new generation with unified ideologies, education 
was identified as the most important vehicle. I agree with Gellner (1983) that 
universal literacy, a result of mass education, was the essential element for 
constructing a national culture. The cultural policy (especially the education reform 
and language unification) imposed in post-war Taiwan was a typical example of the 
transition that Gellner described from an agrarian society to an industrial one. The, 
decisions of what should be taught or excluded, and what should be encouraged or 
discouraged were all fundamentally political. The decisions were based on the 
interests of the KMT and their need to reproduce an imagined motherland and a 
glorious shared history (between Taiwan and China). 
It was fair to say that 'education' was the key to Taiwan's culture construction at this 
period. Once the selected knowledge, values and political ideologies were taught and 
constantly reinforced in schools'as the only universal truth, it was hard for children to 
think otherwise. Nevertheless, as Williams argues, "if what we learn were merely an 
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imposed ideology, or if it were only the isolable meanings and practices of the ruling 
class, or of a section of the ruling class, which 
... 
occupying merely the top of our 
minds, it would be 
... 
a very much easier thing to overthrow. " (1976b: 205) Education 
is an ongoing process and the interaction between formal and informal education is 
far more complicated than it may at first seem. The formation of our world-view is 
shifting and changing all the time. 
In early post-war Taiwan, people were still striving for bare survival, and the 
party-state controlled most resources, which meant that the KMT dominated most of 
the processes of meaning-production (which were written and determined by the 
government, and transmitted by schooling). In the cultural circuit, (DU GAY, 1997) the 
effect of 'cultural regulation' on producing 'representation' and constructing identity is 
overwhelming. 
It was almost impossible to voice one's dissent or criticise the system in the early 
1950s, since nearly all the resources were under state control. Those who strove for 
democracy in the 1950s and 60s, although laying foundations for later democratic 
development, were still in the minority. Most people in Taiwan were just trying to get 
by. In general, there were two typical responses that the Taiwanese made to deal 
with cultural control and ideological scrutiny in the first two decades of the post-war 
years. One was 'escapism', appearing among the elites; the other wasfuyan (Mffi)'- 
demonstrated mostly by folk artists and the masses. 
When the military threat across the Taiwan Strait was at its height, the academics and 
writers faced a dilemma. The only way to express oneself safely was either ignoring 
the reality of life, or conforming to official demands. (YANG CHAO, 1995a, 1995b; Ll 
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LI-LING, 1995; CHIANG PAO-CH'Al, 1994) 
While the writers and artists tried to avoid tripping over ideological landmines, 
ordinary people used fuyan to get by. The phrase fuyan means'acting in a 
perfunctory manner, or'muddling through one's work or duty'. It showed the 
pragmatic attitude of going along with, and obeying the official policy, but with a 
perfunctory manner. Therefore, doing it badly or complying Without believing was the 
way to achieve fuyan. Even the young Taiwanese girl in Stafford's case studies (1995: 
3) adopted a similar attitude to deal with heavy school demands. She followed the 
rules and studied as told, but burnt all textbooks after the examinations. 
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Chapter 2 Cultural Renaissance Movement 
The most important cultural policy in Taiwan during the 1960s and early 1970s was 
the Cultural Renaissance Movement. In this chapter, I will concentrate on how the 
movement was implemented and how the KMT tried to construct the ROC on Taiwan 
as the legitimate Chinese government both domestically and internationally. 
2.1. Rescuing tradition 
2.1.1. Counterattack of Cultural Revolution 
In May 1966, the Cultural Revolution was mobilised in China. In response, the KMT 
decided to initiate an action to combat the destruction of traditional culture. On 12 th 
November 1966, Chiang Kai-shek condemned the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
for launching the Cultural Revolution, in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Day ceremony, 
and used the opportunity to reassure people in Taiwan that they were on the'right! 
side. 
At that gathering, he urged the participants to wage a counterattack by protecting 
traditional culture. Responding to Chiang's call, 1,500 participants proposed to name 
that day (November 12") 'Chinese Cultural Renaissance Day', and to launch the 
Cultural Renaissance Movemene to counter the Cultural Revolution. 
1 November 1: ýh was Sun Yat-sen's birthday. Naming the day as'Cultural Renaissance Day' 
(zhonghua wenhua fuxingfie rýV_ýZJE. MFQM) was a way not only to commemorate him, but 
also to link his historical significance with Chinese culture and tradition. The Cultural 
Renaissance Movement (zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong rý*_5cfLffl4gft was also 
known as the Chinese Culture Restoration Movement. 
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k. 
-- 
On the surface, the movement was a bottom-up initiation., In reality; it was created on 
the instruction of Chiang Kai-shek and organised and supported by the KMT Before 
the movement was formally launched in July 1967, its goals and tasks were already 
planned by the KMT at the 12 th Party Affairs Meeting. The KMT even drew up 
'Measures for Promoting and Reviving Chinese Culture at All Levels (g9ji zuzhi 
tuixing zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong 
&)'as the national guideline. (CH'tN Ll-FU, 1989) 
On July 28 th 1967, the Chinese Culture Restoration Committee (CCRC, zhonghua 
gRgMMf- wenhua fUXing yUndong tUiXing WeiyUanhUi rp-#-ýZJ. LT -. fýjnftf I was 
formally set up to implement the mission to revive traditional culture. At the inaugural 
ceremony, Chiang Kai-shek was elected as the chairman of the CCRC. The role of 
the CCRC was to be the'designer, communicator, coordinator, and negotiator of the 
whole movement. (KU FýNG-HSIANQ 1977: ii) Implementation was, however, the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education (MOE). A cultural war was waged. The 
previous anti-communist emphasis in national policy was shifted to preserving 
traditional culture. 
The structure of the CCRC included both administrative and promotional bodies. The 
Secretariat was in charge of administrative matters, including planning, operation, 
and supervision of departments. (CCRC, 1977: 2) Eight special committees were set 
up to promote areas that needed special attention. It was no surprise to see the 
Educational Reform and Promotion Committee Uiaoyu gaige cqjinhui, *jM*JjýAft) 
was the first, since education had always been a KMT priority. Apart from education 3 
2 The English title was given by the CCRC itselt (NCA, 
-1996) 3 The other seven committees included the Academic Research Promotion Committee', the 
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focus was mainly placed on modernising life style and funding and publishing 
academic research. (CCRC, 1977,1978) 
On the surface, the CCRC was a non-govemmental organisation. However, the fact 
that it had the state leader as its chairman and was funded directly by the party-state 
indicated it was something more than that. Its ambiguous status (whether it was a 
party machine, state apparatus, or neither) became problematic in the late 1980s. 
(See Chapter 4.1. ) 
Cultural policy had always been important for the KMT, nonetheless, it functioned 
mostly as social control or ideological instilment. Before the movement was launched, 
@cultural struggle' across the Strait had already been regarded as part of combat. 
However, it was after 1967 that cultural affairs became the centrepiece of the political 
arena. In contrast to the two previous decades of suppression of Taiwanese cultural 
development, this movement was indeed the first cultural policy positively 
constructing culture (even though limited to certain selected content and categories). 
Furthermore, the 'New Literary and Artistic Movement in the Armed Forces (guojun 
_ 
M)v4 xinwenyiyundong W-Mg-OZOA was also launched to support the movement. 
Citizen Welfare Improvement and Guidance Committee, the Compilation and Translation 
Committee of Chinese Science and Civilization, the Literature and Arts Research and 
Enhancement Committee, the Committee of Awarding Research on Chinese Science 
Technology and Inventions, the Chinese Opera Promotion Committee, and the Finance 
Committee. (CCRC, 1977: 2-3) 
4 In 1965, the Ministry of National Defence (MND) invited 83 artists and writers to set up a 
guiding committee to help people within the Armed Forces to develop their artistic talents and 
interests. Nine groups (novel, prose, poem, music, theatre and film, broadcasting, fine arts, 
Chinese opera, and folk arts) of artists were invited to coach those who would take up artistic 
creation in the forces. Its purpose was to provide soldiers with artistic training for future 
cultural struggle. In 1968, the Literature and Arts Combat Team (guojun zhandou wenyi 
gongzuodui WWITArj3ZVT-fýr-jý) was formed to promote not only zhandou wenyi, but also 
Cultural Renaissance in the Armed Forces. 
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2.1.2. Network building 
-- 
In order to materialise Cultural Renaissance ideas, the CCRC had to set up its own 
executive agents. According to Chiang's instruction that branches be set up at every 
, 
level, three different branches were created Within two years: 
(1) Local branches 
-7 Under the jurisdiction of the CCRC, there were branches 
at prov I incial, countý, city, and village levels. In total, there were 410 local 
- 
branches. 
(2) School branches 
- 
Every education unit was -counted as one. There were 
3,366 branches (2,346 elementary schools; 925 secondary schools; and 95 
colleges and universities). 
(3) Overseas branches in America, Europe, Asia, Africa and Asian Pacific areas, 
of which there were 46. (CCRC, 1977: 10-12) 
By building up a network with such a tight structure, the CCRC had the ability to 
initiate its activities and mobilise the movement throughout Taiwan. Amongst all the 
branches, the most effective agents were the schools. 
Although all governmental organisations were mobilised to support the movement, 
the education system continued, to be the most reliable, efficient and effective agent. 
The CCRC (1977: 103-124) claimed that the implementation of nine-year compulsory 
education, and the success of education reform were crucial in achieving its goals. It 
acknowledged the effectiveness of constructing the foundation of political culture 
from childhood. Even when the movement started to provoke doubts and was 
severely criticised for being out of touch in the 1970s, schools remained its solid 
foundation. 
Outside of schools, the CCRC had to rely on the help of local branches to implement 
its range of programmes. The local branches were active in the first few years, but 
their influence soon declined after the initial fever subsided. 
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As to overseas branches, they functioned as clubs for overseas Chinese providing 
traditional cultural resources such as Chinese books, touring performances and 
exhibitions, and organising Chinese language courses. These branches tried to set 
up relationships with overseas Chinese communities and promote the Cultural 
Renaissance Movement However, it became difficult because of Taiwan's increasing 
international isolation in the 1970s. Their operation relied heavily on the political 
stance (pro-Communist or pro-KMT) of overseas Chinese communities and their host 
countries. Sometimes the CCRC even made use of existing community clubs or 
student unions abroad to operate its programmes. (CHINESE CULTURE 
RESTORATION MONTHLY, 1980: 4-7) 
Apart from these branches, an official organisation within the government was also 
needed to deal with the implementation in other areas, such as in literature, music, 
fine art, drama, dance, film and television. (HSIAO A-CHIN, 1991: 105) In 1967, the 
Culture Bureau was formed to play a supporting role under the jurisdiction of the 
MOE. The Culture Bureau claimed to have two tasks: cultural renaissance, and 
cultural battle against communism. (CULTURE BUREAU, 1968: 108) There were four 
departments, one in charge of promoting the Cultural Renaissance Movement; one 
encouraging artistic activities; one managing broadcasting (radio and television); and 
another supervising the film industry. 
However, the Culture Bureau was abolished in 1973. Its first and only head, Wang 
Hung-chOn 
-: 
EVt, ýt attributed its short-life to its low status in the government hierarchy. 
(CHEN MAN-LINQ 1998) At that time, there were too many organisations dealing 
with cultural affairs within the government and the KMT 
- 
for example in publication, 
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the Ministry of Interior (MOI); in film, television and broadcasting, the Government 
Information Office (GIO) and the KIVIT, in performing arts, the General Political 
Warfare Department (of the MND) and the Department of Social Education (of the 
MOE). 
Wang admitted that, as a low-ranking bureau organisation, it was powerless to 
coordinate ministries and party machines. The other organisations not only disagreed 
and contradicted each other, but also would not support the Culture Bureau's 
coordination or suggestions. Disputes and power struggles would occur during the 
negotiation process. In 1973, the Culture Bureau was finally closed down. It lasted 
less than six years. 
2.1.3. Building up new daotong5 
According to the CCRC (1977), - their aims were the revival of Chinese culture (fuxing 
zhonghua wenhua and promoting traditional ethics and morality 
(fayang lunli daode RM%)Mtý). However, the problem was how to set about 
achieving these two goals. Chiang Kai-sheWs solution (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984h) 
was Sanminzhuyi. 
Sanminzhuyi is a modified socialist theory, which had as its aim the modemisation of 
China. (Also see Chapter 1.1.3. ) According to Chiang's interpretation (1 984f, 1984g, 
0 Dao M means Way' or'discourse'; tong 9 means Iradition' or'interconnected and coherent 
system'. Generally speaking, daotong means the tradition of the correct discourse and proper 
ways of behaving. The ancient sage kings set up benevolent examples for later rulers to 
follow. Therefore, daotong particularly refers to Confucian orthodoxy, which always related to 
political legitimacy and orthodox status. In Confucian ideas, political legitimacy is morally 
correct. (CH'tN CHMAN, 1986a) 
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1984i, 19841), the essential elements of Sanminzhuyi were "ethics, democracy and 
science". These three principles were chosen as the appropriated responses to 
three areas of concern in the late 1 gth century: nationalism (national self-esteem), 
democracy (the political reform), and people's livelihood. 
In contrast, what the Chinese Communists had done on the mainland, according to 
Chiang, was immoral (abandoning national spirit), undemocratic, and unscientific 
(failing to manage people's livelihood). (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984h: 68-69) In other 
words, the CCP was a regime that betrayed national interests and the ideal of 
Sanminzhuyi. In response to that, Chiang, through the Cultural Renaissance 
Movement, advocated the fight against Communism and the need to protect Chinese 
culture With these three essences (ethics, democracy and science). 
Chiang Kai-shek emphasised that Sanminzhuyi was based on both western socialist 
ideas and Chinese thinking, and developed the ideas to his own end. He concluded 
that five thousand years of daotong had been passed on by all the sage kings and 
political saints, from Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, WU, Zhougong7 to Confucius, and 
finally inherited by Sun Yat-sen. (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984g: 546; 1984f: 270) 
The KMT tried to link Sanminzhuyi With Chinese traditional culture and political 
orthodoxy, and emphasised that Chiang was Sun's true successor. At the same time, 
the KMT condemned the CCP as a foreign party, claiming that communist ideas were 
ro Here, Chiang referred mainly to'applied science', since this would directly improve people's 
livelihood. 
7 Yao P_ and Shun # were legendary sage kings in ancient China; Yu j% was the reputed 
founder of the Xia 3Z Dynasty (21st 
- 
16 th century B. C. ); Tang A was the founding king of the 
Shang gj Dynasty (16 th 
_ 
11th century B. C. ); Wen 3Z and Wu A were the father-and-son-kings 
that established the Zhou Dynasty (I I th century to 256 B. C. ), and Zhougong %ý was Wen's 
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not suitabler for the Chinese. (CHEN LI-FU, - 1974: 14) By stressing the idea that the 
CCP was evil and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was a rebellious and 
unlawful polity, 
- 
the issue of the ROC's legitimacy was addressed indirectly. 
At first sight, advocating Sanminzhuyi in the Cultural Renaissance Movement 
seemed irrelevant. However,, Chiang Kai-shek emphasised that traditional Chinese 
, 
culture was embedded deeply in Sanminzhuyi. By advocating Sanminzhuyi (or more 
precisely, Chiang's interpretation of it) and linking it with selected Chinese culture and 
tradition in the movement, a newly constructed daotong 
- 
political legitimacy and 
., 
orthodox tradition 
- 
was produced. Furthermore, it was clear that the focus of the 
.- 
movement was not on the revival of tradition, but on the selection of tradition. In the 
- 
name of preserving traditional culture and history, the movement endeavoured to 
retell history and build a 'traditional culture' according to the Mrs vision. 
2.1.4. Political legitimacy built by culture 
An overall cultural and historical makeover was needed to create a new daotong. 
., 
Glorifying Sanminzhuyi was the first step., After emphasising Sun Yat-sen's orthodox,, 
status in Chinese history, his relationship with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT would 
also need to be tackled. Therefore, making connecUons between Sanminzhuyi and 
. 
traditional cUlture, 'reinforcing the succeeding role of Chiang Kai-shek, and 
reinventing selected tradition became the most important issues in this movement. In 
other words, instead of promoting culture as a whole, the CCRC was promoting 
(selected) ethics and moralities. (HSIAOA-CH'IN, 1991) 
brother, who assisted Wu in governing the kingdom. 
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There were several ways to link Chinese traditional culture with Sanminzhuyi.. (CCRC, 
1977: Hii, 1-4,24-28) Most commonly, it was to construct academic foundations to link 
Sanminzhuyi vvith traditional Chinese political concepts. (CHEN L17FU, 1988: 28; 
CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984f: 271) Another tactic was to prove the legitimacy of the 
KMT and Chiang Kai-shek, and their political correctness. Hence, this movement 
accentuated the evil of the CCP and condemned it as the sinner of Chinese history. 
(CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984g, 1984h) The KIVIT claimed that communist ideas had 
never been part of Chinese daotong, whereas, the ROC on Taiwan was not only the 
politically legitimate government, but also the culturally orthodox inheritor of Chinese 
daotong. Chiang Kai-shek, successor to Sun Yat-sen and loyal pursuer of 
Sanminzhuyi, was the heir to this Chinese daotong. 
To maintain this image as the inheritor and protector of orthodox Chinese culture, the 
CCRC's mission was to construct Taiwan as an "exemplary province of Sanminzhuyi", 
and "the base for reviving Chinese tradition" (CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1984g). To 
support Taiwan as the embodiment of orthodox, traditional China, the National 
Palace Museum was opened in Taipei in 1965.3,000 cases of national treasures 
containing the cream of Chinese arts from the Palace Museum in Beijing were on 
display. 
The National Palace Museum soon became the centre for specialists in Chinese art 
and attracted millions of tourists. However, it is worth noting the timing and the 
purpose of the KIVIT's careful shipment of these artefacts to Taiwan during the civil 
war (winter 1948), which took place even before the official retreat in 1949. Chiang 
Fu-ts'ung HIR11,9(1977: 8-83), the first director of National Palace Museum, shed 
some light on the reason why they were shipped prior to the armies and civil servants. 
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He explained, the take-over and preservation of cultural relics had always been of 
great importance during the change of dynasties in Chinese history. The symbolic 
meaning of tradition and continuity was significant Therefore, the purpose of 
protecting these national treasures was exactly to maintain a political legitimacy and 
the sense of traditional continuity for the incoming rulers. 
In order to build the image of Taiwan as the base of Chinese orthodoxy, the ROC 
sent Beijing opera troupes abroad. The first Beijing opera to tour abroad was 
performed by the Dapeng )ýV Beijing opera troupe in 1957. They toured around 
Europe for five'months and put on 124 performances. Later, the Fuxing ; MR Beijing 
Opera School, under the direct jurisdiction of the MOE, regularly represented the 
ROC touring abroad. The biggest ever Beijing opera tours, performed by the ROC 
Chinese Opera Group8, under the organisation of the MOE, took place in the USA in 
1973 and 1974 after the ROC was forced out of the UN. The tours acted as cultural 
ambassadors to sustain Taiwan's 'authentic Chinese'image. (MAO CHIA-HUA, 1995:, 
122) According to the group leader Yang Ch'i-hsien (11995), the whole experience of 
the tours formulated a model for future cultural exchange. 
During ten years of Cultural Revolution in a China closed to the rest of the world, 
Taiwan successfully provided an alternative, and supplement, for people longing for 
traditional Chinese culture or who wanted to learn Chinese languagesg. There were 
many courses'designed especially for foreign students to learn Chinese. The earliest 
0 It was constituted by the elite in this trade who teamed up temporarily for the tour. The' 
troupe called itself 'Chinese Opera'to emphasise the association of cultural orthodoxy. 9 According to the Government Information Office (GIO. 1993a: 133). there were nearly 6,000 
foreign students from 73 countries around the world enrolled in ROC higher education and 
Chinese language studies during the academic year 1991-1992. According to the calculation 
of the MTC (MANDARIN TRAINING CENTRE, 2001), there have been at least 33,247 foreign 
students trained in its centre (according to average student numbers of 1000 to 1200 students 
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one was run by the Mandarin Training Centre in the National Taiwan Normal 
University in 1956. The other prominent ones included the Inter-university Program 
for Chinese Language Studies (the Stanford Centre) on the campus of the National 
Taiwan University (NTU), the Mandarin courses organised by the Mandarin Daily 
News, and many Mandarin Training (or Learning) Centres in universities'(). 
(MANDARIN TRAINING CENTRE, 2001) 
Taking the political opportunity afforded to him by the Cultural Revolution on the 
mainland, Chiang Kai-shek directly and indirectly indicated that the revival of 
traditional Chinese culture was equivalent to the recovery of the mainland. Therefore, 
this movement became the frontline of the anti-communist struggle. 
2.2. KMT Strategy 
2.2.1. Degraded Taiwan 
The intensive activities of the Cultural Renaissance Movement were considered 
"enormously successful" (CCRC, 1977: 233-235) in its first decade. There were three 
major focuses: education reform, promotion of Chinese civilisation and scientific 
achievements (in order to enhance historical pride and encourage scientific 
development), and the modernisation of daily life. 
Apart from imposing nine-year compulsory education and unifying textbooks, 
Fer term since 1956). 0 They include Fu Jen Mf-- Catholic University, Chengchi Aýýn University, Fengchia J193 
University, Tanchiang J? k'M University, Chinese Culture University, Chingi jUA University, 
T'unghai *0 University. 
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language policy also became severe. Since the movement was launched, a complete 
-, 
ban on using dialects in schools had been imposed. (Also see Chapter 1.3.3. ) Chdn 
Mei-ju (1996) described the two decades of this movement was the worst period for 
local dialects. In 1973, the MOE even took guoyu WUýffl(national spoken language, 
Mandarin) as an individual subject and trained teachers specialising in Mandarin 
tuition. (LI CH'IN-AN, 1997) 
Another influential language policy was the restriction on dialect programme 
broadcasting. In 1971; the Taiwan provincial government restricted TV programmes 
, 
in local dialects to only an hour per day. (SUN HUI-MEI, 1997; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 
1998) In 1976, the Radio and Television Broadcasting Act was promulgated. Article 
20 of the Act stipulated that the proportion of Mandarin programmes should be more 
than 70 %. (CH'ýN MEI-JU, 1996; Ll CH'IN-AN, 1997) It was not until 1993 that 
Article 20 was finally abolished. 
The stringent language policy could be regarded as'successful'. By 1991, the 
Mandarin-speaking population had reached 90%. (1-1 CHIN-AN, 1997) Even after 
local dialects were introduced into the education system by some opposition county 
magistrates and mayors after the lift of martial law in 1987, the official attitude 
remained discouraging until the late 1990s. 
Because of the aim to revive traditional Chinese culture, any unorthodox and 
unconventional culture was discouraged. The glorification of Chinese culture also 
meant the belittlement of Taiwanese culture. Culturally, China became the centre and 
Taiwan peripheral to it Chinese culture was glorified as the best and grandest, while 
Taiwanese culture was considered parochial and secondary. The consequence of this 
94 
movement was profound. 
For example, because of its connection with religious ceremony and local dialects, 
the business of folk arts was heavily hit. In the 1950s, folk performances survived by 
the support of the masses and transformed themselves from pure religious events 
into commercialised activities. However, the situation had changed since the 
movement was launched in the mid-1960s. There were several reasons for this. 
Firstly, indigenous culture was degraded as 'vulgar' and 'tasteless', in contrast to 
'classical', refined' Chinese arts from the mainland. Secondly, the tightened language 
policy not only punished dialect-users, but also debased the. status of local dialects. 
Consequently, it degraded Taiwanese performing arts, because dialects were the 
essence and foundation for folk arts". 
Furthermore, the promotion of modemisation tamished the reputation of religion as 
'superstitious'. Since the early 20th century, this trend of rationalism and scientism 
dominated Chinese thinking, showing the desire to change the old frail empire. 
(CHEN MEI-YEN, 1991) As a result of that, folk art performances were degraded as 
a cultural product related with superstition and backwardness. Even so, the most 
crucial element for its decline was the industrialisation of Taiwanese society in the 
1970s, which will be looked at later. (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1998; SUN HUI-MEI, 1997) 
In contrast to their robust resistance towards stringent control in the 1950s, the folk 
11 Local dialect was an important component in traditional performing art forms, especially for 
xiqu (traditional opera forms). The operatic tune (shengqiang ffM, 
- 
of local xiqu has a 
fundamental connection with local dialects. Details of this nature are explained in Chapter 
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arts were the biggest casualties in the 1970s. The contemptuous attitude toward all 
., 
folk art forms impacted on both the 'identit)( of performers (and also audiences) and 
its 'representation' as vulgar, backward, superstitious and parochial. In the process of 
. 
-, 
meaning production, the movement created an image of folk arts such that only 
country bumpkins would appreciate them. 
Apart from the degradation of the Cultural Renaissance Movement, Taiwan's 
- 
industrialisation had changed the environment of folk arts and the taste of its 
audiences. As a result, the folk arts market shrank. In the 1950s and 60s, the 
influence of 'regulation'and 'representation' (which dominated by the authorities) 
were most important for constructing identity and meanings in Taiwan's enclosed and 
authoritarian society. However, the emphasis shifted, and the processes of 
'production' and 'consumption' became more influential in the industrialised 1970s. 
2.2.2. Academic incorporation 
In order to construct and select a KIVIT-favoured tradition, an overall culture- 
construction was necessary. The most common tactic was to use academic research 
and favoured discourses to build up moral bases. The CCRC systematically 
encouraged, funded, and organised academic research and publications. (CCRC, 
1977: 45-83) 
Ku F6ng-hsiang (1987), the first secretary-general of the CCRC, said, "Academic 
progress is the core of culture development 
... 
academic research 
... 
will inspire new 
research, uplift national self-esteem, and improve foreign understanding of Chinese 
culture. " It was evident that the CCRC supported intellectuals with plentiful resources 
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(research projects, publications, facilities, fame, position, etc. ), in order to select and 
rewrite the content of 'traditional culture' to meet its own needs. 
According to the CCRC's own records (1977), many series of books and research 
papers were funded and published. These publication projects involved almost all the 
academics in the fields of history, Chinese literature and philosophy. Over two 
hundred scholars, professors and senior lecturers from the higher education sector, 
were invited to produce over one hundred volumes of the Chinese Culture series. 
(KU FýNG-HSIANGý 1987) 
The focuses of sponsorship were mainly on certain subjects, such as Sanminzhuyi, 
theories of ancient thinkers and philosophers, Chinese history, literary classics, and 
scientific achievement. This was because the main concerns of the CCRC were to 
organise discursive Chinese culture, select and glorify historical achievement in 
every aspect into a systematic tradition. 
Most of all, the task was to popularise Sanminzhuyi and thereby build up the 
orthodox status of the KMT Therefore, Sanminzhuyi was elaborated, compiled, 
published, and popularised nationwide. In order to create the sense of continuity of 
Chinese daotong and to imply that Chiang Kai-shek was the successor of Sun 
Yat-sen (since Chiang carried out Sun's ideals), academics were called in to select, 
compile and annotate both Sun and Chiang's writings, and to make connections to 
ancient classics. In addition, the establishment of Sanminzhuyi clubs on university 
campuses were encouraged to popularise Chiang's version of Sanminzhuyi. (JUI 
H E-CH ENQ 1982) The recreation of 'Chinese daotong' (through a careful selection 
and interpretation of Sanminzhuyi) and the cultural connection between Chiang, Sun, 
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and Chinese culture were widely disseminated. 
The promotion of the achievement of Chinese civilisation and scientific inventions 
was another focal point of academic publications. The idea was drawn from Joseph 
Needham's Science and Civifisation in China., The CCRC got in touch with Needham 
and decided to translate the voluminous work in 1969. The first volume of the 
Chinese edition' was published in 1973. Following this, the CCRC also commissioned 
The histolY of Chinese science and technology series to introduce Chinese physics, 
mathematics, medicine, and astronomy. (CCRC, 1977: 28-34) 1 
Contemp orary literature was also important. The same tactics of providing 
opportunities"lor publication and awarding grants were adopted. Not only did the 
CCRC have its own magazine Chinese culture feidva/ monthly (Zhonghua wenhua 
tuxing yuekan qV3Zj-EM. W)jT4j) providing publication opportunities and , 
commissioning books, but it also gave awards such as the Golden Pen award, the 
. 
Editorial Award, and Fine Literary Magazine Award, to make sure that the "right kind" 
of literary work was encouraged and published. (CCRC, 1977) 
2.2.3. Intellectual and moral reform 
The CCRC'was designed to'restore' Chinese culture. In fact, the so-called 'traditional 
culture' that the CCRC endeavoured to promote was selected and elaborated 
carefully by academics. 
This kind of incorporation was commonly used to create a desired discourse. 
Academics were'drawn in to build a framework that selected traditions, filtered and 
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moralised values, and retold history. 
As Gramsci said, "A social group can... exercise 'leadership' before winning 
governmental power... it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, 
but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to'lead' as well. " (1971: 57-68) 
The whole operation that the KMT carried out in the Cultural Renaissance Movement 
was an attempt at a 'moral and intellectual reform', to use Gramscils term (197 1: 
57-58). The dominant social groups can use'moral and intellectual reform' to 
maintain and reinforce their hegemony. 
In Gramsci's analysis, history is a process of conflicts and compromises where the 
dominant class leads the rest, both in economic, and in moral and intellectual terms. 
A dominant social group (or any social group intending to gain hegemony) needs to 
lead, not just to dominate, by making alliances and compromises. I agree with Simon 
(1982: 63) that "a class advancing towards hegemony needs to build up an 
ideological system which can act as cement to bind together and unify a bloc of 
social forces. " Therefore, forming consensus was truly essential for the goal of 
gaining hegemony. Since it could not be won by force, the key to gain consent and to 
lead the rest relied on how to make allies and include others' interests. 
Gramsci's idea of hegemony was elaborated from Manes assertion that social being 
determined social consciousness. He believed that consciousness was not 
spontaneously bom but was structured in certain ways corresponding to the general 
structure of society. He said, "it is untrue that all individual opinions have'exactly' 
equal weight. Ideas and opinions are not spontaneously'born' in each individual 
brain: they have had a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of 
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persuasion. " (GRAMSCI, 1971: 192) For him, ideology did not descend'from above', 
nor emerged 'from below. It was structured between these two extremes by the 
intellectuaIS12. 
By the help of moral and intellectual reform, a system of alliance and consensus 
could be built, and ideologies favoured by the dominant group(s) could be 
. 1.1 -: ''
disseminated and become the norm. No wonder that Gramsci took intellectuals as 
"the dominant-group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social 
hegemony and political government! '. (GRAMSCI, 1971: 12) In this case, the ROC on 
Taiwan built consensus and strengthened its political hegemony through the 
operation of the movement, with the help of intellectuals to reinvent history and 1, 
tradition. 
After two decades of thought control and aggressive education policy, the KMT used ý 
this movement as the opportunity to disseminate favoured ideology further and 
regenerate its anti-communist messages. In order to ensure and strengthen political 
hegemony, the Cultural Renaissance Movement was operated as a political culture 
. 
assimilation mechanism to build consensus. It was a conscious effort to forge popular 
beliefs, common sense 13 
, 
and ideology aggressively, both inside and outside the 
education system. 
12 Here, Gramsci extended the traditional meaning of 'intellectual', and called them 'organic 
, intellectuals! (roughly including: managers, technicians, policy-makers, etc. ): "By 'intellectuals! 
must be understood not those strata commonly described by this term, but in general the 
entire social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the wide sense 
- 
whether in 
the field of production, or in that of culture, or in that of political administration. " (GRAMSCI, 
1971: 97) 
13 In Gramsci's term, common sense denotes 1he uncritical and partly unconscious way in 
which people perceive the world'. To him, it is the site on which the dominant ideology is 
constructed. (SIMON, 1982: 26-27) The KMT government had always stressed the importance 
of controlling the 'socialisation' process. Furthermore, the subject 'Common Sense" had 
always been important in primary education to influence how children sense the world. 
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2.2.4. Moralisation and modernisation 
Although compulsory education kept the political socialisation process tightly in 
control, the KMT felt the need to continue the same socialisation in family and society. 
Therefore, it was crucial to set up standards and norms in life forcefully to reinforce 
the socialisation experiences outside of schools. In the process of creating shared 
values and'common sense'to pressurise people to conform, the KMT used 
academics to build theoretical foundations in two areas: modernisation and 
moralisation. 
According to Yen Chia-kan (1988: 22-23), Chiang Kai-sheWs vice president, the 
modernisation of daily life was most vital for the movement, and it should work hand 
in hand Wth school education. He emphasised that ethical and moral socialisation 
should be rooted in ordinary daily life. As a result people could learn the proper 
manners of shi yi zhu xing ftVfjf T 14, the public moralities could be fostered 
naturally, and environmental hygiene could also be maintained. 
In order to foster the'proper way of life', the CCRC even gave guidelines on daily 
manners and behaviour, and designed all kinds of projects and programmes in order 
to "rationalise and modemise people's lifestyle". (CCRC, 1977: 7) First of all, the 
CCRC drew up The necessary knowledge of the modem citizen's life (guomin 
shenghuo xuzhi in 1968 and Examples of proper manners of good 
14 Literally, shi yi zhu xing means four important areas in life: eating, clothing, dwelling, and 
behaviour. Here, Yen quoted from Sun Yat-sen's ideas. They were basically: dining manners, 
dressing codes, the living environment, and proper conduct. Generally speaking, it refers to 
the life style as a whole. 
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citizenship (guomin flyi fanfi ENRj rsý, LffeXVD in 1970. They were widely distributed as 
manuals providing instrucfion on'modem citizenship'. "By 1977, everyone in Taiwan 
- 
has copies of those two booklets, which provide information and guidelines of model 
life-style for people to follow. " (CCRC, 1977: 7) 
Although they were just two small booklets, the amount of manpower, energy, and 
-- 
government funding put into their compilation was unimaginable. The necessaty 
knowledge of modem citizen's life was drafted by eight government organisations 
and took a year to finish. Related organisations included the MOE, the Ministry of the 
Interior (MOI), General Political Warfare Department, the MND), Education r-- 
Departments in the Taiwan Provincial Government and Taipei City Government, the 
CYC, the Revolutionary Institute (geming shýian yanjiuyuan and the 
ýI Fourth and the Fifth Units within the KMT 
This booklet comprised six chapters covering general rules, eating,, clothing, dwelling, 
. 
behaviour, and yu-Ie Yl, *Z- (education and leisure). Principally, it was based on Chiang 
. 
Kai-shek! s concepts from the Two Amendments on Education and Leisure for the 
Ptinciple of the People's Livelihood. (CCRC, 1977: 7-9) The final draft was checked 
and ratified by Chiang Kai-shek in 1968. 
The compilation of Examples of proper manners of good citizenship was even more 
complicated. The MOI proposed the first draft in 1968, but was turned down because 
the Executive Yuan was dissatisfied with the content. In 1969, the CCRC was 
brought in to form a special team to revise the content. This draft was double- 
checked by the State Safety Committee. ' 
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Even so, Chiang Kai-shek was still dissatisfied and asked for a simplified version. In 
1970, Chiang Kai-shek finally approved the last draft. The booklets were distributed 
to all institutions, schools, and non-governmental organisations nation-vvide. 
Trivial demands, such as "no spitting", "no urinating on the street' (from the The 
necessary knowledge of modem citizen's life) were described in great detail, in order 
to rid the Chinese of old bad habits. Although the content sometimes seemed trivial, 
the painstaking process of drawing it up, the constant modifications it had undergone, 
and the severe social pressure it generated, showed their political significance. That 
was to say, the KMT wanted not only to unify thoughts, but also desired a 
standardised behaviour. 
This tactic of standardising and modernising behaviour had once been used by the, 
New Life Movemen t15 in 1934. This same tactic was used again: launching a 
movement advocating reforms that were to build a better and stronger nation. On the 
surface, it was a modernisation movement to rebuild the nation and deal with 
imperialist aggression. Nonetheless, it was also a cultural struggle tackling the 
domestic problems at that time, counterattacking an anti-tradition mentality and the 
wholesale adoption of western ideas inherited from the May Fourth Movement. 
(HSIAOA-CH'IN, 1991) 
Judging from the difficulties the KMT faced in the 1960s, both from within and outside 
the island, the Cultural Renaissance Movement was a necessity. The purpose was 
15 In order to achieve a 'new lifestyle' of fiyifian chi IMM4L, (good manners, justice, integrity, 
and a sense of honour), this movement promoted the habits of living a hygienic and'simple 
lifestyle, and placed emphasis on accuracy and efficiency. (HSIAO A-CHIN, 1991) The 
movement was inspired, at the time, by German and Italian fascism. 
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not only to build the KMPs legitimacy, politically and culturally, but also, to divert 
aftention from international isolabon and the domesfic demands for democracy, and 
focusing it instead on the -evilsof the CCP and the destruction it caused. Setting up a 
new target meant drawing attention away from the unrealistic goal of the'recovery of 
mainland' and declining international recognition. The Mrs intention behind the 
movement was to reconstruct domestic confidence and rebuild the international 
image of the ROC. 
2.3. Decline and change 
2.3.1. International isolation 
After Washington decided to reverse its 'hands-ofF China policy, Taiwan became "a 
foreign policy protectorate of the United Sates". (ROBINSON, 1996: 1340) Thereafter, 
American aid was resumed 16 
, 
and an American Military Advisory Group was set up in 
Taiwan in 1951 to provide further military support for the KMT regime. In total, the 
United States'provided the ROC on Taiwan with almost US $15 billion in economic 
aid (WANG TSO-JUNQ'1988: 17-18) and US $ 25 billion military aid (JOCOBY, 1996: 
118). From'I 954 to 1979, the American-Taiwan Mutual Defence Treaty" guaranteed 
Taiwan's security. The maintenance of the Mrs legitimacy as the lawful successor 
and the legitimate polity of China also relied on the support of America. At the same 
time, it was also in American interests to consolidate its military ties in Asia in the 
16 When the KIVIT was still the Chinese government in power, the US signed the Sino- 
American Economic Aid Agreement with the ROC in 1948. The aid was soon postponed 
because of the civil war between the KIVIT and the CCP in 1949. The aid was resumed when 
the Korean War broke out, and continued until 1965. (WANG TSO-JUNQ 1988) 
17 The treaty was replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act, which was passed by the US 
Congress and signed by President Jimmy Carter on April 10"', 1979. It provided a new format 
for handling ROC-US ties. 
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Cold War by ensuring its relationship with Taiwan. 
According to Michael Yahuda (1996), Taiwan was crucial for American power in this 
region, and had similar importance to Japan and Beijing. "it sits astride the major sea 
lanes linking North-East and South-East Asia and its destiny is therefore of interest to 
Japan... By the same token it has been seen by Beijing as an unsinkable 
'aircraft-carrier' that hostile powers have used and could use again to threaten its 
eastern seaboard. " (YAHUDA, 1996: 1320) Therefore, the Taiwan problem "in one 
form or another has been central to Sino-American relations since 1950". (YAH U DA, 
1996: 1320) 
However, more and more countries recognised the PRC as a sovereign state and the 
legitimate Chinese government and severed diplomatic relations With the ROC. For 
example, the UK recognised the PRC in 1950, France did so in 1964, Canada in 
1970, and Japan in 1975. 
Although Washington was not very happy with Chiang's high-handed authoritarian 
style, it maintained its support for the ROC for the sake of its cold-war strategy in Asia. 
The decline of support from Washington started when J. F. Kennedy took up the 
presidency in 1961. The'One China One Taiwan' (sometimes known asTwo Chinas) 
principle 18 Kennedy pursued was the first sign of a threat to the legitimacy of the 
ROC. This'One China One Taiwan'policy was postponed because of Kennedys 
18 Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed that there was only "one China", although each' 
disagreed which was the legitimate one. During the early 1980s, Deng Maoping offered a 
"one country, two systems" model to Taiwan. It allowed Taiwan to retain the KMT rule, its own 
capitalist economic system and defence forces, in return for acknowledging the sovereignty of 
the PRC. It was also known as'one China, one Taiwan'. (SHAMBAUGH, 1996a; YAHUDA, 
1996) 
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death and the interruption of the Vietnam War. (YANG TS'UNG-JUNQ 1992: 25) 
In 1967, the launch of the Cultural Revolution was an extraordinary opportunity for 
the ROC to resume its legitimacy. The Cultural Renaissance Movement distinguished 
the KMT from the CCP, justified its legitimacy, and won sympathy intemationally. 
-The 
aim was to prove 'free China' under the KMT rule was morally correct and politically 
legitimate. 
Nonetheless, when Richard Nixon visited China in 1971, Taiwan's international status 
was at stake. The ROC was replaced at the United Nations by the PRC the same 
year. Consequently, the majority of member states of the UN shifted their recognition 
from Taipei to Beijing. Furthermore, the ROC found itself replaced in many leading 
international governmental organisations by the PRC in the 1970s. Finally, 
Washington recognised Beijing in 1979. American's de-recognition damaged the 
ROC's "remaining faint credibility to represent China as a whole". (YAHUDA, M. 
1996: 1321) 
Within such a cont64 fortifying spiritual defence seemed reasonable, and modifying 
domestic policy inevitable, in order to solve the problem of international isolation and 
- 
domestic doubt about the ROC's political status and future. 
2.3.2. Short-lived Uwan spring "', 
Doubts were raised questioning the twenty-year illusion the KMT created, that the 
ROC on Taiwan represented the legitimate Chinese government. The 1970s was a 
period of uncertainty and self-doubt a time when the KMT worked mostly on 
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self-reassurance, and manoeuvred to strengthen its position on Taiwan. Therefore, in 
reaction, Taiwanese awareness and liberal assertions of Taiwan's own dghts grew. 
Under immense domestic pressure demanding for change, Chiang Kai-shek felt the 
need to reform the party and to rid it of some senior members. At the 10"' National 
Congress of the KMT in 1969, the principle of quanmian gexin ýkffijX*(total renewal) 
was decided. He attributed the situation to senior statesmen's reluctance to retire, 
which blocked the channel for party regeneration. (CHIANG KAI- SHEK, 1984m: 405) 
Again, he appointed his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to be the man in charge of 
party reform, and as the vice Premier, preparing for future power-succession. 
In order to secure the success of reform, Chiang Ching-kuo drew support from the 
mass media and intellectuals. In 1970, he openly encouraged the younger generation 
to be frank in expressing their opinions. (CHINATIMES, 1970) The purpose was not 
only to encourage different opinions to be heard, but more importantly, exerted 
pressure on the party reactionaries. This period was called the "Taiwan Spring" (HSO 
CHIEH-LIN, 1997), a period ushering in a liberal atmosphere and allomAng the rise of 
the opposition. 
At the same time, Chiang Ching-kuo started to foster the young Taiwanese elite to 
build up his own influence. (LI HSIAO-FENQ 1987: 103-104; HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997) 
Many of the Taiwanese elite were promoted by him and became the major figures in 
Taiwanese politics today, such as Wu Po-hsiung 
-! Afnhg, HsQ U-t& Aitf, and HsO 
Shui-t& gd-T71, ýM6. This strategy was executed by Chiang Ching-kuds right-hand man Li 
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Huan 
-JEA. Later, it was generally termed cui taiqing fjE-CI3j7'9. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 
1997; WANG MO-LIN, 1999) 
In 1970, the KIVIT initiated a meeting to discuss national affairs with young people 
and advocated'free speeclY. Encouraged by the new found freedom, many young 
academics started to express their cdticisms and demands for democratic reform in 
Daxue ), ýf:, R, (Great Learning) Magazine2o. It offered a public forum allowing 
discussion and criticism. Their main assertion was gexin baolaiXrfq, 
-L-3(reforrn and 
save Taiwan) and this affirmed the significance of Taiwarfs existence. (LI YIH-YUAN, 
1996a: 28) These participants included many young academics, who were educated 
in America and held teaching jobs in universities. Later, they became the main force 
behind both the KMT (such as: U Chung-kuei Kuan Chung Uq: 3, Yang 
Kuo-shu Qfflfg, Sun Ch6n Yrrl, etc) and the opposition party (such as: Chang 
ChOn-hung NfkrA, Ch'&n Ku-ying MjUff, HsO Hsin-liang 9, WaA, etc. ). 
In October 1971, fifteen scholars from both camps issued a statement in Daxue, 
entitled "A Forth right Admonition of National Affairs" (guoshi zhengyan WJZ,, -Vrt) 
criticising the undemocratic political system and the old mainlander representatives 
who were reluctant to retire2l. (CHANG CHOWHUNGý 1977: 32) In January 1972, 
19 'Cut means 'push', 'urge', or'speed u; Y, and '1aiqing` means 7aiwanese youth'. The phrase 
described the principle of promoting young Taiwanese and puffing them Into the bureaucratic 
system and the party. (HSO CHIEH-LIN, 1997, chapter 43) However, the term cuitaiqing also 
borrowed the same sound from a famous female singers name 
- 
Teul Tal-ch'ing jj,, jM. 
2(3 Daxue was a liberal magazine established in 1968. Originally, it Introduced western 
theories and thoughts, rarely touching political issues. After the participants joined the 
magazine, Daxue became a political forum. It closed down In 1973 because of Internal 
disputes on different political stands. 
21 When the KIVIT fled to Taiwan in 1949, it brought the constitution of 1946 under which it 
had been formed. In order to sustain the Mrs legitimacy to "represent the whole of China", 
all the mainland elected representatives (Legislators and members of National Assembly) 
remained in their seats as a symbol representing the whole China. The symbolic meaning of 
re-electing the whole parliament was that the KMT admitted losing Its legitimate status over 
China. It was not until 1992 that the parliament was totally replaced by Taiwanese elected 
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another joint statement, "Nine Demands of National Affairt" (guoshififulun MjM; -Aug), 
was published raising many important issues, including human rights, bureaucratic 
reform, the democratic and economic future, social welfare and local politics. (LI 
HSIAO-FENQ 1989: 234) 
The political atmosphere suddenly opened up, not only because of the boom of 
liberal development, but also due to the inspiration of the Diaoyutai Jjtft(-. z1 Incident. 
The Diaoyutai islands22 are a group of eight uninhabited islands located 120 miles 
northeast of Taiwan on the continental shelf, and which are separated from the Liu 
Ch'iu fj4l-Ej* Islands (Ryukyu). They were first recorded in Chinese history in 1403 A. D. 
For centuries, they had been administered as part of the Tairwan region, and used by 
Chinese fishermen before the Second World War. 
In 1968, when a UN geological survey revealed this area might hold rich oil reserves, 
the Japanese claimed that they had the sovereignty over the islands, ejected 
Chinese fishermen from the area, and mutilated the Nationalist Chinese flag on the 
islands. 
One reason why the Japanese had a claim to Diaoyutai was due to an American 
mistake. After the Second World War, Diaoyutai was supposed to be returned to the 
Chinese government along with all the islands in the Taiwan region. However, it was 
not returned because the Americans kept Diaoyutai for bombing practice for their Liu 
Ch'iu based Air Force. (LIU CHUNQ 1996) In 1970, when the Okinawa (Liu Ch'iu) 
Reversion Treaty was discussed between the US and Japan, America included the 
representatives. (TIEN & CHU, 1996) 
22 Japanese call them Senkaku %RIA. The name was actually translated from the British 
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Diaoyutai Islands within the Okinawa region, thereby, signing them over to Japan. 
- 
This development enraged Chinese all over the world. Chinese students in America_ ý, 
started to protest the violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty in December 
1970. In January and February 1971, Chinese students in New York, San Francisco, 
Los Angles, Chicago and Hong Kong held dernonstrations. On April 9h, 25,000 
Chinese demonstrated in Washington D. C. to protest against the way America had , 
handled the Diaoyutai issue. (HUNG SAN-HSIUNQ 1993) 
Nevertheless, it . was not until then that people in Taiwan started to sense the evenCs 
seriousness and significance. Four months into this dispute, the issue finally inflamed, 
Taiwanese opinion. The first protest poster was put up in the campus of the NTU on 
April 12H'. Within two days, posters and banners filled the campus protesting the 
injustice. The resentment towards Japan and the USA spread quickly among 
"I 
university students. They gathered outside of Japanese and American Embassies 
and protested vigorously. 
The United States did not want to get involved in the dispute and stated: "in 
transferring its rights of administration to Japan it does not specifically constitute a 
transfer of undedying sovereignty nor can it affect the underlying claims of any of the 
.-, 
disputants. " (Congressional Record, November 9,1971, Proceedings and Debates of, 
-,, 
the 92nd Congress, First Session) 
At the beginning, the Diaoyutai Incident provoked nationalist protests expressing 
frustration about international injustice. Eventually, it also reflected the anxiety of the 
name, Pinnacle Rocks. (HE ANDA, 1996; HUNG SAWHSIUNGý 1993) 
110 
baby-boomer generabon searching for their'place in the world'. and asking for 
international recognition. (TSENG HUI-CHIA, 1998: 137) It was the first time that the 
post-war generation of Taiwanese had tried to take action to solve their identity crisis. 
It was a response to the increasing isolation of Taiwan within the international 
community. This incident prompted not only the very first social movement in Taiwan, 
but also kindled the flames of a decade-long search for identity. 
Since the protests were regarded as 'patriotic!, these students were tacitly 
encouraged by the KMT, despite of the fact that public assembly was subject to 
restriction. (HUNG SAN-HSIUNG, 1993) The Diaoyutai dispute has not yet been 
resolved. However, it demonstrated what protests could do and what impact they 
could have, thus, becoming an inspiration and model for young Taiwanese 
demanding democracy. In the end, this once encouraged student movement became 
problematic for the KMT. (HUNG SAN-HSIUNQ 1993) 
By the end of 1971, domestic pressure for democracy became severe. In a seminar 
held at the NTU, hosted by philosophy professor Chdn Ku-ying MMUM,,, 
unprecedented frank discussions were held. Participants demanded that the KMT 
authodties should re-elect the whole Parliament. Encouraged by the seemingly liberal 
atmosphere, 336 university academics issued a joint statement and demanded 
re-election (see footnote 21). Because of this outburst of free speech, fuelled by the 
Diaoyutai Incident the KMT suddenly realised the seriousness of student movement 
and the increasingly liberal atmosphere. It soon tightened its cultural control again, 
and considered the Philosophy Department of the NTU to be the root of the trouble. 
(HSCJ CHIEH-LIN, 1997) 
III 
In Apdl 1972, the KIVIT launched counterattacks on liberal forces by releasing a 
series of articles in the Central Daily News (the KMT mouthpiece) entitled "Voices of 
ordinary citizens". They condemned Ch6n Ku-ying's speech as inciting the student 
- 
movement and endangedng national secudty. In 1973, the whole faculty of the 
Philosophy Department (NTU) was fired and a new head, Sun Chih-yen NV& put 
-ý, 
in place. The contracts of 13 staff were unlawfully discontinued because of the : -, -- 
political stands they had taken. (HUANG JUNG-TS'UN, 1995) 
Witnessing the incident, Huang Jung-ts'un XMfl,, professor of the NTU Psychology 
Department recalled, "The whole incident was a continuity of controlling speech and 
suppressing academic freedom from the Yin Hai-kuang inciden e3. It caused a chilling 
effect in Taiwanese academia... All the liberal enthusiasm and exciting atmosphere in 
the NTU was gone. What was left in social sciences was self-censorship. " (1995) ,, 
Although this liberal atmosphere was short-lived, the inspiration of 7aiwan Spring' not 
only demonstrated the power of free speech and public protest, but also triggered a 
trend of localisation. 
2.3.3. Losing power and influence 
In order to emphasise the cultural legitimacy of the KMT, the Cultural Renaissance 
Movement encleavoured to promote tradition and moralities. To establish its 
'authenticity', it forbade any alterations of tradition. As a result its principle of 'holding 
on to the past! forced Taiwanese culture to'retum to the ancients (fugu 
23 He was forced to stop teaching in 1968 by the NTU because of his radical criticism of the 
KMT 
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After Taiwan was forced out of the UN in 1971, the realisation of the impossibility of 
recovering China had dawned on the general public. Once the goal of 'recovering 
China' faded, the mission to revive Chinese culture became irrelevant. By the 
mid-1970s, both the anti-communist claims and cultural renaissance missions 
became absurd. The KMT needed to create something new to rebuild confidence to 
consolidate the people. 
After his death in 1975, Chiang Kai-skek was succeeded as President by vice 
President Yen Chia-kan (1975 
- 
1978). Following the precedent set up by Chiang, 
Yen also concurrently held the post of the president of the CCRC. However, when 
Chiang Ching-kuo was elected as the sixth constitutional president in 1978, he 
declined to accept the presidency of the CCRC. Instead, he insisted that Yen should 
stay. According to official explanations, Chiang Ching-kuo wanted to show his respect 
to Yen, so "modestly declined the position". (UNITED DAILY NEWS, 1990a) Yen 
remained in this post for fifteen years (even after Lee Teng-hUi24 succeeded to the 
presidency) until he resigned in 1990 because of ill health. In fact, Chiang 
Ching-kuo's decision not to chair the CCRC signalled its decline. 
Consequently, its work could go no further than the schools. The decline of this 
movement was not just caused by its obsolescence: losing its firm supporter, when 
Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, affected its once unshakable place. More importantly, 
losing its enemy with the end of Cultural Revolution had cut off its lifeline. The cultural 
24 Lee Teng-hui is a native-born Taiwanese. He was educated in Japan and the United States. 
He worked for the United States-Taiwan Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. He later 
became the mayor of Taipei, provincial governor, and vice-president in 1984. He succeeded 
to the presidency after Chiang died in 1988. 
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battle between 'reviving the tradition and abandoning the old' ended. How to cope 
with change and create a new era was now the most urgent issue. 
In 1977, then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo included 'cultural construction' in the Twelve 
National Construction Projects. For the first time, cultural affairs were listed as a 
major national project, as important as economic development. Chiang Ching-kuo 
- 
explained in his policy statement: "A modernised nation not only provides the people 
vvith an abundant material life, but also renders them with healthy spiritual lifestyle. " 
(GIO, 1983: 809) 
Nonetheless, the Cultural Renaissance Movement was never officially abolished. No 
matter how powerless it was, the CCRC managed to survive for another fifteen years 
after the Cultural Revolution ended. It still performed its routine works such as, 
promoting Beijing opera, compiling modem versions of classical books, holding 
annual 'Good People Good Deed' events, and so on. But it could only operate within 
very limited areas, and had no significant impact on society. Over the years, the 
CCRC had become like a rest home accommodating the Mrs aging reactionaries. 
Since the KMT stopped talking about recovering mainland in the 1970s, this 
anti-communist institution had become increasingly embarrassing for the party. 
The Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) was established in 1981, with the support of 
Chiang Ching-kuo, to deal with national cultural affairs. All that was left for the CCRC 
to take care of were anti-communist, moral-oriented matters. In the 1980s, the annual 
budget of the CCRC had been cut down year by year. Its existence was under severe 
attack. Its development and transformation to a new cultural apparatus in the 1990s 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Z3.4. Native-soil literature debate 
Since the late 1960s, when diplomatic defeats started to hit Taiwan one after another, 
, 
the sense of uncertainty increased and the identity crisis surfaced. Politically, 
indigenous politicians, such as Huang Hsin-chieh Xrfij'f-, and Kang Ning-hsiang JU* 
4, emerged. They became the core and founding members of the Opposition. 
Culturally, identity crisis urged artists to challenge the old ostrich attitude. A trend of 
searching for one's cultural roots appeared. 
The first periodical dedicated to Taiwanese culture and folk arts, Echo, was published 
in 1971. It introduced both Chinese and Taiwanese indigenous culture in English. 
Although there were some articles about Chinese customs, the main focus was put 
on Taiwanese indigenous artists, cultural heritage and folk arts. It was praised for 
"Starting the future cultural orientation 
- 
wenhua xungen 3: 
-rjh4jA(searching for 
cultural roots) trend". (SU WEN-ICUEI, 1998) 
Because everything Taiwanese had been categorised under the framework of 
Chinese culture, before the mid-1 970s the distinction between the two cultures was 
not obvious. However, the native-soil literature debate 0±--: ý-'ýýIIMMM(xiangtu wenxue 
lunzhan) in the 1970s stimulated self-examination and accelerated the debate 
between these two subjectivities: Chinese/Taiwanese; officiallunofficial; capitalist 
dght/socialist left. (TStNG HUI-CHIA, 1998: 145-158) 
In 1972 & 73, young poets Kuan Chieh-ming RMMH)j and -rang wen-piao (Jft_5ý_rj7, ) 
criticised the obscure language used in modem poems, and sent a shock wave in 
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Taiwanese literature. Instead of seeing it as a debate merely of modem poems, Un 
Wen-pao (2001) regarded it as a self-criticism and soul-searching quest for Taiwan's 
modem literature. After this incident, Taiwanese literature started to deal with issues 
of social change and the reality of Taiwanese life. 
In May 1977, Yeh Shih-tao's AýUj3 article mThe introduebon of Taiwanese 
indigenous literary histor y* in Xachao g[M Magazine touched off the whole debate 
between different views on literary creation and subject matters. (LIN WEN-PAO, et 
al, 2001; YANG CHAO, 1995b: 181; CHANG CHI N-CH'IANQ 1997) As Tu Weiming 
commented, this debate: "seriously challenged the legitimacy of imported Western 
categories in analysing local sensibilities... rejecfing'modem literature'with a 
distinctive American style as an authentic expression of Taiwanese consciousness. " 
(TU WEIMINQ 1996: 1227) 
This debate was a discourse struggle fought between two camps: one consisted of 
Western-trained writers and those with strong China-centric mentality (such as: Yu 
Kuang-chung 5qt, )ýqj, and Pdng K6 another consisted of native writers with 
strong Taiwanese consciousness (Weirien-ts'ung UIXP,, Wang To I-Ifi, Yeh 
Shih-tao ýX. Ua, etc. ). The former was the group of writers who were the mainstream 
and active in the 1950s and 60s; and the lafter were mosOy indigenous writers (some 
young Taiwanese academics, some old indigenous writers who were silenced in the 
post-war decades or only wrote in Japanese), who proposed to write in an honest 
realistic style. In general, their viewpoint was anti-westernisation, anti-KIVIT, 
- 
and-Communism. In other words, they insisted on the establishment of Taiwanese 
awareness. (LIN WEN-PAO, et al, 2001) 
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The main concern of the debate was at first literary expression and writing style- 
Native wTiters criticised the modernist style as an act of worshiping and having blind 
faith in western culture. They were dissatisfied with its distant and unrealistic content 
and advocated paying more attention to real people in Taiwan. On the other hand, 
modernists condemned native witers for making a separatist mistake, and putting 
too much emphasis on workers, peasants and soldiers. 
The debate extended to the literature communities in the mid-1 970s and finally 
generated a trend of 'searching for one's cultural roots' in Taiwanese society by the 
end of 1970s. As a result, it pushed the culture communities to contemplate their 
works and the relationship between literature and its locality. It soon developed 
beyond the literary community to the general public and into a debate between 
"modernism and nationalism". (LIAO PING-HUI, 1995: 133) 
2.3.5. Root-searching trend in CUItUre25 
The 1970s was a difficult era for the ROC on Taiwan. In this decade, the ROC lost 
half of its international alliesFG. Taiwan's internafional status became an unsolvable 
issue, because it was a political dispute rather than a legal one. Although the military 
tensions across the Taiwan Strait had lessened since the mid-1 970s, the 817 
Bulletir ?7 signed between the USA and the PRC in 1982 had again caused chaos 
25 This trend in the 1 970s is generally called 'wenhua xungen 3Zfh4a 
- 
searching for 
cultural roots. (LI YIH-YUAN, 1996a: 28) 
26 After the ROC was replaced in the UN by the PRC in 1971, many countries shifted their 
recognition to Beijing. (YAHUDA, 1996) In 1972, there were 42 countries having official 
diplomatic relationship with the ROC (there were 147 countries in the world in 1972). When 
America built a relationship With the PRC in 1978, there were only 22 countries (out of 164) 
recognising the ROC. (YIDAN HE-LINGý 1999: 504-505) 
27 In this Bulletin, the American government promised the PRC to limit the quantity and 
variety of arms sold to Taiwan. Hau Pei-tsun afltJ, then Chief of General Staff of the 
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and insecurity in Taiwan. 
By 1978, the native-soil debate ended Wth no particular conclusion or consensus.. 
However, it had heated up many discussions not limited to literary issues. The 
concerns about indigenous culture and Taiwanese identity became more and more 
significant and relevant to the Taiwanese. A pursuit for identity and a longing for 
intemational recognifion surfaced. 
It was not just the defeat in diplomacy that made people in Taiwan long for 
. 
recognition, it was really the uncertainty of one's identity that urged the Taiwanese to 
search for an answer "if they (people in mainland) are the legitimate Chinese, who 
are we? " This uncertainty accelerated the need to find one's identity and the search 
for cultural roots. 
The 'root-searching' trend inspired young artists to dedicate themselves to explore 
indigenous subjects and to express their feelings as young Taiwanese. (YANG 
MNG-YO, 1998) They looked for Taiwanese identity through artistic pursuit and 
, 
individualised expression. ' Although the prospect of Taiwan's international status 
was bleak, Taiwan's economy did exceptionally well even during the oil crisis in the 
1970e8, and the cultural scene was extremely active. An era of wenhua xungun 
. 
3:, rit 
4fR (searching for cultural roots), using U Yih-Yuan's phrase (1996a: 25 
- 
29), had 
arrived. Many artistic groups emerged: Cloud Gate Dance Company vrqX! 
-g-(est. 
Ministry of National Defence, admitted its immense influence on Taiwan's national security. 
Taiwan's armed forces had only old style weaponry because of the Bulletin. Therefore. Taiwan 
had tried to seek other sources outside of the USA. (HUANG TSU-CHIANGý 2000) 28 The Per capita GNP of the ROC rose drastically in the 1970s. According to Bureau of 
Statistics (Directorate-general of Budget, the Executive Yuan), the Per capita GNP was only 
US $ 360 in 1970. However, the annual economic growth rate in the 1970s was averagely 
10.23%. The Per capita GNP rose almost 6 times within ten years to US $ 2,155 in 1980. 
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1973), Yayin Ensemble V-fIj-'/j\, %(est 1979), New Aspect Arts Company We (est. 
1979), Lanling Theatre Workshop (est. 1980), and Contemporary Legend Theatre a 
ftfS-. q2jq* (est. 1984). Many of them are still influential today. Their emergence was 
not only the result of a much looser cultural control and the booming economy, but 
also, demonstrated a general desire to express the uncertainty that troubled the 
Taiwanese. 
After the ROC was forced out of the UN, composer Shi Wei-liang then the 
head of the Taiwan Symphony Orchestra, called for artists to build a new culture for 
the next generation, which could boost Taiwanese confidence. He asserted: 'Chinese 
compose, choreograph, and dance for Chinese audiences'. 
This description of artists in Taiwan as 'Chinesewas a deliberate tactiQ It was a time 
when international society turned its back on Taiwan. After ten years of the Cultural 
Renaissance Movement reiterating that Taiwan was the centre of traditional Chinese 
culture, it was a shock for people in Taiwan to be denied their Chinese status in the 
international arena. Therefore, the emphasis on Taiwanese artists"Chinese-ness' 
was an act of self-assurance. The need for self-justficabon and reassurance pushed 
4 the search for'cultural roots' further, looking for comfort in a nostalgic motherland 
culture. 
ýDGBAS, 1997: 14-18) 
9 New Aspect was the first commercially run arts promoter and agency. It was established by 
composer HsQ P'o-yOn ' ! Tt#jt. New Aspect was the first to organise foreign artists touring 
Taiwan. Later it also acted as the agent to promote Taiwanese artists abroad. At a time when 
the cultural environment was tightly controlled and dominated by the authorities, New Aspect 
not only introduced world-class performances, but also broke the governmental monopoly in 
cultural expression. Therefore, when it was first established, many university students wished 
to work in New Aspect. (LI HUMA, 2000) 
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His call had touched many artists, and its influence joined forces with the 
root-searching trend in literature. 'Cultural development in the second half of the 
1970s was a process of the self-searching, tom between China and Taiwan, between 
tradition and the modem. The most influential figure in performing arts was the 
novelist and choreographer Un Hwai-Min ý Lin joined in the Diaoyutai , 
protests when he studied in the United States and "decided to go home to do 
something for the country". (YANG MLNG-YCJ, 1998: 41-43) He was heartened by 
Shi's appeal and responded by forming the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre. Its debut in 
Taichung was described by critic Chan Hung-chih)2PAA, 1115, as "a cultural revolution for- 
Taiwanese society". (YANG MeNG-YO, 1998: 59) 
Cloud Gate received considerable acclaim in an environment where artistic activities 
were rare. It was praised and supported by many writers and academics, including 
P'dng Kd, YO Ta-kang -lot )<fg, and HsQ Ch'ang-hui ', N,, MLK. Its work dudng that pedod 
- 
for example Qiyuan bao 11ME, Nezha Ogat-, Baishe zhuan fýrtq, and Xinchuan 
V" 
- 
drew inspiration from Chinese legends, and absorbed the body language of 
traditional xiqL? l forms and Taiwanese folk arts. 
In this 'root-searching' trend; artistic creations were usually melancholy, and full of 
sentimental yearning for Chinese cultural roots. Although they did not necessarily use 
30 Because of the discouraging attitude towards the arts, artistic activities were not common. 
Most artistic performances for ordinary people In Taiwan before the 1970s were folk 
performances and religious activities. Artistic exhibitions and performances (of modem art 
forms) were few. The level of participation was low in the official festivals that started In the 
late 1970, even though official effort was put In to promote them. (CHIU HEI-YUAN, 1985) 
31 Traditional Chinese theatre is called xiqu ffidt. X11means play, and qu means music or a 
verse for singing. Chinese theatre consisted of literature (dialogue), music, singing, acting, 
dancing, and acrobatics. Around the turn of the 10"' Century, the early form of xiqu had 
appeared. Records in 1962 showed, there were over 460 different kinds of local xiqu In China, 
and the most prominent one was Beijing opera. (TSNG YUNG-1,1988: 115) Thus, it was 
sometimes commonly called 'Chinese opera' in English. (Also see Chapter 5) 
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Chinese traditional art forms directly, they perceived the essence of 'Chinese-ness' 
as the origin of their works. Un not only used many elements from traditional xiqu 
and folk music, but also introduced and promoted Beijing Opera. 
This generation of young Taiwanese artists was different from the older generation in 
the 1950s and 60s. They were mostly baby-boomers who grew up and were 
educated under the KIVIT ideologies, as were their audiences. In contrast to the 
'Chinese tradition' appeal that previously promoted by the Cultural Renaissance 
Movement, their search for Chinese-ness was mainly focused on its inspiration, 
which artists could draw upon and modemise. 
Moreover, aftention was also drawn to Taiwan, even though it was placed within the 
context of Taiwan as part of China. (CHEN CH'I-W, 1989; YANG MENG-YCJ, 1998; 
WU HSING-KUO, 1999) In the 'root-searching' trend, Taiwan's folklore began to 
revive. Indigenous xiqu, folk music, variety shows, religious events and traditional 
rituals gradually became acceptable again. 
Although this 'root-searching' trend was initiated by artists themselves, it was 
encouraged by the authorities directly and indirectly. For example, because of the 
patriotism and longing for motherland in Un Hwai-Min's works, Cloud Gate has 
always enjoyed privileges that other groups do not have. In the 1970s and early 80s, 
they could easily get permission to book performing halls (which were all under 
government control) when there were only 3 proper venues, in the days before the 
cultural centres were built (CCA, 1999: 100). Pdng M, one of the KMT literary 
standard-bearers, recommended Cloud Gate in the party-run newspaper, Diplomat 
Yeh Kung-chao C-akU volunteered to be its fund-raiser, The army-run Chinese 
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Televisio -n System (CTS) even produced its video programmes... (YANG MNG-YO, 
- 
1998) Although the sentimental approach of Cloud Gate's early works was a genuine 
-, 
expression of the longing for motherland culture, for the authorities, this could easily 
be transformed into a patriotic, nationalist appeal that could comfort in a time of 
uncertainty. 
Take Cloud Gate's 1978 piece Xinchuar? 2 as an example. This dance was about 
early Taiwanese settlers and their struggles. Cloud Gate chose to give its debut 
performance on the day when the US formally established diplomatic relations with 
the PRC. According to Yang M6ng-yO (1998: 135), the official biographer of Cloud 
Gate, Xinchuan could be seen as a remedy for the Taiwanese to relieve the pain of 
the shock of being 'abandoned' by the US. Its founder Lin HwaMn said, "no mafter 
what kinds of difficulty our ancestors were facing, they had always had their fate 
tightly in their grip, and built their confidence with sweat and blood... I wish that our 
dancers, audiences and the society would be empowered (by their stories). We can 
regenerate our own strength by learning from them. " (YANG MNG-YO 
1998: 130-131) 
In the 1970s, the suppression of pop music and the support for minge Pý. e was 
another example of how the KMT selected and promoted 'useful artistic expressions' 
for its own ends. In order to differentiate their musical expression from the notorious 
32 Literally, xinchuan means 'the torch of learning passes on from one generation to the next'. 
It refers to the continuity of history and a sense of cultural responsibility to future generations. 
33 Minge, known as'campus songs (xiaoyuan gequRW: &iW)', was developed and created by 
university students. It emerged around the mid-1970s along with the rise of the search of 
cultural roots. Partly, it arose because the younger generation was dissatisfied by the 
domination of western pop music. Partly, it was because since the late 1960s Taiwanese pop 
music was regarded as corrupted and decadent. Many young people were eager to find a 
new style of song to express themselves. (rStNG HUI-CHIA, 1998: 138) 
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pop songs, university students used modem poetry to write lyrics, while searching for 
inspiration from folk songs. The most common theme in minge was the search for 
'Who I am ". (TSENG HUI-CHIA, 1998: 142-145) It included not only the quest for 
individual identity, but also the passion for nationalist sentiment. 
Although the minge trend was initiated by university students, it was supported and 
promoted by the authorities. Not only did it have official support for concerts to be 
held in Zhongshan Hall (EP ýUR), but by the end of 1970s, it was even promoted and 
rewarded by the KMT. According to Tsdng Hui-chia (1998: ), minge was taken as a 
cultural movement pursuing a modem version of national music, and a direct action 
challenging, and fighting against, foreign culture. 
In anthropologist Li Yih-yuan's view (1996a), the root-searching trend in culture was a 
response by the anxious Taiwanese, who were trapped between the choice of 
modernity and tradition, confused by the gap between western and indigenous 
- 
culture, and lost in the midst of identity crisis. The most comforting way was to return 
to the basic and the most familiar cultural roots. Alongside the development of this 
trend, Li believed that the gradually opening political atmosphere (Taiwan Spring) and 
the attempt to revive folk arts by academics all contributed to later cultural liberation 
at the mid-1980s. 
Summary 
Without doubt, the most important cultural policy from the 1960s to 1970s was the 
Cultural Renaissance Movement. It was a cultural re-construction project mobilised 
by the cultural apparatus, in the attempt to promote selected traditional culture to 
123 
combat the Cultural Revolution. ,vý. 
-1 - 
The contrast between Cultural Renaissance and Cultural Revolution was a 
manifestation of the different viewpoints on Chinese modernisation held by the KMT 
and the CCP. This search for'modemising' China and Chinese culture had haunted 
the Chinese over a century. The cultural struggle between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait embodied the struggle between two distinct assertions of how to 
modernise China. However, this concern was replaced in Taiwan by the'search for 
cultural roots' in the mid-1 970s. 
Within the domestic sphere, altemative thinking emerged and challenged a 
seemingly unified society. Internationally, the increasing isolation pushed people in 
Taiwan to face reality and contemplate Taiwan's future and identity. Because of the 
- 
inspiration of 7aiwan Spring', the Diaoyutai Incident and the heated discussion of the 
native-soil debate, after two decades! of fight thought control, alternative opinions 
were finally heard, and things started to change. 
This dissatisfaction and seff-examination triggered an awakening trend in the search 
for cultural roots and the acknowiedgment of one's native culture. Most of all, after 
losing their identity asChinese', people in Taiwan embarked on a journey of 
searching for Taiwanese identity. 
As to the Cultural Renaissance Movement this subsided and withered. The illusion 
of 'we were going back to mainland soon' collapsed. Apart from the reasons of 
international isolation, emergence of dissidents and demands for democracy, ý 
Gramscian theory provides another angle to consider Taiwanese disillusion with the 
124 
myth that the KMT had constructed. Since hegemony has a national-popular 
dimension, it requires the unification of a variety of different social forces into a broad 
alliance expressing a national-popular collective vAll. The KMT could not maintain its 
cultural hegemony by'imposing'mothedand culture, or'promoting' a Cultural 
Renaissance, since it had never built a broad bloc of various social forces, nor 
provided a broad-base ideology. The version of Chiang Kai-shek! s Sanminzhuyi 
could not draw the conviction and loyalty of the majofty of intellectuals, let alone 
school students and the rest of the population. 
In this movement, the new ideological system that the KMT tried to construct was a 
tailor-made, top-down one. The whole cultural construction was instructed by Chiang 
Kai-shek, designed by conformist intellectuals, and served only the interests of the 
KMT No compromise was made to include various social groups, but only exclusion 
by force. This war of position, as Gramsci put it could not be won without 
national-popular support. Therefore, the effect of the Cultural Renaissance 
Movement did not last, because the KMT dominated Taiwanese with coercion, but 
failed to lead the people with public consensus. 
Because of the collapse of the old values and orders, the 1970s was an era gearing 
up for change. Because of the severe impact of international isolation and the 
increasing confidence encouraged by Taiwan's economic growth, all the hidden 
social forces and once suppressed alternative thinking started to surface and made 
the impact It was the best timing for constructing a new discourse and producing 
regenerated meanings for the decades to come. In the next two chapters, I Will look 
at the Mrs cultural construction effort and the shift of focus in the 1980s and 90s. 
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Chapter 3 Root-searching Trend to Self-discovery 
In this chapter, I examine how the ROC re-established a valid'national image' in an 
increasingly isolated international society. My interest lies in why, by what, and how a 
new'national image' was constructed (different from the'traditional Chinese' image 
that the KMT once claimed), in order to gain domestic support and international 
recognition. 
3.1. New atmosphere 
3.1.1. New cultural policy and apparatus 
After the turbulent 1970s, it was impossible for the KMT to remain claiming itself as 
the'legitimate Chinese government any more. Then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo 
realised that the times had changed, and hence the necessity to update cultural 
.. 
policy. In his annual administration report of September 1977, Chiang announced 
that'culture construction' would be one of the Twelve National Construction Projects, 
and the first step was to build a culture centre in every county and city. (CHIU 
HEI-YUAN, 1985: 5) 
Chiang Ching-kuo explained his ideas to the Legislative Yuan in February 1978: 
We should draw attention to cultural development and take it as one of the most 
important national constructions... Within five years 
... 
all the culture centres 
should be finished. In order to provide people with opportunities to enjoy spiritual 
life, we will have to have a long-term and comprehensive culture construction 
plan. (GIO, 1983: 809; CHIU HEI-YUAN, 1985: 5) 
The whole concept of 'culture construction' was primitive and straightforward in the 
beginning. The project took the idea of 'culture construction' literally; hence, it 
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seemed to be only associated with 'buildings'. The policy to'build culture centres' 
was the core of the construction plan, which also included a local library, an 
exhibition space and a performing hall for each city and county. (WANG CHEN-HU, 
1991: 17) 
Problems soon emerged. In research commissioned by the Executive Yuan, 
sociologist Chiu Hei-yuan (1985: 10 
-12) pointed out, that many complicated 
problems emerged from the very beginning that the central government did not 
. 
expect, mostly to do with the lack of funding and understanding at local level. 
Before long, the inadequacy of this project showed. Chaos was caused by only 
building culture centres, and not providing the long-term planning needed to create a 
cultural framework and set of goals. To mend the problem, the Executive Yuan drew 
up the Improvement Programme for Culture, Education and Entertainment (Xaqiang 
wenhua yu yule fangan promulgated in February 1979, with 
firm political support from Chiang Ching-kuo and his successor, Premier Sun 
YCin-hs0an 
The programme targeted the improvement of the cultural environment, through 
measures such as revising legislation on copyright and antiquities preservation, 
preserving traditional arts and crafts, and encouraging non-govemment cultural 
organisations. (WANG CHEN-HU, 1991: 11) The most important task above all was to 
'establish a special institution to deal with and plan for cultural development and 
policies'. As a result, the Council for Culture Affairs (CCA) was founded on November 
11 th 1981, and has been in charge of cultural affairs since then. 
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The official name of the CCA was wenhua fianshe weiyuanhui 
literally meaning 'committee for culture construction'); its official English title was the 
Council for Cultural Planning and Development (CCPD). Both terms had strong 
indications of control, planning, and selection 
- 
taking cultural affairs as a subject that 
could be developed in the same way as the economy. However, its official English 
name was changed to the Council for Culture Affairs (CCA) in 19961. 
The decision to set up the CCA was not simply a top-down policy, but a governmental 
response to meet a newly emerging need for indigenous culture, and to deal with the 
'root-searching' trend that had begun in the late 1970s. The CCA was established in 
order to'modernise and develop modem Chinese culture in Taiwan. Furthermore, 
Chiang Ching-kuo also used the establishment of the CCA to replace the Chinese 
Culture Restoration Committee (CCRC). It was an attempt not only to rpodemise 
culture, but also to localise the KMT regime and transform its old reactionary image. 
Although the policy to 'revive tradition' seemed obsolete in the early 1980s, the 
supporters of the Cultural Renaissance Movement were still influential within the KMT 
To them, the orthodox associations that the CCRC symbolised guaranteed the KMT 
regime's legitimacy. In order to reassure and pacify the reactionaries within the KMT 
after the CCA was established, the Executive Yuan made the CCA chairperson the 
secretary-general of the CCRC. This arrangement indicated the connection between 
the two, and also demonstrated a hierarchy between them (arranging the CCA 
When Cheng Shu-Min %AM took up the chairwoman's post at the end of 1995, she felt 
that the name *gave the wrong implication and would damage Taiwan's Intemational image". ' (LU CHIEW YINQ 1995a) To reduce the obvious suggestion of state-control, the English 
name was changed in 1996. (LU CHIEN-YING, 1995a) However, the Chinese name (wenhua 
fianshe weiyuanhui) remains the same. To avoid confusion, I will uniformly refer to it as the 
CCA (even conceming affairs before 1996). 
128 
chairperson as the second-in-command of the CCRC) in order to clear the doubts of 
the party reactionades. This arrangement showed them that Chiang Ching-kuo had 
not abandoned the mission of 'restoring traditional culture' or'recovering mainland'; 
hence, he did not fail to claim the political legitimacy of the ROC. 
3.1.2. The framework 
According to the Organisational Rules of the CCA 2, the organisation has three central 
goals: (1) planning for overall cultural development; (2) carrying Chinese culture 
forward; and (3) enhancing people's spiritual life. In order to achieve smooth 
coordination, there are 15 to 19 members on its Board, which comprises Ministers 
and senior officers from related governmental organisations. Apart from the majority 
of official representatives, there are also a couple of representatives from culture 
communities. 
Within the CCA, there are three departments, four supporting administrative units and 
three duty-organising units. (CCA, 2000b) Its main body is the three departments. 
The 1" department is in charge of cultural policy planning,, heritage preservation, 
cultural legislation, training for talent and administrators. The 2 nd department takes 
charge of literary development, museum, library, and cultural building projects. The 
31d department is responsible for visual arts and performing arts. 
According to the nine missions listed in its Organisational Rule (Article 2), their 
responsibilities were less politically focused and more culturally oriented (compared 
2 The Organisation Rules of the CCA (xingzhengyuan wenhua fianshe weiyuanhui zuzhi tiaoli 
were issued in 1981 (CCA, 1981), and revised in 1994. 
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with the old CCRQ. Furthermore, its focus shifted to Taiwan. 
Traditionally, KMT cultural policy and its cultural apparatus had always been operated 
within the educational domain. The closest organisation (to the CCA) was the 
short-lived Cultural Bureau, under the Ministry of Education (MOE). When the CCA 
was set up, many issues surfaced and became political considerations, such as 
where to house it, what status within the government structure it was given so as to 
avoid the same difficulties that the Cultural Bureau encountered, and what 
- 
administrative power it could exercise. 
The CCA was expected to be the 'coordinatoe between ministries, and the 
'consultant for making cultural policy, but not the 'executoe. It had to rely on other 
ministries or councils to put policy into practice. It was this nature that limited its 
development and influence. Moreover, because it had no power to implement policy, 
nor the rank within the political hierarchy to supervise or coordinate, this unclear 
'distribution of laboue intensified the power struggle between ministries and councils. 
There are several reasons for designating the CCA as a 'council'. Firstly, it was done 
to avoid disturbing the existing government framework, and overlapping with the 
duties of existing ministries. It seemed to be a good way for the Executive Yuan at 
that time to save an expensive reshuffle. (WU TS'UI-LIAN, 1987) Secondly, choosing 
'council' as its organisational structure gave it the flexibility to play the role of a 
'Chief-of-Stafr within the Executive Yuan, Le. this model empowered the CCA to act 
like a Chief-of-Staff beside a General. 3 
3 According to Miao Ch'aan-chi R: t-W, a professor In the Department of Politics at the NTU, 
this 'council' status would enable the CCA to mobilise and command other Ministries. (WU 
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As a matter of fact, in the late 1960s, the Cultural Bureau had a similar role 
coordinating between governmental organisations. Because of its low status within 
the government hierarchy (under the jurisdiction of the MOE), the Cultural Bureau 
was torn between Ministries. In the end, it was abolished in 1973 because it could not 
command, or control the other Ministries, let alone advise on matters related to 
culture. The CCA suffered similar problems of powerlessness, not only because of 
the low status of cultural apparatus within the political arena, but also because it had 
no actual administrative power. 
There were at least five main ministries and councils in central government and two 
departments in Provincial government in charge of important cultural affairs. They 
included the MOE, in charge of antiques, folk art, art education, national theatre and 
music hall, museums, galleries and libraries; the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), in 
charge of preservation of cultural heritage, folklore and customs, publications and 
copy right; the Council of Agriculture, in charge of nature reserves; the GIO, in charge 
of the management of radio, Television, cable TV and the film industry; the MND, in 
charge of most Beijing opera troupes; the Civil Affairs Department in the Provincial 
Government, and Civil Affair Bureaus (minzhengju RRQ) in local government, in 
charge of actual preservation and management of national heritage. (WU TS'Ul-LIAN, 
1987; CCA, 1998a; Ll YIH-YUAN, 1996) 
According to Ko Chi-liang (1999), a CCA veteran, the early confrontation With other 
ministdes came mainly from the Department of Social Education of the MOE. It was 
the main administrative body dealing with cultural affairs before the CCA was 
TS'UI-LIAN, 1987) 
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established. Traditionally, the KMT took cultural affairs as part of education, and 
called it'social education'. Not only was the Department of Social Education in 
charge of cultural affairs before the CCA was setup, supervising the short-lived 
Cultural Bureau, but it also drew up the Improvement Programme for Culture, ý- 
Education and Entertainment as the legal base of the CCA. Therefore, after the CCA 
was established, their duties overlapped greatly,, and the Department of Social 
Education (MOE) took the CCA as its advisory organisation, holding a seemingly 
superior attitude towards it. (KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) Worst of all, it would not let go of 
certain administrative business, which now should belong to the CCA. 
As to the other authorifies,, because of its role as a consultant and advisor, many felt 
uneasy about its involvement in their business. (K'O CHI-LIANQ 1999) The lack of 
real power paralysed the CCNs work and morale, also making its existence a 
nuisance for other authorities. To them, suggestions from the CCA were like 'criticism'. 
The hostility between the Ministries and the CCA grew. 
Instead of coordinating and supervising, the work of CCA could go nowhere because 
no other organisations would let it interfere. The suggestions that the CCA made 
were regarded as irritating, idealistic, and unrealistic. (WU TSUI-LIAN, 1987; KO 
CHI- LIANQ 1999) For example, the CCA had the responsibility to advise and give 
support, both financially and professionally, to all culture centres. Nonetheless, it was 
unable to act directly to reorganise a culture centre's internal structure or even 
provide suppore, because culture centres belonged to the education department at 
4 Culture centres were built before any substantial cultural policy or plan was drawn up. 
Hence, there was no framework, understanding, nor clear goals for them. The heads and staff 
of culture centres were mostly civil servants transferred from local government. Professional 
advice and vocational training were urgently needed. 
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local govemment level. 
In the end, what the CCA could do was to either make suggestions, or explore new 
areas that came within nobod)(s jurisdiction. Wo Chi-liang (1999), a veteran of the 2 nd 
Department (CCA) from 1982 to 1994, could remember vividly that Ch'C-n Ch'i-lu 
TTg, the first chairman of the CCA, had reiterated in the internal meetings: 'We should 
encleavour to do things that no one wants to do, on the other hand, we should not get 
involved in areas where other ministries already take charge. " After a few years of 
this kind of dispute and power struggle, the CCA gradually developed a working 
pattern and an area of unwanted territories that it could lay its hands on. Even so, 
every now and then, similar confrontations happened, and disheartened Ch'&n 
Ch'i-lu. 
3.2. Ch'6n Ch'i-lu period 
3.2.1. The foundations laid 
The first Chairman of the CCA was the prominent anthropologist, Dr. Ch'6n Ch'i-lu, 
who chaired the CCA for six and half years and laid its foundations. It was the first 
time that a governmental organisation was set up to deal vvith culture construction 
positively, not merely for the purpose of cultural battle, and chaired by a prestigious 
scholar from a cultural background. The most important policy throughout his term of 
office was'tradition & creation'. 
As a young man, Ch'6n Ch'i-lu went to China for his first degree. He graduated from 
St. John's University in Shanghai (BA in Politics), and then he went to Japan to 
133 
further his studies in Cultural Anthropology and received his Ph. D. degree from Tokyo 
University. With an encompassing understanding of politics and culture, fluent 
language ability in Chinese (both Mandarin and Minnan yu) and Japanese, his 
ap pointment was considered most appropriate, and welcomed by the culture 
communities. (HSU P'O-YON, 1985) It was not only because Ch'6n Ch'i-lu had a 
prominent academic reputation that he had been chosen, 'but also because he was a 
Taiwanese scholar with dose Chinese links. 
It was at this time a political convention to arrange for a Taiwanese to either serve as - 
the second-in-command of an important organisation, or as the head of a lesser 
organisation6. Appointing Taiwanese Ch'6n'Ch'i-lu as the chairman clearly indicated 
, 
the secondary status of cultural affairs within the KMT political hierarchy. 
The CCA under Wk's lead played a transitional role, abandoning moral emphasis , 
and clich6, and updating cultural policy in order to suit the needs of a fast-changing 
society. In contrast to the CCRC, the CCA promoted both high arts and folk arts, 
encouraged modem arts and artists, and preserved both Chinese and Taiwanese 
cultural heritage. After three decades of stringent cultural control, its establishment 
Minnan yu rAffl-5 is the most common dialect used by the Taiwanese majority. 
This political convention was an extension of Chiang Ching-kuo's cuitaiqing policy (see chapter 2.3.2), of having a mainlander In charge and a Taiwanese as the assistant. In 
1978, when Chiang was elected president, he chose Taiwanese politiclan Hsieh Tung-min 
*rA, as his vice-president. Following that precedent, the premier Sun Yun-hs0an chose 
Taiwanese Ch'iu Ch'uang-huan nqA as vice-premier In 1981. In 1984, native-born Lee 
Teng-hul was chosen as the vice-president of Chiang Ching-kuo. This'half-half pattern was 
criticised as 'political incorporation', and was reversed in 1990. Lee Teng-hui chose the 
mainlander Lee Yuan-cu as vice president when he assumed the presidency In 1990. 
However, after Lee was elected (by the people)as president In 1996, he chose another 
Taiwanese Lien Chan aln as his vice-president. By then, the criterion for choosing 
candidates for less important positions was changed to 'female'. For example, the CCA has 
had 4 female chairs (Shdn HsOeh-yung rPA-1-1 Mj, Ch6ng Shu-min %VJ& Un Ch'dng-chih 
0, Ch'dn Yu-hsiu FA %3ý-j In the last nine years. 
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symbolised the beginning of cultural liberation and a conscious move to respond to 
people's needs. The culture communities had high expectations of the CCA, 
especially because they considered Ch'dn Ch'i-lu, as HsO Fo-yOn (1985) put it, "one 
of us". 
3.2.2. Tradition and creation 
In general, the basic framework and working focus of the CCA were built in the Ch'C-n 
Ch'i-lu period. Therefore, his strength and character determined the direction of the 
CCA. Apart from his professional expertise in aboriginal culture, his interests in 
cultural heritages and folk arts, he also valued high arts, especially modem artS7 that 
had been ignored for a long time because of the Cultural Renaissance Movement. 
Therefore, two important themes 
-'tradition'and 'creation'- became the CCA's main 
concerns shaping or informing the major policies of the first decade. It strove both to 
preserve cultural heritage and encourage modem creation. 
The focus on creativity was mainly realised through holding the 'National Festival of 
Culture and Arts'. It was the most prominent and noticeable work of the CCA. The 
festival consisted of performances, lectures, and exhibitions. Artists were 
commissioned to create new works to exhibit and perform. Not only were established 
artists invited, but young and local artists were also encouraged to take part. It was 
the first official occasion that artists were provided with money and opportunities to 
produce new works, without worrying about the official line or box office incomes. 
Consequently, the festival provided the most exciting programmes, not only 
7 In Taiwan, the term 'modem arts! usually refers to western contemporary arts, such as 
modem dance, western theatre, classical music, fine art, etc. 
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encompassing all art forms, but also embracing innovation both in concept and ,-ý 
format. 
Before the CCA was established, Taiwan's artistic environment was quiet and rigid. 
There were very few arts performancesP, or art festivals. The difficulties of holding 
artistic activities in Taiwan were a result of the fightly controlled and repressive 
environment, as well as a lack of resources (very few suitable theatres, limited 
market and a low level of funding). After the Improvement Pfogramme for Culture, 
Education and Entertainment was promulgated (1979), and the opening of culture ý 
centres in the early 1980s, holding artistic events suddenly became an official 'policy. 
Consequently, the once silent cultural environment turned prosperous and bustling. 
- - 
After the first ever Taipei Music Festival was held and received accJaim in 1979, there 
were five official festivals and one private festival held in Taiwan within one year. " 
Taiwan's arts environment appeared to be booming. 
,ý--, -, ý, 'I ,, 
These festivals were held mostly with the purpose of celebrating official cultural 
--, 
achievement and promoting well-established artists. In comparison, the National- 
Here, I refer mainly to performances of modem art forms (as previous footnote, western 
music, modem dance, ballet, and theatre). In other words, they are artistic performances that 
sell tickets and perform in theatre venues. As to the xiqu and folk performances, they were 
considered mostly as 'entertainment, and were completely driven out of theatre venues 
., - 
around the mid-1 970s. (Details see Chapter 5) Since then, they were mainly performed In 
religious and festive occasions, in front of temples or in the village squares. They were part of 
religious ceremonies rather than artistic events. It was not until the mid-1 980s that their social 
status was enhanced and taken as part of the Taiwanese arts scene. However, It was a 
common view at that time that only modem art forms should be promoted. (HSO P'O-YON, 
1985) 
9 Art festivals suddenly became popular. Five festivals were held In 1980, Including the 
Provincial Festival of Culture and Arts (February 1980), the Kaohsiung Festival of Culture and 
Arts (March 1980), the Festival of Culture and Arts held by the Ministry of Education (April 
- June 1980), the Taipei Music and Dance Festival (August 1980), the Taipei Drama Festival 
(October 1980), and the New Aspect International Festival. They were mostly organised by 
the government (apart from the New Aspect). 
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Festival of Culture and Arts aimed at encouraging creativity and fostering new blood. 
(CCA, 1991 a) Hence, new dance works, works of fine art, plays, and contemporary 
music pieces were funded and produced. It indicated the change of culture within the 
cultural apparatus from a repressive and controlling approach to an encouraging and 
fostedng one. 
In the first few years, the festival had encouraged many artists to produce new works. 
As a result, the number of artists and artistic groups mushroomed after the CCA was 
established. (HSUEH MAO-SUNQ 1999; KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) Most of all, the more 
open environment gave artists more freedom. The money, the venues, and the 
performing opportunities that the CCA provided allowed Taiwanese arts to grow and 
bloom in the late 1980s. 
As well as encouraging creativity, the CCA also placed on equal emphasis on 
preserving 'tradition'. However, since the CCRC was the official organisation in 
charge of preserving traditional Chinese culture, the CCA needed to avoid 
overstepping its authority. As a result, the CCA's definition of 'tradition' shifted 
towards Taiwanese culture. This was partly because Taiwanese culture was a 
territory untouched and discouraged by the authorities before the 1980s. Partly, it 
was because Ch'&n Ch'i-lu, as a cultural anthropologist, understood the importance 
of common culture and encouraged 'indigenous culture!. The effort that the CCA 
placed on preserving Taiwanese tradition was the first serious attention paid by the 
cultural apparatus to indigenous culture officially and systematically. 
Nonetheless, for sensitive political reasons, this shift was not easy, nor obvious at 
first. Because the emphasis on Taiwan was still quite controversial and sensitive, the 
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CCA had to be subUe in order to avoid criticism of being pro-independence. 
3.2.3. Preserving Taiwanese heritage 
-1.. I-I.: ý. 
The CCA's emphasis was placed on the'here and nov/, especially on Taiwanese 
indigenous culture and heritage. It put much effort on establishing the legal basis on 
which to protect cultural heritage. Regulations of Cultural Heritage Preservation 3: 
_rft 
YZpjR4jk(Wenhua zichan baocunfa) was drawn up by the CCA within the first six 
months of its establishment, 'and then promulgated in 1982. 
According to Article 3, the definition of 'cultural heritage' includes anything with 
historical, cultural and artistic values. The divisions include antiquities, historical, 
buildings and sites, folk arts, folklore and folk relics, and natural reserves. The 
emphasis on cultural heritage could be seen as the realisation of Ch'6n Ch'i-lu's 
personal beliefs., " 
'Protecting and maintaining our cultural heritage is the most important task at the 
current stage of cultural planning and development... Having been charged with 
the work of cultural planning and development in recent years, I have come to the 
belief that such work must begin with the preservation of cultural heritage, which 
will in turn, have to rely on broader cultural education and communication of ideas 
about culture! (CH'tN CHI-LU, 1989) 
It showed that the preservation of cultural heritage was the most essential task for 
him. In January 1983, the CCA was entrusted with listing and evaluating historical 
sites. It organised an ad hoc team of scholars and experts to investigate all the 
possible sites. A list of 460 sites was produced and given to the MOL A 
twenty-seven-phase sequence of investigations was carried out over more than three 
years. Finally, 225 sites were listed and the ranks of these sites were assigned 
according to their historical and artistic values. (CCA, 1987,1985) 
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The administration of these sites will be determined by their grade (from Grade I to III 
Listed). The Grade I Listed sites (18 in number) are managed by the Central 
government (the MIO). The responsibility for Grade 11 Listed (36 sites) is assigned to 
Provincial govemmentlo, and the care of the Grade III Listed (171 sites) is given to 
local (County/City) government. 
Apart from investigating and listing historical sites, research and publications were 
also important. The CCA commissioned many scholars to research historical 
buildings and archaeological sites, survey them and make records of nearly-extinct 
folk arts and artists, and most importantly, draw up plans for, and put money into, 
many projects to encourage the passing on and learning of traditional skills. 
3.2.4. Beliftlement reversed 
Even though Ch'6n Ch'i-lu emphasised the importance of indigenous culture, the 
mentality of belittling indigenous culture was still common in the 1980s. For example, 
the National Festival of Culture and Arts was the focus of the CCA's work in the 
1980s, (CCA, 1998b: 246) and the organisation of the festival could be seen as the 
embodiment of policy emphases. The proportion and treatment of different art forms 
(such as Taiwan's indigenous, traditional Chinese, or Western art forms) in the 
festival indicated their weight for the cultural apparatus. 
In the first National Festival of Culture and Arts, modem dance, new works of 
10 Before the Taiwan Province was downsized and abolished in 1998, all the Grade 11 Usted 
sites were managed by the Civil Affairs Department (Taiwan Provincial Government). After 
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contemporary music and drama were arranged for performance in the Sun Yat-sen 
Memorial Hall, the best and largest performing hall in the early 1980s in Taipei, vvith 
around 2000 seats. Beijing Opera" was performed in the Military Culture Centre, 
which had around 800 seats and was routinely used for Beijing opera performances. 
, 
Mainland xiqu 12 was performed in the Taiwan Art House, small and poorly equipped 
.. 
and with around 500 seats. Finally, Taiwanese xiqu and other folk arts were ý 
performed at the open-air stage in the Folk Theatre FestivalI3. 
The performing spaces assigned to different art forms showed a particular hierarchy: 
western and modem art forms were regarded highly, therefore, received higher 
funding and were staged at the best venue as the showcase for cultural achievement. 
Comparatively, Chinese traditional art forms were considered not so advanced, and 
did not need the best performing spaces to accommodate their needs. Among them, 
Beijing opera had special treatment in terms of being given its own specific venue, 
and being officially provided for since 1949. As for local xiqu, mainland xiqu was 
obviously maintained by official will for political needS14 
. 
The lack of professional 
performers made the standard low and it was necessary to rely on amateurs (who 
were usually members of provincial associations) or borrowed Beijing Opera 
performers. In contrast to the unprofessional mainland xiqu performers, the 
professional Taiwanese folk artists were at the bottom of the pile. They were still 
21r't December 1998, this responsibility has been handed to the MOI. 
11 Beijing opera was promoted as the embodiment of Chinese performing arts (See Chapter 
5 The KIVIT made use of its associations of cultural orthodoxy. 
Xqu is traditional form of Chinese theatre (see Chapter 2 footnote 31). Every province or 
region had developed their own style of xiqu, using local dialects and folk music, therefore, 
local xiqu was considered an embodiment of local culture. 
13 Among all programmes in the National Festival of Culture and Arts, the 'Folk Theatre' 
(rninjian juchang RrXj#qQ) was the most popular event. It was held In the Youth Park, and 
tried to bring traditional folk arts back to daily life through a fun-fair style event. 
14 The promotion of mainland xiqu was an effort to create the image that the KMT regime 
represented the whole of China cufturally. 
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considered inferior to mainland xiqu amateurs; hence, they were unsuitable to enter 
the modem theatre. 
The arrangement of locations for different art forms manifested an intriguing 
phenomenon of that time: western culture was considered superior to Chinese, and 
Chinese culture was regarded weightier than Taiwanese. It was a common mentality 
- 
overtly westernised and having blind faith in things foreign (TSýNG HUI-CHIA, 
1998) 
-a result of wholesale westernisation influence. 
In the follovVing year 1983, things started to change in the National Festival of Culture 
and Arts, although slowly. One Gezaixi (Taiwanese xiqu) group was invited to perform 
at the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, because of the recommendation of scholars Ch'iu 
Kun-liang and WU Jing Jyi. By 1984, the popularity of folk arts and their influence 
had been widely acknowledged, and the proportion of folk art performances started 
to dse. 
Among all programmes in the National Festival of Culture and Arts, the fun-fair-like 
'Folk Theatre' was the star. It was designed to recreate the atmosphere of the old 
Temple Fair, but modernised by careful planning and selection in the hope of bringing 
traditional folk arts back to daily life. It was situated in the Taipei Youth Park. An 
open-air stage was constructed in the centre, surrounded by hundreds of folk arts 
stalls. On the stage, all sorts of Taiwanese xiqu, shuochang W1315, and folk songs 
were performed. Most stalls sold folk artefacts and local snacks, and some. 
demonstrated traditional handicrafts. 
15 Shuochang is a traditional genre of popular entertainment. It usually consists of talking, 
singing, and playing instruments to describe a story or sing a repertoire. 
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For the CCA and its producer, scholar Ch'iu Kun-liang, Folk Theatre was only an 
experiment to test the possibility of reviving the environment of folk arts, and bringing 
folk arts back to daily usage. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1983) Yet to ordinary people, this 
. 
occasion was fun and nostalgic, like a revival of childhood memories and an easy 
approach to folk activities and artefacts. It brought attention and interest to Taiwan's 
indigenous culture. Its success was echoing the growing xiangtu (0-±, indigenous, 
native soil) trend. 
Before the mid-1970s, folk arts and xiqu encountered great difficulties in surviving a. 
gradually industrialised society. (CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1980) It was the native-soil 
literature debate and root-searching trend that triggered changes in folk arts. This, 
together with the assertions 'save our cultural heritage' and 'overturn the disastrous 
loss in folk arts' made by the intellectualS16 
, 
awelerated the'indigenous fevee, ý 
(xiangtu re) of the 1980s. Taiwanese consciousness gradually surfaced, and 
indigenous culture and folk arts became the symbol of such awareness. It made 
connections between folk arts, cultural awareness, and a nostalgic longing for a- 
motherland. Although the 'motherland' culture still referred to Chinese culture, ý, 
however, the focus had moved to its connecfion with Taiwanese culture. 
The reversal of the lowly status of indigenous culture was the result of several factors: 
the native-soil debate, the surging cultural root-searching trend, and the promotion by 
academics, and the success of Folk Theatre. Folk arts and indigenous culture, once 
taken as vulgar and tasteless, became acceptable and even were officially funded 
16 They included Ch'iu Wun-liang 4*A, HsQ Ch'ang-hul ; 3ý979, Un Hdng-dao #Y-fM, Tsdng 
Yung-i iftn. 
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and promoted. 
The rise of indigenous fever was a result of not only intellectual effort, but also public 
support and market demand. (HAN PAO-THE, 1977) The trend spread to every 
aspect of life in the 1980s, and alongside the growing economy; the desire to 
consume Taiwanese cultural products also rose. By the late 1980s, Taiwanese 
culture had become a fashion statement, and indigenous cultural products became 
popular. Since then, the antiques, ancient relics, folk artefacts, and even ancient 
furniture and daily utensils became sought-after in the market as a symbol of culture 
and a touch of nostalgia. 
Consequently, many forms of folklore were used in modem commodities 17 
, 
such as 
furniture, interior designs, packaging for traditional food, commercial advertisements, 
decorations and crafts, etc. Lots of modem copies of traditional items were produced 
to satisfy the market. Even crafts from the mainland were sold in the late 1980s as a 
cheaper option to Taiwanese folk arts. (CHUANG PO-HO, 1990: 126) Many 
teahouses were opened and decorated in a Taiwanese retro-style with bamboo 
screens, palm-bark rain capes and oilpaper umbrellas on the wall, Japanese low 
tables, and tatami, or wooden floors and bamboo table sets. (LIN & YEN, 1988) 
The success of the Folk Theatre also became a cultural phenomenon, an annual 
event that everyone looked forward to and enjoyed. Most of all, it successfully 
formulated a new cultural model that created cultural associations linking cultural 
17 Folk style became important in fashion, advertising and commercial commodities. For 
example, the advertisement of Kaixi Wulong Tea emphasised Taiwanese-ness 
and implied the local taste was the in thing for the younger generation ; Yi-mei *jA traditional 
snacks are decorated in traditional patterns. Its ice bar emphasised its traditional ingredients 
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consumption Wth cultural status: consuming folk culture was an act of loving one's 
motherland, and preserving Taiwanese culture was the way to rescue cultural 
heritage. This discourse, proposed by folk scholars, was used by the authorities and 
turned into part of cultural policy. 
By 1987, responsibility for Folk Theatre was transferred from central to local 
government, to encourage local initiative and local artists. (CCA, 1991 a: 29) Local 
governments took over and hosted their own festivals according to the local 
character and its produce. At the'national level', the CCA had a bigger plan in mind 
- 
a Taiwan folk art theme park that operated like Folk Theatre all year round. After 
many revisions, the plan to establish the 'National Centre for Traditional Arts'was 
approved by the Executive Yuan in January 1996, and was opened in I-Ian RfW in 
January 2002. (CCA, 2000b; CHI HIJI-LINa 2002) 
3.2.5. Pro'independent or China-centric? 
The emphasis on both tradition and creation in the early 1980s seemed more than 
appropriate. The all-embracing policy had incorporated various camps in the early 
1980s. According to Ch'dn Ch'i-lus official statement (1989), it was obvious that he 
was proud of being Chinese. On the one hand, he understood the importance of 
indigenous culture and respected aboriginal culture. On the other hand, he also 
adored Chinese culture and appreciated Chinese arts. During his tenure of office, he 
tried to construct strong cultural links between Chinese and Taiwanese culture. He ý 
stressed: 
The presence of Chinese civilization in Taiwan dated back only a few hundred 
and flavour. 
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years, yet one can hardly deny that the achievement of the early settlers from 
Canton and Fukien, their palpable hard work and determination, represents the 
spirit of the Chinese at their best... These architectural remains... provide the 
means for a deeper understanding of the roots of Taiwan's cultural development. 
(CH'tN CHI-LU, 1989: 4) 
However, this once 'appropriate' approach was caught in the cross fire of political 
struggle in the second half of the 1980s. Because of his emphasis on the importance 
of folk arts and Taiwan's own cultural heritage, the CCA was severely criticised. The 
reactionaries within the KMT accused the CCA of being too 'Taiwan-oriented' and 
having a tendency towards Taiwanese independence. (CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1983) 
For example, the CCAorganised the'Hundred Years of Taiwan's Fine Arts' exhibition 
in 1984. This exhibition alarmed some conservative painters who believed that 
Taiwan's art scene was inferior to, and only a branch of, Chinese arts. (HUANG 
TS'Al-LANQ 1984) Ironically, a few years later, when the strengthening opposition 
gradually won a significant number of seats in the Legislative Yuan, Ch'6n Ch'i-lu was 
criticised for being too'China-centric! ". 
According to what he said and the work undertaken by the CCA during his office, it 
was evident that Ch'&n Ch'i-lu held a'China-centric! mentality. For example, he stated 
on many occasions that "Chinese culture is the most extensive, profound and 
long-lived in the world today... we possess a rich fund of cultural heritage. " (CHEN 
CH'I-LU, 1989) However, he was the first person within the post-war KMT 
government who really put effort into preserving and promoting Taiwan's local culture 
and paving the way for future indigenisation. 
18 The organisation of the National Festival of Culture and Arts in his period meant that there 
was a high proportion of Beijing Opera, mainland ditang xi, and Chinese folk art performances. 
At the end of his tenure, the opposition party had constantly criticised him for being 
'China-centric! and old-fashioned. 
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3.3. Dark age with hope 
3.3.1. Setback and slow-down 
This craze for indigenous culture was taken on widely for commercial purposes. 
However, the preservation of historical buildings and cultural heritage was much 
more difficult to carry out, exactly for the same reason 
-economic interests. Although 
many historical sites were generally accepted as 'cultural assets' and tourist 
attractions from the 1980s, objections rose among residents of historical areas and 
owners of listed buildings. They objected to being listed because of economic loss 
and inconvenience. These owners did not want to be deprived of their right to decide 
what to do with their properties, nor of their possible commercial benefits. It seemed 
reasonable that they should want either to convert the house to update their lifestyle, 
or to sell the land to a construction company for new developments. The disputes 
became unsolvable, and caused trouble and complaints. 
The CCA tried to persuade the owners to take pride in having their properties listed. 
Once they realised that pride did not compensate their economic loss, the progress 
of conservation slowed down. By the late 1980s, an era of 'popular culture and 
consumedsm'arrived. (LI YIH-YUAN, 1996a: 29-31; HSIAO HSIWHUANGý 1990) 
The value of historical glory and the sense of honour had been considered secondary 
to profits. The market for antiques became prosperous because of its commercial 
capacity; yet ironically old houses with fragile structures were regarded as worthless 
and obstructive to Progress. Since the national priority was 'economic development', 
the idea of preserving the 'old' did not find much support either from private owners, 
146 
or from the Executive Yuan. 
In the mid-1980s, Taiwan's national policy was basically 'economy first. The new 
Premier YO Kuo-hua iTi7ffltt, who took over from Sun YOn-hs0an, emphasised 
economic growth and scomed the idea of cultural development. "Any cultural project 
proposed by the CCA was never supported nor passed during YO's period", the CCA 
veteran Ko Chi-liang (1999) remembered well. There were several occasions that YO 
deliberately embarrassed Ch'&n Ch'i-lu and belittled the work of the CCA19. In the 
four years of YO's office, the CCA's annual budget had never increased 20 
. 
Moreover, 
because of the lack of political support from the Premier and the Executive Yuan, the 
CCA could not have the full cooperation from other related Ministries to push 
preservation work further. 
The private owners' objection was understandable since the Taiwanese mindset at 
that time considered that'development and progress'were above everything else. 
The CCA wanted to provide compensation in some ways to make up for private 
owners' financial loss. However, there was no support within the government to 
provide compensation or tax deduction in any way. (JUAN WEI-M I Na 1992) The 
only thing that the CCA could do was 'advise' and 'persuade' private owners, and to 
put off the go-ahead of any new development in those areas. Private owners were 
furious and resentful, and refused to have their properties listed. They criticised the 
19 For example, Ch'dn found an important Chinese wash painting at a reasonable price, 
around NT$ I million (approximatelyE20, OOO) in an auction abroad and wanted to buy it back. 
During the process of applying, he was refused because the Executive Yuan believed that it 
was 'unnecessary', even though the CCA had the budget. Ch'dn became disheartened and 
almost resigned. (K'O CHI-LIANCýl 999) Another example was that YO often acted as if that 
the CCA did not exist. YO once visited the Department of Health; he did not bother to stop by 
the CCA, which was located in the same building. In fact, he had never visited the CCA during 
his four years tenure. 
20 It was not until Li Huan 4EJA took over as Premier in 1989 that the annual budget of CCA 
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CCA for being highbrow and over-idealistic. 
The CCA had fought this battle single-handedly for more than 15 years. The debate 
about which was more important, new development or historical conservation, was 
finally resolved by the change of law in 1997. The Legislative Yuan finally added a 
new clause in November 1996 to the Regulations of Cultural Heritage Preservation in 
order to solve the problem. It enabled the private owners of the listed properties to 
- 
claim compensation and tax exemption. ý 
This struggle was a typical example of the difficulties that the CCA has always faced. 
Because this 'culture for culture's sake' apprcoch had never been an issue for 
politicians, the work that the CCA set out to achieved was aWays going to be hard. 
All the problems and difficulties that the CCA faced were in fact caused by its old 
problem 
- 
it had no administrative power to execute its duties. They struggled within 
a bureaucratic system that prioritised political and economic concerns rather than 
cultural ones. After several incidents, Ch'6n Ch'Hu felt humiliated and disheartened. 
(CHINA TIMES, 1987) 
3.3.2. 'Poweriess machine 
According to Ko Chi-liang (1999),, the inferior status within the government damaged 
the development of the CCA, because most of its energy was spent avoiding 
overstepping other ministries'territory and working on matters with no administrative 
support. In the end, the CCA opted for the golden rule 
- 
"the less you do, the less 
trouble you will be in" (SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999) 
- 
in order to avoid offending other 
finally Increased. 
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ministdes. 
Since there were only a handful of matters that the CCA could attend to, many staff in 
the CCA felt that they had become like "the sancai tongzP1 for culture centres and 
artists". (WU TSUI-LIAN, 1987) As to their main tasks of cultural development and 
planning, these were totally unachievable. Before the problem was Widely identified 
around the second half of 1980s, the existence of the CCA was window dressing to 
create a more civilised facade for the KMT govemment. The problem of the CCA's 
inferiority was also rooted in KMT mentality that took culture as a political tool and a 
part of social education. 
Basically, in a Chinese perspective, 'culture' related with a sense of top-down 
cultivation. Therefore, the focus of post-war cultural policy had been within the 
education domain. The Chinese idiomyujiao yu le 3ýW,, 
-! Z- (blending education in 
recreation)'was exactly the embodiment of this concept. There was no doubt that 
culture was regarded instrumental for the KMT, although cultural policy in the 1980s 
was not used purely for political or propaganda purposes as bluntly as before. 
This way of thinking had also been used by the KMT as the justification for using 
culture for'more important, purposes, such as national security, political stability, 
ideological construction, international image or economic development. The CCA! s 
sense of powerlessness to fight its belittlement and its role as a political vehicle 
within the bureaucratic system in the 1980s was daunting. Ch'C-n Ch'i-lu called for 
solutions to either upgrade the CCA or at least unify the responsibilities for cultural 
21 Sancai tongzQkRfV--T- means 'money-distributing lad', a fairy figure who brings fortune to 
the people in Chinese mythology. 
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affairs under one roof. (CHINA TIMES, 1987) Neither was done, and the problem 
remained. After few years of fighting without result Ch'dn Ch'Hu was demoralised. 
(ICOCHI-LIANQ1999; HSOEHMAO-SUNQ1999) 
The CCA was often bullied vvithin the Executive Yuan because of this problem of 
---, 
'youzhi wuquan YM "IM powedessness but with duties attached to it)'. (WU 
TS'UI-LIAN, 1987; LIN & YEN, 1988) Once, Ch'6n Ch'Hu was even sneered at by a 
lower officer in the Social Education Department in a dispute over, 'which institution 
(the MOE or the CCA) should be in charge of culture centres'.: He was so humiliated 
that he almost resigned. 
Because of the discouragement from YQ's cabinet, the work of CCA had gradually 
slowed down and became more passive. During the second half of Ch'6n Chi-lu's 
tenure (1985 to mid-1 988), what the CCA focused on was not as innovative or 
ambitious as his first half. - The CCA followed the old routine, and was cautious about 
proposing any new plans or making changes. Its work had moved to merely holding 
activities, organising performances, and giving subsidies. Ch'6n Ch'Hu was stuck 
and unable to reverse their inferior position22, and the CCA became increasingly 
cautious and conservative. 
3.3.3. Political and social change 
Anthropologist Li Yih-yuan (1996a: 22-23) noticed this conservative tendency and 
22 When I worked as a reporter for the United Daily News (Taiwan), and was In charge of 
cultural news, the CCA was the most important Institution that culture reporters visited almost 
daily. In those days, Ch'dn Ch'i-lu often complained to the media about the CCA's limitation 
and his powerlessness. However, he asked for this not to be revealed so as not to annoy the 
other authorities. 
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criticised the CCA for falling into the old pattern of the CCRC. Li said that the CCA 
put most of its energy on matters that were visible and practical, but not on long-term 
planning or value construction. He believed that the CCA suffered badly in the power 
struggle among ministries, and was forced to narrow down the scope of its works to 
avoid conflict. However, since the problem of overlapping responsibilities had always 
existed from the beginning, why would this change-of-direction happen at this 
particular time? Furthermore, the CCA had gradually won the support of the general 
publiC? 3 and over the years had established some workable patterns between 
Ministries. Why did the conservative and politicised tendency appear around the 
second half of the 1980s? The reason. for this setback was not totally clear. However, 
it seemed to me that it was to do with the ferocious change in Taiwan's political 
environment. 
The 1980s was an era of upheaval and uncertainty. The political reform initiated by 
President Chiang Ching-kuo in March 1986 started a revolutionary change in Taiwan. 
He announced his intention of political reform in the Central Committee, KMT Ten 
days later, a reform group was teamed up to take charge of draviing up plans and 
making timetables for ending martial law (the Emergency Decree), lifting the ban on 
the establishment of new political parties, and re-drafting election regulations to 
increase local autonomy. (LU JUI-CHUNQ 1998: 24; MYERS, 1996) 
Before martial law was officially lifted on 28 September 1986, the core members of 
23 The general feeling among the public was that cultural affairs should be dealt with in a 
coherent manner. The CCA has never lacked the support of the public to be in charge of 
cultural affairs, although there were different opinions about how to achieve that goal. (LI 
YIH-YUAN, 1996a; CHINA TIMES, 1987; HAN PAO-THE, 1989; THE INDEPENDENT NEWS, 
1993) The most accepted way was to upgrade the CCA to ministry level in order to coordinate 
all cultural affairs and draw up cultural policy in an overall perspective. 
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dangwai Ltý$N formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taipei when it 
was still illegal to do so. Instead of repressing this threat to the Mrs one-party 
dictatorship, Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated its existence. ,-- 
Within six months, two reform proposals were presented to the Mrs Central 
Standing Committee; one was the lift of martial law, and the second was the lift of the 
ban on forming new political parties: Soon after the two bans were lifted, many other 
restrictions were also relaxed, such as foreign exchange control, the ban on going 
abroad or visiting Mainland China, and the restricUons on setting up new 
newspapers. 
Although the political reform was initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo, the relaxation of 
political and social environment in the late 1980s was definitely not a result of the 
top-down efforts. In this struggle for political freedom and tolerance, 
-'culture' had 
played a key role and formed an overwhelming bottom-up pressure demanding 
freedom and democracy. 
For example, the inspiration of Diaoyutai incident, the academic promotion of human 
rights, the native-soil debates, and the trend of searching for cultural roots had all 
. 
contributed to the big change. The root-searching trend and the impact of the 
native-soil debate had worked as catalysts in Taiwanese society since the mid-1970s. 
The longing for cultural roots was at first expressed in a self-reassuring and 
, 
China-centric tone. However, from the early 1980s, things started to change, and this 
root-searching trend developed into a conscious desire for indigenisation. 
24 Dangwal iterally meansoutside of the party. Taiwan's opposition members used to call 
themselves dangwal in order to differentiate them from the KMT 
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The focus of the root-searching trend shifted from the nostalgic, melancholic longing 
for a motherland to the yearning for an indigenous 'Taiwan'. Because the rejection of 
being recognised as Chinese in the international society began to dawn on people in 
Taiwan, an awakening self 
- 
Taiwanese identity 
- 
emerged. People in Taiwan were 
forced to face the reality that they did not represent China, and started to raise 
questions about their given status as second-class Chinese. The social changes 
were accelerated by the liberation in political restriction and freedom of expression. 
Following the lift of the martial law, the society was disturbed and excited. 
Once-forbidden public gatherings and social movements suddenly became active 
and frequent. There were only 173 protests and demonstrations in 1983. This figure 
grew rapidly during the mid-1980s (204 in 1984,274 in 1985,337 in 1986,734 in 
1987), and rose to 1,172 protests and demonstrations in 1988. (WU CHIEH-MIN, 
1990: 45) It meant that there were at least three protests per day in 1988. These 
protests and demonstrations involved the student movement, peasant movement, 
workers' strike, environmental movement, and minority protests (aborigines, feminists, 
gay right etc. ). They targeted two kinds of domination: the patriarchal party-state and 
capitalism. (WU CHIEH-MIN, 1990: 55) 
While the whole society was undergoing drastic changes, sociologist Hsiao 
Hsin-huang (1990) observed several worrying cultural phenomena in the second half 
of the 1980s: an overpowering capitalist influence-, an increasing desire for sensual 
pleasure and entertainment; the desire to earn quick money (from the booming stock 
market and gambling); a culture of violence; and the trend of political spin. 
(1990: 78-83) Apparently, the chaotic situation in Taiwan in the late 1980s was not 
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limited only to the political domain 
- 
the whole society was under great strain. From 
1985 onwards, ideological challenges to old values had been voiced, and the calls for 
vigorous social betterment raised. Since the social changes were so great, and the 
demands for reform and social justice were targeted at every aspect of life, the whole 
-., 
society was shaken. 
The second half of the 1980s was a turning point in Taiwan's development a 
revolutionary era. However, it was also a terrifying time of uncertainty. (HSIAO 
HSIN-HUANQ 1990: 73) In contrast to the uncertainty of the 1970s 
- 
an anxiety of 
identity relating to international isolation 
- 
the uncertainty in the late 1980s and early 
1990s was caused by the collapse of the value system. 
At a time like this, when the old order had tumbled, and new systems and order had 
yet to be established, -the CCA did not involve itself in the cultural change, or make 
use of the opportunity to construct a new culture, nor get involved in the process of 
meaning production aggressively. - Instead, they repeated routine works and were 
unresponsive to what was going on in society. The civil servants in the CCA, who 
stood in the frontline of the policy planning and the nation-building process, lost the 
sense of direction themselves. The CCA took the safe route by driffing with the 
political flow, and following routine. (LI Yl H-YUAN, 1996: 23) 
It seemed to me that the real reasons for Ch'6n's vAthdrawal, and for turning the CCA 
into a negative and conservative organisation in the mid-1980s, were not as simple 
as Li Yih-yuan put it. Partly, it was caused by a lack of support of the Executive Yuan. 
In part, it was Wk's scholarly character that determined to the negative reaction 
towards the MOE's aggression. However, I believe that an important factor was the 
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unsettling political environment of the second half of the 1980s that had shaken the 
CCA and placed it in constant cross-fire. No matter what the CCA did, it was always 
taken to task. Hence, Ch'6n took withdrawal as the safest way to ride out a political 
storm and kept silent. Being the official head of cultural affairs and national cultural 
planning, Ch'&n failed to respond to the radical change that Taiwan was undergoing 
before his very eyes and took no action to cope with it. 
3.3.4. Cultural change 
Pressured by growing opposition and 'indigenous fever, the KMT started to localise 
the party. By hijacking the 'indigenisation' appeal, the KMT government assumed the 
air of the benefactor of Taiwanese arts. Moreover, because of continuous economic 
growth 25 
, 
people in Taiwan had more money to spend on cultural products. All these 
elements helped a better cultural environment to develop. 
In 1989, the pace of change in Taiwan reached a critical point. Among all the art 
forms, theatre seemed to be most active and enthusiastic in the upsurge of calls for 
political reform and social change. By then, almost all theatres had been drawn into 
the'political theatre movement pushing further for democracy. In addition, social 
activists also adopted theatrical tactics, and used theatre groups to bang the drum for 
them. (CHUNG MINGIDER, 1992) From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, theatre 
activists worked hand in hand with political campaigners, joining social movements 
calling for change, and became the crucial element in Taiwan's political reform 
25 According to Howe (1996: 1171-1172), Taiwan's economic growth from the mid-1 950 to the 
mid-1 980s was an archetypal Asian Newly Industrialising Economy (ANIE). It achieved rapid 
growth, marked structural change and exceptional export performance. Before 1990, Taiwan's 
national product grew within a range of 8 to 10 per cent per annum. 
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process. Their involvement will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Because of the encouragement of free expression and the exciting social changes 
taking place in Taiwan, Taiwanese culture was booming. Take the emergence of 'New 
Wave' in Taiwanese cinema as an example. Although the KMT government started to 
control the film industry and make propaganda films in thel 950s, it was not until the 
1960s that the film industry was finally under its contrO126 
. 
Two main genres 
dominated the market: kung fu films, and romantic melodrama. Film reflected exactly 
the same characteristic as literature at this time: both were described as "being 
alienated from the reality of Taiwanese society". (CHEN JU-HSIU, 1993: 36) 
During the 1970s, although a middle class in Taiwan started to emerge, and the 
output of film production also remained high (2150 films were produced in the 1970s), 
cinema attendance figures for Taiwanese films did not grow alongside the increased 
ability of the Taiwanese to consume. According to Ch'6n Ju-hsiu (1993), the decline 
in cinema-going was partly caused by the popularity of TV and partly the impact of 
popular Hong Kong films. But most of all, audiences were fed up with formulated 
films irrelevant to their own experiences of life. 
The early 1980s was the gloomiest period for the once prosperous Taiwanese film 
industry. Hollywood and Hong Kong films dominated the Taiwanese film market In 
this period of desperation, the'NewWave'of Taiwanese film emerged. It began with 
26 Due to vast market demand, all sorts of films could be found In Taiwan's cinemas In the 
early post-war years, such as Minnan yu films, Japanese films, Hollywood films, films from 
Hong Kong in Cantonese, and even illegal films from mainland China. This situation was 
gradually changed after a vast quantity of Taiwanese films was produced for the home market. 
The Taiwanese film industry reached its peak in the 1960s and had the third biggest film 
industry in Asia (second to India and Japan). (CH'tN JU-HSIU, 1993) For example, there 
were 189 films made In Taiwan in 1968, while the Hong Kong film Industry produced 160 films 
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two new films produced by the Central Film Company" in a move to encourage new 
blood: The Story of Time MMn, jWW guangyin de gushi) in 1982 and Son's Big Toy 
. 
2: fe, )z, 
-rAR(Erzi de da wan'ou) in 1983. (CH'ÜN JU-HSIU, 1993: 38) 
These two films comprised four short films by four young directors, the idea being to 
reduce production costs and increase the visibility of new directors. Many important 
Taiwanese film-makers emerged because of these two films, including Hou 
Hslao-hsien ft*-R, Edward Yang Qttg, Chang I NJQ, Wan An Mr-, and K& 
1-chC-ng fq-]LE. Their films reflected Taiwanese life and people, and responded to the 
newly-found freedom in arts, displaying the same back-to-reality tendency of other 
cultural areas such as literature, drama, music, and dance. 
At the same time, from the mid-1980s artistic groups and young artists sprang up at 
an unimaginable rate and speed. (HSOEH MAO-SUNQ 1999) In part, this was 
encouraged by official policy, because many national resources were released and 
became publicly available. In some ways this was a practical need since so many 
culture centres had opened. They needed programmes and exhibitions to fill the 
spaces. In addition, people's consuming ability had increased, and they needed more 
spiritual and leisure activities. Since there was a market for it, artistic groups 
emerged. 
Along with the gradually opening society, cultural affairs seemed to become a'must' 
for a civilised government and its politicians. More and more politicians talked about 
cultural issues and the need to build culture. Legislators from the opposition became 
in the same year. (LU FEW, 1994) 
27 The Central Film Company zhongyang dianying gongsi) was a semi-official 
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especially concemed vAth cultural affairs. Some legislators, such as Un Cho-shui 
-# -, 
ffl, 7]ý(DPP), Wang 7o T-M(DPP), Chu hui-liang ýr-, LRft(New Party), Fan HsQn-IQ M-W., 
, 
*(DPP), and Un Ch6ng-tsb #M[I(DPP), earned themselves the reputation of 
"legislators of culture". (PERFORMING ARTS ALUANCE, 1999) 
However, the contrast between the lifeless CCA and Taiwan's surging modem art 
.1 
movement was astonishing. Facing the drastic changes in Taiwan, the CCA seemed 
paralysed and had lost touch with society. It indicated that. - after almost a decade's 
dedication to heritage preservation and encouraging high culture, the direction and 
structure of the CCA had run into deadlock, changes needed to be made in order to 
- 
catch up with the pace of the changing wodd. 
3.4. Reinventing international image 
3.4.1. New chair coping with change 
Early in 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died, and was succeeded by Vice President Lee, 
Teng-hui. In the cabinet reshuffle, Kuo Wei-fan was appointed to chair the CCA. At 
-- 
the same time, the Executive Yuan announced its infrastructure reform plan: four 
. 
councils, including the CCA, would be upgraded to ministry-level. The future for the 
CCA suddenly became bdghter. 
Kuo Wei-fan came from a pedagogical background2a. He had worked in the MOE and 
film company, which belonged to the KMT and was supported by the GIO. 
28 Kuo Weimfan received his PhD in Pedagogy from Pads University, France. Before taking 
the office, he had been the Administrative Minister of the MOE, and the principal of the 
National Taiwan Normal University. 
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maintained good connections with it, which was considered a help in smoothing the 
difficult relationship between the MOE and the CCA. Kuo Wei-fan expressed exactly 
this intention in an interview after his appointment: '7he CCA will focus on its 
planning and coordinating tasks in the future... and avoid direct involvement in actual 
policy execution. " (LU CHIEN-YINQ 1988) He also explained that his idea of the 
CCA's future role would be: "like the steering wheel of the fast changing society. " (LU 
CHIEWYINGý 1988) He regarded himself as a steersman of culture construction and 
intended to build a better cultural environment. 
Knowing the difficulties Ch'dn Ch'i-lu had encountered, Kuo Wei-fan clearly tried to 
avoid making the same mistakes, and wanted to find a new interpretation of 'cultural 
affairs'. According to him, there were five areas that CCA should emphasise: 1, 
improving the cultural environment; 2, promoting cultural life; 3, beautifying the public 
environment; 4, balancing cultural development between city and suburb; 5, 
promoting and carrying out international cultural exchanges. (CCA, 1991 a: 2) Among 
them, the last two tasks were new and later proved to be successful and influential. 
Compared with Ch'dn Ch'i-lu, Kuo Wei-fan was considered a layman in the arts. 
However, he proved himself as a chairman with modem ideas and flexible political 
skills. Ko Chi-liang remembered well how different his style was from Ch'6n Chi-lu's: 
"He was very young, only 46 or 47 at that time. He was not afraid of loosing face and 
always ready to strive to win support and fight for resources he thought that the CCA 
needed. " (KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) After he took up the office, the direction of the CCA 
changed. 
At first, culture communities suspected that his policy would focus on a'social 
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,T Pik 
education' function. However, the fact that his pedagogical background actually 
prevented him from getting too involved in any artistic dispute, or from being too 
close to one particular faction, freed him from being influenced by any personal 
connection or bias. (HSUEH MAO-SUNQ 1999) 
Kuo Wei-fan's wish was to improve the cultural environment as a whole. Firstly, 
instead of fighting over administrative power with other minisbies, he asked the CCA 
to put more energy into improving the legal basis of the culture industry. During his 
--, 
office, new regulations such as the Regulations of Encouraging Cufture andArts29, 
Tax Reduction and Exemption for Cultural Industt3? O were drawn and promulgated. 
For him, it was the base to protect and encourage the growth of culture. 
Secondly, because the arts market was limited3l even at the end of the 1980s, he 
wished to create an environment for a professional art industry. He wished to create 
a suitable environment and a market place to support the possible growth of a- 
professional art market. In order to achieve that, on the one hand, he introduced the 
'enterprise feedback scheme' to boost sponsorship and fund-raising opportunities 
and on the other, he tried to sort out the problem of tax-exemption and cleduction 
- 
regulations. 
29 The Regulations of Encouraging Culture and Arts (wenhua yishuflanzhu tiaoli 3ZjtUWJ_% 
MIMIPD was issued in July 1992.. 
30 This operating rule (wenhua yishu shiyeflanmian yingyeshuiji yuleshul banfa 
'*'jtUjTCj$ 
was issued In June 1993. It took decade-long struggle to break 
through the rigid tax regulation, beginning In the Ch'6n Chi-lu period. It was not until the late 
1980s that the attitude of taxation on cultural industry changed, and tax exemption on arts 
was accepted. 31 According to the Cuffural Statistics in 1992 (CCA), the rate of annual attendance in cultural 
events in Taiwan was low between 1989 and 1991. The figure showed poor attendance in arts. 
It showed that, on average, everyone in Taiwan went to an exhibition around 0.27 times a 
year, 0.02 times to music, drama and folk performances; and only 0.01 times to dance and 
seminars. (CCA, 1992) In other words, only I in 4 Taiwanese went to one exhibition each year, 
I in 50 to music, drama or folk performances; and I in 100 went to dance performances or 
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The CCA borrowed the management model from the Cloud Gate and the 
Performance Workshop32 
. 
Their successful management model inspired Kuo Wei-fan 
and was taken as the solution to modernise the arts environment. The CCA not only 
encouraged cooperation between the artists and big enterprise, but also started to 
construct a state funding system. Many CCA staff (e. g. HsOeh Mao-sung, 1999; Ko 
Chi-liang, 1999; Su Kuei-chih, 1999) paid tribute to Kuo Wei-fan's endeavour to 
modemise the cultural environment. Kuo opened up a new battlefield to extend the 
international arena to promote Taiwan, rather than fighting the old war over 
oadministrative territories' within the bureaucratic system. 
3.4.2. Representing China 
The ROC on Taiwan had always emphasised its political legitimacy by promoting 
traditional culture. Robinson (1996: 1345-46) described the way the ROC "used its 
cultural assets to support its political, and hence its security, goal regarding the 
United States". Especially during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, Taiwan 
'capitalised' on the opportunity and promoted the ROC as the 'culture centre of 
China'. 
The GIO was responsible for promoting a national image in international society. Its 
focus was basically to increase the ROC's international visibility. Over the years, the 
seminars. 32 Through the 1970s, the Cloud Gate was the only artistic company in Taiwan to try to run a 
group professionally. It managed to sustain itself in an almost barren environment by a 
combination of box office income, subsidies, and private donations. The Performance 
Workshop emerged in the late 1980s. It carried out an aggressive publicity policy and paid 
great care to ensure their plays were popularly accepted. (See Chapter 5) 
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GIO sponsored and organised a large number of American groups to visit Taiwan, 
organised different trips and visits for foreign correspondents, and got in touch with ý I- 
foreign media. (ROBINSON, 1996) This kind of effort had double benefits, not only ý:; 
increasing Taiwan's visibility, but also, boosting domestic morale at a time when the 
.,, 
- 
Taiwanese felt abandoned in intemational society. Once articles or news about 
Taiwan was published, or programmes broadcast abroad, the GIO would release the 
news announcing Taiwan's international appearance as another wave of internal , ý; 
propaganda to prove Taiwan's existence. 
The ROC on Taiwan capitalised on its claim to be the [after-day culture centre of 
China and the preserver of many artefacts; of the culture. (ROBINSON, 1996) The 
frequent cultural exchanges between the ROC and the USA was a typical example: 
"Not a month was allowed to go by without some cultural troupe, sports team, film 
festival, art exhibit and the like visiting and travelling through the United States. " 
(ROBINSON, 1996: 1345) 
Apart from inviting foreign tours to Taiwan, the ROC offered itself as the main and 
legitimate provider of Chinese cultural resources, providing programmes full Wth 
Chinese essence during the Cultural Revolution period. The GIO was in charge of 
providing cultural programmes and propaganda films to television stations in foreign 
countries. Many exhibitions, seminars, visits, performances and academic 
conferences held abroad were in fact arranged by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and Education (MOE), and funded by the ROC government. 
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the need to promote the ROC was even 
greater in order to tackle the mounting isolation in international society. But this was 
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found to be increasingly difficult. Because of Taiwan's weak position in international 
society an the status of being without diplomatic relations, many Taiwanese cultural 
events touring abroad were held in local community centres, university halls, or local 
gatherings33. In other words, their influence was limited. Also, host countries were 
constantly under the pressure of the PRCs strong objections. 
Until the late 1980s, cultural programmes were mostly Beijing opera performances. 
This kind of performance was particularly important, because of its association With 
orthodox culture 
- 
the implication being that the KMT was the legitimate heir of 
Chinese culture. The ROC government tried to build up a 'representational system' 
that could create a meaningful association between Chinese culture (Beijing opera) 
and political legitimacy (the ROC) in an international context. I agree with Woodward 
(1997) who comments that it is 'culture' that is used to mark out and maintain identity 
within and between groups. The cultural association that Beijing opera provided was 
crucial for the ROC on Taiwan to prove its authentic Chinese-ness. Through the 
promotion of Beijing opera, the ROC attempted to produce its desired meaning 
- 
Beijing opera was orthodox Chinese culture, and promoting Beijing opera was the 
duty of the legitimate Chinese government. Therefore, in contrast to the destruction 
that the PRC caused to traditional culture, Taiwan presented itself as the real culture 
centre and the ROC was the one and only legitimate Chinese government. 
As Taylor (1992: 32) stresses, the recognition of the 'significant others' is crucial for 
, 
the formation of identity. "I negotiate it (my identity) through dialogue, partly overt, 
33 These touring performances were mostly organised by the MFA, or sometimes, the 
overseas Chinese associations. However, there was one exception in the Cloud Gate Dance 
Company. It has been invited to tour around the world more than thirty times since 1975. It 
won its reputation without any diplomatic support. 
163 
partly internal, with others. That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly 
generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My own identity crucially 
depends on my dialogical relations vvith others. " (TAYLOR, 1992: 34) The cultural 
-, 
exchange was clearly taken as part of diplomatic work to create and articulate an 
'ideal identit)( to the significant others. 
In this process, making sure that'desired meanings' are produced in the 
representational system is crucial for its success. As Hall comments, "Representation 
functions less like the model of a one-way transmifter and more like the model of a 
dialogue 
- 
it is, as they say, dialogic. " (1997a: 10) Since the desired 'ideal identity' 
can never be fixed, a constant opportunity to make dialogues vAth the significant 
others is important. For the ROC on Taiwan, creating as much dialogue as possible 
was the priority. Beijing opera was used as the cultural symbol to win the 
international recognition for Taiwan as the authentic China, even though the ROC on 
Taiwan was not diplomatically recognised. 
Apart from Beijing opera, another common cultural exchange event was the'goodwill 
mission troupe'. After Taiwan's expulsion from the U N, the 'Chinese Youth Gooclwill 
Mission'34was set up topromote the total diplomac?. (LO HSIEN-FU, 2000) The 
purpose was to show off these energetic, lively and most talented young people who 
34 Each year, talented students from universities would be selected to form a Touth Goodwill 
Mission Troupe'(zhonghua minguo qingnian youhao fangwentuan rp 41RIA 
Its purpose was to show goodwill from Taiwan. However, the style of the programmes was 
mainly 'Chinese', stressing the authentic Chinese-ness of the younger generation. (LO 
HSIEN-FU, 2000) It was especially popular among young Taiwanese before the late 1980s, 
because it was their only chance to go abroad at a time when overseas travel was restricted. 
35 The policy (quanmian ýýfflj diplomacy, total diplomacy) was proposed by then Premier 
Chiang Ching-kuo after the ROC's expulsion from the UN in 1971. He outlined this strategy In 
1973 to tackle the difficulties and deadlocks that the ROC faced In international society. He 
proposed mobilising all available resources (political, economic, scientific, technological, and 
cultural) to maintain diplomatic links with countries that had transferred recognition to Beijing. 
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represented "the future of Free China 
- 
the ROC on Taiwan". (LO HSIEN-FU, 2000) 
This format has been operated and toured around the world (mostly the USA) for 
almost 30 years. 
Most significantly, the old tactics 
- 
the academic influence that the KMT always 
employed 
- 
was also used extensively in the cultural exchange domain. Robinson 
noticed this policy had long-term and influential impact. 
For many years, Taipei funded an important, and more recently an increasing, 
portion of the American study of China. Academic professorships and - 
programmes were set up at many universities, not only those that historically 
had ties with Taiwan but increasing those at the top of the American 
China-studies community. The same was true of many American research 
institutes, and not just those traditionally 'right wing'. (ROBINSON, 
1996: 1346-1347) 
As Gramsci suggested, using academics was a tactic to win or maintain hegemonic 
discourse: the ROC's representation as the orthodox Chinese government. 
Compared with other cultural exchange schemes, this effort to incorporate 
intellectuals to form discourses about Taiwan indeed had a fundamental impact on 
Taiwan's international image. It was an attempt to produce knowledge and meaning 
through influencing the formation of discourses. 
3.4.3. Globalisation 
The urge to be recognised in the international society was intensified when Taiwan 
became more open and the communication with outside wodd became more 
frequent. To make sense of one's being and belonging, the need for recognition was 
inevitable. The urge to reach out being part of the world, and also the longing of 
(YAHUDA, 1996: 1329-1330) 
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being known and heard accelerated the globalisation trend in Taiwan. 
During the early post-war years, 
- 
the only contact between Taiwan and the outside 
world came from economic activities. According to Chang and HsQ (2000), the 1960s 
was the cnicial period when foreign investment came into Taiwan. It laid the 
., -,, 
foundations for Taiwanese economic development and included Taiwan within the 
global economic system. The Japanese company Takeda set up a factory in Taiwan 
in 1962, Pfizer in 1964. IBM established its International Purchasing Office'in Taiwan 
in 1966. The same year, General Instrument Texas Instruments, and Philips set up 
factories producing electronics in Taiwan. All the products made in Taiwan at this 
period were mostly'original equipment manufacturing' (OEM). Two industries were 
the veterans of this area: electronic products, and the clothing industry (including 
garments, textile and footwear). 
In the 1970s, even more trans-national companies set up factories in Taiwan, 
including Zenith, RCA, GE; or cooperated with local companies, e. g. Cyanamid and 
Taiwan Sugar Corporation, Sankyo and China Chemical Pharmaceutical Company. 
(CHANG & HSO, 2000) 
Before the mid-1 980s, the Taiwanese economy was described as an economy 
activated mostly by foreign investment and trans-national companies. (HSU 
WEI-CHIEH, 1999) Between 1982 and 1985, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
purchase in Taiwan still dominated Taiwan's economy, making up 77% of Taiwan's 
gross national product (GNP). (CHANG & HSO, 2000) 
The mid-1 980s was an era of change and transition. Taiwan's prosperous economy 
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faced challenge, partly because of the difficulties of transforming from a labour to a 
more capital and skill-intensive economy, and partly because of the political and 
economic uncertainties. Because of the change, Taiwan's clothing industry moved 
overseas after the 1980s, and transformed its role to become a'global broker. With 
its foreign buyers and overseas factories, usually in SoutheastAsia and mainland 
China, Taiwan has constructed alriangle man ufacturing' framework, in which Taiwan 
takes the orders from abroad, designs the products, and produces them in cheaper 
overseas factories. (PAN, 1998) 
According to Howe's analysis (1996), after the economic reform and the open door 
policy in China, the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits became 
both competitive and potentially beneficial. Although China took Taiwan's place in the 
labour intensive sectors, the two economies complemented each other in different 
sectors. Mutual growth and development were supported by Taiwanese investment. 
The computer industry prospered after the mid-1 980s and became one of Taiwan's 
specialisations. Because of the rapid growth of the domestic market for PCs, 
Taiwanese computer companies started to produce their own brands. (CHANG & 
HSO, 2000) By 1995, Taiwan held world market shares above 25% in nine major 
information technology (IT) products, and above 50% in four of nine36. (HOWE, 1996: 
1195) 
Overall, Taiwan's economic role has transformed from being a labour-intense 
producer, to'brokee, 'designee and 'investor' actively involved in global economic 
36 The nine major IT products include monitors, handheld and desktop scanners, PCs, 
network cards, mother-boards, power supplies, graphic cards, and keyboards. 
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activities., (CHNG, 1996; CHANG & HSO, 2000) Alongside TaiwarYs increasingly 
- 
globalised economy, the speed of cultural globalisation in Taiwanese society ý 
accelerated through vast quantities and varieties of information provided by internet, 
satellite and cable TV, books and magazines as well as from increasing overseas 
travel, personal communications and cultural contact. (Further discussions see 
- 
Chapter 4.6.1. ) As a matter of fact the globalisation process in Taiwan took place 
quite early and played an important role in bringing new ideas into an enclosed and 
authoritarian society and pushing for transformation. 
3.4.4. Exporting Taiwan 
In the 1960s and 70s, the representational system that the KMT tried to create 
- 
the 
legitimate Chinese government promoted traditional Chinese culture 
- 
was 
sustainable because the PRC was occupied by its domestic struggle and was closed 
to the outside world. What better substitute for traditional Chinese culture could there 
be than the ROC on Taiwan? Many artistic tours were arranged by the MRA. ;- 
However, this representation was challenged after the Cultural Revolution ended. 
- 
The creation of another meaningful representation was the issue that needed to be, 
tackled. Furthermore, it was hard to explore any overseas arts market since 
Taiwanese artists were unable to represent Chinese culture any more because of 
- 
intemational situabon. 
In the late 1980s, Taiwanese indigenous artists started to attract international 
attention. Taiwanese abodginal musicians and folk artists (Beiguan and Stdng Puppet 
performers) were invited to tour around Europe in 1989 (not arranged by the MFA). 
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International attention was drawn to Taiwan's native arts and the reviews were 
positive. (CCA, 1991a: 50) Many Taiwanese artists became active in the international 
arena 37 
. 
Successful arts events had won Taiwan unexpected visibility and praise 
abroad. Increasingly, it became clear to the ROC on Taiwan that it was their 
Taiwanese-ness that attracted the significant others in the international society, not a 
substituted Chinese-ness. 
The CCA was encouraged by the result and decided to get more deeply involved in 
this area. Groups touring abroad would receive subsidies covering part of their travel 
and living expenses. However, the successful experience of funding the 
Contemporary Legend Theatre in the U. K in 1990 totally changed the official 
approach to cultural exchange. In 1990, the prominent Japanese art promoter Tadao 
Nakane recommended a small Taiwanese group, the Contemporary Legend Theatre, 
to London's National Theatre. (ROYAL NATIONAL THEATRE, 1990: 1) Its production, 
The I(ingdorn of Desire, gained an international acclaim that Taiwanese artists had 
never had before. "In any language, this is exciting theatre. But it is a bonus to see 
such a well conceived innovation that combines the dazzle of Peking opera with the 
strength of Western realism. " (KENNETH REA, 1990) Its success was based on its 
own merits and did not reply on state 'promotion'. 
This successful event was especially rare because the UK government had always 
had a close relationship with the PRC, and any cultural exchanges that the ROC held 
in the UK were protested and muffled. The CCA chairperson Kuo Wei-fan was with 
the group when the production was put on in London, and witnessed the experience. 
37 Such groups included the Lanyang MM Folkdance Group, the Xinhexing VT-fnjQI Gezabd 
Group, and the Yiwanran /ZruPtk,, Puppet Group. (CCA, 1991 a: 50) 
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He decided to improve the cultural environment to encourage similar results 
elsewhere 
- 
that is, for work to be recognised on the merits of artistic achievement 
rather than diplomatic push. As a result, it became a CCA policy to invest more 
money and place greater emphasis on supporting a sustainable cultural environment 
(CCA, 1991 
When the ban on visiting the mainland was lifted, culture was again considered an 
appropriate form of contact between the two sides. Cultural exchange was used to 
improve the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait Hence, when the 
'Guidelines for National Unification (guojia tongyi gangling W%ýe-, Aa'were 
announced in February 1991, the document stipulated in explicit terms that cultural 
and educational exchanges should be a first step in the process of re-building mutual 
understanding and friendship between the two sides. (CCA, 1998a: 263-269) 
In the summer of 1990, the Minghuayuan RJIM24 Gezaixi Group was invited to 
perform in the opening programme of the 1990 Asian Games Festival' in Beijing. it 
was the first official 'cultural contact' between two sides. Although it was a political 
gesture of goodwill from Beijing to invite Taiwanese xiqu 
- 
Gezaixi to open the festival, 
Minghuayuan did show its strength in adopting modem theatre tactics and using 
sumptuous costumes and scenery. It was a good beginning for cultural exchange. 
Because of the increasing contact across the Strait, many regulations were drawn up 
to cope with increasing communications. (CCA, 1998a: 265) This cultural exchange 
also started a "China Craze" in Taiwan's performing arts, and the art market, 
beginning in the late 1980s. (LI YIH-YUAN, 1996a: 52-96) Apart from increasing 
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tourisO8, all kinds of non-governmental activities were carried out. From 1987 to 
1994, there were 7.25 million such activities taking place. (SIEW VINCENT C. 1995: 
3) For example, academic visits and discussions were organised; musicians and 
performers from the two sides performed together, academic conferences were held; 
even Taiwan's Mazu39 worshipers slipped through the blockade in the Taiwan Strait 
and went directly to Meizhou Vfln to offer incense. 
According to the CCA (1998a: 267), there were 6,180 artists and intellectuals, 123 
performing groups, and 25 exhibitions from China visiting Taiwan between 1987 and 
1997. In recent years, the pattern of cultural exchange moved from purely visiting to 
further cooperation4o. However, the 1994 Qiandao Lake T-)%M incidenel, and the 
missile threats of 1996 dampened this enthusiasm and interrupted the cultural 
exchanges abruptly. It will be looked at in Chapter 4. 
3.4.5. Cultural windows opened to the world 
38 According to Taiwan's official records, there were about 380,000 Taiwanese travelling to 
China to visit relatives in the first year after the ban was lifted. In addition, there were at least 
20,000 Taiwanese tourists visiting China. (LI YIH-YUAN, 1996a) LI Yih-yuan interpreted the 
craze as curiosity of, and a longing for, motherland and traditional culture. (11 996a: 72) 
Furthermore, the trading relationship also grew drastically. In 1994, the volume of indirect 
trade via Hong Kong amounted to $18billion per annum, while Taiwanese investment in the 
PRC was between $20 and $30 billion. (SHAMBAUGH, D, 1996a: 1285) 39 Mazu is the goddess of the sea, usually worshiped by fishermen and people along the 
coast. In folklore, her hometown was on the southern coast of mainland 
- 
Meizhou MM. In 
order to control illegal immigrants and justify its political stand, Taiwanese authorities outlawed 
direct travel between the mainland and Taiwan. Therefore, this sort of visit was illegal without 
ping through a third area (usually Hong Kong or Macao). 
This kind of cooperation included the joint performance of the National Taiwan 
Experimental Chinese Orchestra and the Shanghai Traditional Instruments Orchestra; a joint 
performance of the Kuo Kuang Chinese Opera company and the China Beijing Opera Troupe. 
The Qiandao Lake incident took place on March 31 st 1994, when 24 Taiwanese tourists 
were robbed and burnt to death when they travelled to Hangzhou RJJJ, a famous tourist site in 
southern China. After the incident, Chinese police concealed the news and tried to cover up 
the truth from the victims' families. They claimed the whole incident was an accident caused 
by fire. The Chinese authorities not only refused to let the families take the victims! bodies 
back to Taiwan, but also refused to talk to the Straits Exchange Foundation 
- 
the arms-length 
quasi-institution that was designed to deal with non-official matters concerning people across 
the Taiwan Strait. This incident aroused great resentment towards China among Taiwanese. 
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The diplomatic situation had been hard for the ROC since the 1970s, because of the 
problem of Taiwan's legal status. (YAHUDA, 1996) According to the official records of 
- 
the GIO, the main diplomatic mission of the ROC is to "consolidate its cooperative 
- 
relations with friendly countries". (GIO, 1993a: 57) Over the years, the MFA has tried 
- 
to set up representative offices to replace the former embassies and to promote 
economic, trade, technological, and cultural ties with countries that do not have 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. By 1992, there were around 88 representative 
offices in 60 counties, (GIO, 1993a: 58-59) although the number of countries that had 
formal diplomatic relations Wth the ROC had never exceeded 30. (YAHUDA,, 1996) 
The ROC has struggled to make itself visible and heard in international society. 
- 
In 1989, President Lee Teng-hui asserted a new diplomatic line-'pragmatic 
diplomaCyA2. 'Culture' became a useful tool to break the deadlock in international 
relations. The official attitude towards 'cultural exchange'was to take culture as a, 
branch of the diplomatic instrument. Even the CCA held the same vievr "Using 
cultural acfivities as the medium to increase the visibility and communication (in the 
international arena) could easily gain good response, and cause no 
antagonism. "(CCA, 1998a: 244) 
Performances and exhibitions that were full of 'Chinese essence' were used for 
lexport' to America and Europe. However, when Taiwanese artists started to bring 
international interest to Taiwan, the situation changed. Although the task of cultural 
After this incident, the peace talks between two sides were put on hold. 42 Pragmatic diplomacy (wushi diplomacy was proposed by president Lee in 1988. 
It was a diplomatic principle based on realistic and pragmatic considerations, which did not 
stress ideology or traditional values. (WANG GAO-CI-ItNGý 1998: 298) 
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exchange remained a part of foreign policy 
- 
"taking culture as the vanguard to 
improve international understanding about the ROC " (CCA, 1998a: 242) 
- 
the focus 
had shifted. The content of cultural exchange events not only relied mostly on the 
merits of artists, but most importantly, they focused on Taiwanese culture. (CCA, 
1998a) The cultural image of the ROC that the CCA tried to portray has also changed, 
especially in recent years, from an 'authentid Chinese culture centre to a modem 
Taiwan. 
Because of increasing praise, Taiwanese arts and artists believed that they had 
proven themselves to be "good enough" to represent contemporary Taiwanese 
culture. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999; LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) Intemational 
recognition was won not because they were a good copy of 'traditional Chinese arf, 
but for the first time, they were accepted as modem Taiwanese artists in their own 
right. Taiwanese artists had gradually built up confidence in the belief that Taiwanese 
indigenous arts were not secondary to Chinese culture, nor vulgar or shameful. 
(LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) At the same time, the increasing opportunity for cultural 
exchange boosted the confidence of Taiwanese artists. They became proud of 
themselves as a cultural product made-in-Taiwan. 
The'effect of these cultural exchanges was a surprise to the MFA and GIO, because 
the cultural exchanges they organised were either thwarted by the constant protests 
from the PRC or ignored. 
43 For example, the Chinese Information and Culture Center (the CCA office in New York), 
had arranged over 80 exhibitions and 400 performances over the years. Most of them were 
Taiwanese arts, including Hakka culture, Taiwan's tea culture, traditional Taiwanese prints, 
glassware, Taiwan's modem arts and folk arts... (CCA, 1998a: 244-245) 
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For politicians, it opened a new way-out and a promising channel for building up 
Taiwan's restricted diplomatic relationship. In 1991, the Executive Yuan instructed the ý 
CCA to coordinate vvith related ministries to organise cultural exchanges, for the 
purpose of enhancing the 'national image (guojia xingxiang (CCA, 1991 a: 
, 
51; 1998a: 244,249) The CCA started to hold 'International Cultural Exchange 
Negotiation Meetings'regulady, in which the MFA, the MOE, and the GIO had to 
participate. In order to achieve the overall effect of 'cultural export, each sector learnt 
to cooperate and coordinate when the international cultural events were organised. 
Therefore, inoffensive cultural acfivities seemed to be the most effecUve and fruitful 
way to construct Taiwan's national image and win recognition. Because of this, Kuo 
Wei-fan had the idea of opening 7aiwan's cultural vvindows! in all international 
cosmopolitan cities. The first WndoW was opened in New York in 1991 
- 
the Chinese 
Information and Culture centre (CICC). It was located in Manhattan's Rockefeller 
Centre and claimed to be "the largest public resource centre for Chinese culture and 
contemporary life in the ROC on Taiwan" (CCA, 2000c) and played the role of 
'national window of Taiwanese culture' to America. 
In 1994, the same format was adopted in Europe. "rhe Taipei Culture and Information 
Centre, Paris'was opened, and functioned as a European base, operating cultural 
exchanges and liaising With European countries, such as the UK, Austria and Italy. 
Performances and exhibitions were arranged regularly in order to carry out 
'international cultural exchange' further. In May 2000, the London Chinese Culture 
Centre, another window to Europe, was opened in the UK 
Summary 
174 
As Taylor (1992: 25) describes, "Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, 
can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced 
mode of being. " The disturbance of non- or mis-recognition of the ROC's international 
status since the 1970s was painful and degrading. People in Taiwan were denied the 
recognition of their identity. In order to cope with the frustration of feeling rejected, 
and to satisfy the longing to belong, the ROC government endeavoured to construct 
its desired image intemationally. 
By the end of the 1970s, the Cultural Revolution ended. On the one hand, the 
international society had turned its back on the ROC and recognised the PRC, and 
on the other, the domestic demand for political reform intensified. The trend of 
searching for cultural-roots emerged. All these changes pressured the Taiwanese to 
re-examine the issue of Taiwanese identity. As Eriksen (1993: 68) comments, "social 
identity becomes most important the moment it seems threatened". This was exactly 
the case in Taiwan. Whenever there was a drastic change, either domestically or 
internationally, the need to either construct a new identity or maintain the old 
emerged. 
Consequently, the establishment of the CCA was a deliberate action of the KMT 
regime to construct a new culture. The CCA had tailored its policy to accommodate 
indigenous needs. During the first half of the 1980s, the CCA had steadily altered the 
cultural focus away from the old cultural renaissance line to stressing the importance 
of Taiwanese culture and heritage 
- 
although the emphasis was still placed within the 
hierarchy of 'Chinese as the mother culture' and 7aiwanese as the sub-culture. It 
was not until the late-1 980s when Taiwanese consciousness became stronger, that 
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the claim that'Taiwan represented the authentic China' became increasingly 
embarrassing and unbearable. I- - *__ 
;ç 
The 1980s was a period full of political turmoil and uncertainty. Taiwan was 
-, , '. "" 
undertaking vigorous political and social reform. Newfound freedom accelerated 
cultural change and awoke Taiwanese consciousness. - Although international '. 
,-7 
isolation did not cease, - economic prosperity gave the Taiwanese confidence and high; 
self-esteem. Instead of trying to be a copy or supplement of 'Chinese culture', and ýi 
claiming to be the legitimate Free China, prosperous cultural development in Taiwan 
provided new possibilities for the country to present itseff as 'ROC on Taiwan' to the 
'significant others'. 
From the 1970s, it was dear that the ROC government could no longer pretend to : 
-.. 
represent the legitimate Chinese government Therefore, finding new ways to 
articulate and create another'representation' of the ROC, and to influence the 
international view on Taiwan, became important tasks. Hence, the course of the 
.-" 
culture-building process changed, from maintaining'the continuity' and'authenticity' 
of traditional Chinese culture, to creating and discovering Taiwanese culture., Within 
this decade, alongside the successful story of Taiwan's economic miracle, the image 
of the ROC on Taiwan changed. Taiwanese-ness, once taboo and suppressed, was 
officially promoted, even though it was still within a China-centric framework. ,-, 
In order to differentiate itself from the PRC, culture was used to build up a new 
identity and national image, promoting the official discourses that the ROC on Taiwan 
wanted to construct. In other words, culture was treated as 'cultural capital' creating a 
national image within an international arena and sustaining domestic support. 
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Chapter 4 New Taiwanese 
In this chapter, my aim is to see the interaction between identity and social change 
since the late 1980s. I will look at what affected the formation of identity, how the 
political tide was reversed, why Taiwanese identity was drastically changed within a 
few years, and most of all, how the old discourse of Taiwanese identity was replaced 
and rebuilt. 
4.1. Building up the Lee Teng-hul regime 
4.1.1. Power transition 
The'silent revolution' conducted by Chiang Ching-kuo in the 1980s re-routed 
Taiwan's political direction from that set by his fathees authoritarian rule. He devoted 
the last years of his life to liberation and clemocratisation, and steered the KMT 
govemment toward 'Taiwanisation". However, it was the rise of Lee Teng-hui that 
fundamentally reconstructed Taiwan's political ecology. (TU, 1996: 1129) 
After Chiang's untimely death in 1988, Lee succeeded to the presidency. In contrast 
- 
to the two Chiangs, he was a native Taiwanese and came from an academic 
background, and was considered untypical as a KMT politician. Under the shadow of 
party reactionaries, Lee Teng-hui contained himself and followed the regular party 
precedents during the first two years in office. It was not until he was elected as the 
president in 1990 (by the National Assembly, which is similar to the presidential 
electoral college in the USA) that his position stabilised and he gradually became his 
own man. Willem van Kemenade, a Dutch correspondent in Asia, described Lee's 
change: "'The metamorphosis of President Lee 
... 
began in 1990... After the 
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election... [he] immediately embarked on a subtle but revolutionary overhaul of the 
Nationalist political structure, pushing it in the direction of a new Taiwanese state. 
Lee dubbed his own tactics 'creative ambiguity'l. " (KEMENADE, 1998: 108) 1- 
Tension between an emerging Taiwanese force and the old conservative mainlander 
- 
power split the KMT during the early 1990s. The KMT divided into two camps: the 
'mainstream' (zhuliu pai jrtfflý, mainly Taiwanese or Taiwan-born politicians, 
representing the liberal force within the party, led by Lee Teng-hui) and the 
'non-mainstream' (fei zhuliu pai gpjrt9, mainly mainlander politicians, representing 
the conservafive faction, led by Hau Pei-tsun MMf Jý). Lee's'creafive ambiguity' was 
a skill used to balance the factional struggle and to steer the party subtly towards 
Taiwanisation. At first this division was not too obvious. 
In May 1990, Lee Teng-hui appointed the senior mainlander General Hau Pei-tsun as 
the Premier, in order to stabilise his political position and control tension. However, it 
released a storm of protest against the prospect of a military government, because of 
Hau's influence and close connection within the armed forces. This appointment was 
a clear demonstration of Lee Teng-hui's technique of 'creative ambiguity. He skilfully 
used this appointment to unnerve the right-YAng reactionaries inside the KMT, at the 
same time containing Hau by arousing the suspicions of the opposition party 
- 
the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). With balanced containment from both forces, 
Lee's status was temporarily secured. 
' He described how he had contained himself during political struggle In an Interview In 1994 
with the Japanese writer Shima Ryutaro. (LEE TENG-HUI, 1994a: 469483) He said, 
'ambiguity'was the key to survival; otherwise, he would have been destroyed long before then. 
He also admitted that he had always contained himself during difficult situations, and not 
showed his true feeling. He used the old Japanese saying 
- 
"when having the third bowi of 
r1ce, the guest has to do it quietly" 
- 
to describe how he survived all the political storms after 
Chiang died. 
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Then, enoouraged by the German unification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War, 
Lee Teng-hui proceeded to revoke all the repressive emergency legislation that had 
provided the constitutional basis for the existence of the ROC on Taiwan. The 
Temporary Articles were abolished, and the "Period of Mobilisation for the 
Suppression of Communist Rebellion" was terminated on April 30th 1991. Backed by 
a ruling of the Council of Grand Justices, all members of the National Assembly who 
had been given lifelong posts were forced to resign before the end of 1991. 
This paved the way for a series of elections for a new representative apparatus that 
could no longer claim to be the extension of all China. It also laid the foundations for 
the process of Taiwan's democratisation. (TIEN & CHU, 1996; WACHMAN, 1994; 
KEMENADE, 1998) From then on, people in Taiwan could directly elect the members 
of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan (comparable to the House of 
Commons in the UK), the Control Yuan (an apparatus that supervises the proper 
exercise of power within the government) 
, 
and representatives in local government. 
Democratic development was not just the result of Lee's political will, but rather the 
people's demand for change. From the second half of the 1980s, people from 
different social sectors took to the streets in protest and called for changes that the 
government seemed incapable of making. There was a huge increase in the number 
of street protests, both authorised and unauthorised, demanding reform and a 
redress of injustice. (GOLD, 1996; WU CHIEH-MIN, 1990: 45) 
Gold believed the outburst of demonstrations showed "the emergence and 
consolidation of civil society". (1996: 1111) By then, the old KMT ideologies and 
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ideological apparatus were under great pressure to change. 
It was at this period, when the first wave of factional strife had temporarily settled and 
Hau seemed to share power, that KMT reactionaries in the Chinese Culture 
Restoration Commiftee (CCRC) called for Lee Teng-hui's'rescue!. The influence and 
power of the CCRC had reduced drastically since the end of the 1970s. Its budget 
(included in the Executive Yuan annual budget) was cut down year by year. In early 
1990, its annual budget 
- 
NT$1,440,000 (approx E 262,000 )- was under severe 
attack from the opposition in the Legislative Yuan. After negotiation between parties, 
it was cut by 50%, and the opposition threatened 'no more money next yeae. (CH'tN 
PI-HUA, 1990a) 
The reason for not funding the CCRC was clear. The newly elected Taiwanese 
legislators could not agree to subsidise this ancient institution for a purpose that no 
longer existed. In November 1990, a meeting of the standing committee of the CCRC 
was held, which called for Lee's help to take over its presidency. (CHN Pl-HUA, 
1990a) 
The CCRC was originally set up to counterattack the Cultural Revolution in the 
mainland, and its existence symbolised not only Chinese cultural orthodoxy, but also 
the Mrs political legitimacy over China. Hence, even the thought of abolishing it 
would risk the accusation that Taiwan was giving up political sovereignty of China, in 
other words, condoning Taiwanese independence. Lee Teng-hul was under pressure 
to declare his position. 
At that time, he had just appointed Hau Pei-tsun as Premier to calm fictional strife, 
ISO 
and pacify doubt Urging Lee to chair the CCRC was also a political test to sound him 
out about his political line 
- 
pro-independence or unification2? It was crucial for him 
to deal with this matter delicately, in order to alleviate suspicion within the party. 
Therefore, Lee could not decline. 
4.1.2. President's personal mouthpiece 
During the process of taking on the CCRC, Lee's staff found that it was in fact an 
illegal organisation. Originally, It was a special organisation set up for political 
purposes, and under the direct supervision of Chiang Kai-shek. After the Civic 
Organisation Law was promulgated in 1989, it suddenly became illegal, because it 
was not a non-governmental organisation, nor a quango, but categorised as a "social 
movement organisation". (CHEN PI-HUA, 1990b) It not only received government 
funding, but also had the privilege to mobilise government sectors. However, 
because of its special political mission and privileged status, no one had ever 
questioned its legal status. 
Taking this as an excuse, Lee Teng-hui renamed and reconstructed the institution in 
compliance with the Civic Organisation Law. On March 28th, 1991, the National 
Cultural Association (NCA) was formed to replace the CCRC, and Lee Teng-hui was 
elected as NCA president. 
According to an NCA official publication, the CCRC was replaced "to meet the 
2 Lee had always been vague about his attitude towards 'Taiwanese independence'. 
Therefore, there was constant doubt about his support for independence. Many powerful 
CCRC members were still influential within the party, such as Ch'dn Li-fu FIA* (the architect 
of the Cultural Renaissance movement) and Ch'in Hsiao-l 
-Aj*f*(Chiang Kai-shek! s personal 
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challenges of a new society and a new era". (NATIONAL CULTURALASSOCIATION, 
1996: 2) In order not to alarm the reactionaries, it kept the CCRC's ultimate goal of 
'recovering traditional Chinese culture'. Nonetheless, four new focuses were 
identified3. The NCA's tactic was to emphasise new tasks and ignore the old ones. All 
but one of the CCRC staff were made redundant and the resources were put into 
three newly established committees and commissions 
- 
the Television-Culture 
Research Committee4 (est. 1992), the Commission of Youth Community 
Development (est. 1997), and the Commission of Spiritual Reform Promotion 
(est 1997). (CH'I N CH NQ 1998) These were chosen fmm a total number of fifteen., 
Lee Teng-hui was enthusiastic about having the chance to reconstruct and take 
control of a new cultural apparatus. (Ht HSO-CHU, 1991) In the first year, he visited 
the NCA every Wednesday aftemoon, aftencled meebngs regulady, and was deeply 
involved in its work. 
The emphasis of the NCA was to 'modernise the Taiwanese lifestyle' rather than 
preserve tradition, Nonetheless, the NCA and CCRC were fundamentally similar. 
They have quango status5 and similar privileges, carry out the presideffs political 
secretary and long-term cultural advisor). 3 They are: 1) encourage participation In cultural activities; 2) unite communities to foster 
moral and ethical values; 3) enhance etiquette, advocate modem lifestyles, and Improve 
social atmosphere; 4) support cultural exchanges and establish a society In harmony. (NCA, 
1996: 4) 
4 Although Shih Yung-kuel E*ft (the refired publisher of the KMT party mouthpiece, 
Central Daily News, and an experienced television broadcaster) was elected as the 
committee chairman, it was the Executive Secretary of the NCA 
- 
Lai Kuo-chou jwjAm, Lee 
Teng-hui's son-in-law 
- 
who was really In charge. (CRIN CHENQ 1998) Lai was also In 
charge of the Youth Community Development Committee. 5 The annual budget that the NCA receives Is from the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA), and 
the Ministries of Education (MOE) and Interior (MOI). Apart from that, private donations are 
also Important. (SU HSIEN-YA, 1992) When there was not enough money, the NCA asked 
money from the government. For example, its secretary-general Huang Shih-ch'6ng X; EJA 
asked the Executive Yuan in 1992 to draw on the governmental second reserve fund. (LIN 
YING-CHL, 1992) 
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message, and play a role of 'political mouthpiece'. 
4.1.3. Community of shared fate 
In July 1992, Lee Teng-hui announced his first cultural slogan 
-' sherigming 
gongtongti Mr, M Community of shared fate )6' in the NCA's central committee. 
This slogan later became his o1ficial state-management policy. (KAO HUI-LIN, 1993) 
Lee Teng-hui explained: 
There are twenty-one million people in Taiwan. Apart from the aborigines, the 
ancestors of most people in Taiwan were migrants from the mainland, either fifty 
years ago, or hundreds of years ago. Every one of us has stuck together through 
thick and thin, and has created a civilised, and prosperous society here. For our 
future prosperity, we rely on one another. We are both Chinese and Taiwanese. 
There is no ethnic difference... We should be able to have an equal footing and 
equal opportunity... This is what'shengming gongtongtP is all about. (LEE 
TENG-HUI, 1994b) 
In order to construct such a community, which distinguished no ethnic difference, the 
first thing needing resolution were the shengji conflicts. Shengji *$% means 'the 
province of one's birthplace or origin'. In general, people in Taiwan categorised 
themselves, according to their shengji, as aborigines, Taiwanese or mainlanders. 
Ethnologically, Taiwan's Malayo-Polynaesian population are the original dwellers and 
make up less than 1% of the population. (LIU CHIWAI, 1981) As to Taiwanese and 
mainlanders, they are all Han Chinese. However, the 'Taiwanese' in this context 
" Literally, shengming means'life'; gongtong means'shared', or'common'; and gongtongti is 
sometimes translated as the English word 'community. According to many of Lee Teng-hui's 
speeches (11 994a, 1994b, 1995,1996), he wanted to build Taiwan as'one community' and 
emphasised the shared fate and Interests of Taiwan's future. I translate the slogan as: 
'Community of shared fate' according to its meaning rather than the literal meaning. However, 
when I have to mention this slogan later as a policyý I will quote it as'shengming gongtongti'. 
This idea was suggested by the Taiwanese anthropologist Ch'6n Chi-nan F*AM, then the 
head of the Anthropology Department of the Chinese University, Hong Kong. Ch'dn was 
recommended by Lai Kuo-chou, Lee's son-in-law, to advise Lee Teng-hui on cultural affairs. 
He proposed the whole ideological structure of shengming gongtongfi, and wrote many of 
Lee's speeches on cultural issues. (KO CHI-LIANGý 1999) 
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refers to people who lived in Taiwan before 1945, whose ancestors migrated to 
Taiwan during a two hundred year period, starting around the 17u' century, and 
ending vvith Japanese rule in 1895. The category'mainlandee refers to Chinese who i, 
came to Taiwan after 1945. Therefore, the division of sherWI in Taiwan refers not only 
to origins, but also to the period in which ancestors arrived on the island. 
According to the 1990 census, there were 20,366,325 people in Taiwan, of which 
87.11 % were Taiwanese and 12.74% mainlanders. (WACHMAN. 1994: 17) Because i 
intermarriage has been fairly common, Wachman describes this dichotomous notion 
of labelling people as "more meaningful when applied to the generation alive in the 
1940s and 1950s than those bom since... Not everyone 
... 
fits into one of these two 
neat categodes. " (WACHMAN, 1994: 16) 
In 1992, when the Census Registration Law was revised, shengfi registration was 
changed. Before this date, the census registration recorded one's zujý. Therefore, 
many Taiwan-born baby-boomers were classified as'second-generaflon mainlanders' 
rather than Taiwanese, even though they were bom and had lived In Taiwan all their 
lives, as is the case %vith myself. In order to create a less divided society, the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) abolished the sher7gji record in the census, and replaced the entry 
vvith a record of one's 'birth place'. This change not only tried to reduce the gap 
between different shengji, but also demonstrated an official line defining Taiwanese' 
in order to cut out unnecessary division. As a result, the boundary between 
Taiwanese and mainlanders became blurred. 
1 Zuji jffUW literally means the original family home or ancestral home. In the old census 
registration, zuji was recorded according to one's ancestral origin. For example, a mainlander 
who came from Shanghai would have his zuji recorded as'Shanghal City, Jiangsu Province'. 
However, residents who lived in Taiwan before 1945, even though their ancestors mostly 
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For commentators such as: Tien & Chu (1996), Wang Chdn-huan (2000), and 
Wachman (1994), the identity issue was the most unsettling factor in Taiwan's politics. 
It developed not only into a conflict of those holding different identities (Taiwanese or 
Chinese), but also between mainstream and non-mainstream factions, pro-unification 
and pro-independence groups. This conflict reached boiling point during the 1992 
Legislative election. Tien and Chu (1996: 1144-45) described its significance thus: "a 
turning point for the evolution of the national identity crisis 
... 
all major policy debates 
were consumed by this underlying cleavage 
... 
These trends set the stage for two 
subsequent developments: a split in the KMT and a transformation of the national 
identity crisis. " 
Therefore, the significance and the timing of the introduction of the slogan shengming 
gongtongti was political. It was an attempt to persuade people to live 'law-abidingly 
and peacefulIV for the sake of a better future, at a time when factional strife was 
most severe, and a split within Taiwanese society was deepening. 
This idea of shengming gongtongti was further proposed as Lee Teng-hui's 
state-managing policy after this wave of factional struggle ended in February 1993. 
Lee reiterated on many occasions that people in Taiwan "should work together" for 
their shared future and interests. (LEE TENG-HUI, 1994a, 1995,1996) This concept 
was utilised to calm disagreements, remove misgivings, and maintain Lee's political 
hegemony. 
As Lee's personal cultural mouthpiece, the NCA was the organ to elaborate this idea 
came from southern China, would have their zuji recorded as Taiwan'. 
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and initiate actions. The deputy secretary of the NCA, CtYiu Juo-chQ RMJ$, blended 
this concept into Lee's state-building idea: 
According to President Lee, there are three crucial elements of shengming 
gongtongtt humanity, community, and state. The concept is crucial in the 
modernisation process... In the hope of building a modemisednew China'of 
democracy, that is law-abiding, and with fair-distribution... it should be 
developed step by step: starting from personal life, then to community life, and 
finally settling under the framework of the state. (KAO HUI-LIN, 1993: 8-9) , 
Consequently, this principle was shifted to emphasise the importance of 'community. 
Lee Teng-hui claimed the goal of shengming gongtongd was to "consolidate the 
social structure and construct an identity consciousness", (1995: 106) and the 
starting point to materialise it was the 'communit)(. (1996: 16) He asserted that 
lcommunity consciousness (jrjl&gM st*qu yishi)'was the demonstration of 'the 
awareness of shengming gongtongtP, and its ultimate goal was to build a state with 
consensus. (LEE TENG-H U 1,1995: 106- 107) 
This whole idea of constructing a better and shared future, disregarding from where 
people had originated and precisely when they had arrived in Taiwan, was an attempt 
to create a new identity, a new belonging for people who lived in Taiwan. As Lee 
Teng-hui (1995: 107) said: "It is an issue of building up a new idea, a new identity... 
and the whole building-up process starts from 'culture'. * 
4.1.4. Competing views of Identity 
Initially, the two factions within the KMT were divided by different political interests 
and beliefs, holding opposing views on Taiwan's future. The'mainstream' pressed for 
party reform and Taiwanisation; the 'non-mainstream' wanted to maintain the Chinese 
KMT tradition. However, because of the general constitution of their membership, the 
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two political alignments gradually became two different political assertions. Soon, the 
divisions were expanded to generalised political stands of different shengit 
Taiwanese vs. mainlanders. 
Wachman described the main characteristic of this period (1987 to 1993) as "the 
interplay between the determination to create a stable democracy and the contest 
between two competing views of national identity. " (WACHMAN, 1994: 4) 
After the mid-1990s, this division developed further, and the focus shifted to a tong 
du zhi zheng e%-: 
_ý14P -a struggle between two groups of people who were either 
pro-unification-vVith-China or pro-Taiwanese-independence. The non-mainstream 
faction accused Lee Teng-hui of encouraging separatism (SHIH CHIH-YU, 1998; 
CHN KUEI-MIAO, 1998), and used populism to manipulate public opinion and 
promote independence. (HUANG KUANG-KUO, 1995) The mainstream faction 
criticised the non-mainstream for ignoring political reality, preserving the outworn, 
and not letting go of mainlanders' vested interests. (CHOU YANG-SHAN, 1998) 
Lee's attitude towards Taiwanese independence was indeed ambiguous. He had 
never openly advocated independence, though, he always emphasised that the ROC 
on Taiwan was an independent sovereignty and fought vigorously for international 
recognition despite continuous objections from the PRC. Whenever being questioned, 
he would claim that Taiwanese independence was not a movement initiated unitarily 
within the island, but a response to the coercion and external pressure placed on 
them by the PRC. (SHIH CHIH-YU, 1998) 
As early as in 1991, the DPP included in its manifesto its commitment "to build an 
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independent state". Although Lee Teng-hui preferred middle ground 
-no reunification 
and no independence'- and believed maintaining the status quo was the best 
solution, he tolerated the DPP's promotion of independence. (KEMENADE, 1998: 
109) This annoyed the non-mainstream faction greatly. Because of his silent consent 
many DPP members also supported NO. 
These two camps were used to pigeonhole political beliefs into either 
pro-independence vs. pro-unification, or liberal vs. reactionary, and to classify various 
interest groups as privileged mainlanders or victimised Taiwanese. The divisions also 
incited emotion between different shengfi in elections, when people were constantly 
, 
forced to take sides. This conflict pervaded Taiwan and permeated every aspect of 
daily life. 
Wachmarfs observation of Taiwan in the early 1990s vividly described how this 
uncertainty emerged, where it came from, and how it affected people's sense of 
secudty: 
... 
underlying tensions related to national identity affected nearly every sphere of 
political and social interaction at the central level and guided the attitudes, 
decisions, and behaviour of the political elite. Residents of Taiwan have been 
impelled by changes in the political and social realms to re-examine their attitude 
toward China, toward Taiwan, and toward themselves. The simple truths to 
which they clung in the past no longer seem so simple and may not even be true. (WACHMAN, 1994: 9) 
Soul-searching questions such as: "who are the Taiwanese", "are the Taiwanese 
Chinese", "should people from mainland fifty years ago be included as Taiwanese", 
a Many DPP members sympathised with him, If not supporting him directly. This kind of 
sympathy was described as the 'Lee Teng-hui compIe)e(4ý_jj%jttjj, *) within the DPR 
Therefore, there was a rumour, during the 1996 presidential election, Indicating that a strategy 
- 
"qi peng bao H (XWý_V, of abandoning the DPPs own candidate Peng Ming-min) 
- 
was 
adopted In order to save votes for Lee Teng-hul to ensure his victory. (ASIA WEEKLY, 1996) 
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puzzled many people in Taiwan. (CH'tN CHAO-YINGý 1995b) This quest for identity 
was intensified especially during the election period. The Economist (1994) described 
the passionate pursuit of democracy in Taiwan during the 1994 elections: "Taiwan's 
voters were asked to consider the question of their national identity. Is Taiwan to 
remain formally a part of China, or should it declare itself an independent state, as in 
practice it is... Taiwanese have taken to democracy with a passion second only to 
... 
gambling. Nearly 80% of the electorate turned out to vote. " (THE ECONOMIST, 1994: 
23-24) The division of shengji deepened and the conflicts were intensified in these 
passionate pursuits. 
By the 1990s, many Taiwan politicians, in all parties, were Taiwanese. Because of the 
victory of the mainstream faction in the 1993 factional strife, the once suppressed 
independence line was no longer a taboo among the general public. At the same time, 
the New Party was formed and supported by many mainlanders who felt threatened 
and were uncertain about their'placel in Taiwan. 
The rise of the New Party could be seen as the direct response from pro-unification 
mainlanders. Ther6fore, the DPP described it as a 'mainlanders' part)(. However, a 
survey conducted by the DPP in 1995, indicated a different and interesting reading. 
(LIANG CHIH-CHNa 1995) It showed that 40 % of New Party supporters were first 
and second generation mainlanders; while 60 % were local Taiwanese, Hakka, and 
aborigines. In the same survey, it also showed that 60 % of New Party supporters 
identified themselves as'Chinese', and 30 % as'both Taiwanese and Chinese'. 
Compared with the figures for other political parties' supporters9, the tendency of 
9 According to the same survey, 40 % of KMT supporters and 18 % of DPP supporters 
identified themselves as 'Chinese'(LIANG CHIH-CHENGý 1995) 
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New Party voters to identify themselves as Chinese was much higher. 
Indeed, the New Party had atways been criticised as a party with a strong 
China-centric ideology. (CHANG MAO-KUl, 1994) However, it was nota party of 
mainlanders', as the DPP once claimed, but'a party of people Who lived in Taiwan 
and identified themselves as Chinese'. It showed clearly that the difference between 
the three parties' supporters was not shengft but identity, i. e. how they identified 
themselves. 
After two impressive years in the elections (1994-5), in which the New Party trebled 
its Legislator seats, its limitations began to show. After the Chinese launched the 
missile threat in 1995-6, the idea of unification with China became less attractive, and 
its support withered since. It finally lost all its seats in the 2001 election. 
Competing views concerning Taiwanese identity also existed in the DPR It divided 
the DPP into the New Tide (xin chaoflu Vrgy. t-) and Formosa (medi dao X-ffjýh) 
factions. The former advocated the definite goal of Taiwanese independence; the 
latter had a much milder attitude to Independence, and insisted on a pragmatic 
approach, concentrating on Taiwan's democratic progress. The gap between two 
factionslo intensified after the mid-1 990s. (WACHMAN, 1994: 19-20) 
The content and context of 'competing views' has changed over the years; however, 
they can still be roughly defined as a "pro-Taiwanese identity", and a "pro-Chinese 
10 For example, the Formosa faction considered modifying Its Party Principle on Taiwanese 
independence after the 1994 election, because they suspected that assertion of 
independence had driven voters away. (CHANG MAO-KUI, 1994) In 1995, the New Tide 
faction protested the unfair method used within the DPP for the nomination of Legislator, 
since this had benefited the Formosa faction. (CHUANG SHNG-HUNGý 1995) 
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identity". At the beginning of the 1990s, when people mentioned competing views, 
most referred to the political opinions concerning Taiwan's future, i. e. either 
unification with China, or independence. It was a political struggle within the KIVIT, 
starting from different views on identity and power structure, which developed into an 
identity struggle among the general public. It was a process of acute hegemonic 
struggle in both political and cultural spheres. As a result, political hegemony was 
reversed. 
In 2000, the opposition party (DPP) candidate Ch'&n Shui-bian M7KQ won the 
presidential election, and most Taiwanese (76.5%) felt that the PRC had become 
increasingly unfriendly towards Taiwan's government At the same time, more and 
more Taiwanese (73.6% in 1998 August 84% in 2000 August) believed that Taiwan 
should maintain its status quo. (MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 2000) 
4.2. Changing atmosphere 
4.2.1. Shifting focus 
The emphasis on indigenous culture that appeared in the 1970s, came long before 
the conscious shift of official policy. However, it was not until the late 1980s that the 
ft Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) responded actively. The new chairman Kuo Wei-fan 
saw the emergence of the indigenisation trend (LU CHIEN- YINQ 1988,1999) and 
responded prompfly. 
Kuo Wei-fan admitted openly to a reporter in 1990 that, "The direction of cultural 
policy and its tactics have to change drastically. The long-term direction of the CCA 
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would inevitably be affected by political environment and atmosphere. " (CHIIN 
CH'ANG-HUA, 1990) He believed that Taiwan's indigenous culture would be crucial 
- 
for future development. Therefore, he modified the previous China-centric tendency 
and balanced policy focus between city and countryside, and between Taiwanese 
and Chinese culture. 
During the severe factional strife, the CCA did encounter difficulties in satisfying the 
- 
two sides and keeping their policy politically correct. For example, the drastic change 
of focus in the National Festival of Culture and Art in the late 1980s was obviously the 
result of trying to juggle competing views. In 1989, Beijing Opera was its theme, a 
response to'China Feveell. (CHILI KUWLIANGý 1993) In 1990, Taiwanese xiqu 
(tradibonal opera form) became the focus. (CCA, 1991a) 
In Contrast to the rise of 'China Fevee, the sense of Taiwanese consciousness also 
strengthened, because of the comparison and the obvious difference between 'us' 
and'them'. (HSIAO HSIN-HUANQ 1990) These seemingly contradictory trends of 
China Fever and Taiwanese consciousness developed alongside each other. 
The "Arts Going to the Countryside (IflWITJP5 yishu xiaxiang)"12 scheme was 
11 The term 'China Fever' was used to describe the popularity of Chinese culture after the ban 
on visits to and communication with the mainland was lifted after 1987. The fever showed 
itself especially in culture and the arts. Many mainland artists visited and performed In Taiwan. 
JHSIAO HSIN-HUANGý 1990: 88-89) 
2 Although most xiqu performances were performed outdoors and were free to the public, 
they were regarded as religious activities. The Cloud Gate Dance Company was considered 
Ihe first artistic groulY to consciously perform outdoors for the public. The Cloud Gate Initiated 
the event as a kind of Yeedback! to society. Their Intension was to perform for people who 
could not afford to go to theatre as an educational and promotional work. (YANG MtNG-YO, 
1998: 167) They gave 16 performances all over Taiwan both on campuses and pingfia shequ 
*MRIK(poor housing estates where poor people were accommodated, Including Furnin ?a 
R Community of Shuangyuan ItR& District, Ank'ang %ýW Community of Mucha *#9 District, 
Fut6 ? 4tAf, Community of Sungshan fil', lill District). (YANG MNG-YO, 1998: 153-167) That 
was the beginning of this trend and set up the formal of 'Arts Going to the Countryside'. 
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implemented in 1990 to reduce the gap between urban and rural life-styles. In 
contrast to the conscious action initiated by the Cloud Gate, this wave of 'Arts Going 
to the Countryside' in the 1990s was conducted as an official policy. 
Beginning in 1990, the CCA had arranged many tours, and sent artists around the 
countryside and university campuses to perform. In addition to this, similar schemes 
were also launched, including Weekend Cultural Square (Xati wenhua guangchang 
fU F1 3ý_'JtAlg, free performances in parks and museums); all sorts of arts clubs and 
courses (ranging from flower arranging, tea ceremony, and Chinese chess, to Beijing 
Opera, Gezaixi and other Taiwan xiqu, held by local culture centres and 
non-governmental organisations); 'Countryside Galleries' and 'Countryside Theatres' 
in local communities, etc.. 
This emphasis on local cultural activities fit in well with Lee Teng-hui's idea of 
'shengming gongtongtf (CHINA TIMES, 1994a), and heralded the next culture trend,, 
'Community Construction (TT&-MVfM*M shequ zongli yingzao) 03 which began in 
1995. 
As a result of official support and the increasing performing opportunities available, 
the number of artistic activities including performances and exhibitions increased 
dramatically from 6,051 events in 1989 to 10,705 in 1993. (CCA, 1991 a, 1994: 36-37) 
However, did the sudden increase of artistic events really change cultural life in the 
countryside, or improve people's cultural life as a whole? Although the exact effect 
was difficult to calculate, looking at the figures of event attendance gives some 
13 Literally, shequ means 'community', yingzao means 'management' and 'construction', and 
zongti means lotal' and 'overall'. 
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indicabon of success. 
According to the Cultural Statistics of 1993 (CCA, 1994: 36), the average annual 
increase in artistic activities was 17.5% and the average annual attendance 
increased 20.56%. Performances, including music, dance, and theatre, did extremely 
well, and the average attendance at performing events increased 71.43% every year.. 
between 1989 and 1993. It was evident that the fast growing quantity of 
performances (3,569 events in 1989 to 6,321 events in 1993) had indeed increased 
the market demand and changed people's Iffestyle. 
4. Z2. Figumhead 
After the decisive battle between two fa&jons ended in February 1993, Taiwanese 
politician Uen Chan ae was chosen to replace Hau Pei-tsun as the Premier. During 
the reshuffle of the cabinet, Kuo Wei-fan was appointed Minister of Education and 
Soprano ShOn HsOeh-yung qlM)X was chosen to chair the CCA. 
Before her appointment, Sh6n HsOeh-yung's previous administration experience 
was limited. She had never been recognised as a political figure 14 
, 
nor had any 
strong ideology that could be categorised into any faction. Although the arts 
communities welcomed the appointment questions about her lack of administrative 
ability and qualifications were asked. (KAO HUI-LIN, 1993: 11) Some even suggested 
that she was appointed because of the influence of 'lady Uerf. 's 
14 She was a famous soprano and the head of the Music Department at Taiwan Arts College. 
The only civil service experience she had was In the early 1980s as the director of the 3'd 
Department of the CCA during ChU Ch'imlu period. 
15 Then newly appointed Premier Lien Chan's wife, Lien Fang YO jt)ý% took singing 
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It was not fair to judge Sh6n's appointment or ability merely by whom she befriended. 
However, not only had she no previous political experience or interests, but also she 
had almost reached her retirement age. It was an unusual appointment. Therefore, 
the speculation was that she was put in the post as a figurehead to carry out Lee! s 
cultural policy, the Community Construction Movement, in a transition period. (KO 
CHI-LIANa 1999; WU HSING-KUO, 1999; LU CHIEN-YINa 1999) 
Community Construction, the most influential cultural policy in the 1990s, was 
implemented during Shdn HsOeh-yung's office. Nevertheless, in her first report to the 
Legislative Yuan in April 1993, there was no trace of any emphasis on community 
culture. It was not until October 1993 that this concept of 'Community Construction' 
was first raised in the CCA's administrative planning report to the Legislative Yuan, 
(CCA, 1998a: 84) which emphasised the "importance of community life" and the 
significance of re-building modem community culture. (SHLN HSOEH-YUNQ 1994) 
Supported by Lee Teng-hui, a programme of Enriching the Cultural Environfwnt and 
Substantiating Cultural Facilities within the Community at Local Level (chongshi 
shengshi xianshi xiangzhen ji shequ wenhua ruanyingti sheshi elfefte, U-rý, eýM 
RTTr±7h3MaFfffff&A) was announced as one of Premier Lien Chan's Twelve 
National Constructions. (SHEN HSOEH-YUNQ 1994) The CCA drew up the 
Development Programme for Promoting Community Culture (tuidong shequ wenhua 
fazhan fangan to implement this policyin March 1994. It 
lessons from Sh6n. It was said that many of Sh6n's amateur students were wives of high 
officials. Apart from Lien Fang YO, the Governor James Soong's wife, Soong Ch'dn Wan-shui 
J, ý was among them. Rumours said that Lien's cabinet appointments were heavily ,, F*M7 
influenced by her. (U YO-LINGý 1999) 
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included three improvement plans: (1) enhancing cultural activities and facilities in 
every county and city, (2) improving cultural development in villages and towns, (3) : 
16 
reinforcing cultural heritage preservation. (SHEN HSUEH-YUNQ 1994) 
It seemed that the whole idea of 'community culture' was proposed, promoted, and 
.. -
put into effect by the authorities within a very short period of time between 1993 and 
.., 
1994. Sh6n HsOeh-yung (1994: 18) reported to the Executive Yuan in 1994, and 
reiterated the concept of shengming gongfongM "To establish community 
consciousness and construct community culture are equally important 
... 
[it] has been 
-, 
recognised as the correct direction for cultural development by the people. " 
Apparently, this policy was raised as a "direct response to President Lee's state 
policy shengming gongtongU. " (CCA, 1998a: 27) 
423. Cultural architect 
Behind this grand cultural construction, there was an architect who drew the plans 
and was in charge of the-operation 
- 
anthropologist Ch'6n Ch'i-nan. (KO CHI-LIANGý 
1999) As a matter of fact, before the arrangement of the new cabinet was announced 
in 1993, Ch'6n Ch'i-nan was predicted as the possible candidate for chair of the CCA. 
He was a scholar who had been deeply involved in developing the goal-setting and 
policy-making process for Lee Teng-hui. He was said to be the man behind Lee 
Teng-hui's cultural policy, acting as his wendan (", think tank in culture affairs) In 
. 
the eady 1990s. (TStNG CHING-YEN, 1993) 
Soon after Sh6n HsOeh-yung's appointment, Ch'6n Ch'ýnan was also appointed as 
the adviser of the CCA. In January 1994, in order to accommodate Ch'6n Ch'i-nan, 
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the CCA Organisational Rules were revised to create a new deputy chairman post for 
him. This appointment was regarded as the arrangement made from the highest level 
to carry out the cultural building process. (KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) 
At the end of 1994, the Community Construction Movement was formally launched. 
On the surface, it was a CCA initiative. In reality, the movement was both mobilised 
and supported by Lee Teng-hui. Since then, local culture and Taiwan Studies have 
become the xianxue (Mý-ýM the most influential and dominant discourse) in Taiwan in 
the 1990s. (CCA, 1998a: 84; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999; CHUANG YUNG-MINQ 1999) 
The movement was so popular that it was not just a cultural policy, but became the 
administrative emphasis in many government policies including those relating to 
medicine, education, the environment and local industries. (CCA, 1998a: 93) 
According to Ch'6n Ch'i-nan, an all-round and satisfying community life could 
enhance the local culture and reduce the cultural gap between city and countryside. 
(CH'tN CHMAN, 1986a, 1986b) For example, the traditional activities of finxiang 
(3SW, offering incense and worshiping in the temples) and Yingshen (gj$, greeting 
the gods) were usually criticised as'superstitious and ignorant by modernists (CH'LN 
MEI-YEN, 1991), and condemned as'extravagant and wasteful' by the authodties. 
Ch'C-n Ch'i-nan believed that they were actually the most practical way to provide a 
festive atmosphere and artistic events for people in the countryside: 
By getting local people involved in local religious activities, the community 
consciousness can be uplifted, and the level of spiritual and material culture 
enhanced. That will be an important issue to contemplate in terms of cultural 
establishment for the people. No matter whether the goal is to develop or 
recover the culture (either high culture or popular culture), the focus should be 
especially put on the activities in the countryside and local communities. These 
activities should be supported and guided properly. (CH'tN CHMAN, 1986b: 
14) 
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In Ch'6n's view, community was and still could be the solid spiritual base for people. , 
Hence, building up an active and lively community culture and community 
consciousness would be the way to build new culture and Taiwanese identity. 
Undoubtedly, it must be exciting for academics to have the opportunity and power to 
realise what they believe in, and furthermore, to have the chance to execute it 
Unfortunately, Ch'6n Ch'ýnan's political career did not go as smoothly as he had 
expected, even Wth the support of Lee Teng-hui. I will look at the development of the 
movement and his disillusion later. 
4.2.4. Running big Taiwan, establishing new zhongyuan 
Lee Teng-huPs book Vingying da tahvan Managing Big Tahvan)' was 1: 3 
published in 1994 
-a collection of his important speeches made during his tenures as 
Taipei City Mayor and Provincial governor, demonstrating his managerial style. At the 
ceremony of donating the royalties of this book in Januaryl 995, he advocated 
another slogan 
- 
Running Big Taiwan, Establishing the New Zhongyuan (jingying da 
tahvan, jianlixinzhongyuan4§. *)ý-lo-M RAV'rqQ) 
,A- as 
the future blueprint for 
nabonal development (LEE TENG-HUI, 1995: 5-11) 
Zhongyuan literally means the'Central Plains'in China, comprising the middle and 
lower reaches of the Yellow River. Usually, the phrase zhongyuan indicates the 
'homeland of Chinese', 'the central land of China', and 'the reign of the empire. 
Symbolically, it was usually used to imply'China'orChinese regimd. 
Lee Teng-hui (1995) explained, that Taiwan had not only been dominated by imperial 
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colonialiSM16 for hundreds of years, but also was abandoned by its motherland 
- 
the 
Qing court in China in 1895. Historically, the Chinese in Taiwan had always been 
manipulated by foreign powers and could not decide their own destiny. He believed 
that a new zhongyuan culture was forming in Taiwan after the 2nd World War. 
Different elites from the mainland and overseas, along with Taiwan's local elite, 
had gathered on this island 
... 
We have developed a new kind of cultural vitality 
in the last 50 years... The convergence of multi-cultural influences makes 
Taiwan leap to be the most advanced upsurging force in the course of Chinese 
culture development... and the new zhongyuan of Chinese culture. (LEE 
TENG-HUI, 1995: 10) 
The stress Lee placed on the possibilities for modem Taiwanese to develop a new 
zhongyuan (either Chinese culture or regime), had an underlying implication. The 
symbolic meaning of zhongyuan was not limited to a 'geographical notion', but had 
more to do with its central cultural position and its politically orthodox significance. 
Apparently, the emphasis of building the'new zhongyuan', a new polity, was placed 
on culture. The slogan not only manifested Lee Teng-hui's intention to build Taiwan 
as the centre of a new culture, but also demonstrated his wish to build Taiwan as a 
spiritual homeland, to outgrow and divorce itself from the motherland that had 
previously been imposed on it. (LEE TENG-HUI, 1996: 11-19) 
When Lee Teng-hui raised the concept of shengming gongtongli (community of 
shared fate) in 1992, he pleaded that people from different ethnic groups and with 
different political beliefs should cooperate and work together for Taiwan's future. This 
time, the purpose was totally different Lee Teng-hui shifted Taiwan to the'central' 
position, and emphasised his future state policy would "reinforce the superior status 
of Taiwan as the centre of new zhongyuan. " (LEE TENG-H U 1,1995: 11) 
18 Apart from Chinese nile (both the Ong and the ROC), people in Taiwan had gone through 
several stages of colonialism under the rule of the Spanish (1627 
- 
1642 A. D. ), the Dutch 
(1624-1661A. D. ), and the Japanese (1895 
- 
1945 A. D. ). (KIYASU SACHIO, 1999) 
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This emphasis could be easily found in many cultural policies in the mid-1990s. 
Amongst all policies, the Community Construction Movement was the most powerful 
, 
and the largest in scale set to tackle the goal of taking contemporary Taiwan as the 
centre on which to build a national culture and modem lifestyle, rather than the old 
and remote Chinese culture. 
4.3. The development of Community Construction 
4.3.1. The launch 
If the slogan shengming gongtongti was raised for Lee Teng-huis political survival, ýi 
then the wish to establish a new zhongyuan in Taiwan was his dream of Talwarfs 
future. (LEE TENG-HUI, 1995: 5-11) In order to move Taiwan's position from being , 
peripheral and secondary to the centre, a cultural movement to reconstruct a new 
Taiwanese culture was necessary. The Community Construction Movement was 
launched as the locomotive to promote the whole idea. 
The Community Construction movement was officially launched In 1995. Its targets 
were to help each community create its own character, develop consensus among 
members and love for their hometovm or community group. The ultimate goal was to 
encourage local people to care for their own environment, to make their own 
decisions, and to create community consciousness and a sense of belonging and 
, 
pride, especially around urban areas where a sense of community did not exist. 
(CCA, 1998a: 85) 
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Apparently, the movement was designed to be a process of building consciousness 
and shared values. In other words, it was a movement aiming to realise the concept 
of shengming gongtongti and create a new cultural zhongyuan. Ch'6n Ch'i-nan even 
described it as a process of building a "new homeland" (rTjWV5 xin guxiang). (CHN 
CHMAN, 1996a) This movement was an official gesture to cut off connections with 
the old Chinese-identity construction that the KMT had previously promoted. 
In 1995, the movement was launched vigorously. The CCA drew up a massive 
budget to boost its introduction and promote it nationwide. The annual budget of the 
CCA in 1995 had risen 66.77% from the previous year. The increase was because of 
this new scheme to enhance cultural environment at local level. The CCA spent NT$ 
1,991,100,000 (around Z 39.82 millions) directly on 'Community Constructimn', which 
took up 58.34% of the CCA's 1995 annual budget ( NT$ 3,413,025,000, 
approximately E68.26 millions). (CHENG SHUMN, 1996: 26-29) A vast amount of 
money was spent on local developments to encourage local culture and artists, and 
to improve local cultural facilities. 
Before the 1990s, the CCA had a problem of over-centralisation, because state 
resources were distributed mostly to big cities, and especially concentrated on the 
capital city Taipei. Since state resources started to be redirected towards local 
development, artists and artistic groups were also encouraged to move out of Taipei 
and other big cities to apply for funding. The shortcoming of centralisation was being 
tackled. New groups and young artists were especially attracted to the new scheme. 
For the first time, there were more opportunities and subsidies at local level than in 
Taipei. (CHOU I-CHANQ 1999; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) 
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The first step was to encourage every community to develop their unique 'community % 
culture!. In order to enable local culture to take root and grow; resources were poured 
. 
in not only to help local people explore local history and culture, but also to empower 
local culture centres to take up the responsibility to participate in local culture 
development 
4.3.2. Local agents 
Within only one year, Taiwan's culture environment had changed dramatically. 
(CH'tN CH'I-NAN, 1996b: 2; LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 19W; CHOU I-CWANGý 1999; 
LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) It was a change created by both the attraction of Idealistic 
concepts and plentiful resources. Many people involved in the arts moved to the 
countryside, or went back to their hometown to join in local culture development 
schemes. The most popular response was to set up local workshops for cultural and 
historical research 17 
. 
Within a few years, over 400 local workshops were setup all 
over Taiwan. (CCA, 2001 b) 
After the movement was launched, this sort of local workshop mushroomed. Their 
interests differ from one to another, but basically, they are concerned with local 
history, environmental issues, local culture, aboriginal conservation, heritage 
preservation, and nature reserves. Many were organised by young enthusiasts who 
gave up their jobs in big cities and went home, dedicating themselves to Community 
17 The kind of wenshi gongzuoshl 3Z51ýMfT-5j can be traced bark to 1957 when the Tainan 
Culture and History Association (Tainan shl wenshixiehul bif1jr! St, 3z. taff) was formed by 
local historians and enthusiasts. However, this kind of organisation, which focused on 
Taiwanese cultural and historical research, had never been encouraged by the authorities. 
Therefore, its growth was limited. It was not until 1962 that a second one 
- 
Zhongyuan 
Weekly (rPK(NfU) 
- 
was formed, and In 1972 another similar workshop XjZndiaoju (, LjMFQ 
was established. (CCA, 2001b) 
202 
Construction in their hometown. (CHOU I-CH'ANQ 1999) Some were set up by local 
gentry to concentrate on local affairs". Some were voluntary organisations founded 
by local teachers, houseWives, and enthusiasts concerned With different local 
issues". Only a few of these workshops were organised by big enterprises and 
funded sufficiently2o. (CCA, 2001b) 
In order to execute the Community Construction Movement more effectively, apart 
from encouraging local workshops, local cultural apparatus played a crucial role. The 
CCA entrusted a new role to local culture centres, to act as the 'local CCA' for 
developing and supporting local culture. (SHEN HSOEH-YUNQ 1994: 8) Therefore, 
culture centres became the direct agents carrying out the promotion, and took up the 
direct responsibility to initiate and implement it locally. 
To support them, the CCA tried to build up a working format for culture centres to , 
follow. Financially, the CCA helped the culture centres to draw up their own annual 
budgets and provided them as much money as possible. The CCA offered them 
on-the-job management training. Furthermore, a team of experts was sent 
island-wide to provide tailor-made help and advice. By giving support, and guiding 
them on how to take initiative, the CCA planned to turn these culture centres into able 
agents. The CCA hoped that local cultural centres could act on their own. Ultimately, 
what the CCA needed to do was only to provide money and advice. 
18 Such organisations include the Hsinkang Foundation(fT'&3Zft&k1ft) and the Lukang 
Foundation(RiS-ýCV&ft-ft 
19 They include the Tanshui Folk Wbrkshop(&7ý0±1ýMft the ShOnk'ung Culture and 
Heritage Workshop(plrj, ýZjt-&MT-fýjjr and the Yungk! ang Community(; 
20 This sort of organisations includes the Lin Pdn-yuan Foundation 
the New Hope Foundation(UPMUZAVMM_, ýCVII: t_ýift), and the Taiyuan Arts Foundation(-"'-W, 
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4.3.3. Problems emerged 
Ideally, everyone should care for their own hometown, make decisions for 
themselves, create an environment they like to be in, share responsibility, and be. 
proud of local unique culture. In other words, the Community Construction Movement 
was a "new homeland construction", and a "zaoren3da-Mpeople r construction) 
project". (CH'tN CHMAN, 1996a, 1996b: 3) Its aim was to recreate a beautiful new 
world through local people's own effort Nevertheless, the reality was that the 
beautiful picture that the CCA tded to portray was not realistic vvithout long-term 
investment and education. Essentially, problems occurred because of a high 
expectation of quick results in the political arena. 
In order tomobilise local people to function by themselves', the CCA tried to 
empower the culture centres first, by giving them money, support and a sense of 
honour. However, enabling culture centres to act as the 'autonomous local CCA'was 
difficult in reality. (1-1 YO-LINQ 1999) Because culture centres had low status vvithin 
the local government structure, they had long been regarded as subordinate, and 
had always yielded to local politicians' demands. (LI YO-LINGý 1999) Finding a way to 
make a clean break with localism became a problem. 
It became even more complicated when it came to the issue of money. The CCA had 
poured as many resources as possible in at a local level since 1995. However, most 
of the money was spent on 'facilities' and buildingS21, rather than long-term tasks of 
21 There were 12 tasks in the scheme, including expanding and refurbishing culture centres in 
the counties and cities; providing professional support to help culture centres to develop their 
own unique themes according to local characteristics, and subsidising them to buy collections 
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fostering habits of autonomy and developing community culture organically. 
Not only was the way in which the money was used problemabc, the half-half funding 
pattern that the CCA offered also created troubles for local governmen f22. When the 
local governments could not raise enough money from either local annual budgets or 
from other local resources, the Community Construction Movement became a burden, 
especially for poor and remote counties that were already in heavy debt 
In 1997, only one year after the movement was launched, the CCA annual budget 
decreased by 1/3 
- 
almost NT$ 600,000,000 (around C 12 million). Then chairwoman 
Chdng Shu-min found herself under severe interrogation about the reduction in the 
Legislative Yuan. She explained that the decrease was a direct consequence of the 
fact that the local governments could not raise enough money for the half-half 
subsidy scheme. (NATIONAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK CULTURE CENTRE, 1997: 94) 
Since then, the budget for the Community Construction has been reduced year after 
year. The status of this once most important cultural project slid sharply after 1997. 
From almost 60% of the CCA annual budget in 1995, (CHNG SHUMN, 1996: 
26-29) the Community Construction budget slipped to 11.98% in 1999 (NT$ 
432,807,000, approximately Z 8.66 millions) (CCA, 1998c) The drop in budget 
indicated the drastic slip of the importance of the Community Construction Movement 
from local artists or craftsmen; improving local culture and arts development; helping the local 
culture centres to plan and run their own festivals; giving culture centres guidance on how to. 
organise small-scale international events; encouraging cultural activities in the community; 
improving performing spaces in towns and villages; preserving local traditional buildings; 
preserving traditional folk arts and running lessons to pass on traditional skills; and setting up 
the National Centre for Traditional Arts, the National Cultural Heritage Preservation and 
Research Centre, and the Traditional Music Centre. (CHtNG SHU-MIN, 1996) 
22 In order to encourage the local government to take initiative, the CCA provided half of the 
budget of any related local cultural development project. The local government only needed to 
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in government policy. 
The CCA blamed the difficulties mainly on two areas: impotent local governments 
and inexperienced local people. In addition, the inconsistency between related 
authorities was also problemabc. (CCA, 1998a: 92-93) Many researches have come 
to similar conclusions, blaming local people for a lack of democratic habits and 
experience of self-goverment. (HUANG KUO-CHN, 1998; CHNG I-CHON, 1996) 
However, before the movement was officially launched, local issues (such as local 
culture, environment, and power structures) were not taken into account while the 
policy was drawn. According to ChCang Rorn-shingý3(1 999), who has had life-long 
experience working in the Hakka community, and vvith folk musicians, the crucial 
problem of Community Construction came from arrogant'outsiders' trying to coach 
local people how to live their lives. (CHNG ROM-SHINQ 1999) 
Ch6ng Rom-shing believes that the fatal weakness of this movement was that it did 
not pay enough attention to'people'. '7he movement has the best intentions. 
However, the method of approaching the local community is too arrogant. Every 
place has a different character, individual needs, - a particular social relationship and 
power structure. The way to approach and regenerate each community should also 
be different. " (CHNG ROM-SHINGý 1999) 
Many local workshops and clubs were set up by young enthusiasts, with the help of 
scholars and experts from outside the communities. According to the CCA's own 
raise the other half of the money. 
23 He is an active Hakka musician and famous folk music theorist who works closely with 
Hakka communities and people. He is now the president of the National Taiwan Junior 
College of Performing Arts. 
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research (CCA, 2001 b), many of the workshops that were set up concentrated on 
getting governmental contracts: either gaining funding to research local history and 
culture, or being contracted to run local Festival and events. 
Local people, who had worked in this area for many years and had strong local 
- 
connections, were sometimes left out or ignored, because they did not know how to 
apply for funding, could not write 'attractive' proposals, nor make connection with 
Taipei-based scholars. Many of them were volunteers and did not have the 
managerial ability required. Before the arrival of these 'professional' community 
, 
workshops, community affairs developed organically. After the movement was 
launched, the concept of building a shared community indeed became popular. (LIN 
MAO-HSIEN, 1999; CHOU I-CHANQ 1999) However, many local decisions 
concerning public affairs fell to the hands of outsiders 
- 
experts and well-educated 
newcomers. (CHNG ROM-SHINQ 1999; CHNG I-CHON, 1996) 
Even people who came back to their hometown with ideals of rebuilding local culture, 
sometimes fell into a nostalgic and idealistic trap, and were criticised for "consuming 
the idea of 'hometown', and utilising romantic imagination and fantasy as cultural 
commodities". (CHtNG I-CHON, 1996) 
4.3.4. Local factional strife 
In the traditional communities, there were luzhu MLtU and village elders in charge. 
Therefore, it was common that local affairs were discussed and decided by local 
24 Luzhu is the person who organises the temple celebrations. The person Is chosen by the 
fellow villagers and has to get approval from the Gods through casting Xao 5E (a bamboo 
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gentries and elders, and supported by traditional religious organisations and local 
kinship networks. (CHtNG ROM-SHINQ 1999) The Community Construction 
Movement did not pay attention to local culture and failed to understand 'local power 
structures'. 
Newly formed community organisations relied mostly on experts and the authorities 
to provide ideas, a working pattern, funding, connections, and even the content of the 
events. Many experts became the staple contractors supplying professional advice, 
producing research, reports, and even organising events and performances; or, 
sometimes, acting as a rubber stamp for the approval of cultural construction projects. 
(LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) 
Apparently, this social reform process needed time and education to change old 
habits, values and the over-all culture. Nevertheless, there were fundamental 
problems that the CCA did not touch on, or notice. 
According to Chdng Rom-shing, (1999) local factional strife accelerated after the 
movement was launched. He said: 'Without the understanding of the locality, or 
paying respect to the local tradition and the elders, this project has no 'foundation' to 
build upon; therefore, its effect becomes fragmented... Worst of all, it intensifies local 
factional strife... There are more factions and divisions now in the countryside than 
ever. " 
Sociologist Huang Kuang-kuo (1995) held a similar view, and pointed out that the 
fundamental flaw of this movement was that it ignored the influence of local 
divination tool). The chance to be a luzhu is an honour in village life. (1-1 FENG-MAO, 1992) 
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factions(difang paixi Jt; qra*, ). He believed that local factions actually used the 
movement to manipulate public opinion, take advantage of public resources, and 
expand their own local influence. 
The 'community' concept was borrowed from English, and translated as'shequ UM' 
or 'shequn The former indicates geographically confined locations, while the 
latter implies a set of collective groups based on similar interests, shared values, or 
common professions. Huang Kuang-kuo (1995: 58) believed that the meaning of 
'community' in Western society was different from the meaning for Taiwanese. 
Western society emphasised and respected individualism, while Taiwanese and 
Chinese society stressed collectivity: "For people who live in Taiwan's countryside, 
they have already had strong sense of localism and local consciousness, which is 
based on kinship and geographical links 
... 
Put more clearly, 'community 
consciousness' in Taiwan is simply tantamount to'localism (difangyishittý)ý&M- 
local consciousness)'. " 
Unexpectedly, the movement actually enabled localism to grow stronger, and divided 
factions further. (HUANG KUANG-KUO, 1995: 53-74) It is perhaps inevitable that 
wherever there is money involved, there is a struggle fighting for it. The resources 
that poured in became entangled vvith political interests, and made the local factional 
strife even more severe. The sudden increase of money intensified local factional 
stdfe. 
The Community Construction Movement was supposed to mobilise a revival of 
community spirit and a sense of honour. It should have been a crusade fighting 
against narrow-minded nativism or localism. However, it seemed that it went the 
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opposite way. The central governments ignorance of the local environment 
hampered the effect of the movement. Many powerful factions that had good political', 
connections grew stronger. They took advantage of the movement to win the 
factional strife. Hence, there were times when the movement became a crucial factor 
in dividing the community, not uniting it (CHNG ROM-SHINQ 1999) 
4.3.5. Top-down implementation 
At local level, this policy was a burden. Local governments viewed the policy as: "the- 
CCA's business... we are just helping them". (CHIING I-CHON, 1996; HUANG 
HSIU-CHIN, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Ll YO-LINQ 1999) Therefore, the effort to 
- 
implement Community Construction was sometimes criticised as a superficial and 
temporary 'make-ovee. 
For example, Sani Elt town is a small Hakka town famous for producing wood 
carving artefacts. Miaoli -&M, County decided to promote San! as a 'wood-carving 
town', and transform its high street into a 'wood-carving streer. In 1995, the County ý 
authodfies urged the locals to organise a community committee to promote the 
woodcarving business and the town's image as part of the Miaoli Culture and Art 
Festival. 
To express his support, President Lee Teng-hui was present at the opening, together 
vvith other high officials, such as the then Govemor James Soong. In order to impress 
the high officials from the central government Sani's messy street was changed 
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over-night The shop signboards were re-clesigned and unified 25 
, 
the jumbled street 
parking was moved away temporarily, and piles of wood in front of the shops were 
also transferred somewhere else. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1995a) 
On the surface, it seemed that Sani had been transformed into a community vvith 
distinct characteristics, and geared up to its cultural industry. In fact, it was not the 
case. According to Ts6ng Chin-ts'ai iffAM, the chairman of the Sani wood-carving 
Street Committee, "once the high officials left, the Festival finished, the street got 
back to its original state. The committee has not met since then. " (HUANG 
HSIU-CHIN, 1995a) This sort of makeover effort did not improve the way 
communities organised their own affairs, nor affect the ways in which they operated 
as a whole. 
Much professional help and financial support was offered by the central government. 
The same format of Culture and Art Festivals at local level was held all over the 
island to emphasise local character. However, after the attention of the media went, 
the experts and helping hands left the communities, and local people did not know 
what to do next. An enthusiastic participant in the Penghu WE festival expressed her 
anxiety: 'What next? The government has not instructed us yet. " (HUANG 
HSIU-CHIN, 1995a) 
The movement was supposed to promote 'local uniqueness' and 'a sense of pride'. 
However, the way in which it was carried out became formulated and standardised. 
The so-called 'uniqueness' did not always have a cultural or historical connection, but 
25 Not everyone was happy with the new design and put their own signboard back after the 
officials left. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1995a) 
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was selected by experts or advised by local cultural workshops. Apart from a few 
cultural industries that traditionally e)dsted such as wood carving in Sani and 
historical buildings and cultural tourism in Lukang, - many'local characteristics' were 
invented recently. For example, Paihe 01'q Town in Tainan County was given the 
beautiful image of the 'lotus', because of its nevAy developed lotus planting and lotus 
products. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1995a, 1995b; LU CHIEN-YINQ 1999) 
However, this 'assigned character' was not necessarily to do with the local character, 
nor did it have historical or cultural significance locally. Sometimes, these 
'characteristics' were arbitrarily imposed upon the inhabitants. For example, the 
selling point of YuVien 
-MEII town in the National Festival was theLion dance', which 
did not have a local historical origin. It was chosen by the Ilan RM culture centre and 
local workshops to jazz up this insignificant little town. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1995c) 
I am not suggesting that the movement was not successful. Its ideals attracted 
. 
people's imagination, and it produced a passionate response from both the culture 
communities and ordinary people. (CHOU I-CKANGý 1999; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) 
Many young people were touched by Ch'dn Ch'i-nan's passion and were inspired to 
dedicate their energy to their hometowns. (CHOU I-CHANQ 1999; CH'tN CH'I-NAN, 
1996b) Furthermore, because the idea of the Community Construction Movement 
was borrowed from the Japanese zaoding (MgD26 movement, for the older 
Taiwanese generation who were educated under the Japanese rule, it also seemed 
appealing. 
26 Zaoding is a Japanese term; zao means lconstruct, and ding meansregion'or 'area'. it 
was introduced by Ch'dn Ch'i-nan, and promoted by Japanese professor Miyazaki I(iyoshl 
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In 1996, the CCA promoted the movement further and targeted: "wenhua chanye hua, 
chanye wenhua hua 3ZjtA7-j-L, &7-3; 
_rjtjt(industrialising culture, and culturalising 
industry) to blend together local cultural character and the local agricultural industry. 
(CHEN CHMAN, 1996b) The idea was borrowed from the Japanese experience of 
selling local flavour through agricultural products. (CCA, 1999c) For example, 
Japanese scholar Miyazaki Kioshi was invited to demonstrate how to carry out a 
zaoding project in Puli J_q, an idyllic small town in central Taiwan. After interviewing 
local people and surveying, he recommended they use 'sugar cane' as starting point 
to develop local character and tourism. (CCA, 1999c: 59- 60) 
This movement posed as a policy responding to the wish of the people, aimed at 
empowering the communities. It was supposed to be a social reform movement. 
Nonetheless, its whole development had proved that it was in fact a cultural policy 
imposed from above, not a social movemene7 initiated from the bottom and operated 
by the people themselves. 
The criticism of being a top-down policy did not deter its architect, Ch'6n Ch'i-nan. He 
(CH'tN CHMAN, 1995,1996a, 1996b) repeatedly defended the top-down strategy, 
and believed the CCA had to mobilise and promote it forcefully: "Many believed that 
the community consensus should sprout from the people, a result of autonomous 
response. Theoretically, it was true. But, if it was the case, the CCA should just sit 
- 
back and enjoy the results. In reality, the community consensus could never evolve 
by itself. " (CH'tN CHMAN, 1996b: 15) 
11'fN. (CCA, 1999C) W-FU 27 In general, there should be at least four aspects of a 'social movement' : 1) networks of 
informal interaction; 2) shared beliefs and solidarity; 3) collective action on conflictual issues; 
4)action which displays largely outside the Institutional sphere and the routine procedures of 
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Clearly, this movement was a top-down action. Although there were criticisms about 
the domination and arrogance that the movement had shown and how it was 
promoted, Ch'C-n had different views. 
- 
He believed that those criticisms adopted 
western concepts but ignored the unique situation in Taiwan. (CHN CHMAN, 1995: 
114) For him, top-down implementation and forceful promotion were necessary. 
(CH'N CH'I-NAN, 1995) He believed that there was no non-governmental force in 
Taiwan supporting the arts, nor fundamental and long-term planning being carried out 
in the cultural sphere. 'Without a strong and dominant cultural apparatus and system, 
it is obvious that both the development and the future of Taiwanese culture would be 
hindered... Therefore, not only do we need cultural policies, but also strong and 
dominant ones to put the cultural environment into a virtuous circle. " (CHILN 
CHMAN, 1995: 114) 
4.4. Political storm 
4.4.1. Pursuing international recognition 
Following his election in 1990, Lee Teng-hui had concentrated on constitutional 
reform in the early 1990s. During this period, Taiwan underwent a drastic process of 
democratisation. The Legislative election held in December 1992 was a watershed. 
event in the course of the transition of Taiwan's political regime. (TIEN & CHU, 1996) 
At the party congress in August 1993, the historical objective of 'recovering the 
mainland'was formally abandoned. An old era had finished, a new age begun. 
- 
social life. (DIANI, MARIO, 1992: 7) 
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Democratisation encouraged the growth of Taiwanese consciousness. The process 
of clemocratisation has proven Taiwan to be an effective polity and separate 
sovereign state. Economic development and its growing influence also boosted 
Taiwanese confidence. However, the democratisation and economic development 
intensified Taiwan's ambiguous international status and the anxiety of the Taiwanese. 
The Taiwanese longed for a better and stronger international status and recognition. 
Domestic pressure grew stronger, and consequently, Lee Teng-hui was pressed to 
act more aggressively upon this issue and to test the limits placed on Taiwan's 
intemational status. (YAHUDA, 1996: 1333) 
For Taiwan, diplomatic ties were always difficult to establish under the resistance and 
obstruction of the PRC. Several 'alternative' diplomatic principles were developed. 
During the early 1990s, when the ROC took aggressive diplomatic moves in 
international society, the PRC did not pay too much attention at first and chose not to 
counteract in order to maintain a good relationship. However, since 1993, many 
different strategies were used to explore the possibilities of expanding Taiwan's 
diplomatic relationships, such asdollar diplomaCy28, 'the southward policy 29 
, 
and 
'academic or holiday diplomacy3o. 
28 This strategy targeted small and impecunious developing countries to build a diplomatic 
relationship by investing or donating money to help their economy. Taiwan used economic 
strength to present itself as an international benefactor, and set up a fund to help'friendly 
states', such as giving economic aid to Poland, the Philippines, Paraguay, Latvia, and 
technical aid to African and Latin American countries. (YAHUDA, 1996: 1331-1332) 
29 It was a deliberate attempt to shift Taiwan's excessive economic ties with the mainland to 
South-East Asia. Since early 1994, the ROG started to ease bureaucratic procedures for trade 
and investment in this area. Within a year, Taiwan had become the largest investor In Vietnam, 
the second largest in Thailand, and a major investor in the region as a whole. According to 
Yahuda (11996: 1333-1337), this policy was not purely an economic one, but more a political 
one. Because of the increasing economic relationship with countries in this region, any threat 
to Taiwan would be regarded as a threat to their own economic stability. 
30 This strategy emphasised making every overseas visit useful by building informal relations 
and contacts. For example, then Premier Lien Chan visited the Czech Republic and received 
an honorary degree there in 1996. Governor James Soong visited the Czech Republic and 
Hungary later that year. Both claimed to have been taking a holiday there, but carried out 
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Many new strategies were also used by overseas Taiwanese representative offices. 
For example, the Co-ordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA)31 
revised its lobbying strategy, as part of a new diplomatic offensive in 1993. The 
CCNAA not only engaged almost two dozens lobbyists, but also spent US $4.5 
million to hire Cassidy & Associates in Washington D. C. to persuade American 
-, 
Congressmen of the rightness of Taiwan's policies and win sympathy. (ROBINSON, 
1996: 1344-1345) 
The ROC government initiated another diplomatic move in 1993 trying to re-enter the 
United Nations (UN), a proposition had always been preferred by the DPP. Although 
it was clear that there was no way that the appeal Goining the LIN under the name of 
the ROC on Taiwan 
- 
ROCOT) would be accepted, because of the PRC's influence 
within the UN, the ROC took it as a strategy to raise its profile Internationally. 
There is no doubt that the ROC vvill continue to apply year after year, because this 
act symbolises the assertion of Taiwan's sovereignty. As Yahuda comments: 
"Clearly it is more dangerous for the people of Taiwan to be ignored or 
overlooked than it is to be seen thwarted by China at the UN. The forlorn 
attempt to be considered for entry is in fact an opportunity to address the 
international community on terms of Taiwan's choosing 
... 
[and] to engage Beijing 
in open public debate. " (1996: 1337-1338) 
In 1995, when President Lee Teng-hui was invited to give the'Olin Lecture'at Cornell 
Universit)(s alumni reunion weekend in Ithaca, New York, President Clinton allowed 
non-political activities and contact during their visits. 
31 The CCNAA was an organisation that had previously been the ROC Embassy in America. 
It was formed In 1979 after the USA established a formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC. 
Later in 1994, it was renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO). 
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him a personal visit The lecture Lee Teng-hui gave on June 9th was titled "Always in 
My Heart", and emphasised his political ideal of being'always with the people'. rime 
said: "Lee Teng-hui's trip to the dais at his alma mater was a going-forth into the 
world for both Lee and his dynamic but perilously isolated island republic, Taiwan. " 
(SPAETH, 1995) 
Under great pressure from the PRC, apart from the lecture, Lee Teng-hui's Amedcan 
trip was kept low-key. He only met three U. S. Senators and attended class-reunion 
festivities. Lee Teng-hui did not receive the usual treatment as a head of state. The 
only involvement the Clinton Administration had was the granting of a visitor's visa. , 
Even so, this visit was regarded as a "public relations triumph" for Taiwan. (SPAETH, 
1995) Spaeth (1995) reckoned that "Lee's back-to-school holiday was the most 
important Taiwanese diplomatic coup since the U. S. broke off formal relations in 1979 
in deference to Mainland China. " 
It seemed to be a triumph for Taiwan, but probably a bad decision for Washington. 
This incident triggered the lowest point in Sino-America relations. (ROBINSON, 1996) 
Shambaugh even described it as being "in real danger of degenerating into a new 
Cold War'. (WEHRFRITZ, 1995: 21) The PRC Withdrew its ambassador from 
Washington, cancelled all high-level visits, and expelled two 'American spies'just 
before Taiwan's presidential election in 1996. 
Shambaugh pointed out that Lee's trip to America was interpreted by the PRC as "a 
dangerous step towards dejure independence". (SHAMBAUGH, 1996a: 1286) 
Taiwan's attempt to expand its international recognition was interpreted as "a move to 
divide China permanently". Furthermore, it was especially serious for the PRC 
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because this incident had set up a 'bad precedenf. '7he slight upgrading in Amedcan 
relations with Taiwan in 1994 and President Lee Teng-hui's visit in 1995 
fundamentally changed Beijing's calculus. The Chinese leadership was concerned 
that other nations would follow suft. " (SHAMBAUGH, D, 1996a: 1287) 
All these diplomatic endeavours and conflicts were to do with 7aiwan's place in the 
world'. The pursuit of international recognition in the 1990s was different from the 
1980s'effort. The recognition that the ROC longed for had shifted from maintaining 
the image of the'legitimate Chinese government in the 1980s to constructing an 
- 
image of Taiwan as 'a separate sovereignty' in the 1990s. 
4.4.2. Rising hostility from the PRC 
In terms of timing, the Community Construction Movement was launched at a period 
of conflict and disillusion. After the Qiandao Lake incidene2 in 1994, the Taiwanese 
were disappointed by the 'motherland' and disillusioned about the imagined identity 
of being'Chinese'. (SHIH CHNG-FtNa 2000) Furthermore, when communications 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait increased in the early 1990s, the 
,, 
Taiwanese realised that they were different from the people of the 'motherland'. The 
realisation of their'other-ness! became more and more obvious: 'The values are so 
different 
... 
We feel somehow very familiar with Chinese culture... but we're a new 
kind of person. " (ELLIOTT, 1M: 16) Even the older generation mainlanders who 
lived in Taiwan for over fifty years found it difficult to feel at home in the mainland. "I 
32 This incident happened in 1994. Taiwanese tourists were robbed and burnt to death on a 
boat trip in China. Aso see Chapter 3, footnote 41. 
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no longer know anybody there. We have little in common. " (ELLIOTT, 1996: 16) 
Once the old imagined 'mothedand'was no longer the 'homeland', the anxious quest 
for a new identity and a sense of belonging intensified. This movement not only 
promoted an idealistic'homeland-construction' idea, but also reflected the grovving 
Taiwanese consciousness that appeared in the early 1990s. Most of all, it captured 
the newly released longing for'dangjia zuozhu V*fýEt(being one's own master, 
making decision for one's own affairs)'among the people. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 
1995a) 
President Lee openly expressed his 'sadness of being Taiwanese' in an interview 
Wth the Japanese writer Shima Ryutaro (Wjj; Mt, R5) in 1994, describing the 
sadness of Taiwan's colonial past. He openly admitted that the KMT was one of the 
'foreign regimes33 that ruled Taiwan', and expressed his wish to transform the KMT 
into a Taiwanese KMT, (LEE TENG-HUI, 1994a: 472- 473) This interview aroused 
doubt domestically, angered Beijing, and provoked overseas Chinese communities. 
(TU WEI-MINQ 1996: 1131) 
His statement irritated the PRC, and he was accused of endorsing Taiwanese 
independence. The PRC openly threatened to take action if Taiwan declared 
independence: "we vvill not sacrifice political concerns to economic interests... it is 
better to have a devastated Chinese Taiwan, which we can quickly rebuild, than an 
independent Taiwan under American-Japanese domination. " (KEMENADE, 1998: 
134) 
33 Also see Chapter 4.2.4. When Lee Teng-hui talked about building Taiwan as the new 
zhongyuan, he also expressed similar ideas. 
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The threat became so real in 1995 that the Taiwanese lived under fear and 
uncertainty. A best selling book 
- 
August 1995. 
- 
Great Prediction of the Communist 
Chinese Invasion of Tahvan (1995 runbayue: zhonggong wuli fan fai sh#i da yuyan 
- 
ýftKmjk)j: r: P#A)jjRI! ý ftfAE)cfR--M', English title was provided by the publisher) 
- 
stirred up a wave of national anxiety and fear in Taiwan. 34 The author Ch6ng 
Lang-ping Xjft2F(1994) described the psychological, political and strategic context 
in which the PRC's ambition to be an international superpower depended on its 
possession of Taiwan. His theory was that the PRC would sooner or later wage war 
against Japan. Without controlling Taiwan, it could not win the war. He predicted that 
the military action towards Taiwan would most likely take place between August 1995 
and the Election Day (March 24h 1996). In 1994,3,000,000 copies were sold in 
Taiwan alone. Although "professional military analysts initially regarded Chbng's book 
as pure sensationalism", (KEMENADE, 1998: 127) Chdng Lang-ping's book reminded 
the Taiwanese of the military threat that Communist China had always imposed, and 
this intensified distrust of the PRC. 
4.4.3. Presidential election and missile crisis 
The cross-strait tension grew after Lee's US visit. The PRC cancelled a semi-official 
summit and postponed quarterly meetings on non-political issues vAth Taiwan 
34 The book was based on traditional Chinese superstition and had an alarming impact on 
public confidence in Taiwan's security. Because 1995 was the last leap year of the lunar 
calendar of the 2CP century with two intercalary months of August, it warned that such years 
were traditionally catastrophic in Chinese history. It predicted that Taiwan would be militarily 
vulnerable between mid-1 995 to mid-1 996, and the temptations for the PRC to invade Taiwan 
would be the greatest. In fact, the suspicion and panic about Chinese possible invasion was 
not purely superstitious. Just before 1996 Taiwan's presidential election, the PLA undertook its 
largest ever manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait and nearby regions in which 150,000 troops, 
one large naval armada, newly-purchased submarines, fighterjets and bombers were 
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authorities. (NEWSWEEK, 1995a) Nonetheless, the real target of this aggression 
was the 1996 presidential election, which was regarded by the PRC as a deliberate 
action towards a new independent country, or at least a de facto one. 
On July 216t 1995, the first PRC missile exercise commenced 95 miles north of 
Taiwan. The 81 e Missile Brigade of the Second Artillery Corps of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) fired six M-9 medium-range surface-to-surface ballistic 
missiles into the sea in the subsequent five days. (SHAMBAUGH, 1996a: 1285) In 
mid-August a second 'missile exercise' was carded out. Highly accurate anti-ship 
missiles were fired from naval destroyers into the East China Sea. It appeared to 
some Taiwanese that these missile exercises happened to accord with Ch6ng 
Lang-ping's prediction: the T-Day (Turning Point Day, the time of Chinese invasion) 
was coming. 
The tension was at its height before the 1996 Presidential election. Around the end of 
1995 to the beginning of 1996, newspapers throughout East Asia were regularly filled 
with scenarios of the coming war between China and Taiwan. (KEMENADE, 1998: 
134) 
On 5 March 1996, less than 20 days before the election, China announced its new 
series of missile tests. The PLA fired four M-9 medium range ballistic missiles into 
two 25 kilometre-wide box zones just outside of the harbours of Keelung Aga and 
Kaohsiung AM (two biggest harbours in the north and south of Taiwan), the impact 
zones were only 30 and 20 kilometres offshore. (SHAMBAUGH, 1996a: 1287) 
deployed. (SHAMBAUGH, 1996a: 1286) 
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During the 1995 missile tests, not only was Taiwan's economy heavily hit, its morale 
was also put to a severe test The stock market dropped 19 % within one month; at 
least US$1 0 billion left the country to buy foreign currencies or gold; applications for 
emigration had dramatically increased. (CABESTAN, 1996: 1278-1279) 
The reaction towards the missile threat in 1996 was relatively calm, and the 
economic impact was also much smaller than in 1995. People's attention was drawn 
to the bustling election campaign. The most popular slogan was'chuandan (IWYa 
election leaflets), not daodan (4W ballistic missile) vvill decide our future'. To the 
PRC's disappointment, the missile threat did not disrupt the presidential election or 
deter Taiwanese voters. On the contrary, this crisis aroused resentment towards 
Beijing and actually helped to boost Lee's popularity, because it "created a 
'rally-around-[the-]Ieadee effed'. (TIEN & CHU, 1996: 1170) 
The years 1994 to 1996 were the crucial period for the formation of Taiwanese 
identity.. How the Taiwanese viewed themselves in the 1990s changed drastically at 
this point. According to 21 surveys concerning Taiwanese identity conducted by 
several reputable institutions (see Appendix 1) between 1992 and 2000, the identity 
trend reversed clearly at the point of Chinese aggression in 1995 and 1996. 
In 1992,44% of Taiwanese Identified themselves as'Chinese', 16.7% identified 
themselves as'Taiwanese', and 36.5 % identified themselves asboth Chinese and 
Taiwanese'. The figure started to change dramatically after the Qiandao Lake incident. 
The incident changed the Taiwanese impression of the mainland Chinese as a whole. 
In July 1994, the figure of Taiwanese identifying themselves asChinese' slumped 
more than half to 21.7%, the figure identifying themselves as 'Taiwanese' increased 
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dramatically to 28.4%, and as 'both' rose to 49.5%. Especially after the PRC's missile 
crisis, this shift developed further. Although the PRC appealed to resume cross-strait 
talks under the 'one China' precondition in 1997, the hostility between two sides of 
the Taiwan Strait did not subside. For example, the number of people who identified 
themselves as'Taiwanese'by the end of 1997 rose to 43.3%, as'both Chinese and 
Taiwanese' 39.4%, and the once dominant group identifying themselves as'Chinese' 
became the minodty at 17.3%. 
Since then, people who identified themselves as 'Chinese' steadily decreased over 
the years with or without the PRC aggression (16.3% in April 1998,12.7% in April 
1999,13.6% in April 2000). The onoe minority group (those identifying themselves as 
'Taiwanese') increased since 1994 (22.5% in March 1994), to 42.3% in April 1998, 
and 42.5% in April 2000. The group identifying themselves as 'both' remained 
steadily around 40% (41.2% in April 1998,45.4% in April 1999,38.5% in April 2000). 
This dramatic reverse between Chinese and Taiwanese identities demonstrated both 
negative factors (such as national security crisis, and factional strife) and positive 
factors (such as cultural constructions, policy promotion, and funding) could influence 
the formation of identity, and even reverse the tide to grasp political hegemony.. 
4.4.4. Politicisation 
In spite of domestic uncertainty, the prediction of possible catastrophe, and military 
threats, the year 1995 was in fact a year of historical significance and reconciliation 
for Taiwan. Firstly, it marked the 50th anniversary of the recovery of Taiwan and 100 
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years of the Shimonoseki Treae. Secondly, Lee Teng-hui, representing the KMT, 
apologised to the 228 Incidents victims and their families for the mistakes that the 
. 
KMT government made. Lee's open apology was the first time since 1947 that the 
, 
KMT government admitted and begged pardon for the historical tragedy. The 
govemmenrs recognition of the victims'suffering helped to heal the historical 
wounds. 
Many measures were taken officially to rehabilitate these cases of injustice. The 228 
investigating team was set up to investigate the incident and give a just and neutral 
report about what happened. The 228 Monument was erected on 2e February 1995. 
At the same time, the construction of the Taipei 228 Memorial Museum was also 
undertaken. In this politically sensitive time, ChC-ng Shu-min #MM was appointed to 
take over the CCA. 
Ch6ng Shu-Min had many years' experience of working in the medie, and therefore, 
she was very good at'voicing'the CCA policy and winning support. (LU CHIEN-YINQ 
1995b) Her PR ability and media background helped the CCA to establish a better 
relationship Wth the public, and to have a much 'easiee time in the Legislative Yuan. 
However, she played a different role to the three previous chairpersons. Under her 
leadership, the CCA was used to support Lee's election campaign and carry out 
political missions. (LI YO-LINQ 1999; LU CHIEN-YINQ 1999; KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) 
Many cultural events at that time were held to either push the historical message 
35 Treaty of Shimonoseki X; NIM, was signed by the Qing Court with Japan in 1895. Taiwan 
was ceded to Japan because of this treaty. It brought half a century's colonial rule to Taiwan. 
w She had worked in the Chinese Television System, and on the newspapers the China 
rimes and the China r1mes Weekly, as well as in the Government Information Office. 
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forward, or seek reconciliation for the purpose of improving social harmony and 
making alliances. Many concerte' were themed and designed to celebrate the 
occasion, and to re-examine Taiwan's relationship with Japan and China. For 
example, the 228 Commemoration Concert held by the CCA was part of the healing 
remedy, an expression of apology for the historical wrongdoing, held just one month 
before the Presidential election. 
Among all the events held, the'Music, Moon Festival, and Intercalary August (fr! Z 
qifk F4)k)l Yinyue zhongqiu runbayue) in October 1995 was considered the most 
politicised cultural event. 90 concerts were held simultaneously island-wide, with over 
160 music groups involved. Although the concerts were to celebrate the'Moon 
Festival' (the full moon of the eighth Lunar month), it was obvious that the concerts 
were designed to calm Taiwanese anxiety, to relieve the tension stirred up by the 
prediction of a catastrophic'intercalary August. 
All in all, the cultural events that the CCA held before the presidential election were 
either for the purpose of building confidence, or part of Lee Teng-hui's election 
campaign. (LU CHIEWYINGý 1995a) It was apparent that Ch6ng Shu-min not only 
played a key role in'spinning'the Lee Teng-hui ideology, but also led the CCA to 
make way for Lee to run his presidential campaign. (LI YU-LINGý 1999; ICO 
CHI-LIANGý 1999) 
37 Many concerts were held, such as'50 years of Taiwan recovery (guangfu wushiY69K+)', 
'50 yearsvictory of the anti-Japanese invasion (kangzhan shengli wush! nianfinian RqMB§flj 
'the July 7th Anti-Japanese war anniversary (qiqi kangdfinian 
-t=-L-REJ 
War and Peace: 50th anniversary of the Second World War (zhanzheng yu heping. - er ci 
dazhan wushi zhounian *! PPfn2F: etc.. (NATIONAL CHIANG 
KAI-SHEK CULTURE CENTRE, 1996: 212- 226) 
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It was evident that the CCA used it as a political propaganda vehicle. According to 
Wo Chi-liang (1999), a CCA veteran: "As far as the culture community is concerned, 
the politicisation of the CCA was problematic. However, from a political point of view, 
it was understandable that the ruling party used all the political assets it could get 
hold of during the election period. " 
As With Sh§n HsOeh-yung, Chdng Shu-min's tenure of office was short less than 
nineteen months. It seemed that her appointment was also a short-term arrangement 
The work that the CCA did during her tenure was almost identical to that of previous 
chairpersons'. The only difference was that she liked to organise big events, 
especially international ones, endeavouring to improve Taiwan's international 
image. 
4.4.5. Spiritual Reform 
In June 1996, Ch6ng Shu-min was promoted to President of the board of China 
Television Company (CTV)39. A new chairwoman 
- 
Lin Ch'&ng-chih f)MR 
- 
was 
appointed. She did not have any cultural connection or background. The only 
qualification she had was an undergraduate degree from the Shijian Home 
Economics Training College (WR*RWf4WK) 
- 
Because of her father-in-law, the 
^'8 For example, one month before she left the office, she organised cooperation with the 
French Academy to set up the annual 'Sino-France Award', which began In 1996 to 
encourage international Sinology studies. By her initiative, an annual event 
-'Grand Autumn 
Art Fair The Evening of New Cultural Silk Road (shengqiu yiyan 
- 
wenhua xinsilu zhiye Ift 
VV_ 3ZfjýW, #, f4ZM'was launched. These events Indicated her intention to Improve 
communication and set up an image of'new cultural zhongyuart of Taiwan. 
39 The CTV was the party-owned television station, and its programme and administration 
policy were mainly controlled by the KMT. Inside of the KMT hierarchy, the new post meant 
she had done well to earn herself a promotion to such high position Inside the party-run 
business. 
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senior statesman Hsieh Tung-min JjMrA40, she had spent most of her career life in 
the KMT41. Since she had had strong party connections and a low profile, she was 
regarded as a reliable appointment in the cabinet. 
In contrast to Ch6ng Shu-min's promotion, the deputy chairman Ch'6n CtYi-nan was 
again left out He was first predicted to be the chairman in 1993 before Sh6n 
HsOeh-yung was appointed. When Ch6ng Shu-min took over the post, rumour said 
that her appointment was only a temporary arrangement for running the Presidential 
election campaign. (KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) However, when Lin Ch'6ng-chih was 
appointed in June 1996, Ch'6n Ch'i-nan resigned. Although he stayed for another half 
year because Lin asked him to'save her face', (LI YO-LINQ 1999) he left by the end 
of 1996. Ch'6n Ch'i-nan now teaches in the National Institute of Arts (Taiwan) and 
works in a non-governmental foundation 
- 
the ROC Community Construction 
Foundation. 
Ch'6n Ch'i-nan had Stayed at the CCA for four years. Within that period, not only had 
the whole movement encountered great difficulties, but he had suffered criticism from 
within and outside the government. There were different explanations of why Ch'an 
Ch'i-nan was not chosen to chair the CCA. (LI YO-LINQ 1999) However, according to 
the CCA veteran Ko Chi-liang (1999), it was Ch'6n Ch'i-nan's high-handed style and 
unyielding, uncompromising character that had offended many Legislators from both 
parties, and had therefore blocked his political career. 
40 Hsieh Tung-min was Chiang Ching-kuo's vice president between 1981 and 1984. He lost 
his left arm from a mail bomb sent by Taiwanese independence activists in 1984 and retired 
early. Lee Teng-hui was chosen to replace him. 
41 She was the deputy chair of the Department of Women's Affairs(DWA QfflýiCMfýift), Central 
Committee (KIVIT) in 1989, and the chair in 1993. Her connections within the KIVIT were based 
on the old connections of her father-in-law. All her previous working experiences were related 
to children's and women's issues within the party domain. 
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Compared with the full support when the movement was first launched, the weight of 
the Community Construction Movement had fallen drastically within two years. Ch'bn 
, 
Ch'i-nan's powerlessness indicated that the shift of cultural policy had been affected 
immensely by the political situation. This emphasis oncommunity' was soon 
replaced by another Lee Teng-hui slogan 
- 
spiritual reform. 
In the television speech on the Taiwan's Recovery Day (October 25"') 1996, Lee 
Teng-hui first mentioned the idea'Spiritual Reform (xinfing gaige, Ljffa*),. (LEE 
TENG-HUI, 1997: 266- 267) He celebrated the striving character of Taiwan's early 
seftlers, never giving up, fearing no hardship. He appealed to the Taiwanese to 
re-establish traditional values and a robust spirit by starting a spiritual reform to 
. 
create the next'Taiwan miracle% 
Lee mentioned 'Spiritual Reform'again in the NewYeaes Day speech in 1997. 
Although it was a slogan rather than a policy, Lee Teng-hui intentionally put it forward 
and promoted it as a movement. He even listed it as one of his three'national tasks A2 
. 
(CCA, 1998a: 32) Lee Teng-hui used this slogan to call for a peaceful, orderly and 
law-abiding life style and to promote an attitude of "purifying one! s heart and reducing 
desires". The CCA was asked to draw up a plan to 'rebuild social values' and improve 
public order. 
This was a time when political corruption, social chaos and economic disorder were 
rampant. (CCA, 1998a: 31-33) In order to compete vvith the DPP in the election, the 
42 The other two tasks were: 'constitutional reform' and setting up the 'Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Centre (APROC)'. 
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KMT not only allowed business tycoons and powerful gangsters to stand as their 
candidates, but also accepted financial backing from enterprises with particular 
business interests. Since the 1990s, this kind of situation, generally called heijin 
dangdao M. &SM(the underworld and dirty money were in power), had gone from 
bad to worse. The combination of money and the underworld influenced Taiwan's 
political ecology, and bribery and corruption were rampant. (BAUM, 1996; 
KEMENADE, 1998: 110; TU WEI-MINGý 1996: 1130) There were daily news stories of 
kidnapping, murder, arson, robbery, and youth suicide. (LI YlH-YUAN, 1998) The 
slogan'Spiritual Reform'was employed again for Lee's political needs. 
When the slogan was first introduced, many worried that the Spiritual Reform concept 
would be used at the service of a political movement However, many critics felt the 
social chaos was even more worrying. 'We suddenly realised that this society is 
severely ill... even those who criticised the political intention of 'Spiritual Reform'felt 
the necessity and urgency for social reform. " (1-1 YIH-YUAN, 1998: 31) 
The CCA listed thirteen focuses in its report to the Executive Yuan in 1997. The 
Community Construction works became part of the CCA's routine duties, and 
emphasis was shifted to 'spiritual reform' by encouraging a 'healthy' and positive 
leisure life. Therefore, new programmes were promoted, such as'Fill Taiwan with the 
Literary Aroma (Shuxiang man baodao V; WAT1A&)' and 'Protecting the Spiritual 
Environment (xinfing huanbao, L, 3ffMR). (CCA, 1998b: 80-84; LIN CH'tNG-CHIH, 
1997: 3-5) Furthermore, following the introduction of the'two-days off, twice a 
43 The crime rate in 1986 in Taiwan was 48.14 cases in every 10,000 people. It almost 
doubled within ten years (93.34 cases in 1996) after the lift of martial law. (HSIEH MING-HUI, 
1998) According to The Economist (UNITED EVENING NEWS, 1995), the corruption in 
Taiwan was the worst among the FourAsian Uttle Dragons (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and South Korea). 
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month'44 scheme in 1998, the encouragement of leisure life, tourism and 
- 
entertainment became new focus. (LIN CHNG-CHIH, 1998: 25) 
4.4.6. Cultural policy made way for political manoeuvres 
The 
-1990s were an era of self-discovery in political, social and cultural spheres for 
people in Taiwan. As mentioned, an obvious identity reversal had taken place in the 
mid-1990s. As a result, the cultural policies of the second half of the 1990s 
manifested the change from China-centric to Taiwan-centric ideologies 
- 
in other 
words, an official indigenisation trend emerged. 
Examining the slogans that President Lee promoted over the years, it became clear 
that his interests and political agenda had shifted rapidly according to the political 
situation and his own needs. The slogan 'shengming gongtongtf was asserted in May 
1993, at a time when he wanted to calm the non-mainstream faction and call for 
solidafty. The purpose of promoting the'Community Construction Movement' in 1994 
was to prepare Taiwan to build a new'hometown', to have a new identity, and new 
culture in its own right. When public order worsened in the second half of the 1990s, 
the call for'Spiritual Reform'was raised to improve social order. In order to prove that 
Taiwan was not a province of the Chinese regime, Lee Teng-hui abolished Taiwan 
44 The Iwo-days off, twice a month'system was implemented from the beginning of 1998, for 
the purpose of Increasing leisure time for the people... and enhancing spiritual life". (LIN 
CH'tNG-CHIH, 1998: 1) Until this time, people had only a one and a half day weekend. 
Following this announcement, the first and third weekends of every month were the 'long 
weekend' (two days off), and the other weekends remained the same (half day at work or in 
school on Saturday). Finally, the WAAays off" system has become the norm since 2001 for 
students and civil servants. 
45 The governments on each side of the Taiwan Strad insisted that there was only one China, 
although each had different views on who was the legitimate government. Lee tried to break 
totally from the old KMT party line 'one China', and made it clear that Taiwan was not a 
province, but an independent sovereignty. 
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Province. Under Lee! s instruction, the Interim Provincial Government Downsizing Act 
was promulgated in December 21 at 1998 and the first elected governor James Soong 
was forced to step down. 
In 1998, to win votes for Ma Ying-chiu A, XA, the Mrs second generation 
mainlander candidate running for Taipei Mayor, Lee Teng-hui issued another slogan: 
"New Taiwanese"46. It was devised to promote Ma, and also combat the DPP 
candidate, then Taipei Mayor Ch'6n Shui-bian. Lee explained his definition of 'New 
Taiwanese' in an interview in the Japanese newspaper Yomiud Shinbun (MjqWrgj) 
on 1 gth December 1998: 
Taiwan was originally deserted by the Chinese and has since then developed its 
own uniqueness. The KIVIT party came to this island only after the Second World 
War, and the Taiwanese had never had their own political regime... Now, people 
in Taiwan have finally been able to create their own future. Therefore, the 
Shengji conflicts between Taiwanese and mainlanders should no longer be an 
issue. We should unite as a whole. That is what I call New Taiwanese-ism. (CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, 1998) 
These slogans, usually related with cultural and identity construction, were closely 
followed by the KMT government and the CCA. Although some of them were just 
political assertions, or slogans, they affected cultural policy greatly. 
Lee's political strategy heavily relied on 'culture'. He liked to use cultural statements 
and cultural policy to pave the way for future state policy changes. Not only did he 
mobilise cultural targets, moralise policies, and try to control speech, but most of all, 
he paid great attention to the formulation of dominant discourses. Therefore, cultural 
policy worked hand-in-hand with political goals, and a pattern was formulated: Lee 
46 The phrase xin taiwan ren was generally translated in foreign media as 'New 
Taiwanese' in foreign media. However, the Director-General of the KIVIT Chang Hsiao-yen *t 
*f& believed that it should be Oneo-Taiwan person". (CENTRAL DAILY NEWS, 1999) Here, I 
use'NewTalwanese'to reduce confusion. I 
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launched cultural slogans, expounded elaborately, cultural policies followed, and 
, 
finally, political battle was fought. 
4.5. Indigenisation 
4.5.1. Indigenisation trend in social life 
The identity of the Taiwanese changed dramatically around 1995 and 1996. This was 
triggered by many factors including the Qiandao Lake Incident, the PRCs aggression 
towards Taiwan in international society and the missile threat It was around the 
mid-1 990s that the old KMT ideologies had been put under severe scrutiny, the once 
heated 'China Fever' subsided, and the indigenisation trend became acceptable and 
politically correct 
The DPP had always asserted Taiwan's own subjectivity, and had been ahead of the 
KMT in responding to the indigenisation trend. When the DPP candidate Ch't-n 
Shui-bian W7, KQ won the election for Taipei Mayor 47 in 1994, he carried out many 
cultural policies to push the DPP ideas forward. Being the first opposition Mayor 
governing the Capital, many new policies were implemented to wage cultural battles 
to "break down the old symbols and systems set up by the KIVI-17, (CHI YEN-LINQ 
1995; YANG CHIN-YEN, 1995) and remove the authoritarian traces of the Chiang 
Kai-shek period. The central government, located in the opposition-controlled capital, 
had many dramatic conflicts with the Taipei City Government. 
47 Before 1994, the Taipei Mayor was assigned by the central government and had always 
been a KMT member. Ch'dn Shui-bian was the first elected Taipei Mayor. 
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Most of these measures were symbolic gestures. For example, an outdoor dance 
party was held at the square in front of the Presidential Office building onraiwan 
Recovery Day 1995. Taipei City Government claimed that holding the party in the 
restricted area of the capital symbolised liberation from the authoritarian regime. 
(CHINA TIMES, 1995a; UNITED DAILY NEWS, 1995a) According to rough 
estimation (UNITED DAILY NEWS, 1995b), there were over seventy thousand 
people in the square that night. 
This kind of political gesture happened frequently during Ch'6n's office (1994-1998). 
Others included cancelling the national anthem broadcast in the cinema between the 
trailers and the films and taking one of Chiang Kai-shek! s official residences in Shi-lin 
: J: # (since the land belonged to Taipei City Government) and transforming it into a 
public park. (CHINA TIMES EXPRESS, 1996) 
Amongst all such changes, the most symbolic was the renaming of Chieh-shou Road 
This road ran through the government district in central Taipei up to the 
Presidential Office. The original name meant'Wishing Chiang Kai-shek long life". 
(HSIA CHUN-HSIANQ 1998) In 1996, it was renamed "Ketagalan Boulevard" 
(CHINA TIMES, 1996; KEMENADE, 1998), named after the Ketagalan, the aboriginal 
tribe that inhabited this area before Chinese emigrants arrived in the 17'h century. 
In addition, Ch'6n Shui-bian also tried to rebuild Taiwanese history and memory. For 
example, the sixty-year-old Taipei New Park, located on the north side of the square 
in front of the Presidential Office, was renamed the 228 Peace Memorial Park in 
1996. The Ch'6n Shui-bian administration also planned to change the Taiwan 
Provincial Museum inside the park into the 228 memorial hall, and to refurbish the old 
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city government building into a Taiwanese Culture Museum. (CHI YEN-LINQ 1995) 
However, 
- 
these plans were eventually overturned because of criticism that they were 
, 
politicising cultural affairs. 
The Taiwan Provincial Museum remains because it is the oldest natural science 
museum in Taiwan. The 228 Memorial Museum was relocated appropriately in the 
old building of the Taipei Hose Bureau inside the park, because of its historical 
significance in the 228 Incident (rAIPEI CITY GOVERNMENT, 1997) As to the old 
city hall, this was refurbished and reopened in May 2001 as the Institute of 
Contemporary Arts, Taipei, to promote Taiwanese modem arts. (LU CHI EN-YI NQ 
2001) 
4.5.2. Indigenisation trend in education 
In 1989, the DPP drew up a strategy of "containing central government at local level 
(dilang baowei zhongyang ft; VIgErp5ýL)" to increase its influence in the political 
arena. After all the pre-1 949-elected representatives were forced out and replaced by 
newly elected parliament in the 1992 election (TIEN & CHU, 1996: 1141), the 
influence of the local politicians grew. As a result not only could local demands be 
voiced, but also the indigenisation trend grew and boomed accordingly. (CHEN 
CHAO-YINGý 1995a) 
Although many changes were conducted or forced through by the opposition and 
48 Hoso is a Sino-Japanese-European loanword. (LIU, 1995: 285) It means 'broadcast'. This 
old building was the Taipei Broadcasting House when the 228 Incident broke out. (KERR, 
1966) It belonged to the Ch'dn I administration and was used to broadcast governmental 
propaganda, and announce the implementation of martial law. 
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public opinions, the most fundamental changes happened in the domain of education. 
In the past, education had always been the most conservative and the slowest area, 
to respond to social changes. It played a role as the final hold for the ruling power to 
construct ideologies and reproduce its values. The call for the liberation of the 
stringent education system since the early 1980s came from many sectors, including 
from non-governmental organisations, foundations, and intellectuals". (HSUEH 
HSIAO-HUA, 1995) However, education reform and indigenisation arrived much later. 
It was not until January 1994, the University Law was finally enacted. The 
relationship between the MOE and universities was changed from'direct 
management to'distant supervision'. (MOE, 2000) By the end of 1994, the MOE set 
up the "Education Reform Committee" and appointed Lee Yuan-tseh JE&ff- a Nobel 
laureate in chemistry and the President of Academia Sinica5q- to lead the 
investigation and carry out reform planning. 
The breakthrough in the education system as a whole was drastic and happened 
Within a very short period of time during the second half of the 1990s. For example, 
the most criticised system, the standardised textbook and unified editorial system, 
49 The movement for the reform of Taiwan's educational system began in the early 1980s. 
Hsueh Hsiao-hua (1995) divided it into several stages: 1, Embryonic period (1983-1987), 
which took place mostly on university campuses; 2, Organisation period (1987 
-1990). At this 
stage, many non-governmental organisations were formed to urge the MOE for more 
aggressive action, e. g. Women's Alliance IMIN12, University Education Reform Association 
Teachers! Human Rights Association Taipei Society ja 
Renben Education Foundation 3, Pushing for action period (1990 
-1994). 
Many hearings were held in the Legislative Yuan. Non-governmental organisations were 
invited to get involved in drawing up the laws and advising on reform; 4, Prosperous era 
(1994-). After 1994, many suggestions made by the non-governmental organisations were 
taken and put into practice. At the same time, academic freedom was also gained after the 
University Law was promulgated. 
50 The Academia Sinica was founded in Nanking on June 9,1928. As the highest academic 
institution in the Republic of China, the Academia Sinica has two basic missions: conducting 
high-standard academic research in its own Institutes, as well as providing guidance and 
channels of communication, and secondly encouragement to raise academic standards in the 
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was loosened in 1989. Nonetheless, subjects opened to optional textbooks were still 
limited, and included Arts, Music, Design Technology and Crafts, and Physical 
Education. The textbooks for traditional academic subjects (such as Chinese, 
Mathematics, History, and Geography) and subjects concerning ideology-building 
(such as shehui? rl*-Social Studies, gongmin ýaA - Citizenship) were still 
stanclardised and provided by the National Institute for Compilation and Translation. 
,, 
(SHIH CHI-SHýNGý-1995; also Chapter 1.3.1. )
The standardised textbook system was finally relinquished at the primary school level 
in 1996, and opened to schools' and teachers' choice at junior and senior high school 
levels in 1999. (OU YUNG-SI-ItNGý 1997) According to Ou Yung-sh6ng (1997), the 
policy not only gave the freedom to choose textbooks, but also, returned the 
responsibilities and the right of the teachers. Through regaining power, many other 
teachers' rights were also restored, such as the right to join the teachers' scrutiny 
committee, to share decision-making and the responsibility for hiring new staff, to 
organise teachers' union, and the right to appeal in disputes. 
Another problem in Taiwan's education system was the lack of knowledge about 
Taiwan. The issue had been argued about since the 1980s. However, it was not until 
the early 1990s that the situation started to improve. Partly, this improvement was 
because the opposition party was in power in some counties and cities, and they 
promoted a'Local Studies' module in primary schoolsý'. Partly, it was because public 
support grew for more indigenous content in education. 
country. 
51 According to Chiang Wen-yu's research (CHANG TSUI-FEN, 1995a), counties where the 
opposition was in power were Taipei County, I-Ian County, Hsinchu County, Tainan County, 
Kaohsiung County, and Pingdong County. Although they promoted mother-tongue education, 
once the power changed hands, such as in Pingdong, provision ceased. 
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In 1993, Education Minister Kuo Wei-fan announced that the MOE would increase 
the proportion of Local Studies(xiangtuflaoxue J05±ftm-T-) in the new elementary 
curriculum, covering Taiwan's history; geography, natural environment, arts, and local 
dialects. (1-1 CHIN-AN, 1997) Even vvith all the good intentions of strengthening local 
studies, thete were still many difficulties. For example, the teaching hours 62 of Local 
Studies were insignificant. According to Li Ch'in-an (1997), the teaching of local 
dialects accounted for only 1/40 of the time spent learning Mandarin. Furthermore, its 
status as an'optional module63 was also insufficient. (CH'tN MAN-LINQ 1999b) 
However, it was not until June 1995 that the MOE finally redressed the problem in the 
new 1996 national curriculum for primary and junior high schools. According to the 
MOE, the charactedstic of the new cuniculum was "indigenisation". (CHINA TIMES, 
1995b) 
In 1998, changes were made in curriculum at the junior and senior high'school levels 
to make the courses more lively and acceptable, and also to celebrate the 
'indigenisation' trend. (HAN KUO-DONGý 1995) For the first time, a new subject 
"Knowing Taiwan (MR-6"I'M renshi taiwan)" was added to the 1998 cunriculum. 
Another major change was to combine fiazheng *R (Household Management for 
girls) and gongyi T-N(Design Technology and Crafts for boys) into one joint subject 
called "Family and Technology in Life". According to the MOE, the purpose was to 
provide students with the all-round knowledge they needed in life without presuming 
52 From summer 2001, all primary schools students have to take a'Native Languages xian9tu 
ct yuyan module for two hours per week. It includes Minnan yu the diale of 
south Fujian Province and the mother-tongue for the majority of Taiwanese 
- 
Hakka dialect, 
and aborigine languages. 
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that girls and boys are different in terms of their future roles. (UNITED DAILY NEWS, 
1995c) 
The MOE claimed that any content concerning ideology formation would be removed 
from textbooks or modified. (HAN KUO-DONQ 1995) Such content in Sanminzhuyi, 
Chinese Uterature, Military Training, and Citizenship was either removed, or reduced 
to the minimum. (CHANG TS'UI-FEN, 1995b, TSENG I-FANG, 1999a) The most 
affected were Sanminzhuyi and 'Military Training' lessons. 
Apart from the changes in the curriculum and the freedom to choose textbooks, many 
other major improvements to the education system were also carried out. The heavily 
criticised fiankao 0--e systems at junior and senior high school levels have 
undergone continuous modification and thorough reform since the late 1990s. In 
1999, then Education Minister Lin Ch'ing-chiang #NJI: announced that the joint 
examination system would be totally abolished before the academic year 2002. 
(CH'tN MAWLINGý 1999a) 
4.5.3. Taiwan studies is the new In 
The growing indigenisation trend gradually became politically correct in the 
mid-1 990s. By then, it was generally accepted that Taiwan issues and Taiwanese 
. 
53 After countless petitions, the MOE finally made it a compulsory module in 2000. 54 The flankao was an examination system for testing students' academic performance, which 
was needed for entry to the next level of education. it was held every July. All the third year 
students of the junior and senior high schools would take a national examination. Based on 
the result of that exam, students would be able to enter the next level of education: senior 
high school or university. The exam took place on the same date, and all the students from all 
the schools were mingled together. Because the students had only one opportunity to prove 
themselves through liankao, pressure mounted. Suicide cases of frustrated and nervous 
students had often occurred in the past. 
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identity had long been ignored, degraded, and misunderstood. In the past, any 
academic studies relating to Taiwan issues would face difficulties of funding, gaining 
official support or gaining credit. (CHANG YEN-HSIE, 2001) Taiwan Studies scholar 
Tai Kuo-hui MWO said in 1985 that his research (Taiwan Studies) had been a 
"lonely pursuiV'. (TAI KUO-HUI, 1994: 126) 
In June 1995,18 non-governmental organisations and foundations held a joint 
hearing in the Legislative Yuan, and urged the MOE to establish Taiwanese Literature 
(Taiwan wenxue ýCl Departments in universities. (CH'tN CHAO-YINQ 1995c) 
Even with the growing consensus of placing more emphasis on Taiwan, this call for 
setting up departments of Taiwanese literature was not responded to by the 
authodties. 
Moreover, there were two immediate setbacks. In 1996 Ching-I AJA University 
applied to set up a new module 
- 
'Taiwanese Literature' in the Department of Chinese 
Literature. The proposal was turned down by the MOE. Another similar proposal to 
set up a 7aiwanese Literature' Module under the Graduate Institute of Chinese 
Literature was rejected in an internal meeting at the National Taiwan University (NTU). 
(CHEN WEN-FEN, 2000) 
However, the fide finally turned and objections subsided because of growing public 
support. After seven to-and-fro applications and modifications, the Aletheia University 
(then the Danshui Management College was able to gain MOE 
approval to set up the first-ever Department of Taiwanese Literature in 1997. (CHAO 
CHIA-LIN, 2000) In the following year, the proposal of the National Cheng Kung 
University (NCKU) to set up a Master degree course in Taiwanese Literature was 
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also approved. The MA course started in summer 2000, and a Ph. D. course 
(Taiwanese Literature) in the NCKU is in preparation for the 2002 academic year. 
(CH'tN WEN-FtN, 2000) 
In contrast to the previous negative attitude, only four years later in 2000, the MOE 
wrote to all national and public universities and asked them to consider the possibility 
of setting up a Taiwanese Literature Department. (WU CHIN-HSON, 2000; WNG 
TS'UI-P'INQ 2000) Furthermore, to act as an encouragement the MOE vAll provide 
two extra staff for a newly established department. 
According to Chang Kuo-bao NMR, the deputy director of the Department of Higher 
Education(MOE), 'this policy was designed to deal With the pressing need to deliver 
the new compulsory subject, Local Studies. (WýNG TS'UI-P'INQ 2001)The change 
was triggered by the new national curriculum, which started in the summer of 2001. 
This subject urgently needed teachers with professional ability to teach or compile 
and produce teaching materials for'Local Studies'and'native languages'. 
Because of the new curriculum and emerging market, several national universities 
such as Ch'ing Hua N-V University and Chung Hsing rPR University sent proposals 
for new courses beginning in the 2002 academic year. (MNG TSVI-PINGý 2001) 
Even without the formal establishment of Taiwanese Literature Departments, many 
Chinese Literature Departments have already started to run Taiwanese Literature 
modules to provide options for students. 
From an idea to reality, fmm a lack of recognifion to its emergence as the favoudte 
new subject, Taiwanese Literature has been established in universities within a few 
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years. Consequently, Chinese literature was under siege. (HSIANG YANQ 1998) The 
resources and student numbers of Chinese Literature Departments plunged. It was 
undeniable that the grovVing popularity of Taiwanese Literature Departments 
suggested the inevitable decline of Chinese Literature. Many Chinese Literature 
Departments were criticised for ignoring Taiwanese culture, being Chinese- 
chauvinist or teaching the "enem)(s literature". (CHN CHAO-YINQ 1995c) 
Debates over identity affected not only politicians and activists but also, and perhaps 
most of all, ordinary people. The debates involved everyone in Taiwan and affected 
everyone's life. (WACHMAN, 1994) Many families, Mends, and couples were 
estranged because of the identity dispute. However, the intellectual debates were at 
the front line in forming a Taiwanese consciousness, fighting to Win the hegemony to 
influence people's perception of identity, and constructing the 'discourse'. 
Emotional feelings and heated debates in academic communities were stirred up 
because of the different political stances of the early 1990s. The most noticeable 
academic debates on Taiwanese Identity appeared around 1994 to 1995, a 
watershed of Taiwanese identity reversal. Such debates included: the'Taiwan 
comple)e and 'China comple)e that Tai Kuo-hui (1994) initiated, the debate on the 
limitation of new Taiwanese nationalism (CHANG MAO-KUl, 1993; CHAO KANG, 
1996: 1-72), and the debate about the definition 'who were the fake Taivvanese'. (ISLE 
MARGIN, 1993,1995) 
Ch'bn Chao-ying's essay (1 995a, 1995b) on Taiwan's nativistic movement also 
aroused intense debate and discussion about Taiwanese identity. Many scholars 
joined in to discuss the definition of rraiwaneW and Taiwanese subjectivity. (LIAO 
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CH'AO-YANQ 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996; LIAO HSIEN-HAO, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) 
In general, most of the debates could be categorised into two different camps: one 
, 
advocated the necessity and historical reasons for building Taiwan's own subjectivity; 
the other, criticised the tendency to deny Chinese influence in Taiwanese culture. 
Even in Taiwan's highest academic institution, the Academia Sinica, the 
indigenisation trend also took its course and changed the structure of the institution. 
Initiated by the prominent historian Chang Kwang-chih ýRYffl 
, 
the Academia Sinica 
passed a resolution in 1988 to form 'the Office of Field Research on the History of 
Taiwan In 1990, a Preparatory Planning Team was set up, 
because of *the grovving interest in the study of Taiwan[ese] history... and the 
increasing encouragement from the Legislative Yuan". (ACADEMIA SINICA, 2000) In 
1993, after the Legislators' visit and their expressions of concern, the Institute of 
Taiwan History Preparatory Office was established. Huang Fu-san JQU-=, Professor 
of the Department of History at the NTU, was the first Director. 
Taiwan went through a process of severe self-examination and soul-searching in the 
mid-1 990s. Eventually, the struggle of cultural hegemony was won by the 
Taiwanisation discourse, which advocated building up Taiwan's subjectivity and 
constructing Taiwanese culture as central. The growing indigenisation trend started to 
do'minate every aspect of government policy by the late 1990s 
- 
state resources and 
official support have all been diverted to this new direction of Taiwanisation. Taiwan 
Studies had long suffered suppression by the KMT authorities. However, because of 
the change of the political atmosphere, by the end of the 1990s it had become the 
most important subject to be involved in, and attracted funding and state support. 
Some raised worries that politicisation would affect intellectual neutrality, academic 
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conscience and autonomy. (CHN CHAO-YING, 2000; WANG MING-ICO, 1994b) 
Undoubtedly, the indigenisation trend has started. 
4.6. Centralisation 
4.6.1. Impact of cultural globalisation 
The urge to be recognized internationally has always been an important issue for the 
Taiwanese. It was even more urgent in the 1990s when the Taiwanese encountered 
the PRC's hostility. Under the shadow of identity crisis and the surging globalisation 
trend worldwide, the need for the Taiwanese to become part of the global village, to 
be recognised and mapped in international society became desperate. As a result of 
such longing, embracing global culture and cultural products became a way of 
expressing the urge and dealing with the anxiety of wanting to be part of the global 
development. 
Therefore, the Taiwanese have been keen on absorbing foreign culture (mainly 
Japanese and American) and consuming foreign cultural products. For example, the 
first branch of McDonald's in Taiwan was established in 1982. The chain then swept 
the island creating an American 'fast food culture'. By 2001, there were 340 
McDonald's restaurants island-wide. Kentucky Fried Chicken established its first 
Taiwanese branch in 1985, and now has 124 stores. Starbucks came to Taiwan in 
1999 and has set up 74 stores on this tiny island within three years; TFI Friday 
restaurants came to Taiwan in 1991, and Planet Hollywood in 1998. 
The ROC government has always endeavoured to develop Taiwan's economy, and 
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therefore, has engaged in global economic activities since the 1960s. (See Chapter 
, 
3.4.3. ) However, the Taiwanese experience of the influence of global culture was 
totally different Communications with the outside world were very limited for ordinary 
people before the 1980s. According to Chang & HsQ (2000), the KMT imposed strict 
control in order tomaintain national secudW. Hence, global cultural influence in 
Taiwan started much later than in the economic sphere. 
The beginning of the introduction of global culture was limited to TV programmes, 
films, publications, which however, were filtered by the KMPs stringent censorship. 
Before the lift of martial law in 1987, most'global cultuW to be found in Taiwan was 
mainly American. Chiu Hei-yuan (1997: 197) comments that Taiwanese society had 
been 'Americanised' after the 1950s. This was because America was not only the 
major international ally and economic investor in Taiwan had after 1949, but also the 
most powerful cultural exporter in the world. American ways of life and values were 
- 
passed on through popular music, imported TV programmes and Hollywood films. 
The globalisation of Taiwanese culture began in daily life by people using cultural 
products, reading foreign publications, listening to foreign music, and viemfing foreign 
films and television. The lift of martial law changed the filtered information flows and 
increased the availability and varieties of alternative views. For example, the state 
control on culture subsided after the 1980s, and the quick expansion of cable and 
satellite TV influenced Taiwan greatly. After the ban on overseas travel was lifted, 
intemational travel grew dramatically5-5. Overseas travel experiences provided 
opportunities for the Taiwanese to see the outside world for themselves and coMpare 
55 Only 640,700 people travelled overseas in 1982. Within ten years, the figure increased 6.5 
times to 4.214 million overseas visits in 1992. (DGBýkS. 1993) In 2000, overseas travels 
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different cultures. 
Before cable TV was legalised in 1993, broadcast television was monopolised by 
three govemment-run television stations 
- 
Taiwan Television Enterprise (TrV, est. 
1962), The China Television Company (CTC, est. 1969), and The Chinese Television 
System (CTS, est. 1971). Even so, in the prosperous 1980s, apart from the 
mushrooming video rental business, satellite TV and cable TV had also permeated 
the Taiwanese market, operating illegally for over a decade before the legislation56 
that allowed it was passed. 
According to Wang & Chung (1988: 217,271), foreign imported programmes took up 
90% of all cable TV programming in the late 1980s. Research on video rental habits 
confirmed that the most popular videos were western films in English. 82.72% of the 
interviewees favoured western films (mostly Amedcan). In addition, Japanese and 
Chinese films were also popular. Over half (57.3%) of the interviewees liked to rent 
Japanese films, and 44.94% liked Chinese filme7. (WANGý 1986: 371) 
As well as the cheap video rental and cable options, well-off middle class customers 
who could afford to, installed satellite receivers in the 1980s, in the main to watch 
Japanese TV. (FAN & WANQ 1989) By the early 1990s, the number of households 
that had installed satellite receivers was around 400,000; the highest dens ty in sia 
increased to 7.33 million tdps. (GIO, 2001: 132) 
5r3 The earliest record of cable TV was in 1979. The United Daily News had a report on the 
appearance of cable TV in Keelung and Juifang 9)5. The KMT government tried to ban them 
in 1981. Resistance from the cable TV industry began in 1984. There were around 230,000 
cable TV users in Taiwan by 1985, and this figure rose to 540,000 in 1991. (FtNG 
CHIEN-SAN, 1995: 36-37) 
57The sort of Chinese film is called kuo pian (JMPý), referTing to films in which characters 
speak either in Mandarin and In Cantonese. Before martial law was lifted, kuo pian referred 
mostly to Taiwan-made or Hong-Kong-made films. 
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(INGELBRECHT, 1992: 40; FtNG CHIEN-SAN, 1995: 14) The number of 
households subscribing to cable TV mushroomed and reached 1,500,000 in the 
Taiwan region. In 1993, the government finally changed its media policy, and 
legalised cable TV stations in order that they could be controlled and regulated. 
(FtNG CHIEN-SAN, 1995: 37) 
A vast quantity of global information and view-points from all over the world (however, 
mainly American"') poured into every household, breaking the monopoly of mass 
media broadcasting and its KMT-controlled view-point. According to Fbng 
Chien-san's estimation (1995: 5-6), the total import of foreign films and television 
productions in 1993 was worth at least NT$ 138.05 billion. In addition, Japanese 
culture was already deeply rooted among the older generation of Taiwanese, (CHIU 
HEI-YUAN, 1997) and it gradually increased its influence in the 1990s on youth 
sub-culture through Japanese TV and popular music. (Lll & CHN, 1998) 
After the ban on Japanese drama on Taiwanese television was lifted in 1992, 
Japanese icons were introduced into Taiwan's market: soundtracks; of popular soap 
operas became top sellers in the record shops, which introduced more Japanese 
popular music and singers into Taiwan. (1-11 & CH'tN, 1998) According to Taiwan's 
Social Change Survey conducted in 1994, (CHIU HEI-YUAN, 1995: 132-33) 41.9% of 
the interviewees liked Japanese popular music, 43.5% liked western popular music, 
and 51.2% liked western classical music. 
In the last few years, Korean popular culture followed the same pattem 
- 
soap 
58 Typical channels included Cable Network News (CNN), Home Box Office (HBO), Disney 
Cartoon, American Broadcast Company (ABC) news, Discovery etc. 
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operas became popular first, sound tracks second, then, pop idols and popular music 
followed to become part of Taiwanese popular culture. People could sing Japanese 
and Korean songs in Karaoke without understanding the lyrics, (LU CHIEN-YINC-% 
2001) in the same way that they had sung western popular songs in the 1960s 
without knowing their cultural context. (CHIU HEI-YUAN, 1997: 198) 
Many scholars noticed that the Taiwanese generally embraced globalisation and 
ignored cultural imperialism, especially the younger generation. (LIAO HSIEN-HAO, 
2000; LIU TA-Hý, 2001; CH'tN KANG-1,2001) This condition was so severe that 
media scholar Rng Chien-san claimed that cultural globalisation of Taiwan had 
created "wuwo, %, a (selfless-ness). (CH'tN KANG-1,2001) This wholehearted 
embrace of globalisation is a worrying social phenomenon. In contrast to what Castell 
predicted in terms of reactions against globalisation, networking and flexibility in a 
gradually globalised world, the Taiwanese took on western values, adopted foreign 
systems, and welcomed technological and social changes, as long as they brought 
'progress'. 
4.6.2. Laying foundations for funding structure 
Because of the willingness to accept foreign culture and the enthusiasm for bringing 
change and borrowing values and technologies, the state control on culture started to 
thaw. In order to deal with the globalisation trend and regain control, cultural 
regulation 
- 
the state effort to construct culture and influence meaning production - 
became more and more important 
Cultural regulation and subsidy were two means to. achieve state intervention in 
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cultural policy. (LEWIS, 1994) In the process of meaning production, how state 
resources were distributed related closely to what kind of cultural capital the state 
encouraged. Therefore, funding was an issue not only of the distribution of resources, 
but also of meaning production. The KMT did not pay much attention Warts funding' 
before the 1980s, because most cultural resources and events were under state 
control anyway. It was not until the end of the 1980s that the Legislators were 
interested in how subsidies were given, and to whom. The KMT gradually realised 
the 'usefulness' of cultural policy and the need to establish a funding system to 
'reward' certain cultural products and reinforce desired rpeanings. 
When theatre theorist Chung Mingder (1990: 224-225) reviewed ten years' of the 
development of Taiwan's little theatre, he suggested that the CCA systemise funding. 
According to Chung (1990), state funding should provide long-term financial and 
managerial support to excellent groups for at least three to five years in order to 
empower them to develop to "professional scale'm. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1990, 
- 
222-226) 
Chung Mingders suggestion was put into practice vvith Kuo Wei-farYs support. The 
construction of a state funding system had finally started. The very first funding 
system ý- the Scheme to Foster Intemational Peiforming Groups (guojixing yany! 
tuandui fuzhifihua was drawn up in 1991, and 
implemented in 1992. It was one of 24 important tasks in the Culture Construction 
Programme (1992-1997). 
59 Chung Mingder received his Ph. D. degree in America; therefore, many of his suggestions 
drew influence from the American professional theatre environment and system. He 
suggested that the CCA fostered the little theatre into a 'non-profit professional theatre' as 
part of public service. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1990: 225,229) 
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The goal of this scheme was to support excellent performing groups to present 
Taiwanese modem arts in the international arena and to strengthen their financial 
ability. However, criticism arose soon after this scheme was imposed. First of all, the 
most important criterion, the ability to represent Taiwan internationally, was 
considered unfair, because different art forms had different markets. (LIN KU-FANQ 
2000a: 41) Most of all, it seemed to benefit the well-established groups instead of 
encouraging young artists. (LU CHIEWYINGý 1999) 
In 1992, the first year of the scheme, there were only eight elite groups on the list: 2 
music groups, 2 dance groups, 3 theatre groups, and 1 xiqLP group. Each group 
received an annual budget to "substantiate their cast' and "improve training". (LIN 
KU-FANQ 2000a: 104) The number of subsidised groups increased to twelve in 1993 
and 1994: 3 music groups, 4 dance groups, 2 xiqu groups and 3 theatre groups. 
Because of the criticism of unfaimess and of being too exclusive, and because of the 
new emphasis on promoting the Community Construction Movement, the CCA 
decided to reduce the international emphasis and focus on 'improving the constitution 
of artistic groups. The CCA changed strategy in the middle of the scheme, and 
modified its criteria for selection in 1995. This 'opening-up' policy had changed the 
nature of the scheme and selection criteria. The number of funded groups increased 
to twenty-eight in 1995: 10 music, 10 dance, 3 xiqu, and 5 theatre groups. 
60 Xiqu is a general term for traditional opera form. However, when the scheme was first 
launched, the only xiqu group chosen was the Contemporary Legend Theatre, a group using 
Beijing opera technique to modemise theatre form. From official prospect, the CCA still took it 
as Beijing opera group. 
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In 1998, the scheme was replaced by the Scheme to Select and Reward Excellent 
Performing Groups Uiechu yanyi tuandui zhenxuan fifianglifihua 
The number of subsidised groups rose substantially. In 1999 and 2000, 
the figure reached 65: 18 music groups, 16 dance, 17 xiqu and 14 theatre groups. 
The total number increased eight times from 8 groups in 1992 to 65 in 2000. 
It was evident that the surging indigenisation trend from the late 1980s had affected 
which group or individual, and what kinds of art form would be subsidised. For 
example, community theatre groups had been included since 1995 because of the 
promotion of Community Construction. Taiwanese xiqu forms became the most 
popular category because of their place within indigenous culture. The number of 
subsidised xiqu groups rose seventeen times within, eight years. 62 
In addition, a string of state-resource distribution measures were also taken to 
encourage indigenisabon. For example, Inthrmation thrApplying for Subsidy for 
Community Construction (CCA, 1997) was announced to encourage community 
activities; Measures to Select Important FolkArdsts was announced in 1995 to boost 
the status of folk- arts and artists. The National Centre for Traditional Arts (a 
preparatory office was set up in January 1996), the National Cultural Heritage 
Preservation and Research Centre (its preparatory office was set up in October 
1996), and the Traditional Music Centre were all set up to promote Taiwanese 
traditional culture. 
61 The scheme was changed again to Scheme to Foster Performing Groups (yanyi tuandui 
fazhang, fuzhij1hua in 2001, to place emphasis on managerial ability. 
62 In 1992, there was only one xiqu group (Contemporary Legend Theatre) was selected. The 
figure grew each year (2 xiqu groups in 1993 & 94,3 in 1995,4 in 1996,8 in 1997,13 In 1998, 
17 in 1999 & 2000), and most of them were Taiwanese xiqu groups 
-2 Taiwanese xiqu 
groups in 3 chosen xiqu groups in 1995,6 in 8 groups in 1997,9 in 13 groups in 1998, and 13 
in 17 groups in 1999. In 2001, only 2 among 21 xiqu groups did not perform Taiwanese x1qu. 
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The state funding system was constructed in two areas: one was direct subsidy to 
, 
improve the constitution of artistic groups and their financial stability, e. g., Foster 
International Performing Groups; another area was the general improvement of. 
cultural environment, 
- 
e. g. the Regulations of Encouraging Cultum and Arts, and the 
Tax Reduction and Exemption for Cultural Industry. 
According to Article 19 of the Regulations of Encouraging Culture and Arts, a special 
institution was needed to deal with funding affairs directly. Therefore, the National 
Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) I was established in 1996 and took over most 
funding business from the CCA. Since then, the CCA only dealt with special cases 
and the Scheme to Foster International Performing Groups. 
As to the NCAF, it was designed as an arm-length organisation functioning as the 
"service centre for the arts and culture". (NCAF, 1996: 2) There were five areas that 
the NCAF stressed:, research, grants, awards, stabilisation, and promotion. (NCAF, 
2000) Their services were provided for both artists and the public, ranging from 
subsidies, legal advice, and insurance advice, to managerial help to improve 
administrative ability. Among all its responsibilities, its most important mission is 
"funding the arts"64. 
63 The NCAF is a foundation for promoting and assisting cultural and arts activities. (NCAF, 
1996: 2) The "Statutes on the Establishment of the National Culture and Arts Foundation 
(guojia wenhua yishuffinbui shezhi tiaoli were passed in 
October 1994, and its office opened and started operation on January V, 1996. (A The NCAF provides funding for different art forms. The subsidies are given for the 
preservation and promotion of cultural heritage, encouragement and support for creation, 
research, performance and exhibition of arts (music, dance, fine arts, theatre, literature, folk 
arts, crafts, environmental arts, photography, 'television, film and radio), research on the 
cultural environment, publication, and promotion of arts. (EXECUTIVE YUAN, 
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After the NCAF was established, a total structure for state funding was finally 
accomplished. At central government level, two cultural apparatuses, the CCA and 
NCAF, provided funding for various occasions and purposes. (LI YING-PINQ 1998) 
The Cultural Affairs Department and its local branches, under the control of the 
Taiwan Provincial Government, were set up in May 199765. They were in charge of 
cultural affairs at provincial levels, 24 County and City Culture Centres, local 
museums, and Taiwan's ancient archives. In addition, the most important cultural 
policy in the 1990s, the Community Construction Movement, has also played an 
important role in building up a nation-wide cultural network. By the late 1990s, the 
whole state funding system has been constructed, and functioned, from top to bottom, 
at every level. 
- 
4.6.3. Upgrading to ministry 
According to Gramscian ideas, 'popular beliefs' are an area that hinges the leaders 
and the led. (BENNETT 1981) The way in which to form a broad block of social 
forces, by constructing a common conception of the world, is important. The struggle 
of cultural hegemony is therefore crucial for establishing political hegemony. In order 
to win cultural hegemony, the politicians realised that cultural affairs could be 
influential and the opposition parties were especially aware of their significance. 
(PERFORMING ARTS ALLIANCE, 1999) 
Even though there had been debates about whether it was necessary to upgrade the 
REGULATIONS OF ENCOURAGING CULTURE AND ART, 1992) 
65 The Taiwan Provincial Government was abolished after The Interim Provincial Government 
Downsizing Act was promulgated on December 21 st 1998. The Cultural Affairs Department 
and its local branches were handed over to the CCA, and became the mid-Taiwan office and 
local branches of the CCA. 
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CCA to ministry status since the 1980s (THE INDEPENDENT NEWS, 1993; HAN 
PAO-TH E, 1989; TH E CH I NA TI MES, 1994), official opinion had always favoured 
upgrade. The politicians preferred to 'manage' cultural affairs with greater power and 
under a unified administrative body. At the same time, the arts communities also 
preferred the centralised structure of a Ministry. (TtNG WEI-WEI, 1994; CHINA 
TIMES, 1994b; JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1994) As to the general public, the view on 
establishing a more concentrated and controlled cultural apparatus was the same. 
(PERFORMING ARTS ALLIANCE, 1999) Even so, the whole process of upgrading 
the CCA has been a long and winding road, full of turns and twists. 
Originally, the proposal to upgrade the CCA was made in 1985 to tackle the problems 
of its powerlessness and overlapping duties. The problems had been mentioned 
many times, right from its inception. Only few years after the CCA was established, 
the problems were identified officially by the research commissioned by the Research 
and Evaluation Committee (Executive Yuan). (CHILI HEI-YUAN, 1985) Since then, 
suggestions to establish a higher rank and unified apparatus were raised to solve the 
problem. 
In 1988, the Executive Yuan started to revise its Organisation Law (Xingzhengyuan 
zuzhiha xiuzheng caoan ff-JARkfiadý and planned to upgrade the CCA to 
a Ministry of Culture status, along with three other upgrades (for Councils of 
Agriculture, Labour Affairs, and the Department of Health). The only problem for the 
CCA upgrade plan was who, what business and which departments of other related 
ministries would be merged to form the future Ministry of Culture. (LIN YING-CHe, 
1989) The most affected institutions included the MOE, the MOI, the GIO, and the 
Taiwan Provincial Government. The target for upgrade was May 1990. 
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Although there was no objection to upgrade, this plan was put on hold and dragged 
on for almost five'yeari, because the upgrade was part of the Executive Yuan's 
problematic reorganisation.. (TNG WEI-WEI, 1994b) By the end of the 1980s, a 
general principle within the Executive Yuan was "reduce the staff and simplify the 
administrative structure". (ICO CHI-LIANQ 1999) This, again, hindered the CCA's 
upgrade. 
J. 
In 1994, the Executive Yuan revised the amendment draft, and a special investigation 
team was set up to reconsider the original reorganisation plan. The team decided 
that It was inappropriate to upgrade the CCA since all cultural affairs could be dealt 
with bý other Ministries and councils. (TENG WEI-WEI, 1994a) After the decision was 
made, they were criticised for belittling culture and its importance. (TNG WEMEI, 
1994a, 1994b; HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1994) 
An anonymous source from the team revealed that the overturn of the CCA's 
upgrading plan was purely "a trouble not of one's own making (chiyu zhi yang MA, Z 
vrd, t. )". (TtNG WEI-WEI, 1994b) Among all upgrading cases, the newly considered 
case for the Environmental Protection Administration was most unlikely to be 
upgraded because of strong objection from big enterprise. The team worried that it 
might cause severe protests and criticism from environmental activists, and "it would 
look bad if there was only one case that failed". (TtNG WEI-WEI, 1994b) They 
assumed that the voice from the culture communities was the weakest, and the CCA 
was the least demanding council among all, hence, it was easily sacrificed with the 
Environmental Protection Administration. (TLNG WEI-WEI, 1994b) 
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However, the culture communities were not as 'tame' and 'voiceless' as the Executive 
Yuan had expected. Many protests and petitions were made and supported by the 
Legislators. A few days after that meeting, the investigating team claimed that the 
decision was not definite. (TtNG WEI-WEI, 1994b) It was again put aside, this time, 
for another three years. 
IL was not until June 1997 that Premier Lien Chan announced that the upgrade plan 
would be included in the newly revised Organisation Law of the Executive Yuan. (YO 
KUO-HUA, 1997b) Consequently, the draft of Rules of Organisation of the Ministry of 
Culture (Wenhuabu zuzhifa 3ZIE1., ýkBMM-) was sent to the Executive Yuan, eight 
years after its first version was produced, and is still waiting to be discussed in the 
Legislative Yuan. 66 However, the principle of upgrading the CCA has been accepted 
and the final date for upgrading is 2003. (CCA, 2001 a) 
4.7. Taiwan in the 21 at century 
After 40 years of Sinicised education and China-centric cultural policy, many 
Taiwanese were tom between the old values of being Chinese and being proud of 
Chinese tradition and culture, and the newly emergent Taiwanese awareness. This 
ambiguity showed through in the social change survey in Taiwan, conducted by the 
Academia Sinica in 1994. On the one hand, 68.3% interviewees claimed that they 
were proud of Chinese culture, while only 17.4 did not think so, and 69.2% believed 
that Taiwan was rich in material life but poor in cultural, while 18.6% disagreed. One 
'56 The delay is caused by the lengthy discussion of Xingzhengyuan zuzhifa (the amendment 
for the Executive Yuan Organisation Law). Because the restructure of the bigger framework 
(the Executive Yuan) has not been accepted in the Legislative Yuan, all the related 
reorganisation plans have to wait. 
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the other hand, 74.2% of the interviewees agreed that Taiwan should establish its, 
-,,, 
own culture (only 8.8%'disag reed),, and 59.7% wished to add Minnan yu as one of 
the national languages (25.7% disagreed). 
- 
(CHILI HEI-YUAN, 1995: 129 7130) 
It showed a similar result to the 'identity' surveys conducted around the mid-1 990s. 
(Appendix 1) The identities that people in Taiwan identified for themselves (as 
- 
Taiwanese, Chinese, or both) had changed dramatically in the 1994 
-1996 period. 
.., 
This volatile change was caused not only by the severe discourse struggles between 
.. 
competing views, but equally important, by the aggression from the PRC. 
Because of the hostility across the Strait, Lee proposed the policy of fiejiyongren (A 
guarding against rashness with patience) in 1996, in an attempt to slow down 
the rate of investment in China. In 1996, there were over 21,000 Taiwanese--_ 
investment cases in the mainland and Taiwanese direct investment in the mainland 
was over US$ 11.7 billion. (LIN SHU-YOAN, 2000) In order to cool off the China 
Fever and divert the economic dependency away from China, Lee reminded 
Taiwanese enterprises to be cautious. Following this fieji yongfen policy, more 
. 
bureaucratic procedures and restrictions were imposed in 1997 to control capital, 
outflow and to scrutinise all investment in Mainland China. According to the 
--, 
Investment Commission (Ministry of Economic Affairs), 
-Taiwanese investment in 
Mainland China on average took up 42% of total Taiwanese overseas investment 
before the policy was imposed. However, Taiwanese investment in China reduced to 
27.7% afterfieji yongren policy. (LIN SH U-YOAN, 2000) 
This policy was at first an economic strategy, but soon became an official line and 
manifestation of Taiwan's mainland policy. In recent years, many argued this policy 
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obstructed the progress of Taiwan's economy and missed out the great opportunity of 
upgrading the Taiwanese economy in the international arena. Others argued the 
policy has prevented the drainage of vast capital and technologies to the mainland 
and helped Taiwan to hold on to its dominant position. (LIBERTY TIMES, 2001) 
In the 2000 Presidential campaign, the DPP candidate Ch'6n Shui-bian won the 
election by a narrow margin. Ch'dn Shui-bian got 39.3% of the vote and became the 
first opposition President. His victory ended the Nationalists' regime in Taiwan, which 
had begun in 1945. However, the other 60% of votes went mostly to either the ruling 
Kuomintang's (KMT) Lien Chan (23.1 %), or the previous Taiwan governor, 
KMT-breakaway candidate James Soong (36.8 %). According to Greg May (2000), 
the Assistant Director of the Nixon Centre, this election was "a three way race, no 
candidate won a majority". (MAY, 2000) 
It was a close contest between three candidates, who represented different political 
positions and cultural identities. Both Lien Chan and James Soong were pretty 
similar67 
- 
they both preferred the status quo at that moment, and did not exclude 
the possibility of reunification with mainland China (however, they both claimed that it 
was only possible when it was in Taiwan's interests). Most of their voters supported 
the idea that Taiwan retain the status quo, and still regarded themselves as Chinese, 
or at least both Chinese and Taiwanese. Ch'C-n Shui-bian's supporters, on the other 
67 Lien was chosen by U Teng-hui as successor to the KMT chair and presidential candidate. 
Lien represented the mainstream faction within the KMT. Soong was once Li's right-hand man, 
but their relationship soured when he was forced to resign from his governor post in order to 
make way for Li's plan to abolish Taiwan's provincial status. Soong broke away from the KMT 
in 2000 to run for the Presidential election. His voters were mostly old KMT members who 
disagreed with Li's pro-independence approach. Now he has formed his own party: People 
First Party (PFP, Qinmin dang VRA). After the 2000 election, U and Lien broke up as well. U 
left the KMT and also formed his own party 
- 
the Taiwan Alliance Party (TAP, 
-'-OR). 1: 7 
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hand, represented a group of the Taiwanese majority, who wished for Taiwanese 
independence. 
- '. IIII-,, 
In a survey of how the Taiwanese viewed themselves in the same period (April 20M),, 
r 
there were 42.5% of Taiwanese viewing themselves as'Taiwanese', 13.6% as 
Chinese, and 38.5% as both. Similar results were shown in the Presidential election. 
Roughly 40% of Taiwanese voted for pro-independence candidates; the rest were 
scattered between small portions of pro-unification extremists and the majodty of 
people who identified themselves as both 'Chinese and Taiwanese%, 
The result of the 2000 presidential election demonstrated clearly the relationship 
between the changing Taiwanese identity and the struggle for cultural hegemony. The 
once suppressed and outlawed stand of Taiwanese independence has gradually 
become the official line of Taiwan government. The DPP's political hegemony was 
gained through the course of reversing cultural identity and winning the discourse. By 
December 2001, the DPP has finally become the ruling party" in the elections. it 
indicated the final victory of the indigenisation discourse and the winning of political 
hegemony through gaining cultural hegemony. 
-I 
After Ch'6n Shui-bian assumed office; the relationship across the Taiwan Straits 
worsened, because the PRC suspected that the ultimate goal of the DPP was 
P% Taiwanese independence. (MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, 2000) The DPP victory 
68 The DPP won 87 seats in the Legislative Yuan. The previous ruling party, the KMT, only 
won 68 seats. Two newly formed parties, the People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Alliance 
Party (rAP) also performed well and won 46 and 13 seats respectively. Many dissatisfied 
KMT voters supported PFP's candidates. Many TAP supporters were attracted by Lee 
Teng-hui's personal chadsma, his previous dedication in political reform, or his 
pro-independent tendency. (CHINA TIMES, 2001) 
.. II 
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in the 2001 election again intensified the unfriendliness and distrust between two 
sides. No one can really predict how the cross-strait relationship will develop in the 
future. However, what is for sure is that its relationship will influence greatly how 
Taiwanese identity develops and their view on the island's future in terms of 
unification, independence, or maintaining the status quo. 
Summary 
Since communication across the Taiwan Strait became possible, the differences 
between 'us' and 'them' have been revealed. The search for Taiwanese identity 
became the most highly debated issue in Taiwan in the 1990s. The repercussion of 
competing views on Taiwanese identity in the political sphere expanded to daily life, 
and aroused anxiety, frustration, and emotional debate. An attempt to overturn the 
old values and cut the cultural ties with 'cultural China' has been carried out 
vigorously since the early 1990s. (TU, 1994,1996) 
The Taiwanese identity debate in the 1990s was a typical struggle for hegemony: 
unifying a variety of different social forces into a broad alliance to express a 
national-popular collective will, a strategy that Gramsci termed as'the war of position'. 
(SIMON, R, 1982: 25,64) As Gramsci said, there must be "a cultural-social unity 
through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills with heterogeneous aims, are welded 
together with a single aim, as the basis of an equal and common conception of the 
world". (1971: 349) The alliance must be made through the intermediary of ideology to 
"spread throughout the whole of society determining not only united economic and 
political objectives but also intellectual and moral unity. " (GRAMSCI, 1971: 180-185) 
In other words, this collective will can only be forged through intellectual and moral 
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leadership. By forming a system of new'discourse, a new leadership could be won. 
As we have seen in this chapter, the reversal of Taiwanese identity was indeed made 
possible through rewriting 'discourse' about Taiwan, and its culture and history. 
Foucault's concept of 'discourse' provides a good analytic framework to look at how a 
system of representation influences people's concept of the 'truth' and how it was 
formed. By'discourse', he meant'a group of statements which provided a language 
for talking about 
... 
a particular topic at a particular historical moment. (HALL, 1997a) 
It did not exist in a single action, text, or behaviour. The influence of discourse 
appeared across a range of texts, and as forms of conduct, at different sites and in 
various forms within society. 
In this identity struggle, culture was taken as the vanguard to form opposition 
discourse in order to forge a new national-popular collective Will. It was amazing to 
see how the 'regime of truth'was rewritten within only ten years. The whole process 
is a good example of how discursive formation was formed, how it affected people's 
perception of the world and how it changed Taiwanese identity. As Foucault said: 
Truth... is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint... Each 
society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the 
means by which each is sanctioned. (FOUCAULT, 1980: 131) 
He argued that things meant something and were'true' only within a historical 
context This'regime of truth'could be sustained only within a certain locality and a 
particular historical setting. Therefore, this is not'truth' in an absolute sense, but a 
condition that everybody believed to be true. 
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The construction of a new'regime of truth' started in the 1980s, moving away from 
the once dominant China-centric ideology, and preparing for the total 7aiwanisation' 
process. In the 1990s, the construction became severe and took place in the national 
debates on Taiwanese identity and Taiwan's future. In the struggle for hegemonic 
discourse, intellectuals again played an indispensable role in the formation of a 
'regime of truth'. 
Although beginning in the Chiang Ching-kuo period, the KMT also tried to forge a 
new collective will by adopting opposition ideologies and indigenising its policy, it still 
lost political hegemony. Under pressure, the official cultural policy did not help the 
ruling party KMT to vvin or maintain its cultural hegemony. On the contrary, the 
indigenisation trend that the official policy was forced to take on also contributed to 
the reversal of Taiwanese identity and political hegemony (since the DPP 
represented the indigenous political party). 
Therefore, the trend for Taiwanese cultural policy in the 21't century has already 
shown its route: centralisation and indigenisation, for the sake of strengthening state 
control and reinforcing the pro-independence ideology. 
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PART 11' CASE STUDY 
After my initial research on Taiwan's cultural policy, - I carried out six-weeks of 
fieldwork in Taiwan in 1999. My intention was to check my textual research through 
. 
an understanding of how the arts community responded to cultural policy. 
There are two chapters in this part recording and analysing the case studies. My 
fieldwork covered two areas (xiqu MN- traditional Chinese theatre form, and xiju ja 
*q- western theatre), concerning the relationship between social change and the 
development of theatre, especially after the lift of martial law in 1987.1 want to 
examine how CUltural policy affected theatre development, how theatre dealt with 
political and social changes, how competing discourses affected theatrical 
expressions and their identities, 'and how the theatre challenged what was imposed 
on them. 
The reason why I chose theatre was because of its historical and social significance. 
Firstly, traditional theatre 
- 
xiqu 
- 
has aNvays been used as material to invent 
historical memory, as I will discuss later in Chapter 5, and has been effective in 
constructing cultural identity. Hence, traditional theatre was especially useful at a 
time of severe struggle for cultural hegemony to create shared memories and a 
sense of continuity. Secondly, the closeness of the traditional theatre and the masses 
was a convenient vehicle for politicians to make use of. 
In Chapter 5,1 deal with two most important xiqu forms in Taiwan 
- 
Beijing opera and 
Gezaixi Vf-ffl(Taiwanese opera). Before the late 1980s, Beijing opera was regarded 
as 'national xiqd representing the most orthodox Chinese performing art, and 
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supported fully by the authorities as the'cultural emblem'. In contrast Gezaixi has 
struggled for survival since the 1970s, even though it is the only local xiqu bom and 
bred in Taiwan. Since Gezaixi is the typical indigenous xiqu in Taiwan, it was 
especially hard hit during the Cultural Renaissance Movement period because of its 
implications of vulgarity and parochialism. It was not until the 1990s that Gezaixi 
finally gained its official recognition because of the indigenisation trend, and replaced 
Beijing opera as the Taiwanese 'cultural emblem'. 
Their different developments demonstrated symbolically the shift of official definitions 
of 'national culture. By funding a 'national xiqLI and promoting it officially, the 
authorities intended to construct a different cultural identity. Therefore, Chapter 5 
explores how the traditional theatre was used to create a sense of shared history, to 
lure public support, and to construct a new identity and discard the old ones. 
In contrast to traditional xiqu, the western (contemporary) theatre was histodcally an 
art form of intellectuals in Taiwanese (also Chinese) society. The development of 
western theatre in China and Taiwan had strong connections with social reform, and 
played an especially important role in Taiwan's democratisation process after the 
mid-1980s. 
In Chapter 6,1 examine the development of Taiwanese contemporary theatre, 
especially the political theatre movement in the late-1 980s, which joined forces with 
political reformists, and acted as a catalyst for social change. By examining this 
politically sensitive art form and how cultural policy tried to incorporate theatre 
activists, my intention is to detect the political intention of post-war cultural policy, its 
influence on identity building, and how theatre reacted to cultural policy. 
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The development of Taiwanese modem theatre in the last two decades captured the 
essence of the drastic cultural change. This development vividly manifested the 
'incorporating' trend in the arts. Was it a result of culture policy? How were their 
artworks affected by, and how did they respond to the Taiwanese identity crisis? 
Confining my research to theatre provided me with evidence to see how the theatre 
- 
interacted vvith cultural policy and responded to social change. In considering the 
relationship between cultural policy and identity, the case studies also provided 
different angles from which to examine the issue. The decline of folk arts in the 
gradually industrialised society (consumption element), the shift of national cultural 
emblem (representation element), how cultural policy was made and has changed 
(regulation element), and the fast growing number of fesfivals and leisure activities 
(production element), all contributed to the identity formation process. 
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Chapter 5 Traditional Xqu in Taiwan 
5.1. Historical development 
5.1.1. Xiqu 
- 
people*s art 
The traditional Chinese theatre 
- 
xiqu MEM(xi means'play and drama', and qu 
means'music and songs') 
- 
was the most popular entertainment in traditional 
Chinese society. It differs from the western conception of'theatre'. (RILEY, 1997) 
Xqu was described as'traditional Chinese theatre'. However, until the 1900s, "there 
was no such thing in China as a'spoken play'... Drama (for the Chinese) consisted 
of sung verses, or'arias', interspersed with percussion-accompanied sections of 
stylised chanting in prose or, sometimes, spoken dialogue. " (MACKERRAS, 1975: 11) 
Because of the music and sung elements, xiqu is usually called 'Chinese opera' in 
English. However, as far as the form is concerned, xiqu is unique' and different from 
Westem opera. (MACKERRAS, 1975: 11) 
There have been many different opinions2 about the origin of xiqu. The most 
accepted origin was'ancient ritual ceremonies', asserted by historian Wang Guowei 
3! M gý(1983) (MANG YAO, 1979; ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE QUANJI: XIQU, QUYI, 
1983) 
' Chinese xiqu is regarded as a comprehensive art form embodying all Chinese performing 
arts into one. (rStNG YUNG-1,1980: 14; 1988: 80) Generally speaking, there are four main 
elements in Chinese xiqu: chang Ofi(singing), nian P,, 66(speaking), zuo f&(acting), da tT(martial 
arts and formulated baffle scenes). (ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE QUANJI 
- 
XIQU, QUYI: 427-28) 
2 Nalan Rongruo MWV-; t7 thought that xiqu form evolved from the court dance of the Liang 
dynasty ýnN(around 502-557A. D. ); Xu Dishan believed Chinese xiqu was influenced by 
tanju Mjaq(Ancient Indian drama); Sun Kaidi found many similarities between puppet 
shows and the xiqu performing style. (IFSENG YUNG-1,1988: 79-113; ZHONGGUO DA 
BAIKE QUANJI : XIQU, QUYI, 1983: 451-452) 
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There are well-documented studies of how rituals employing gewu RU(singing and 
dancing) in ancient Chinese society were used to worship the Gods, celebrate the ,, -,. 
harvests, gain blessings and protection from Gods, pray for victory in wars, and scare 
bad spirits away. 3 (ZHANG & GUO, 1985, VoLl: 9) The origin is difficult to pinpoint, : 
although its connections With folk dance and songs, shuochang wenxu64, and huajixp 
are certain. (ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE QUANJI: XIQU, QUYI: 449) 
The development from primitive forms of gewu and ceremonial ritual to theatrical 
form in China was a gradual progress. It was not until the end of the Northern Song 
, 
dynasty, around the twelfth century, that xiqu had finally reached a mature form. 
(ZHENG CHUANYAN, 1995: 102; ZHENGGENQ 1983: 4) However, it was not until,. 
- 
the Mongols conquered China in the 13 th century that drama began to flourish. 
(BROCKETT, 1977: 239) 
Usually, each province or district had its own difang xi ft)ýM. (local xiqu)l Ahat was, 
derived from local gewu, and performed in local dialect. The performing style and 
scdpts of each Wang xi were closely related to folklore, dialect, 
- 
local music, and 
--ý; 
dancing style. Amongst all elements, the operatic tune (shengqiang ffV) has a 
There are many documents recording such activities (worshiping the Gods with dancing, 
singing, and ritual ceremonies). Shujing 1; 4,? Iý(The Book of HistorA and Lushi Chunqui 8VýO 
Jk(Lu's Chronicle) had records of people clapping stones to make rhythms for dance; Zhouli 
JQFTa(The Book of Rites) recorded witches dancing for rain; The Analects described the Nuo 
BO ritual (in which participants would wear masks to perform exorcism) in Confucius' 
hometown. (ZHANG & GUO: 1985, Vol. 11: 3 
-7) 4 Shuochang wenxue : 
-QPJ33ZJM;,, is a genre of popular literature, partly in verse and partly in 
rose, used as material for story-telling and ballad-singing. 
Huafti tfffffffi is a kind of ancient farce that evolved from the performance of Y6u a 
court jester of the King You of the Zhou Dynasty (JQ94-1). 
6 It was possible that one xiqu could be popular across several areas or provinces, and 
several different xiqu could also co-exist in one district. Furthermore, all xiqu influenced each 
other or even mingled together creating a new xiqu, due to geographic connections or the 
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fundamental connection with local dialect, because when xiqu spread from one place 
to another, it changed its original form by combining local dialect folksongs, and 
adopting local legends. (TSENG YUNG-1,1988: 117-119; CHENG JUNG-HSINGý 
1999) 
Because of its liveliness and close connection with local culture, it is not surprising 
that there are at least three hundred different kinds of xiqu in China even today. 7 This 
large number shows not only the diversity and richness of the ditang xi heritage, but 
also manifests the degree of closeness that ditang xi has built with ordinary people 
and their daily lives. 
However, the authorities always disdained xiqu. (ZHANG & GUO, 1985: 101) Xiqu in 
Chinese history was always considered by the authorities as a medium propagating 
sexual and greedy desire (huiyin huidao and took the blame for 
"obstructing farm work, wasting money, corrupting public morals, and disturbing 
public feelings". (ZHENG CHUANYAN, 1995: 9) There had been bans on xiqu 
performances for hundreds of years. However, the bans could never be wholly 
effective. Many believed it was the close connection with the masses and the 
important role it played in folk festivals and religious ceremoniee that kept it alive. 
(SU GUORONG: 1987: 66-67; ZHENG CHUANYAN, 1995; SU GUORONG: 1987: 66) 
origins of local residents 
7 Generally speaking, there are over three hundred different kinds of ditang xi and over two 
thousand xiqu troupes in China today. (ZHANG GENG, 19831; MENG FANSHU, 1988: 4) 
However, according to a survey conducted in 1962, there were over 460 different kinds of 
xiqu in the whole of China. (TStNG YUNG-1,1988: 115) In 1992, the research of Zhou Ungfei 
J1 992: 221-251) found at least 298 xiqu that still e)dsted and were performed at that time. 
These festivals were the core of people's spiritual lives in agricultural society. "Festival was 
the axis of daily lives... Festival in Chinese life was mufti-functional. It was the event for 
commercial trading, the opportunity for cultural activities and entertaining competition, and the 
social event for friends and families. Among all festival activities, watching xiqu (guan xichang 
OWQ was the most important highlight. " (ZHENG CHUANYAN, 1995: 13) 
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Even so, the xiqu trade was the lowest social rank in Chinese society, and xiqu 
,ý 
performers were considered as low as beggars and prostitutes. Thus, the 
involvement of intellectuals and writers in theatre came late, in the Yuan dynasV, -- 
Inherited from Hanlo society, xiqu performance had been "the major leisure activity in 
Taiwanese life until the end of Japanese rule"(CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 59). Most 
early Chinese settlers arriving in Taiwan in the 17'h and 18ffcentudes came from the 
south of China 
- 
mostly Fujian Province (mainly two regions: Quanzhou fu 
and Zhangzhou fu Mjjjr-, j). Therefore, the xiqu styles introduced into Taiwan by ,- 
immigrants were mainly those popular in these two regions: Nanguan", the oldest 
ý' In Chinese literary history, most of the intellectuals who wrote plays did so as a hobby. 
Making a living out of writing plays only happened after the Yuan dynasty (I 279AD- 
.1 368AD. ). (FU JIN, 1995: 239-243,298-308) When the Mongolians invaded and ruled China in the 130 
century, strict social ranks were imposed. Mongolians established the Yuan dynasty, and 
divided the society into four ranks-Mongolian and semu ren tH),, (Europeans and people 
from western regions) were the ruling classes; the Hans (people from the northern part of 
China) and nan ren M)ý(the Southerners, people from the southern part of China) were the 
dominated classes. The Southerners were also Hans, however, because they were the 
subjects of the previous Song dynasty, and were considered the lowest of all. In Yuan society, 
Mongolians divided different professions into ten categories, and the Chinese intellectual was 
classed as the ninth, just one level higher than the beggars. (MENG YAO, 1979 VoI. 1: 158; 
ZHANG & GUO, 1985, Vol. 1: 101) Traditionally, imperial examinations had been the route for 
Chinese intellectuals to pursue their official career. However, in the Yuan dynasty, imperial 
examinations were abolished for seventy- seven years. Many intellectuals did not have any 
chance to pursue a career. Because there was no way that Chinese intellectuals could get 
official positions, or obtain any intellectual fame, frustrated writers eitherjoined in theatrical 
troupes, or wrote plays to make a living. Intellectuals' frustration in fact created the high peak 
of Chinese xiqu literature. In Chinese literature history, xiqu was the most representative 
literary form in the Yuan dynasty. (MENG YAO, A 979; ZHANG & GUO, 1985, Vol. l: 81-126) 
According to literature critics, the Yuan xiqu was the tool to Write essays' for frustrated 
intellectuals'. (FU JIN, 1995: 66-68; WANG GUOWEI, 1983: 74) 
10 'Han people'il),, (also Ihe Hans) is China's main nationality. 
11 Originally, Nanguan MW is the music used in Uyuanxi %Ne 
- 
which is claimed to be 
the oldest existing xiqu in Minnan dialect. (CH'IU ICUWLIANGý 1992a: 140) Sometimes, 
Llyuanxi is also called Nanguan. According to historical documents, Liyuanxi was the earliest 
popular xiqu in Taiwan around the end of 17 century. (LIN QINGXI, 1991: 235) During the I 9th 
and 20th century, Liyuanxi performance started to change, and introduced beiguan music into 
Liyuanxi. As the name suggests, Nanguan music means Wnd music from the south' (nan: 
south; guan: wind music). In general, Nanguan music has a close link with southern Chinese 
Xiqu music. 
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xiqu in Taiwan; Beiguan 12, the most popular xiqu in the 1 gth century Taiwan; Cheguxi 
simple cart-drum style xiqu; and three kinds of puppet shows 
- 
Piyingxi j 
, 
ýEp 
shadow puppet show; Budaixi hand-held puppet show, - and xuansi kuilei 
string puppet (CH'lU KUWLIANGý 1992a: 131) 
According to the folklore scholar Ch'iu K'un-liang (1 992a), xiqu activities came with 
Chinese emigrants and became an important part of Taiwanese social life. They 
served as an offering to the gods during religious festivals (CH'lU KUWLIANGý 
1992a: 36-60). The old Taiwanese saying: "you huiflu you xi; q-ftgt, -qM (whenever. 
there is a gathering, there is a xiqu performance)" indicated how popular and 
important xiqu performance was for traditional life in Taiwan. 
In addition, xiqu performances also functioned as the cement for the community. 
Because festivals were usually held for the purpose of praying for local prosperity, 
the involvement of local people and the scale of xiqu performances were crucial for 
its success. As a result, xiqu became the showcase to display the prosperity of the 
locality. (CHILI WUWLIANGý 1992a: 41-46; Ll FENG-MAO, 1992: 88) 
5.1.2. Local factions and zidi tuan competition 
Before the rise of commercial performances in the mid-1 91 Os, professional 
performances were almost unseen. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 69-129) Taiwanese 
12 Beiguan JLW is also known as Luantan ALW. It had been the most popular xiqu in Taiwan 
for over a century before Gezabd took its place in the 1920s. In China, Luantan was a gýneral 
term for xiqu styles other than those using kunqiang Jrun or yiyangqiang -tMN'- music during the mid-Oing dynasty. Its music was the origin of Beijing Opera. Luantan was first 
introduced to Taiwan around the end of the I 8th century. The name of Beiguan suggests its 
link with northern xiqu music in China. (bei: north) 
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xiqu was mainly performed by zidi tuan T-MPM, a kind of community amateur club 
performing in local ritual ceremonies and festivals. From an anthropological point of 
view, zidi tuan was a voluntary association and its members had a strong sense of 
belonging and community spirit from performing in local festivalS13. (C H'I U, 
KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 3-6) People took great pride in taking part because they could 
demonstrate their sincerity to god, and also display their social status. 
-- 
As mentioned in Chapter 1.1.1jaiwan was once a stronghold of the Ming supporters, 
led by General Cheng Ch'eng-kung14 
. 
The establishment of a Han seftlement 
,- 
formally started in 1661., After the Ong court took over Taiwan in 1683 a closed-door 
policy'5 was imposed, and as a result, not only was the livelihood of coastal ý- , 
provinces suppressed, but also the problem of over-population worsened. (KIYASU 
SAC H 10,. 1999: 61-64) Many people who lived along the coast took the risk and : 
sneaked into Taiwan. These risk-taking emigrants wanted a better life, and usually 
settled down with those clansmen or tongxiang MR J05 (fellow villagers) who had come 
to Taiwan eadier. 
13 There were different folk customs and events according to changes of season. The most 
important occasions included: yuanxiao TLIN(Lantem Festival; the 15th of the first lunar 
month); qingming MR)I(the day marking the beginning of the 5ýh solar term 
- 
traditionally the 
festival for worshipping at ancestral graves); duanwu a-tF(Dragon Boat Festival, the 5th day of 
the 5 th lunar month); zhongqiu rptk(Moon Festival, the 15th of thee lunar month); 
zhongyuanjie rptM (Ghost Festival, the 15th of the 7 th lunar month when sacrifices are 
offered to the dead, the Festival of the Dead Spirits); chunjie VKII(Spring Festival, the 
beginning of the first lunar month). Folk customs were very important for agricultural society in 
ancient China, and provided many functions: religious worship, ' marking the changes of r 
seasons and their connection with farming; enlivening the hard farming life and preparing for 
the next season; educating the youth; and socialisation. (ZHENG CHUANYAN, 1995: 9-29), 
14 In 1644, Chungzhen 
-w-- 
, 
the last Emperor of the Ming dynasty, hung himself in Beijing 15A 
after the rebels broke through the gate of the Forbidden City. The Qing dynasty was 
established by the Manchus in the same year and took over the Chinese empire. Many Ming 
generals supported Chungzhen's male offspring in the attempt to overthrow the Ong dynasty, 
which failed. In 1661, the final successor Ming Yunli H)J; Xjff was captured by the Qing court, 
and General Cheng led Ming supporters retreating to Taiwan. 
15 People who lived along the mainland coast opposite Taiwan (mainly the Fujian province) 
and who relied largely on fishing to make a living, were forbidden to go to sea. Furthermore, 
they were forced to move inland for the convenience of the Ong court in enabling them to 
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According to Ch'iu Kun-liang (1992a), without the official approval and protection 
from the Ong court, the connection between kin and neighbours was crucial in this 
enclosed emigrant society. Zidi tuan became the channel to introduce newcomers 
and was the focus of village social lives. Ch'iu Kun-liang claimed: "The popularity of 
zidi tuan in Taiwan manifested the true nature of 'socialisation' in xiqu activities. " 
(1992a: 6) 
Zidi tuan organisations were very common in Taiwanese society at that time, and 
almost every town and village had its own. The purpose was to help newcomers from 
the mainland adjust to their new environment, enhance their social connections, and 
learn the traditional values and social codes of their new community. (CHILI 
KUN-LIANQ 1992a., 2-6,242-261) Every zidi tuan would perform different art formS16, 
and xiqu was the most popular and important form. 
According to Ch'iu Kun-liang, (1 992a: 1-8) zidi tuan was popular and influential in 
Taiwanese society, because it was almost the only entertainment and social event in 
Taiwanese agricultural society, and the most active participant at social occasions 
and religious ceremonies. 
It was common in Taiwan for the inhabitants of a village to belong to the same 
lineage, or to have come from the same area in China. Zidi tuan was the extension of 
control the coast and Taiwan (1683 
- 
1895). 
16 There were all sorts of zidi tuan, such as: Beiguan JLW, zidi guguan 
-T-V'AM(club playing 
Nanguan music), songfiang zhen *JEW-(a kind of folk martial art training for local militia), 
Beijing opera, Gezaixi ? RfTM (Taiwanese indigenous xiqu), or even western orchestras. 
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either form of solidarity. Even after Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the Jiawu WarýT, 
this had not changed. 
Through zidi tuan activities, each village forged its identity and a strong sense of 
- 
belonging to a certain clan. Therefore, the villages'zidi tuan competition became a 
contest of village honour. In order to show off fortune and wealth,, they competed with 
extravagant costumes, sceneM and close-to-professional performances. The 
winning zidi tuan felt that they glorified the village or family name by displaying a 
stronger financial ability and a greater wealth of artistic talents. 
However, the emphasis on different names and origins had developed so strongly 
that severe xiedou N[9 (group fights with weapons) were developed. There were 
three main origins 
- 
Quanzhou, Zhangzhou and Chaozhou fflfi. (YAMANE YUZOU, 
1930: 15-16; CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1982; KIYASU SACHIO, 1999: 67-68) These fights 
were often caused by the result of pinguan #tM(xiqu competition between zidi tuan). 
Once the result of the competition was unsatisfactory, disputes were inevitable. 
Amongst all the areas, the disputes in Ilan and Keelung were the most severe. After 
studying the criminal records in Ilan court, Lin ChCjeh-t'ai (1917: 42-45) found out that 
major local disputes took place in the Spring festival, the Ghost festival and the Moon 
festival. He identified the cause to be zidi tuan competitions, and blamed the 
Japanese authorities for not being able to calm the situation down. Suzuki's 
document (1934) had similar findings: 'They fought with weapons and set fire to each 
others' houses. It threatened public order... The disputes were caused by zidi tuan 
17 The Jiawu War was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. It was launched by Japanese 
imperialists to annex Korea and invade China. 
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competition 
... 
(and) had caused serious casualties. " (SUZUKI, 1934: 12) 
5.1.3. Emergence of commercial theatre 
Commercial xiqu performances were very rare, and therefore, the festive 
performances were usually canied out by zidi tuan, in front of the temple 
- 
either on, 
a set stage, or on a temporary stage. (CH'IU ICUN-LIANQ 1992a: 45; 70-71) Rich 
and poor alike could aftend and enjoy perfoffnances. (TOUHOU TAKAYOSHI, 1936) 
Even when the Japanese took over Taiwan in 1895, traditional xiqu activities were 
generally tolerated by the authorities and performed as usualla. 
In 1897, the first commercially-run venue, Taipei's Langhuazuo jftjtW-, was 
established especially for the Japanese. The rise of professional venues changed the 
Taiwanese xiqu environment. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992 a: 72) Within six years, there 
were four professional venues built in Taipei'9 (LO SU-SHANQ 1961: 195), and two 
in Tainah". ý (HSO Pl NG-TI NQ 1956) Around 1900, xiqu performance became a 
business, which brought money and fame to those involved. 
18 When the Japanese took over Taiwan In 1895, there was a very short period of military rule 
because of constant revolt. The rebellion was finally ended in 1915 after the XIlai an Incident 
ffl*fiE*ft-. Official records showed there were 14,948 Taiwanese killed between 
* 
1898 and 
1902, including 11,950 in the revolts, and 2,998 captured and sentenced to death. (CH'IU 
ICUN-LIANGý 1992a: 30) Consequently, the Japanese focused more on eliminating the rebels 
and tolerated local customs and habits that were considered bad or backward, such as taking 
opium, foot-binding, etc. 
I Tanshui guan ýftfft was originally for official gatherings. It opened to the public in 1898; 
Both Taipei zuo 61RI and Shizi zuo +!? 
-& opened in 1900; Rong zuo M& opened in 
1902. However, these theatre venues were all located inside the Taipei City Wall, where the 
Japanese gathered. Not only did Taiwanese audiences decline to attend, but also Taiwanese 
xiqu were seldom staged there. Later, Tanshui Theatre &7MM was built in the Tataoch'dng 
)iCfflf%outside the Taipei City Wall) region in 1909 to target Taiwanese audiences. (CH'IU 
ICUN-LIANQ 1992a: 72-73) 
20 The exact date of the establishment of Tainan's theatres could not be pinpointed. However, 
according to HsO Ping-ting's memoirs (1956), there were performances put on in Tainan's Nan 
Zuo Mjj around 1907-09, and Da Wutai jicX-F-j, in 1911. 
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Taiwanese xiqu had grown and become commercialised along with the emergence 
and development of cities 21 
. 
(CH'lU KUN-LIANC-. % 1992 a: 69-92) According to Sung 
Kuang-yQ (1990: 25-26,36), the ways of celebrating religious ceremonies were 
different in city areas and rural villages. In particular, the record of religious activities 
after the 1920s showed an acute increase in city areas. The reason for holding 
intensive festivals and giving frequent xiqu performances was not for religious ý 
reasons, but to wkuozhang fanlu JRýAM (expanding the sale)". (CHILI WUWLIANGý 
1992 a: 102) In other words, it was a 'new marketing attraction to expand local 
business'. (CHIEN JU, 1924) 
Professional xiqu had broken away from its earlier religious role, and became pure 
entertainment and business. (CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1992 a: 77-79) By the mid-1930s, 
commercially run xiqu venues in Taiwan were opened in almost every town. 
Commercial xiqu became part of city life and the most important social event. 
5.1.4. The rise of Gezaixi 
The prevalence of extravagant festivals had brought about a thriving xiqu business. 
The most influential xiqu at this period (before 1936) were Beijing opera and Gezaixi. 
(CH'IU ICUN-LIANQ 1992a: 79) 
21 Before the Japanese occupation, the population in Taiwan was less than three million. The 
average population in the two biggest cities (rainan and Taipei) was then about 50,000. 
People who lived In big towns (with a population over 2,500) made up only 14.03% of the 
whole population. In general, most Taiwanese lived in rural villages before 1895. After the 
modernisation by the Japanese govemment-general, cAies; had started to develop. Within 
thirty years (1905 
- 
1935), the proportion of large cities, those with over 20,000 population, 
had increased from 4.92% to 15.91%. (CHANG YING-HWA, 1986: 233- 273) 
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Originally, Gezabd derived from a simple ballad 
- 
gezai Vff (songs), a kind of ditty 
that came from the Minnan area on the mainland, south of Fujian Province. It was 
said that gezai was performed and introduced into Taiwan by travelling entertainers 
and seftlers from the mainland. (CH'lU WUN-LIANG, 1992a: -183-184; YANG 
FU-LINQ 1999: 16-21; ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE QUANJI: XIQU, QUYI: 88-89) The 
exact date of the transition from pure folksong singing to dramatisation cannot be 
identified. However, at the beginning of its existence, the form was very primitive and 
was performed on the street, or as part of a ritual parade, without costumes, written 
script, or make-up. 
In the late Qing dynasty, Gezaixi was dramatised by absorbing the movement, 
costumes, and music from Cheguxi (cart-drum xJ). It was around the 1920s that 
Gezaixi evolved from a simple two-character street- singing format to a new xiqu 
form that was locally bom and bred. The whole evolution took only twenty years. 
(CHILI KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 185) According to a Japanese survey in 1927, Gezaixi 
suddenly became one of the most popular xiqu forms in Taiwan, alongside Budaixi 
and Luantan (see footnote 12). (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 421-436) 
Gezaixi groups borrowed programmes, costumes, movements and make-up from 
Beijing opera, Luantan, and Gaojia22, and they also invited professionals from other 
xiqu to work for them in order to boost the cast and enhance their performing ability. 
Ch'iu Wun-liang (1992a: 204) believed that it was Gezaixi's adventurous nature of 
experimenting and absorbing the other xiqLts quintessence that enabled it to grow so 
fast and strong. 
22 Based on the foundation of Liyuan)CI, Gaojia)d Aqi increased fighting roles and added 
Beiguan music. 
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When Gezaixi was growing strong, Taiwan xinju (new theatrep was also developing. 
Because these two emerging genres tried to vvin over audiences, the competition 
caused antagonism. Xinju activists saw xiqu as a medium embedding backward and 
old-fashioned ideologies. Therefore, Gezaixi was regarded as a major obstruction 
hindering the progress of modemisabon. 
Although Gezaixi was condemned as'evil'and a scourge, it dominated the 
Taiwanese xiqu scene in the 1920s and 1930s. According to Ch'iu Wun-liang's 
research (1992a: 187-203) on news coverage of Gezaixi in Tahvan Minbao and 
Taiwan Xin Minbao between 1927 and 1932, criticisms of being'vulgar' orlicentious' 
were common, as were the accusations that it was "as vicious as snakes and 
scorpions", and "offended public decenc)('. Gezabd's popularity among the masses 
was unprecedented and such that "ignorant men and women poured into theatres 
and filled the seats day and night". The media also accused Gezaixi of "corrupting 
public morals... [and] instigating elopement of married women". (CH'lU WUN-LIANQ 
1992a: 189-191) 
Although condemned, Gezaixi performances were never banned by the Japanese 
authorities. Taiwanese intellectuals suspected that the Japanese employed a laissez 
faire attitude towards superstition and Gezaixi, in order to repress xinju and weaken 
the Taiwanese nationalist movement. (CHANG WEI-HSIAN, 1954) 
5.1.5. Beijing opera in Taiwan 
" xznju Wgq was a common term for western theatre in Japanese. Itwas first introduced into 
Taiwan in 1911, and was promoted by intellectuals in the 1920s. (CH'IU ICUN-LIANQ 1992a: 
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Under Japanese rule, Beijing opera and Gezabd were on a par as the most popular 
4 
xiqu in Taiwan. Tracing the Taiwanese xiqu history, pihuang2 
, 
the main xiqu tunes 
used in Beijing opera, then known asLuantan', came to Taiwan around the end of 
the le century. (CH'IU WUWLIANGý 1992a: 151) Based on the popularity of Luantan, 
when the visiting fingban 3. P-, fJJ (Beijing opera groups from the mainland) came to 
perform in Taiwan 25 
, 
it gradually became fashionable during the 1910s and 1920s. 
(CHILI KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 79) In contrast to the populist appeal of Gezaixi, there 
were also historical and aesthetic reasons for the growing popularity of Beijing opera. 
After Taiwan was upgraded to Provincial status in 1885, many Chinese officials and 
celebrities from the Qing court travelled to Taiwan. Most of them were Beijing opera 
fans2a. Not only did many xiqu groups learn to play Beijing opera, (LIEN YA-TANQ 
1992b: 35) but the upper classes in Taiwan also took Beijing opera as their way of 
showing their literary cultivation and taste. (CH'lU KUN-LIANa 1992a: 161) 
When Jingban first visited Taiwan in 1908, it was the "only xiqu that could sell tickets 
then. "2"r (HSO PINGJINGý 1956) In the 1920s, Taiwan's economy boomed and cities 
295,302,307,325) The development of xinju will be discussed in the next chapter. 
24 The term pihuang gýR was a conflation of two words: WpfgqjýV, and 'erhuanY: 
--*, 
two 
chief types of xiqu music. Both tunes were essential in Beijing opera music, hence, the term 
lpihuangl also denoted'Beijing opera'. Before Beijing opera, became popular in Beijing and 
gained its nationwide popularity in 1789, its original xiqu form, 'Luantan' had already been 
introduced into Taiwan. Because of the dosed-door policy, Luantan was different from the 
later mature form, Beijing opera. 
25 During the Qing dynasty, Taiwan governor Liu Mingchuan VJAf4 invitedfingban from 
Beijing around 1870 
-1880 to perform for his mothers birthday celebration. (CH'IU K`UN- 
LIANQ 1992a: 160-161; TAKEUCHI OSAMU, 1943: 47) Another record mentions that 
Taiwan's last governor Tang Jingsong JWFgý invited Shanghai fingban to perform for his 
mother's birthday in 1891. (LIEN YA-T`ANq 1992b: 35) 26 Beijing opera was the most popular xiqu from the end of the Ie century. Because a was 
the favourite entertainment of the emperor, it became fashionable among high officials. 
27 Most xiqu were still performed in religious events. Although they were professional xiqu 
performers, their performances were paid for by the temples and donators, and free to the 
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appeared, boosting not only Gezaixi, but also Beijing opera. (CH'lU WUN-LIANQ 
1992a: 152) 
According to Ch'iu Kun-liang, there were two important figures that promoted Beijing 
opera to be the most influential xiqu in TahNan. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 
74-92,160-169) They were Ku Hsien-jung and the famous Lin family in 
Panch'iao. 
Ku Hsien-jung was an influential businessman from Lukang. He had won the trust of 
the Japanese because he led the Japanese army marching through the Taipei Gate 
when the Japanese first arrived and had encountered Taiwanese resistance. His 
political influence and connections with the Japanese enhanced the status of his 
personal interest Beijing opera, and generated a trend among the upper class of 
going to Beijing opera performances, and further more, learning Beijing opera singing 
as keen amateurs. 
Even the Japanese authorities had to take this into consideration, and included 
Beijing opera programmes in official celebrations. (CHEN & LIN, 1967; WU Tt-KUNQ 
1960) For example, the Japanese authorities invited the famous Beijing opera 
performer San Mazi Junior lj\EAT- and his group, from the mainland, to perform in 
the 1935 Taiwan Expo, celebrating forty years of Japanese rule. (TAIWAN RIRIXIN 
BAO, 1939: 300-301) 
Another example was yangwen huiffi_-, ýZ-ft, a big banquet held by the governor- 
public as part of religious events. 
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general Kodama Gentarou in 1900 to buy intellectuals' suppore3. At this banquet, Ku 
Hsien-jung, who was in charge, organised a Beijing opera performance to liven up 
the atmosphere after the dinner party. (WU TL-KUNGý 1960: 36) It not only showed 
how the Japanese yielded to local taste and tried to vvin favour by using Chinese 
entertainment, but also this combination of banquet and Beijing opera had influenced 
the ways the upper classes entertained their guests. Consequently, Beijing opera 
became even more fashionable because of the endorsement of the Japanese 
authodties. 
Another aspect of Ku's influence was his effort to provide better performance venues. 
Ku Hsien-jung bought the Tanshui Theatre, a venue originally built for the Japanese, 
and reopened it as the 'New Stage' Theatre. New Stage opened in 1915 and became 
the most important theatre in Taiwan at that time. Its performances were mainly 
Beijing opera performed by visiting Jingban. (CHEN & LIN, 1967: 3-10) 
In contrast to Ku's political influence, Panch'iao's Lin family's love for Beijing opera 
delivered a different message. The Lin family was a powerful family in Taiwan, and 
famous for its intellectual tradition. Their appreciation of Beijing opera implied good 
taste and literary pursuits. Whenever there was a birthday celebration or wedding, 
the Lin family would hire Jingban to perform on their garden stage, and invited local 
people to enjoy the performance together. This kind of family celebration would 
sometimes last over a month and became a public gathering. People from other parts 
of Taipei would travel a long way just to enjoy the free performances. (CHEN & LIN, 
28 To gain the support of Taiwanese intellectuals, the first step was to win over those who had 
received official rank (including: juren gongsheng ]RýL, Ansheng BK! t) in the Qing court. 
They were all invited to this banquet. The purpose was to buy popular support for the new 
Japanese government. 
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1967) 
When the fingban started touring Taiwan around 191029, they came mainly from 
Shanghai and Fuzhou. Because of the geographical connection with Shanghai and 
Fuzhou, the haipaPO style of Beijing opera, which was popular in the south of China, 
was popular among the Taiwanese audience. 
Beijing opera was not as popular and frequently performed as Gezaixi. Nevertheless, 
it was influential among xiqu professionals. It is fair to say that all Taiwan xiqu forms 
were influenced by its performing methodjormat and style. (CHILI KUN-LIANQ 
1992a) For example, haipai specialties, such as the fiantai benxi M 
(serialised theatrical performanCeS)31, the martial art formulation in wuxi jiW(fighting 
or military programmes); and machine-operated stages were widely adopted by 
many Taiwanese xiqu. Even today, the performing method and stylej its theatrical 
format and repertoire still provide inspiration for many Taiwanese xiqu performers. 
(CHIANG WU-CHANQ 1997; LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) ý- 
Not only did many xiqu groups learn Beijing opera programmes and arias, and 
introduce machine-operated sets, many fingban performers were asked to stay on, to 
either teach or join in local xiqu groups. In addition, some zidi tuan converted from 
29 After Sanqing Ban in 1908, a Taichung businessman invited Jingdu Hongfu Ban ]ý, rMMJ& 
a jingban from Fuzhou, to perform in Taipei in 1910. It started the fingban trend. After this, 
commercially run fingban performances from Shanghai and Fuzhou became extremely 
fashionable. (LO SU-SHANq 1961: 179-198) 
30 There were two main styles of Beijing opera performance: fingpai 3; rra(Beijing school) 
emphasised a delicate and subtle performance style, while haipai r4ra(Shanghai school) 
featured complex machine-operated stage scenery, sensational stories and an exaggerated 
performance style. The two different styles divided in the early 26 h century and became a 
boundary defining the different artistic styles of the north and the south. This division remains 
to the present. 31 Uantai benxi originated in Shanghai. It played one historical or legendary story in parts, 
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performing Luantan to Beijing opera32. Yi-dan, similar to Japanese geisha, in big 
restaurants also changed their performance from Nanguan to Beijing opera. (CHILI 
KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 162) 
5.1.6. Obstruction of the Kominka Movement 
The rise of Japanese militarism had become intense in the 1930s. The first step that 
the Japanese authorities in Taiwan took was to reinforce colonial stability by 
reconstructing Taiwanese culture. In 1936, Japanese language learning centres (riyu 
fiangxisuo [If-! n: 
-XVffi)33 were set up all over the island. In addition, 2,192 UP 
village-improvement associations (buluo zhenxing hui M. M94-ft) were also formed 
across the island. (CHN HSIAO-CH'UNG 1991: 493-516) The purpose of these 
measures was to "modernise the backwardness of Taiwanese life by introducing 
modem Japanese lifestyle and customs", to teach Taiwanese "the beauty of 
Japanese", and to make them "acknowledge the imperial favour and honour given by 
the Emperor to have the Japanese national flag". (CHILI KUWLIANGý 1992a: 326 
- 
27) 
When the war between China and Japan broke out in 1937, the Kominka Movement 
JjjF, J-LMM was imposed throughout the island in order to make Taiwanese loyal 
subjects to the Japanese Emperor. It was not a political movement, but a cultural 
construction project for Japanese daily life. After 1941, when Japan engaged itsel in 
usually divided into ten and played for ten nights. It was similar to a staged soap opera. 32 There are many examples of zidi tuan changing track to perforTn Beijing opera, such as the 
famous Eyun She MlIft. (CH'IU WUN-LIANQ 1992a: 167) The number of Beijing opera zidi 
tuan increased rapidly, especially between 1935 and 1937. (CH'IU WUN-LIANQ 1991) 
33 The number of Japanese leaming centres had grown four times from 3,932 in 1936 to 
15,833 in 1940, with student numbers reaching 763,263. 
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the war in the Pacific, more severe cultural policies were carried out. For example, 
people were encouraged to change their names from Chinese to Japanese names; 
old traditions and Chinese customs were banned; statues of Chinese gods and 
- 
goddesses in the temples were burned down and traditional offering rituals were 
altered. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a; CHEN HSIAO-CHUNQ 1991) ý ý11 I 
All Chinese entertainment and xiqu performances were banned. The Japanese put 
further strains on Taiwanese local culture and imposed strict regulations on any 
public performances. Gezaixi was banned too. (LO SU-SHANQ 1954: 86) However, 
the xiqu trade adapted quickly by conforming to the authorities! requirements 
- 
speaking in Japanese, wearing kimonos, using marching music, adding samurai 
- 
characters, and Japanese figures and stories. (UrIEN-LU, 1991: 97) Even so, most 
xiqu troupes could not maintain, and only Gezaixi was sustained in zidi tuan activities 
and performed in rural areas. (CH'lU ICUN-LIANQ 1992a: 339) 
5.2. Early post-war years 
5.2.1. Gezaixi boom 
After the Second World War, Gezaixi immediately got back to business and boomed. 
The famous Gezabd actress Liao Ch'iung-chih was recruited as an apprentice at the 
age of 11 after the war. She still remembered the excitement of how the. Gezaixi 
business was picking up. It was common for fans to follow the Gezaixi stars touring 
around the country, and throw bank notes and gold rings on the stage during the 
performances. ' 
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Within only three years after the war, there were over 300 Gezaixii troupes throughout 
the island. (LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) This grew to more than 500 after the 
mid-1 950s. (YANG FU-LI NQ 1999: 35) According to Liao's calculation (1999), every 
group performed at least two shows a day, and an extra free Sunday morning show 
for the Armed Forces during the heyday in the 1950s. On average, Gezaixi groups 
performed at least 720 shows a year. 
During Japanese rule, Gezaixi performances were mainly held outdoors in front of 
the temples or on the village squares, and Beijing opera played mainly indoors. 
However, after the Second World War, the situation changed. Because of the impact 
of the 228 incident and the new policy 'reforming folk arts, economising religious 
ceremonies (gaishan minsufieyue baibai M niffff), many xiqu 
performances were forced to move indoors for survival. (See chapter 1.5.4; LIN 
MAO-HSIEN, 1998; CHIANG WU-CHANQ 1990; LO LI-CHýNQ 1990) 
Since Gezaixi moved into indoor venues, its previous role as an loffering'to gods was 
lost. An era of commercial xiqu had arrived. Gezaixi performances took over almost 
all the venues in Taiwan within a decade. This kind of performance was called neitai 
xi NI: LIM, which meantxi (drama) performed indoors34. (SUN HUI-MEI, 1997: 37) 
Usually, neitai Gezaixi groups travelled from town to town and performed for ten days 
at each place. Each programme was performed in a format of ten drama serials to 
attract audiences to come back every night (YANG FU-LINGý 1999: 35). This format 
34 The theatres where neitaixi played in the 1950s were not the same as the theatre venues 
we see today. According to the memory of Gezabd actress HsO Yu-chu ' ! T3i%(SUN 
HUI-MEl, 1 997: 43), some of the venues were constructed of bamboo and poorly built. 
However, it was still better than performing in an outdoor environment. 
283 
was borrowed from Shanghai fiantai benxi. They emphasised the use of 
machine-operated stage scenery, and performances were therefore more advanced, 
and exciting than traditional programmes. By the end of the 1950s, almost all Gezaixi 
groups performed indoors. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1987: 17) Wa#ahdA-'AM(xi 1: 1 
performed outdoors), mostly found in religious ceremonies and local festivals, was 
performed by zfdi tuan. This kind of balance of neitai xi entertaining the people and 
waitai xi entertaining the Gode had lasted over a decade. 
5.2.2. Threat from film, radio, and TV 
Gezaixi had 15 glorious years of prosperity, but by the mid-1960s, its leading position 
was threatened by other more competitive and exciting entertainment forms. Film 
was the main competitor and gradually drove neitai xi out of theatre venues. (YANG 
FU-LINGý 1999, LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) Radio Gezaixi arose in the mid-1950s 
providing a convenient way to enjoy the form. A few years later, the arrival of 
television was the final blow to the livelihood of Gezaixi 
There had been quite a prosperous film industry in post-war Taiwan (LO SU-SHANQ 
1961: 63), but film had never been a threat to the neitai Gezabd business. In 1956, 
Ch'6n Ch'6ng-san, the head of Mailiao Gongyue She *VJAVýit(a famous Gezaixi 
group from Mailiao)36, produced the Gezabd film Xue Pinggui yu Wang Baochuan A# 
2FJRWM: IVNII (a traditional programme) that created an unprecedented box office 
record: NT$300,000 taken vvithin 24 days (LO SU-SHANQ 1961), and a total income 
35 This balance was only a general description, and not an absolute situation. There were still 
some smaller scale groups playing at outdoor events. (HUANG HSIU-CHIN, 1987: 17) 
36 ChIn Cheng-san WME placed emphasis on well-written scripts and insisted on quality. 
Therefore, the performances of Gongyue She always had a good reputation. He has always 
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of NT$1,200,000. (YANG FU-LI NQ 1999) A laiyu pian 
-1-NffiW7 frenzy started. 9: 1 
According to Yang Fu-ling (1999: 52-53), the reason for its popularity was that, "it 
offered audiences a concentrated Gezaixi performance, compressing ten episodes 
into a two hour performance, with the best cast and the best quality production. " 
Soon after this box office success, fast-reacting businessmen were producing taiyu 
pian in order to satisfy the mass Minnan yu speaking audiences. (L0 SU-SHANC-ý 
1961: 70) In 1956, twenty-one taiyu pJan were made. This figure rose to 38 films in 
1957, and 76 films in 1958. 
Many theatre venues changed their management strategy and put on this popular, 
and even cheaper, taiyu pian. Around the late 1950s, the effect of taiyu pian started 
to show its impact on the nefti xi business. In 1959, when costume drama films 
appeared, the neitai Gezaixi business was severely hit and soon went downhill. (SUN 
HUI-MEI, 1997: 45) It was because costume drama films not only had bigger 
audiences 
- 
not limited only to Gezaixi audiences 
- 
but also had more freedom of 
story development and less demand on performers. 
Liao Ch'iung-chih still remembered what it was like when theatres changed into 
cinemas. "The films took the neitai business away. Many groups were dismissed. 
Everyone was anxious about the retreat from theatre and worried for the future. " 
(1999) 
Radio Gezaixi programmes were put on air around 1954 to 1955, reaching a peak in 
been regarded as a pioneer of refined Gezaixi and a reformer. (LIN FtNG-HSIUNQ 1987) 37 Taiyu pian 
-6-1, ffilt were films in which characters spoke in Minnan yu (the major Taiwanese 
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1962. (YANG FU-LING, 1999: 45-49; SUN HUI-MEI, 1997: 44) According to Yang 
Fu-ling (1999), radio was the main family entertainment medium in the eady 1960s 
and television sets were items of luxury. There were only 4,400 television sets 
throughout Taiwan when Taiwan Television Enterprise Ltd. (TTV) first started 
broadcasting in 1962. 
Radio Gezaixi began with live recording of neitai performances, but due to the poor 
quality of live recording, radio stations recruited their own groups and stars to record 
programmes in the studio. 
Because Gezai)(i had gradually disappeared in the theatre, most of the Gezaixi fans 
relied on radio programmes. As a result the need for new qudiao ithM. (tunes) 
became urgent In Gezaixi, as its name suggested, the gezai (song) is the most 
crucial element. Although the two main qudiao, qizidiao 
-ej: Mq and dumadiao M, %M. 
remained as the core, new tunes were regarded as a necessity to enrich musical 
expression and attract audiences. The musicians and performers quickly picked up 
other sources 
- 
popular music and other xiqu music 
-, which blended into new 
qudiao. (TS'Al HSIN-HSIN, 1998: 30-31; LIU NAN-FANG, 1998: 44-45; YANG 
171.1-LINa 1999: 49) Thus, Radio became a forum not only for testing new possibilities 
in music, but also providing singers with opportunities to try out new ways of singing 
and to improve their skills. (SUN HUI-ME1,1997: 44) 
Liao Ch'iung-chih remembered the brief heyday of radio Gezai)d: "Around seven 
o'clock in the evening, if there were ten households in the street, there would be at 
least seven of them listening to the Gezaixi programmes on the radio. " (1999) 
local dialect). This category included Gezabd films. 
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Radio Gezaixi did not last long, and declined very quickly after television became 
increasingly common. Within a few years, the number of television sets in Taiwan 
increased dramatically. The number of Taiwanese households that had television sets 
rose to 1,846,010 in 1971, over 400 times which it had been when television first 
started broadcasting in 1962. (TSLNG HU I-CH IA, 1998: 54) Taiyu pian and radio 
Gezaixi did impact on Gezaixi development, but the arrival of television dealt its fatal 
blow. (LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999; SUN HUI-MEI, 1997: 45-46) 
When the TTV started broadcasting, Gezaixi programme performed live, and was 
similar to the performance on stage. (YANG FU-LINQ 1999) It was not until 1965 
when Yang Li-hua joined the TTV Gezaixi group that its format changed and created 
a TV Gezaixi craze38. Over two decades, she created a 'Yang U-hua frenzy', and had 
a superstar status. Not only did she achieve record high ratings, but also became a 
household name. When the China Television Company (CTV) was established in 
1969, a ratings war was declared straight after it set up its own Gezaixi group to 
compete with Yang Li-hua's show. The CTV intensified competition even further by 
creating a television version of fiantai benxi to boost ratings. After this, Gezaix7i 
became a daily programme and changed its performing style to suit studio recording. 
In contrast, the business of neilai x! started to slump. (YANG FU-LINQ 1999) 
In 1971, the Chinese Television System (CTS) was established, and also set up a 
Gezaixi group to compete in the ratings war. New productions were made to look like 
soap operas. Thus, TV Gezaixi became part of TV drama and separated itself from 
^38 Yang LI-hua MKIE came from Ilan county. Before Yang got into television, she played as a 
child in neital xi and then was recruited for radio Gezabd (Zhengsheng Radio Station). After 
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the stage format. 
The seemingly popular TV Gezabd programmes, according to Yang Fu-ling (1999), 
"did not help to boost the development of Gezaixi". Because of the nature of ýý 
broadcast television and its limitations, TV Gezabd had to reduce its gezai 
performance, which was exactly the essence of Gezaixi. "Adjustments were made 
constantly, such as giving up the long aria, simplifying xiqu movements, abandoning 
surrealist sets in favour of realistic settings, naturalising make-up and costumes, 
verbalising dialogues, and emphasising special effects. " (YANG FU-LINQ 1999: 
68-74) Therefore, TV Gezaixi was regarded as a different art form from live 
performance. (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999; CHIANG WU-CHANG, 1997; YANG FU-LINQ 
1999) In terms of music and performances, TV Gezaixi was closer to a costumed 
'soap opera'with liftle gezai singing. 
On the one hand, TV Gezabd provided the convenience of viemAng at home with ease 
and comfort. On the other, it prevented the audience from going to live performances 
- 
which could only be found in front of the temples or in local festivals. As a result of 
that, not only had television changed Gezaixi performance, but it had also damaged 
, 
its lifeline. 
Most scholars dated the death of 'neifai xi'in 1974, when Ch'6n Ch'&ng-san 
dismissed Mailiao Gongyue She. Nevertheless, for people in the Gezaixi trade, the 
change came much earlier. Uao Ch'iung-chih (1999) believed the obvious 
deterioration of neitai xi started around the mid-1 960s. Most Gezabd groups stniggled 
she joined TTV, she became a household name and enjoyed superstar status. 
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to maintain their livelihood by gradually transferring to waitai performance. Because 
of social change and severe competition, many people in this trade had to change 
track and leave. Those who stayed on could only manage in the waffial xi business. 
(SUN HUI-MEI, 1997: 47) 
5.2.3. Beijing opera and armed forces 
Because of its nationwide popularity and mature performance style, Beijing opera not 
only influenced many difang xi, but also was identified as the most representative 
form of all xiqu. Therefore, it was called 'guoju M*q (national xiqu)' by the prominent 
theatre theorist Ch'i Ju-shan YfM[Ij. Around the 1930s, this term was commonly 
used4o. Many scholars referred to Beijing Opera as "the gem of Chinese Culture" (YO 
TA-KANQ 1977: 1; MAO CHIA-HUA, 1995: 9; JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 3), and "the 
chief of all xiqu " (MENG FANSHU, 1988: 11). Small wonder, then, that Brockett 
(1974: 329) considered it "the embodiment of Chinese classical theatre". 
Although it had never had the same popularity among the Taiwanese masses as 
Gezaixi, Beijing opera had always been a commercially sustainable business in 
39 There are many documents recording this change. Liu Nan-fang (1998: 36) believed that 
the popularity of Gezabd was challenged by Talyu pian. However, its decline was actually 
caused by the industrialisation of Taiwanese society. 
40 Ch'i Ju-shan referred to Beijing opera as'guoju(national opera)' in his book 
- 
Zhongguoju 
zhiyanjiu ýPWI#qZW5E(rhe studies of Chinese theatre) published in 1930. In 1931, the great 
masters in Beijing opera, Mel Lanfang Jfjl%ýg and Yu Shuyan 5?, tfffl, gathered together with 
scholars and celebrities in Beijing to establish guoju xuehui JJ0j#qq! 1ft(the National Opera 
Society). The termguoju'was generally accepted and loosely used afterwards. (JUNG 
PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 1) After the mid-1 960s, this term was emphasised and promoted in the 
Cultural Renaissance Movement. It was not until the lift of martial law in 1987 that the usage 
of the term 'guoju'when refening to Beijing opera was cast into doubt. Criticism emphasised 
the absurdity of naming Beijing opera Taiwan's 'national opera', and called for more attention 
to be placed on Taiwanese xiqu. Since the 1990s, some have suggested that Taiwan's gu0ju 
should be Gezabd. Therefore, this term 'guq/u'(as the denotation of 'Beijing opera) was 
gradually abandoned in the 1990s. Hence I use the term'Beijing opera'in this thesis to avoid 
confusion. 
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Taiwan. However, its status slipped after the Second World War. There were only 
.. 
eleven Beijing opera performances in total between 1946 and 1947 put on by local 
performers. 41 (LU SU-SHANQ 1961: 212-215) Partly, it was because the rupture 
created by the Kominka Movement after 1937, and partly, it was the lack of good 
,- 
performers coming from the mainland after communication between two sides was 
cut off in 1949. 
Therefore, Beijing opera in post-war Taiwan, lacking local support and the stimulation 
of visiting fingban after 1949, was only barely maintained by enthusiastic amateurs: 
. 
Beijing opera clubs inside military units, local piaofang. Vrh(Beijing opera amateur 
clubs), and a few individual performers and fingban that had toured Taiwan before 
1949 and had been detained. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 36) 
For example, the famous dafý2 performer Ku Chfing-ch'iu #AEtA led her group from 
Shanghai to Taiwan in October 1948, and was detained in Taiwan. Ku's Theatre 
settled in Taipei's Yungle ; rM Theatre between 1948 and 1953. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 
1999a: 36) In 1953, Ku married and refired from the stage. Apart from her company, 
even though there were some aftempe to run Beijing opera groups privately, none 
succeeded, because the audiences were limited 
- 
mainly mainlanders and local 
gentry, intellectuals, and officials. It was difficult to maintain all-year-round 
41 This record does not include the performances of visitingfingban. According to Mao 
Chia-hua, there were eightfingban tours from 1947 to 1948. During this period, many 
remained in Taiwan and later became the core members of Beijing opera troupes in the 
Armed Forces. (MAO CHIA-HUA, 1995: 115-116) 
42 There are four main divisions of roles in Chinese xiqu-. sheng I---- male role; dan ! I- female 
role; fing 0- painted-face role, who is usually a man of virile or rough character, chou 
comic role. 
43 Famous actress Tai Chi-hsia VAA formed her own group and performed in Taipei's 
Xinmin, VR theatre in 1949. After a few days, she failed to attract audiences and dropped out. 
Wang Chdn-tsu ! EffiE led the China Theatre Group tPINjOgN and arrived in Taiwan in 1949. 
He had tried several times to run a whole-month programme but had bad box office returns. 
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performances. 
In addition, from 1945 there were some Beijing opera dubs" organised vvithin the 
Armed Forces. At first these small clubs were formed by soldiers'piaofang (amateur 
clubs) to simply satisfy their desire to perform. However, their performances also 
provided comfort for homesick soldiers from the mainland. Their members were 
partly professional, but mainly amateur. 
Because of its self-organised nature, comforting function and voluntary manpower, 
the army officials allowed these groups to develop without interference. The situation 
changed after 1950 when these clubs got support from high-ranking generale5, and 
some units even started to form professional juddi jjjR(xiqu troupes in the armed 
forces). Their cast became more professional after Ku's Theatre dissolved in 1953, 
because many of its members joined judui. 46 From that time until 1995, the Armed 
Forces became the most important institution accommodating and preserving Beijing 
opera. (LI FANGý 1980: 86; JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 14,34 
-39) 
In 1953, the Grand Competition of Literature and Artistic Entertainment in the Armed 
Forces was held for the first time. Beijing opera was one of six competition 
LJUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 40) 
According to records, there were at least 14 Beijing opera clubs within the Armed Forces of 
significant scale during the eady 1950s. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 36) 
45 In the 1 950s, both Wang Shu-ming ýEM, then Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and 
Yu Ta-wei ftto, Minister of National Defence, were firm supporters of Beijing opera. They 
insisted that Beijing opera could provide comfort and entertainment for the soldiers. (LI 
YOAN-P'INQ 1992: 303; MN CH'IU-CHO, 1994: 647) 
46 Apart from the Tap! dng tojuddi which was established by the Air Force in May 1950, 
most judul were set up after 1953. For example, the Kanch'dng TIA judui was formed in 
1953; the Haikuang Q)ý In 1954; the Tawan tN in 1954; the Lungyin 090,16, In 1954; the 
Lukuang P_Y6 in 1958 and the Mingto B)Jje in 1961. (MAO CHIA-HUA, 1995: 116-117) 
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categorieS47 that were promoted and encouraged in the Armed Forces. The purpose 
of these competitions was to encourage artists and writers within the Armed Forces 
to carry forward the mission of 'cultural battle'. (MND, 2001) 
Over the years, there were many reshuffles and mergers between juddi. Only three 
troupes remained after 1986, one belonging to the Army (Lukuang one to the, 
Air Force (Tap'6ng )ýM), and one to the Navy (Haikuang 0)ý)., There was only one 
exception, the Feima yuju dui4a, which belonged to the Marine Corps and perforrned 
yuju 
- 
Henan provincial xiqu. Since then, Beijing opera had always been provided for 
. 
by the state until 1995. 
Many believed that the Cultural Renaissance Movement was the first'obvious 
cultural policy' in post-war Taiwan, since the KMT government seemed to put all its 
, 
energy on national security. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a; YANG TSUNG-JUNQ 1992; 
HSIAO A-CHIN, 1991; Ll YIH-YUAN, 1996a) However, a policy to'promote Beijing 
opera'had begun as early as the 1950s, implemented by the Ministry of National 
Defence (MN D). In other words, this policy of promoting Beijing opera was prioritised 
in an era when emphasis was placed on coercion and suppressive control. Most of 
all, Beijing opera was under the jurisdiction of the IVIND (apart from the Fuxing4). It 
47 Apart from Beijing opera, the other encouraged categories in this competition (Guojun 
wenhua kangle dafinsai 1N_W3Z1bWV)iM3*) were literature, painting, Chinese calligraphy, 
singing, and huaju -fýj&*J (stage play, spoken drama). 
48 Felma yuju dui A%ftft was founded in September 1953 in Tsoying 2ýE* in the south of 
Taiwan. Feima was established to make use of the staff and old costumes that were left over 
from the Chung-Chou yuju tuan qiýjfigqpffl, which had just returned from Vietnam with the 
Marine Corps the same year. Yuju aj#q is the provincial xiqu of Henan, a province in central 
China. The establishment of Feima was an accident, rather than a deliberate policy. In the 
beginning, it was not fully supported financially, and therefore had struggled during the early 
years. All the members and students could have only two meals a day during the early 1960s. 
JKUO KUANG YUJU DUI, 1998: 6,11-12) 
9 FuxingjuxJao"; NR(Fu)dng xiqu school) was originally established by Wang Chdn-tsu 
-I- ffij, fl in 1957. Because of financial difficulties, this private school was rescued and taken over 
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was clear that Beijing opera was promoted as part of national defence, rather than 
cultural heritage. 
Beijing opera did not have the environment or enough audience to maintain 
commercially in post-war Taiwan. Its development only stabilised after the 
professional judui (xiqu troupes) and juxiao *qfQ(xiqu schools)o were set up in the 
1950s and'60s with state support Consequently, the originally market-driven 
mechanism had changed. After this, the development of Taiwan dithng xi and Beijing 
opera took totally different paths. (CHI HUI-LINQ 1997: 74) 
On the one hand, Beijing opera was provided for by the state without the worry of box 
office or audiences. It was taken at first as a combatant in cultural warfare, and later 
became the symbol of Chinese cultural hedtage. On the other hand, Taiwan difang xi 
fought against the drastic social changes that were brought about by industrialisation. 
Xqu business struggled to make a meagre living in the waitai environment, and 
furthermore, was hard hit by the Cultural Renaissance Movement Taiwanese xiqu 
suffered deliberate belittlement and had become a symbol of bad taste. Although TV 
Gezaixi and Budaixi were popular, they were discouraged by the authorities. (See 
footnote 54 & 55) 
5.3. Bleakest period for traditional xiqu 
5.3.1. Impact of industrial isation 
by the MOE in 1968. Wang remained as the principle of Fwdng until he died in 1980. 
When juxiao was first established in Taiwan in the 1950s, its training method was still very 
old-fashioned. (WANG CHP-N-TSU, 1980a) Dapeng juddi set up its training course (xiaoban 
/]\IM in 1955; Lukuang in 1963; and Haikuang in 1969. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 37) 
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As mentioned earlier (Chapter 3.2.4), Taiwanese culture was belittled by the Cultural, 
Renaissance Movement According to folklore scholar Lin Mao-hsien (1999), the 
suppression of local culture was actually an attempt by the KMT to build up 
'China-centric! values in Taiwan. In contrast to naming Beijing opera guoju, all the 
other xiqu forms in Taiwan were called Wang xi (local xiqu). The implication of 
parochial limitations served as a foil to the classic, orthodox and more presentable 
Beijing opera. 
Moreover, because of the emphasis on economic growth, Taiwan thrived during the 
1960s and boomed in 1970s. (KIYASU SACHIO, 1999; LO SHAO-WEI, 200O)The 
original agricultural social structure had changed drastically. In 1951, the proportion 
,- 
of GDP (gross domestic product) by industry was 32.29% in agriculture, 21.33% in 
industry; and 46.38% in services. This emphasis on agricultural production was, 
reversed in the period from 1958 to 1959. By 1970, the GDP share in agriculture had 
reduced to 15.46%, industrial production rose to 36.83%, with services accounting for 
47.71 %. By 1980, the percentage of GDP accounted for by agriculture slumped to 
only 7.68%, while industrial production rose to 45.75%. (DIRECTORATE-GENERAL 
OF BUDGET, 1997) 
Lifestyle had already begun to change with the growth of Taiwan's economy in the 
late 1960s. By the late 1980s, religious activities had already lost their central place 
in Taiwan's gradually modernising society. (LIU NAN-FANQ 1998: 36) Inevitably, xiqu 
was pushed further away from the modem lifestyle and audience. The role left for 
xiqu to play was to fulfil its religious function of worship for the Gods. (1-1 FNG-MAO, 
1992: 90) 
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Because of the drastic change, traditional xiqu 
- 
once the focus of social life and the 
main form of entertainment in agricultural society 
- 
had lost its socio-economical 
grounding and importance. It was a bleak picture in the 1970s. By comparison YAth 
the privileged and protected Beijing opera, Wang xi was badly hit since the late 
1960s. (CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1980) 
After Gezaixi lost its entertainment function to films, radio, television and other forms 
of recreation, not only was it driven out of performance venues, but also found it hard 
to find business in religious events because of the policy of encouraging economy 
with regard to religious ceremonies. Most people in the Gezaixi trade either struggled 
to perform in poor conditions, or they left the business. (LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999; 
CH'IU ICUN-LIANQ 1980: 117; SUN HUI-MEI, 1997: 48) The dissolution of Mailiao 
Gongyue She in 1974 indicated the "overall Wthdrawal of Gezaixi from the 
commercial theatre. " (LIN FtNG-HSIUNQ 1995: 252) After this time, almost all 
- 
Gezaixi groups stayed in the waitai xi market 
In an article written in 1980, the prominent folklore scholar Ch'iu Wun-liang worded 
about the fast decline of traditional Taiwanese xiqu in modem society, and called it an 
"irresistible and irreversible trend". (CH'IU WUN-LIANa 1980: 116) He found out in 
his fieldwork that many xiqu groups still existed in the late-1 970s; however, they had 
fewer opportunities to perform5l, and younger generations were reluctant to join the 
51 The number of xiqu groups Indicates the condition of the xiqu environment. In 1980, Ch'iu 
Wun-liang estimated that the number of xiqu groups had dropped drastically from thousands 
to less than a hundred between 1946 and 1980. Ch'iu was the first folklore scholar to study 
Taiwan's indigenous xiqu. The figure Ch'iu quoted in 1980 was based mainly on his fieldwork, 
because there were no official statistic figures for xiqu groups. However, the figure rose after 
the late 1980s. Ch'iu lCun-liang later said, "at this moment i- there are over seven 
hundred 
.- 
professional troupes. " (1989: 28) The figure was based on how many troupes registered as, - 
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business. Even zidi tuan, once the social focus of village life, became lifelessF. 
Ch'iu Kun-liang (1980: 113-124) commented that, although traditional xiqu was robust 
and would not easily disappear, their future was worrying. Problems such as a 
decline in quality, a decreasing market, bleak prospects, audience Withdrawal, and 
intense competition were so severe that the xiqu business was forced to adjust, or 
transform itself to fit in the fast changing environment no matter for better or worse. 
He predicted the crisis of traditional xiqu could be 'fatal' if urgent measures were not 
taken. If the situation did not improve, traditional xiqu was doomed to die out. 
Scholars such as Ch'iu lCun-liang, Tsgng Yung-l and Lin Fdng-hsiung believed that it 
was industrialisation that wrecked xiqds social grounding and replaced the roles that 
it once occupied. The vivid scene which Ch'iu depicted in 1989 
- 
the difficulties that 
traditional xiqu encountered in modem society 
- 
revealed an unsuitability and 
backwardness that all traditional arts had in common: 
The temples, once the centre of folk belief, arts and culture 
... 
are replaced by 
luxurious restaurants and bars 
... 
The activities of traditional folk art served many 
functions 
... 
in agricultural society. In modem society, however, most of these 
functions have been taken over by other artistic activities or social events... The 
multifarious cinema and television industries, singing and dancing, with the help 
of modem science and technology, have captured the fancy of the majority. In 
contrast, traditional drama and music... have lost their footing; they are 
particularly rejected by the younger generation... Widespread education has 
rendered meaningless the edifying function of traditional drama, which teaches 
morals through singing and dancing... Although folk-performing art... is still kept 
alive (because of its religious function), 
... 
its theatrical presentation fails to 
attract new audiences; its very existence and future are faced with a serious 
crisis. (CH'IU KUN-LIANQ 1989: 20-28) 
Facing the fast changing world, the Beijing opera trade, comfortably maintained by 
members of Taiwan Difang Yj Association. 52 Some zfdi tuan were forced to dissolve because other kinds of social events and other 
forms of entertainment had replaced its role, such as dining out, dancing and singing clubs. (CH'lU ICUWLIANGý 1989) 
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the state, did not worry about its livelihood. On the other hand, Gezaixi business 
declined, but however, managed to survive in wailai during the bleakest period of the 
1970s without any governmental support. 
5.3.2. Vicious circle 
Traditionally, Gezaixi performances were based on a simple story line and a series of 
gezai (songs). It relied on one experienced veteran to tell the story and direct the 
performance, and experienced performers to improvise. Therefore, performers relied 
heavily on rehearsal and experience to improvise. This kind of yan huoxi MMM 
(acting with a quick mind) style is still common in waitai performance in rural areas 
today. (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) Since the pay for waitai performances was meagre, 
Gezaixi performers had to take up extra jobs to make ends meet As a result, daily 
rehearsals and the quality of the performance were sacrificed. 
When waitai became almost the only option, and traditional programmes seemed not 
to be as exciting as modem entertainments such as TV, films, disco and MTV, the 
Gezaixi trade was forced to update its repertoire and adopt gimmicks. After the 
mid-1 970s, the arrival of huache shoW63 in festivals and temple fairs made the 
competition even bloodier. In order to compete with sexy dance girls in huache 
shows, some Gezaixi groups blended in flashy disco lights, pop music, and bold 
53 The huache show rt*N was a kind of exotic song and dance show performed on the 
back of festooned trucks. It was sometimes called a 'stdp show, though not always involving 
stripping. During performance, three sides of the truck would be lifted, and the back of the 
truck would act like a stage, decorated with flashy neon lights. Though simple and small, it 
guaranteed the show could be performed anywhere. Also because of its mobility, huache 
shows dared to perform sexual content without fear of being caught. They usually performed 
in temple fairs and at local events. People in charge of festivals and fairs believed that they 
attracted a larger audience than the usual xiqu and outdoor films. 
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stage stunts to attract audiences. Furthermore, some even combined huache show. 
with Gezaixi and added sexual content, vulgar language, and revealing costumes. 
-, 
(CHN SH'tN-FU, 1999) These measures taken to win back audiences did not 
always work, but made Gezabd further despised. (LIU NAN-FANQ 1998: 41-42) 
The impact of brutal competition and industrialisation was not a crisis that only 
Gezai)d faced, but a general problem for traditional art forms, including Beijing opera. 
Apart from the religious function, the original roles of traditional xiqu in an agricultural,, 
society 
- 
entertainment, socialisation, passing on traditional values and morals, and 
providing economic opportunities 
- 
had mostly been replaced by other activities in 
.- 
modem society. (CH'IU ICUN-LIANQ 1989: 20-30,1996: 93; Ll FtNG-MAO, 1992) 
The essential problem of losing ground to modem art forms and leisure activities 
troubled all traditional arts. 
The decline of xiqu in daily lives indicated "the end of traditional life style and the 
breaking down of the close connection between village life and xiqu activities". 
(CH'lU WUWLIANGý 1992 b: 98) The difficulty that Gezaixi had encountered 
embodied the problem of all traditional culture in the course of modemisation. 
Taiwanese traditional culture, as a whole, had reached a critical point where its very, 
existence was at stake. 
The Radio and Television Broadcasting AcP4 in 1976 suppressed Taiwanese xiqu 
54 It was promulgated by the GIO to impose restrictions on the use of dialects in TV and radio 
programmes. Article 20 regulated the proportion of Mandarin programmes to be no less than 
70% and this figure should increase year after year. Even though the GIO loosened the 
restriction soon after the regulation was criticised, the damage had been done. By 1992, 
programmes in Minnan yu accounted for less than 10% of total TV and radio output. (U 
CHIN-AN, 1998) In 1993, Article 20 was finally abolished. 
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even further. This suppression of local dialects had not only directly cooled down the 
rising popularity of television Gezaixi and Budaixi55, but also, degraded local dialects 
as second-class and vulgar. Liao Ch'iung-chih (1999) believed that its secondary 
status was the crucial barrier to promoting Taiwanese culture. The inferior status of 
Minnan yu also affected Gezaixi's status. Liao Ch'iung-chih said, "A few years ago, 
many people still mistook Minnan yu speakers to be vulgar and have bad taste. 
People would feel ashamed to use Minnan yu in public before the 1980s, especially 
among the younger generation. " (1999) 
The belittling attitude towards folk arts and local dialects had a significant effect 
Many young people saw Gezaixi as un-cool and vulgar, and would not speak Minnan 
yu. (LI CH'IN-AN, 1998) In other words, the younger generation of Taiwanese were 
ashamed of admitting their own Taiwanese identity and language. It was not until 
Taiwanese awareness gradually emerged at the end of the 1980s and the 
indigenisation trend in the 1990s, that the tide turned. Minnan yu finally became 
acceptable and decent. (HUNG KU, 1996) 
When the restriction was severely criticised and started to loosen, TTV Gezaixi 
staged a comeback for Yang U-hua in 1979 to boost its popularity. Although her 
comeback attracted attention, it was never the same again. (YANG FU-LINGý 1999) 
However, the format she performed had a different impact on TV Gezaixi. This time, 
the television Gezaixi was carefully planned and produced as a television series. The 
55 TV Budabd was extremely popular in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Huang ChOn-hslung's 
X[M Budaixi programme on TTV started a Budaixi craze. Huang's daily programme 
became a big hit and created a new style for Budaixi. There were incidents of children 
dropping out of school, claiming that they wanted to follow the example of the characters in 
Huang's show and learn kung fu. The restrictions of the Radio and Television Broadcasting 
Act were imposed because of its great popularity and influence, as the government feared the 
power of popular culture. (SU HtNQ 1992) 
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style of television Gezaixi changed from studio-filmed performances to a totally 
different format: a mixture of swordsman fiction and romantic melodrama that was 
apparently influenced by Hong Kong kung fu films and soap opera. (YANG FLI-LING, 
1999: 64-68) Once again, Gezaixi tried to survive by adapting itseff to suit the taste of 
modem audiences. 
However, television Gezaixi was only a small portion of the whole Gezaixi scene. 
Most Gezaixi groups were still struggling in the waitai environment. 
- 
5.3.3. Censorship 
When the Cultural Renaissance Movement was launched in 1967, Beijing opera 
became the preferred art form and the national cultural symbol. From being a popular 
entertainment in the 19"' centuM it rose to be officially granted the title 'national 
opera', and became the art form embodying the essence of traditional Chinese 
performing arts. Since then, refenring to Beijing opera as guoju became standard. 
In response to the Cultural Revolution, the IVIND organised Literature and Arts 
-, 
Combat Teams in 1968 to prepare for the cultural battle with the Communists. Beijing 
opera was no longer promoted as a comfort for homesick soldiers from the mainland, 
but rather it was to carry out a grand mission to "embody Chinese culture essence, , 
and revive the beauty of Chinese art". (CCRC, 1977) Most of all, it was taken as the , 
symbolic weapon with which to combat the'evil' Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the 
main principle behind the promotion of Beijing opera was to "preserve the tradition". 
Since the 1960s, the mission to'revive traditional Chinese culture' had become a 
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burden. Because of the principle of 'preserving the tradition', no change was allowed. 
Any modifications would face severe attacks for not sticking to the tradition. (WU 
HSING-KUO, 1999) In effect, the movement paralysed Beijing opera and suffocated 
its development by blocking any change. After this, the requirement to 'preserve 
tradition' transformed into stringent censorship, so that every new script was 
subjected to stdct censorshle. 
Therefore, experiment was inconceivable during the Cultural Renaissance years, and 
even those altering traditional repertoire would be condemned as'demons and 
heretics' by the reactionaries. The usual tactic to prevent change was the fabrication 
of 'problematic ideologies. Even many years after the Cultural Revolution had ended, 
such accusations still constantly shadowed the Beijing opera trade. (JUNG 
PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 53) 
For example, the Yayin Ensemble 57 were forced to change the ending of their first 
production Doue yuan 3NQM (The Injustice of Doue's Case) in 1980 on the day of 
the debut. This was because some accused Doue yuan of implying the injustice of 
the Kaohsiung Incidene trials, which took place at the same time. Because of the 
accusation, the original ending was altered from a tragic to a happy one. (CHANG 
56 Officially, the Ministry of Education (MOE) was placed In charge of stage scdpt censorship. 
New Beijing opera scripts had to go through strict scrutiny within the Armed Forces, before 
being handed to the MOE. There was also another element of self-imposed censorship, which 
was inevitable, because all members in the opera troupes were part of the military forces and 
were expected to behave like soldiers. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) However, censorship of 
Beijing opera scripts was finally abolished in 1990. (CHAO YA-FtN, 1990; CHANG BI-YU, 
1990b) 
57 Yayin was a private Beijing opera group, organised by Kuo Hsiao-chuang in 1979. 
58 The Kaohsiung Incident J%hR*ft-(also known as the 'Meilidao Incident! "A$f4: or 
'Formosa Incident) happened on November 10th 1979. It began as an event organised by 
Formosa Monthly to celebrate International Human Rights Day. However, the demonstration 
calling for human rights, the lift of martial law and freedom of speech was crushed by the 
armed police. Many opposition figures were arrested and accused of treason. Trials were held 
in 1980. 
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E31-YU, 1994: 26) 
The power of censorship was not limited to new productions; the traditional repertoire 
was also under ideological scrutiny. For example, the old play Silang tanmu VgP5ge 
had been banned many times" because of the accusation it "encouraged illicit 
-- 
relations with the enemy". (CHAO YA-FýN, 1990) Another example was the ban on 
an old play Lu Wen-long. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) In its final act, the hero Lu 
Wen-long concluded the whole story by saying: "youdac, shi zhongliang bu juehou If 
true it is that the faithful and the upright vAll never be Wthout 
offspring)l " Unfortunately, there were some high officials in the audience who did not 
have offspring and were offended by the dialogue. Lu Wen-long was therefore 
banned. 
Unfounded accusation could cause a witch-hunt. For example, in 1990, the National 
Theatre put on the famous play Meihouwang AN-: E(Monkey King) to celebrate 
President Lee's inauguration. When the programme was announced, rumours 
circulated, that the title viciously mocked Lee! s inauguration as "muhou erguan PýR 
iffn, Ca monkey with a hat on', meaning: a worthless person in imposing attire)". 
(CHANG BI-YU, 1990a) As the political atmosphere started to loosen, taboos were 
also lifted. Whouwang was staged as planned. Soon after this incident, the 
59 Silang tanmu was a classical play in Beijing opera., The play was about a Song court 
, 
general, Silang, who was captured by Liao 32 
-a northern invader. Silang had concealed his 
identity and had been married to Liao's princess for 15 years. When the war broke out again 
between Liao and Song, Silang heard the news that his mother was the commander in chief 
of the Song court. The play described his dilemma of whether to reveal his secret to his wife 
or not (in order to go to the opposite camp to visit his family), and the princess's dilemma of 
whether she should help him or not. The earfiest record of this play was in 1824. (ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE QUANJI: XIQU, QUYI: 364) It had been banned several times 
before the lift of martial law, because it was interpreted as encouraging mainlanders on 
Taiwan to surrender to the enemy, the Communists, and visit their families. (CHAO YA-FN, 
1990) 
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censorship of Beijing opera scripts was finally lifted. (CHAO YA-FLN, 1990; CHANG 
BI-YU, 1990b) 
Not only Beijing opera, but also the development of difang xi was affected by 
censorship. A great deal of politicised content and inappropriate dogma would be 
staged for official occasions. For example, it was common then that modem political 
slogans such as zhuangjing ziqiang UrA n N, chubian bujing pa%! TX' would 
appear in official competitions. In Wang xi competition, some groups even held the 
nabonal flag, sang patdotic pop songs (Plum Flowers MIt, The Dragon Generations 
etc. ), or asserted political slogans (long-live Sanminzhuyi a 
5.3.4. Propaganda instrument 
In contrast to the bare survival of difang xi performers, most people in Beijing opera 
were provided for as part of political battle units in the Armed Forces. However, this 
only delayed the impact of drastic social change. Their crisis showed around the late 
1970s, after the Cultural Revolution ended on the mainland. Their mission to 
preserve Chinese tradition was dissolved. (CCRC, 1977: 3-4) Beijing opera suddenly 
lost its goal, and many people felt aimless. 
Because of its political mission and cultural implication, Beijing opera in Taiwan 
before the 1980s was rigid. For many years, it was encouraged to revive the early 
20 th century style. Li Hsiao-fi (1995: 32) described it as becoming "dinpinghua AT-, V-1 
60 The phrases of zhuangfing ziqiang (gaining dignity by improving oneselQ and chubian 
bujing (staying calm while encountering difficulties and changes), were commonly used during 
the 1970s. They were raised by President Chiang Ching-kuo to encourage people in Taiwan 
to face the continuous diplomatic defeats with calm and dignity. 
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J, L (the setting had fallen into a pattern and stagnated)". 
Chung Ch'uan-hsing Hfq*(1999), the youngest head of the Fuxing Beijing opera 
group, admitted that people in this trade were used to keeping the 'mission' 
(preserving tradition) in mind as their lifelong task and took the 'tradition' for granted. 
This self-imposed inhibition was deeply rooted and lasted long after it was invalid. 
After the end of the Cultural Renaissance Movement not only had its status as the 
'emblem of national culture' changed, but also its existence in the Armed Forces was 
cast into doubt. Professional army officers no longer saw the opera troupes as 'a 
battle force', but rather as being redundant 
Rumours of the dissolution of all the juddi (opera troupes) in the Armed Forces had 
circulated for over ten years before it really happened in 1995. (WU HSING-KUO, 
1999) According to the MND, the idea of dissolving judui was proposed as early as 
-, 
1985, when the Mingto juddi was dissolved after its leading star Hsu Lu #, W left. 
(JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1990) The threat of being discharged haunted the Beijing opera 
from that moment on. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) 
Not only were the members of juddi treated as soldiers, but their officers managed 
them as soldiers as well. Beijing opera performers had to agree to sign a 'joint pledge 
of life- style'when signing their annual contract. For instance, the pledge of the 
Haikuangjudui (HAIGUANG GUOJUDUI, 1994) clearly stated what kind of behaviour 
was forbidden: "leaking military secrets, making public speeches, gambling, getting 
into fights 
... 
or leading a luxurious and wasteful lifestyle". It also asked the members 
to "make sure that rehearsal is like military training" and "remember the stage is our 
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baftlefield". 
As a result, many of the older generation of performers were afraid of the officers and 
Military police, because they were treated as'unwanted soldiers', and their 
performances were regarded only as military missions. There was no forum for 
artistic discussion, or place to argue their artistic rights. For example, the famous 
chou (comic role) performer Wu Chien-hong qA%j was put into prison and stood trial 
in a court-martial because he had a minor argument during a rehearsal. (WU 
HSING-KUO, 1999) Therefore, many performers were afraid of making any trouble, 
. 
as the result would be a court-martial. 
Wu Hsing-kuo61 could still vividly remember how the captains of the Lukuang judui 
regularly mocked his colleagues. '7hey would bluntly tell you that they were laymen 
of this field and were not interested in Beijing opera at all. The only mission they were 
given was to supervise us, get us working, and win the army competitions. " (WU 
HSI NG-KUO, 1999) One captain even laughed at the performers saying that they 
would 'starve to death', because no other governmental organisations would take 
them up. The older generation was terrified. They were not sure whether they could 
manage until retirement, and worried for their family and their old age pension. (WU 
HSING-KUO, 1999) 
Generally speaking, Beijing opera faced a no-win situation. It was constantly taken to 
task for its state-supported status and criticised by other xiqu performers for 
61 Wu Hsing-kuo 
-bqj4ffl started his career as wusheng Al, also danced for the 'Cloud Gate 
Dance Theatrefrom the mid-I 970s. He was a member of Lukuang, but he and some 
colleagues founded Contemporary Legend Theatre to further their interests and ambitions to 
reform Beijing opera. (CONTEMPORARY LEGEND THEATRE. 1995: 37) 
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monopolising state resources. However, this'privileged status' had suffocated its 
.., 
creativity and energy, blocked any opportunity for experimentation, and worst of all, 
degraded their existence to a state propaganda machine. 
5.4. Anxiety and hope 
5.4.1. Tide tumed 
By the end of the 1970s, the trend of searching for cultural roots (also see Chapter 
2.3. & Chapter 3) provided a turning point for the development of Taiwanese culture. 
(1-1 YIH-YUAN, 1998: 21) The native-soil literature debate raised the issue of 
Taiwanese identity. Urgent calls by intellectuals for the preservation of Taiwanese 
culture had also caught national attention in the late 1970s. (TIEN SHIH-LIN, 1980; 
. 
HSO CHANG-HUI, 1989; LIU NAWFANGý, 1998; CH'IU ICUN-LIANQ 1980,1982, 
1989) As the result, the interest in folk arts grew. This urge to know more about 
Taiwanese culture later sprouted into Taiwanese awareness in the 1980s. 
This craving for 'self completely changed the humiliating status of indigenous culture. 
(LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) After the involvement of academics and the emergence of 
Taiwanese awareness, Gezaixi gradually cleared its reputation for vulgarity and bad 
taste, and the common attitude towards local culture changed from being despised to 
praise and appreciation. 
Taiwan's difang xi finally had the chance to turn its fortune, and Gezaixi started to 
fight its way back to theatre venues. The first group to return was the TTV Gezaixi 
Group, led by Yang Ll-hua. (TSW HSIN-HSIN, 1998: 14) They performed in the Sun 
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Yat-sen Memorial Hall for New Aspect's International Arts Festival in 1981. The 
following year, the winners of the Taiwan dftng xi competition, the Mingguang 0)13ý 
and Youlian : ýZW Gezaixi groups, played in Shijian Hall in Taipei's Traditional Arts 
Festival. Although these were only limited events, their return forecast a change in 
Gezaixi's status. 
The most significant event took place in 1983, when the Minghuayuan U)jVto Gezabd 
group was invited by the CCA to perform in the National Festival of Culture and Art. 
Not only did the success of Minghuayuan gain nationwide praise, but also 
demonstrated the potential of Gezaixi as an art form, rather than simply an 
entertainment or a religious activity. After this, many Gezaixi stars such as Yang 
U-hua, Liao Ch'iung-chih, "rang Mei-yOn, and Yeh Ch'ing, were invited to perform in 
national festivals or to give talks. 
The vitality and energy of Minghuayuan excited audiences, although its roughness 
was also clearly shown in a theatre environment. Hence, the new found success set 
Gezaixi in pursuit of fingzhihua Mtftf-L(refinement). (TS'Al HSIN-HSIN, 1998; LIU 
NAWFANGý 1998) The idea of preserving folk art and traditional xiqu became 
commonly accepted after the 1980s. Once the first cultural institution, the CCA, was 
established in 1981, it started to promote Taiwanese folk arts officially. 
5.4.2. Beijing opera reforms 
The repercussion of the root-searching trend blended vvith identity crisis (shaken as it 
was by the increasing international isolation). The awareness of being 'Taiwanese' 
and the search for indigenous culture was awakened for the first time. 
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The impact of this newly awakened Taiwanese awareness on Beijing opera was 
enormous. This art form was once recognised as the orthodox'tradition', and 
deliberately chosen, promoted and preserved. When the old ideology was challenged, 
the guideline of 'sticking to tradition'was also cast into doubt. In the early 1980s, the 
younger generation of Beijing opera performers started to feel the urge to try new 
ways to express themselves. 
Yayin Ensemble *if/]\% founded by Kuo Hsiao-chuang W/J\U, was the first group 
to emphasise the reform of Beijing opera. Kuo was inspired and supported by the 
renowned scholar YO Ta-kang Rij; ýA- and the choreographer Lin Hwai-Min in the 
1970s. Her staging of YQ's play, Wangkui fu Guiying (TMAIIA, Wang Kui 
Abandoned Gui-ying), was highly praised in 1977 as Taiwan's first modernised 
, 
Beijing opera production. After YQ died, Kuo established the Yayin Ensemble in 1979 
and dedicated herself to modernising Beijing opera. Her actions were highly 
controversial during a period immediately follovAng the end of the Cultural 
Renaissance Movement and when the cultural atmosphere was still rigid. She called 
her works'gailiang xin)d &A*M (improved new xiqu)'. (WANG CH tN-TSU, 1980b) 
Gafflang xinxi was fashionable among young audiences in the 1980s and could be 
seen as part of the trend of searching for cultural roots. At a time when the exchange 
of information between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits was strictly forbidden, she 
used to collage famous programmes and arias from the mainland's new 
productions62. 
62 The attraction of Yayin's new works was the new adas that were borrowed from the 
mainland's new programmes, such as New Baishezhuan OJ8ý4, Wangfiangfing, and 
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'Gafflang xinxt represented a trend of searching for a new face for a traditional art 
form, and did attract young audiences at the bleakest moment for traditional xiqu. 
Historically, it broke the taboos on challenging tradition, and opened a market for a 
younger audience. However, Yayin's work on refinement of the form was only an 
individual effort, and relied heavily on'borrovAng'matedals from the mainland. 
Therefore, 'gaifiang xinx? did not stimulate further development or foster any local 
talents. 
Nonetheless, the desire to revolutionise Beijing opera was shared by many young 
performers when the fetters of the Cultural Renaissance Movement were untied. (LIN 
HSIU-WEI, 1990: 4-5) The dilemma was that if they tried to make any change, to 
experiment or make even slight modifications, they would put their careers at risk 
because of reactionary criticism and possible discharge from judui. 
in contrast to gafflang xinxi, the second wave of Beijing opera reforms took a different 
route. Their solution was to borrow inspiration from modem theatre, and draw 
support from enthusiastic academics. The Contemporary Legend Theatre was 
formed in 1984, led by Wu Hsing-kuo. In contrast to the stardom of Yayin and other 
pdvate groups63, most members of Contemporary Legend were not leading 
Qin Xangfian *W& Its productions attracted young audiences and made Beijing opera more 
accessible. Apart from this, Kuo's modem approach, exaggerated acting style, and 
well-conducted PR tactics had all contributed to its success. Even before the lift of martial law, 
many so-called 'banned' records of these new programmes from mainland China could easily 
be found in record shops in the 1980s. It was an unspoken secret that Kuo'borrowed arias 
and scripts from the 'banned' repertoire. Because of ideological restrictions, state judui could 
not openly use the same tactic of drawing inspiration from mainland classics. However, it 
became more and more common to do so even within the official judui In the 1990s. 
63 Before Contemporary Legend Theatre was formed, there were only very few private Beijing 
opera groups outside of state juddi. Most private groups were 'one-stae groups. The most 
famous private company was Yayin, led by Kuo Hsiao-chuang. The others Included the Tai 
309 
performers in this trade. United by the desire to transform and update this traditional 
art, they gathered voluntadly and created a new producdon, The I(Ingdom of Desire,, 
in 1986. (CONTEMPORARY LEGEND THEATRE, 1995: 36-37) 
They were the first to try out modem theatrical tactics and concepts, and started off 
another wave of reform. They drew inspiration from Shakespeare's Macbeth,, the 
base and starting point of their experiment. 
There was no surprise that The lGngdom of Desire created severe criticism at first. 
Those who were involved in this production were almost dismissed from the 
Lukuang64. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) One and half years later, the situation reversed 
after receiving international praise. Finally, domestic recognition was gained. It was 
promoted to the international arena as a'made-in-Taiwan' cultural product that had 
, 
accommodated both the old and the new. After their success in the early 1990s, 
experimental Beijing opera works became acceptable, and even fashionable. 
Contemporary Legend Theatre saw this as the way to go forward, and claimed their 
wish to "create a new form of 'Chinese theatre', which would be neither a 'stage pla)( 
nor a'new Chinese Opera'. " (CONTEMPORARY LEGEND THEATRE, 1995: 37) For 
them, it was not a departure from tradition, but a search for a creative space, which 
was freer, and without traditional burdens. Along with the contemporary (modem 
twestern) theatre movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see next chapter),, 
Chi-hsia Group, and the Sh6nglan Beijing Opera Group (led by Ma Yuqi %. 3M, etc. 
64 When the private companies held performances, they had to 'borrovV performers from state 
opera groups (such as Fu)dng, orjudui from the Armed Forces). Because the state controlled 
almost all the resources and human capital in this trade, consequently, state monopolised 
Beijing opera taste dominated its development 
65 The IOngdom of Desire was performed in the National Theatre, London in 1990, also see 
Chapter 3.4.4. 
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young Beijing opera reformers were also considered as part of themodemisation' 
trend in Taiwan. (CHUNG CHUAN-HSINQ 1999) 
Because of its success, the CCA even drew up the Scheme to Foster Intemational 
Performing Groups to encourage the development of similar'made-in-Taiwan' cultural 
products. (Also see chapter 4.6.2. & Chapter 6) 
5.4.3. Changing fortunes 
For traditional Beijing opera performers, talents, skills and hard work were the key to 
success; however, the pursuit for innovation was not always a priority. Though the 
restriction on keeping tradition untouched was eased in the 1980s, most people in 
the Beijing opera trade did not know how to tackle the new freedom. Especially 
during the second half of the 1980s, Taiwan's society underwent drastic changes. 
When political control was lifted and the cultural mission vvithdrawn, for those who 
- 
were once awarded the status of 'cultural warrior', there was no clear direction what 
to do next. In contrast to the promising prospects of ditang xi, this was an era of 
self-doubt for Taiwan's Beijing opera trade. When communication with the mainland 
became possible and visiting performances of Beijing opera from China became 
frequent, the identity of Taiwan's Beijing opera was at stake. Taiwan's Beijing opera 
performers had to ask themselves how Taiwan's Beijing opera differed from the art 
form in mainland, and where its future lay. 
To begin vvith, the name guoju M*, q(national opera) was problematic. Since Beijing 
was the Capital of the People's Republic of China, naming peijing opera as Taiwan's 
guoju was absurd. In order to avoid embarrassment and confusion, the term guoju in 
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Taiwan was quickly replaced by the original name fingju);, r*q(Beijing opera) in the 
eady 1990s. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 61) 
-., 
Secondly, once the Beijing opera performers from the mainland appeared on 
, 
Taiwanese stages, the myth that Taiwan's Beijing opera was orthodox and authentic 
, 
collapsed. In comparison with the Beijing opera elite from mainland, Taiwan's Beijing 
opera seemed zouweirkPf,, Q(losing original flavour, stale). (CHUNG 
CHUAWHSINGý 1999) 
Finally, not only did the threat of troupe dissolution become increasingly real, the 
-, 
uncertainty about identity became ever more disturbing. As a second-generation 
Taiwan-bred Beijing opera director, Chung Ch'un-hsing had gone through a long 
soul-searching process: 
I have thought long and hard about what role Beijing opera in Taiwan can play in 
the future. Most importantly, what am 1, a member of Taiwan's Beijing opera, , 
going to do in this day and age? I was very confused and troubled when people 
questioned the value of my being in the early 1990s. In the past decade, I have 
been working on new possibilities of this old art form in modernised xiqu. The 
experience proved that it was possible to have a different development from the 
mainland, because Taiwanese society was tolerant of differences and more 
ready for change and experiment. (CHUNG CH'UAN-HSINQ 1999) 
Because of floudshing Taiwanese consciousness in the 1990s, the'indigenous xiqLt 
generally referred to Minnan-yu-speaking xiqu. Tarwan's Beijing opera, even vvith its 
different development and style from the mainl6nd, was not included. Losing 
confidence after comparison vvith the mainland's performers, and being excluded - 
from Taiwan's cultural scene, many Beijing opera performers'dropped out of the 
business in the 1990s because of bleak prospects. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) 
Even Mang xi's reversed social status and a grovAng interest in the form were 
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no guarantee that it would have a better fortune than Beijing opera. All traditional xiqu 
forms have faced the crisis of losing audiences and their grasp of the times in an 
industrialised modem society. However, for many Taiwanese xiqu performers, Beijing 
opera was the main scapegoat to blame for not receiving state funding. (LIN MAO- 
HSIEN, 1999) The hostility between Beijing opera and Taiwan difang x! became 
obvious in the 1990s. 
Antagonism created an emotional reaction, even among scholars and experts. For , 
example, in a meeting in the Fuxing xiqu school, folklore expert Lin Mao-hsien 
questioned the proportion of annual budget used on Beijing opera courses and 
accused them of taking too large a proportion of available state resources. He was 
quoted as saying, "Since Beijing opera is the xiqu of Beijing, why should the 
authorities in Taiwan support it? It should go back to Beijing where it belongs. It does 
not belong here. " (CHUNG CH'UAN-HSINQ 1999; WU HSING-KUO, 1999) 
Many people in the Beijing opera trade faced similar hostility, and felt let down by the 
government and bitter about being accused of having vested interests. Chung 
Ch'uan-hsing found it difficult to argue with emotional complaints. She said, "I 
understand their frustration, however, it is not in our power to change the past, nor to 
decide who should get a share of state resources. " (CHUNG CHUAN-HSlNG, 1999) 
WU Hsing-kuo (1999) also found it hard to deal with the Taiwan-centric atmosphere. 
He said, " We were fostered to represent the orthodox tradition. Ironically, we are 
now categorised as'foreign'. In reality, we are only scapegoats for the shift of the 
culture building process. " (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) 
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In contrast to Beijing opera, Gezaixi performed in theatre became fashionable in the 
1990s. (LIAO CHIIUNG-CHIH, 1999; TS'Al HSIN-HSIN, 1998) This time, Gezaixi 
performed in theatre was not the same entertainment business as it was in the neilai 
xi period, but was presented as an art form.. (LIU NAN-FANQ 1998: 37-38) Scholars 
referred to it as Yuchang Gezaixi" or refined Gezaixi. (TS'Al HSIN-HSIN, 1998; LIU 
NAWFANGý 1998) This new trend drove ambitious Gezaixi groups further to elevate 
themselves from an entertainment business to an artistic group, and to win 
recognition for their artistic achievement. 
Since the mid-1980s, the development of Gezaixi has polarised and divided into two 
different directions. The divisions had different appeals and markets. The majority of 
groups stayed in waitai for religious and folk events. These groups still remain in the 
waitai environment (religious and festive occasions) and make a meagre living. (CHI 
HUI-LINQ 1997: 87-88; LIU NAN-FANQ 1999: 91; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) The others 
encleavoured to refine Gezabd art forms (juchang Gezaixi), although there were only 
a very small number of Gezaixi groups and individual stars that could afford to do so. 
(TS'Al HSIN-HSIN, 1998; LIU NAN-FANQ 1998; LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) 
However, most juchang Gezaixi groups will still need to rely on the waitai market to 
maintain their living. They only applied for state funding once or twice each year to 
maintain their reputation and leading status within the trade. 
5.5. Indigenisation trend 
66 Juchang Gezabd §q*VffjU is different from the neitai Gezabd of the 1950s, even though 
they both take place In the theatre. It is regarded as an artistic pursuit and cannot be 
sustained in a commercial market Usually, this kind of refined Gezabd production was 
performed in art festivals or state-funded events. 
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5.5.1. Dissolution of Beijing opera troupes 
As a result of the political transition of Taiwans regime in the eady 1990s (TIEN & 
CHU, 1996: 1141) Taiwan was heading towards indigenisation. The focus of cultural 
policy also shifted from'preserving Chinese tradition' to 'restoring Taiwanese culture'. 
(Ht HSO-CH'U, 1991) The indigenisation trend dominated every aspect of 
Taiwanese life, and Indigenous culture became increasingly popular. Consequently, 
traditional Chinese culture became relatively unpopular and outdated. 
Apart from the change in the domestic domain, the international atmosphere had also 
changed. Following the end of the cold war and the cessation of military action 
across the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1980s, the MND was under pressure from the 
Legislative Yuan to reduce armaments and increase redundancies after 1992. (JUNG 
PAO- SHAN, 1999a: 61-62) The IVIND was the authority responsible for Beijing opera, 
and had been under attack for its ideological position in guarding orthodox Chinese 
culture. It was not until then that the use of public money to support only Beijing - 
opera finally seemed outrageous. The pressure peaked during 1994's Qiandao Lake 
incidene7' when general antagonism and scorn were aroused towards China. 
Therefore, juddi (opera troupes) were at the top of the list of military redundancies. 
(LIU HSIEN-CHANQ 1998: 30,71) 
The decision to dissolve juddi was announced in November 1994, only half a year 
before the actual dissolution. The news stirred panic and anxiety, (LAN HSON, 1994b) 
because no private Beijing opera group had managed to survive by box office alone 
since the Ku's Theatre. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 152) After forty years of being 
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I provided for by the state, judui dissolution meantunemployment' for people in this 
trade. Furthermore, it would bring Beijing opera to extinction in Taiwan. 
In the previous decade, every time proposals for dissolution were raised, there were 
objections from opera fans in high positions that managed to secure its place. This 
time was no exception. One month before the announcement the decision for 'total 
dissolution'had been reversed (LAN HSON, 1994c) because of intervention from 
'above!. According to Wo Chi-liang68(1999), the pressure came from many generals 
and members of the cabinet. 
It was the end of 1994, a sensitive pre-election period, and the severe concern and 
objections to judui dissolution had shaken Lee Teng-hui. Lee appointed Chiang 
Yen-shih jWA,; J:, then secretary-general to the President, to deal vvith the aftermath 
of the dissolution. According to Chiang (WO CHI-LIANQ 1999), the best way to save 
Beijing opera from dying out was to select the best performers and set up a national 
group. 
The future of Taiwan's Beijing opera was decided in this urgent meeting held in the 
Presidential Office in October 1994. Shbn HsQeh-yung, then chairwoman of the CCA, 
and Kuo Wei-fan, then Minister of Education, were called in to discuss how to deal 
with the placement of Beijing opera performers afterjuddi dissolution. 
Wo Chi-liang (1999) also attended that meeting. He recalled the decision-making 
67 The Qiandao Lake incident took place on March 31" 1994. 
'68 Wo Chi-liang was a senior officer in the CCA. He was involved in the planning of the juddi 
dissolution planning from the beginning, and was appointed as the first president of the nevAy 
formed Kuo Kuang Chinese Opera Company in 1995. 
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process, " It was in this crucial meeting that the future for Beijing opera in Taiwan was 
decided. Chiang Yen-shih told us that it was not acceptable to let it [Beijing opera] 
disappear. Therefore, the future arrangement for dismissed personnel should be the 
core concern of this rescue plan. " 
Chiang Yen-shih wanted the CCA to take charge of a new Beijing opera group that 
consisted of the best performers in this trade. However, there were some difficulties 
concerning legal restrictions preventing the CCA from directly establishing national 
art groups. Finally, the responsibility was handed to the MOE. (KO CHI-LIANQ 1999) 
A special team was organised within the Executive Yuan to deal with the matter with 
great care. 
According to the meeting's conclusion, the MOE would take over the responsibility of 
fostering Beijing opera. As a result, the MOE had two tasks to fulfil: one concerned 
Isustaining traditional xiqLI; and the other was to carry out xiqu education. (KUO 
KUANG CHINESE OPERA COMPANY, 1995; JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 98) In other 
words, the whole merger plan had two missions: one concerning the merger of judui 
talents and related resources; another the reorganisation of xiqu education as a 
whoW'9. 
Facing the increasing Taiwanisation trend, the planning period for setting up a 
69 For the purpose of entertainment and propaganda, the MND had its own performing 
troupes and training school 
- 
the Kuo Kuang Performing Art Experimental School (Kuo Kuang 
Juyi Shiyan Xuexiao It was an art school that trained military artistic 
talents, and Included x1qu training. Before the 1 980s, juxiao ()dqu school) was seen as part of 
the judui, and most students were trained inside military camps. It was regarded as a place for 
poor children from broken families. Students lived in the barracks, had political lessons once a 
week for an hour, and were given a monthly allowance. In the 1980s, the MND merged three 
juxiao (xiqu schools that belonged to three juddi) and put them into Kuo Kuang (With other 
performing art courses). In 1995, Kuo Kuang was handed to the MOE as part of the merger 
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national company was an awkward one. One of the early planners 
- 
Jung Pao-shan 
recalled, "No one would dare to say publicly that the establishment of this new group 
was to'protect' or to'develop' Beijing opera, even if it was the case. We had to do it 
quietly to avoid criticism and trouble from the Legislative Yuan. " (1 999b) 
In summer 1995, the first national opera group, the Kuo Kuang Chinese Opera 
Company7o, was established according to plan. It is the national opera company, 
claiming to have a modernised structure and western managerial style. (JUNG 
PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 147-202; 1999b) In theory, its future should be bright. However, 
after a few years, it was criticised for its high-handed dominant style and the 
- 
impractical measures taken by ignorant managers. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) 
5.5.2. 'One- troupe, one- school' plan 
Originally, the rescue plan seemed straighfforward: there would be two Beijing opera 
troupes (Fuxing and the newly formed Kuo Kuang Chinese Opera Company) and two 
xiqu schools (Fuxing and Kuo Kuang school) after the judui dissolution. However, the 
plan was challenged. The original plan was cast into doubt after the public hearing 
Who Cares About Traditional Arts held by the opposition legislators Fan HsQn-lQ ruW 
0, Ts'ai Shih-yCian #jj: a and Ts'ai Huang-lang ftMIZ on June le 1996. At that 
public hearing, both legislators and scholars criticised the China-centric ideology of 
the KMT govemment. The unfaimess of resource-distdbution to each xiqu also 
plan, in order to sort out xiqu resources, including difang xf 
0 In Chinese, the troupe is called Kuo Kuangjutuan WtNpffl. The title does not have a 
specific indication of what kind of xiqu it performs, and therefore, opens up the possibility of 
accommodating different xiqu and various performing teams in the future. The English title 
was used in its official brochure. (KUO WANG CHINESE OPERA COMPANY, 1999a: 5, 
1999b: 5) 
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became an issue. (CHOU MEI-HUI, 1996; CHIANG WU-CHANQ 1997) 
Kuo kuang's report Advice on Mefgers and development (1996) already recognised 
this problem and the changing attitude among the public towards Taiwanese x1qu and 
Beijing opera. In the report (KUO KUANG CHINESE OPERA COMPANY, 1996: 5), it 
was pointed out that many people were not only dissatisfied with the way resources 
were being distributed, but also blamed the government for neglecting indigenous 
culture and promoting only Beijing opera. 
At the same time in the 1990s, the general pressure to increase efficiency and 
reduce redundant fuctions within the Executive Yuan was overpowering. 
Consequently, the MOE announced that new educational institutions would not be 
established for at least five years. (CHOU MEI-HUI, 1996; JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999a: 
271) The MOE finally found the solution to cope with both the construction of new 
institutions and the need to provide resources for different xiqu by combining all 
facilities and resources into one. (KUO KUANG CHINESE OPERA COMPANY, 1996: 
34) It assumed that'Wthin a 'one-troupe, one-school' structure, the resources could 
be fully used and shared, the state-organised system would also run more efficiently. " 
(KUO KUANG CHINESE OPERA COMPANY, 1995,1996) Moreover, it could also 
achieve the goals of "reaching a balance between the mainland Chinese and 
Taiwanese culture" and. "reflecting the Taiwanese multicultural environment'. (KUO - 
KUANG CHINESE OPERA COMPANY, 1997: 25,27) 
After the military judui merged in 1995, the second stage of merger (between Fuxing 
and Kuo Kuang) started in late 1997. In contrast to the political burden and military 
supervision imposed on judui, Fuxing was under the jurisdiction of the MOE as an 
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educational Institution. The 'school' sector of Fuxing had always been more important 
than the'opem group'sectoe', In contrast to the militaryjudui. Fuxing had developed 
a wide range of traditional performing arts courses, and most importantly, the 
establishment of the Gezaixi Department In 1994. 
Because of Its long history and strength in various traditional xiqu courses, the 
members of Fuxing had enjoyed many years of stable benefits and a refirement 
scheme. They did not want any change or risk redundancy. Putting everything under 
one umbrella was an ideal solution for the authorities, but the staff of Fuxing were 
unhappy. 
When the final decision about the merger was announced in 1998 and a timetable 
drawn up, Chung Ch'uan-hsing, the head of the Fuxing opera troupe, encountered 
huge resistance and a strong emotional reaction. Some members threatened to go 
on strike. Some refused to come in to rehearse. Most of them did not want to work on 
the new production since it was not known whether the new play would be staged or 
not (CHUNG CH'UAN-HSINQ 1999) 
The two opera schools were merged in summer 1999. It was upgraded to'college, 
status as the National Taiwan Junior College of Performing Arts (NTJCPA, guoli 
taiwan xiqu zhuanke xuexiao fostering traditional performing u 
artists in all areas. However, the merger between the two troupes was first postponed 
and then abandoned in 2000, because of strong objections vvithin the trade. (JUNG 
71 Fuxing had its own opera group mainly accommodating Us graduates. Apart from Beijing 
opera, there were three other departments 
- 
zongyitr' M(acrobatics and variety shows, 
established In 1982), traditional xiqu music (established In 1988), and Gezabd (established In 
1994). 
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PAO-SHAN, 2000; 2001) 
5.5.3. Balancing shengji complex 
It was evident that the merger was not merely a measure taken to sort out two 
existing Beijing opera groups and schools. By putting all xiqu forms into one 
institution, limited resources could be redistributed much more easily, as the 
policy-makers wished. By extending subsidy from Beijing opera to selected 
Taiwanese indigenous xiqu, the policy-makers hoped to deal with the problem of the 
'long-ignored indigenous xiqtt. (KO CHNG-FNGý 1999) 
New departments were set up in the National Taiwan Junior College of Performing 
Arts (NTJCPA), and a new emphasis was placed on indigenous culture as a whole, in 
the hope to remedy the shengfi (province of one's birthplace of origin) complex. As a 
result Beijing opera is no longer the dominant department in the NTJCPA. In addition, 
there is a Gezaixi department xiqu music department zongyi (acrobatics and variety 
show) department, Yuju department, and, to many people's surprise, a preparatory 
office of the Hakka Caicha. A72 department. 
)Gqu such as Buclabd, Nanguan and Beiguan are more popular and influenbal than 
Yuju and Hakka Caichaxi. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999b; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999, 
CHIANG WU-CHANQ 1997) The urgency of the need to preserve Budaixi and 
Nanguan was mentioned in the original planning report (KUO KUANG CHINESE 
72 Caichaxi U; FM means lea-picking xf. It is a kind of local xiaoxj/j\M(simpIe form of xiqu, 
without complicated staging, not too many characters or programmes), usually popular In 
Chinese provinces, like Jiangxi M, and Hubei 04L. Caichaxi usually evolved from folk 
songs and dances, and is a very simple folk form. 
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OPERA COMPANY, 1995), and neither Hakka Caichaxi nor Yuju were considered 
important or in danger of extinction. According to Lin Mao-hsien (1999), the reason 
for setting up these two departments was purely political. 
The policy of rescuing all judui after their dissolution was instructed directly from the. 
, 
Presidental Office in 1994. (WO CHI-LIANQ 1999; WO CHANG-FANQ 1999) Feima 
Yuju dui was included as part of the juddi dissolution plan from the very beginning. 
Hence, creating a place for Yuju within Kuo Kuang and NTJCPA was already planned. 
After the hand-over to the MOE in 1995, Feima became a sub-group of Kuo Kuang. 
Lin Mao-hsien challenged this arrangement on various occasions. (CHUNG 
CH'UAN-HSINQ 1999; WU HSING-KUO, 1999). In the pubic hearing Who Cares 
About Traditional Arts, he raised questions about its future: 
It was mad to keep Feima when it was possible to get rid of it in 1994. Keeping 
them does not do Yuju any good in the long term. For example, where can Yuju 
students go or do after they leave school? It is not fair for them, since there is no 
Yuju market. The authorities might as well give the annual budget to Henan 
Provincial government in China. It will probably be more effective. (CHOU 
MEI-HUI, 1996) 
Another surprise was the setting up of the H. akka Caichaxi department While Hakka 
music is famous for its folksongs and the suona'13, Caichaxi is a fairly small and 
comparatively young xiqu form in Taiwan. Hakka Caichaxi was chosen to put into the 
education system, instead of other more influential and important xiqu such Budaixi, 
Nanguan, and Beiguan. Wo Ch6ng-f6ng(1999), the Deputy Director of Department of 
Social Education (MOE), admitted frankly, it was because of the support of WU 
Po-hsiung qfoa. 
73 Suona Uftapi is a kind of Chinese woodwind instrument. Hakka suona is the key instrument 
In Hakka music, and has usually played at weddings and other festive occasions. 
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Wu is a Hakka senior statesman in the KMT government and a powerful politician. 
Ko Chdng-f6ng said that the setting up of the Hakka Caichaxi department was 
supported by WU Po-hsiung, then Secretary-general to the President. Partly, it 
happened because of Wu's influence and interests in Hakka culture, but partly, it was 
because. the new Hakka course fifted in perfectly with the policy of 'balancing shengji 
difference'. (KO CHNG-FNQ 1999) Even the newly appointed principal of the 
college, Cheng Rom-Shing, was an authoritative scholar in Hakka music and 
Caichaxi. The re-structuring of the National Taiwan Junior College of Performing Arts 
not only embodied the cultural policy trend, but also manifested the way in which 
political considerations could influence cultural affairs. 
The preparatory office for Hakka Caichaxi was set up in 1998; however, at present 
there seems little chance that it will materialise. Cheng Rom-Shing (1999) 
complained about the delay and wonied about the possible liquidation of the 
Caichaxi department. 7he policy to 'simplify personnel' in the Executive Yuan was 
imposed after this office was set up. It meant that there would be no extra budget or 
personnel. Without those two elements, how can a new department be set up? " 
(CHENG ROM-SHINQ 1999) 
In fact, there had been strong opposition to the Caichaxi department since the 
beginning. Many argued that Caichaxi lacked cultural representation, and the 
establishment of departments for insignificant xiqu was pufting the trivial above the 
important, and political considerations above cultural significance. (CHIANG 
WU-CH'ANQ 1997; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) 
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When, in 1999, Wu Po-hsiung stepped down from his post as Secretary-general of 
the KMT, the prospects for the formal establishment of the Hakka Caichaxi 
department seemed even bleaker. According to Wo Ch6ng-f6ng (1999), its 
formalisation needed some'political push', because "policy changed when politics 
changed". 
Involved in the rescue plan from the beginning, Jung Pao-shan regarded the policy a 
result of political struggle. wThe establishment of Kuo Kuang was a bizarre product of 
the time. It was a decision made during the severe political struggle. The way it went 
bore the traces of struggle between pro-Chinese ideology and anti-China-centric 
campaign Within the government. "(JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999b) Under the increasing 
influence of the indigenisation trend, the future of Taiwan's Beijing opera was even 
more shaky and uncertain. (WU HSING-KUO, 1999) 
5.5.4. Heading for indigenisation and modernisation 
The ups and downs of traditional xiqu and the reversal of status between Gezaixi and 
Beijing opera in the last decade showed cleady the changing focus of the national 
culture building process. These reshuffles and mergers of Beijing opera groups and 
schools indicated the determination of the KMT government to Taiwanise', and to 
reduce the'China-centric! elements in the cultural scene. 
The promotion of indigenous culture once condemned as'separatist and rebellious', 
became fashionable and politically correct in the 1990s. In my interviews, both 
Beijing opera and Gezaixi performers agreed that they could sense this surging trend. 
Without any doubt, heading for incligenisation was the only way to'survive'. (JUNG 
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PAO-SHAN, 1999b; CHUNG CH'UAN-HSINQ 1999) 
Although Beijing opera is still heavily subsidised by the state, it has embarked on a 
painful process of reform and self-examination since the 1980s. In order to fit in a 
gradually indigenised society, the Beijing opera trade worked on xiqu music, 
modernised script structure, adopted directorial concepts from contemporary theatre, 
and most importantly, has deliberately focused on local subject matter and concerns. 
(CHUNG CH'UAN-HSINQ 1999; JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999b) 
As to the way to go about 'indigenisation', the Kuo Kuang used TaWanese legendS74 
in new productions as the start. However, this kind of attempt was criticised for being 
a change only on the surface. It did not solve the issue that traditional xiqu faced in 
modem society: how to progress to keep traditional essence and modem demands in 
balance, and what to do to allow traditional techniques blending in with artistic 
innovation. (WANG AN-CHI, 1998) Instead of using local stories as Kuo Kuang had , 
done, another approach 
- 
carried out mainly by Fuxing, led by Chung Ch'uan-hsing 
- 
drew inspiration from modem Taiwanese culture and life, and embraced'trial and 
erroe to modernise the art form. (CHUNG CH'UAN-HSING, 1999) The younger 
Beijing opera performers consciously pursued both modernisation and indigenisation, 
and were eager for change in order not to be driven out of Taiwan's cultural scene. 
In contrast, the development of Gezaixi in the 1990s was totally different. People in 
the Gezaixi trade tended to think that justice was finally being done. After thirty years 
74 When Kuo Kuang was established, Ko Chi-liang announced their plans, including a 
three-year production plan for the Taiwan Wilogy. The Trilogy depicted three of Taiwan's 
legendary figures: Mazu M Q1998), Cheng Chleng-kung and Taiwan NMýijjp, 
-z- (1999), on 
and Liao rien-ting AW UO 999). 
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of stniggle in temple fairs, people in the Taiwanese xiqu trade were excited by the , 
prospects of this change and looked forward to having the same status and privileges 
that Beijing opera had, and predicted that Gezaixi was going to replace Beijing opera 
in Taiwan as the 'culture emblem'. (LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999; CH'IU YO-LINQ 
1999; TAI LIEN-1,1999) 
Since the 1980s, not only have many Gezaixi stars and famous groups carried out 
reforms to challenge the general impression of Gezaixi as rough and vulgar, but also 
quite a few scholars have worked to enhance Gezaixi's artistic status and emphasise 
its beauty and tradition. Because Gezaixi was the only genuinely local-bred xiqu in 
Taiwan, its future seemed optimistic. This meant, keeping the traditional form intact 
was important, in order to maintain its new found artistic status and 'tradition'. Yet, 
having a history less than a hundred years, the refinement of Gezaixi in the 1990s 
was a process of both reinventing and developing a 'tradition' 
- 
including borrowing 
performing methods (its weakest element) from Beijing opera as its tradition-building 
matedals. (LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) 
However, the prospects that the government would promote and preserve indigenous 
arts seemed disappointing. The resources for all traditional xiqu had not been 
increased. (JUNG PAO-SHAN, 1999b; CHENG ROM-SHINQ 1999) The current 
policy was only juggling with the existing resources and redistributing them more 
widely. In order to achieve the goal of 'everyone having a share of the spoil', wider 
distdbution meant that'no one had enough'. (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999; CHIANG 
WU-CH'ANQ 1997) 
In fact, the existing resource, once offered only to Beijing opera, was far from 
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sufficient. Chiang Wu-ch'ang (1997) warned that carving up an already inadequate 
resource by redistributing it from Beijing opera to all xiqu was not the way to revive 
traditional arts. He demanded more resources and overall support to prevent xiqu 
forms fighting over inadequate resources. 
Generally speaking, nine out of ten traditional xiqu groups still rely on waitai 
performances in temple fairs as their main lifeline. (CHI HUI-LINQ 1997: 87-88; 
CHEN WEN-1,2001) Most Gezaixi groups have survived Wthout state funding. Since 
the rise of indigenisation, their social status and general perception has changed; 
their business, though, has not been improved. 
Although it was true that "as long as there was a temple, there was a business for 
Gezaixi", (LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) waitai Gezaixi could only maintain a meagre living 
because of severe competition. The waitai business had to cut the price so low that 
they could barely survive. The quotation for hiring one-nights Gezaixi performance 
was about $NT 30,000 (around Z600) in 1996. (CHI HUI-LINQ 1997: 87) This price 
included two performances (afternoon and evening shows), and also transportation, 
electdcity, meals, and administration fees. Worst of all, when I checked in summer 
2001, the price has not risen since then. 
Some Gezaixi groups even reduced the price in order to compete with bigger groups. 
The quote could be as low as NT$ 27,000 (around E 540). Ch'C-n Wen-I (2001), the 
owner of the New YingAng Vffljjl Gezaixi group, was angry with those kinds of 
'comer-cutting' performances and the vicious circle caused. He said, on average, 
waitai performance needed at least 17 people. Some groups would cut the cost by 
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reducing the cast, using recorded music and simple sets7s. "How could we live on 
- 
NT$27,000 divided between 17 people? It is hard enough to have the price as low as 
NT$30,000, the same as three or four years ago. " 
In fact, the poor environment of wailai Gezaixi has not improved since the 1970s. 
According to Lan Chfin-hsiung (2001), the owner of the Hongsheng rzAV Gezaixi 
group, the business was in fact befter twenty years ago. The influence of 
governmental policy, such as'reforming folk arts, economising religious ceremonies 
(gaishan minsufieyue babai ilki-IRTIRf6, Irp niff f f)', was relatively mild compared with 
the impact of the recession in recent years. "Even during the 1970s, there were more 
waitai opportunities than now. " (LAN CHtN-HSIUNQ 2001) 
What folklore experts worTied about was not the livelihood of the xiqu trade, since 
they could make a living by playing banxian xif&[4M76 in religious occasions, but the 
roughness and decreasing quality of waitai performance. (SUN HUI-ME1,1997: 74, 
177-178; CHILI KUWLIANGý 1995; LIN MAO-HSIEN, 1999) The carelessness and 
crudeness of waitai performance dragged their standard down. Therefore, Lin 
Mao-hsien believed that the future for Gezaixi lay in juchang Gezaixi (see footnote 66) 
because it stood more chance of replacing the 'national opera' status that Beijing 
opera once occupied. 
75 Because waital usually took place on a temporary stage, Gezaixi performances should also 
provide stage sets. Some groups would stress the importance of sets and props, however, 
some used a simple painted screen rather than realistic sets. 76 Banxian xi is a kind of role-playing episode before the formal performance, carrying out 
religious functions. It performs the Gods giving blessings to the audience or exorcising evil 
spirits. Typical banxian xi are flaofiaguan tjUja'ft, fiao zhongkui ; ADA, and fianguan cifu X'a 
ON. Most of the waitai Gezaixil groups could make a small profit, not from the performance 
itself, but from the tips received for playing banxian xi, which was not included in ordinary 
charges. (SUN HUI-MEI, 1997: 74,177) 
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Similarly, Liao Ch'iung-chih looked forward to the establishment of a national Gezaixi 
group" to encourage the development of juchang Gezaixi. She said, 'The 
recognition is important to us, it means that we are finally recognised by the state. " 
(LIAO CH'IUNG-CHIH, 1999) In fact, most Gezaixi performers were as exeited about 
the prospect of a national Gezaixi group as Uiao. They believed that the 
establishment of a national group indicated the "national opera status", and longed 
for "being recognised by the authorities". (CH'IU YO-LINQ 1999; TAI LIEN-1,1999; 
YANG LIMEN, 1999; TS'AO YA-LAN, 1999) 
Governmental support cannot always guarantee the future prospects of Gezaixi. 
According to a survey that Performing Arts Monthly conducted in 1998, most xiqu 
performances were free to the public because they belonged to temple fairs. (CHU 
NAI-LI, 1998: 119) Even for some prominent groups which were active in juchang 
Gezaixi performances such as the Hanyang M Gezaixi Group and Minhuayuan, 
most of their income still came from the wailai business. (SUN HUI-ME1,1997: 65, 
177- 178) They rely on the income from the waitai business to make a living, and use 
the profit to support the refinement of the unprofitable juchang performances. It 
means that the development of refined and waitai Gezaixi is inseparable. 
According to Lan Ch'dn-hsiung (2001), the running of the waitai business relied 
mainly on two elements: connections with temple managers and local factions, and 
economic development in Taiwan. Lan also stressed that Gezaixi groups could only 
rely on themselves rather than expecting government funding. '7he chance to 
perform in governmental events was very small for ordinary Gezaixi groups like us. If 
77 The MOE told Liao Ch'iung-chih that a national Gezabd group would be formed in the near 
future, as a sub-group of Kuo Kuang, or Within the framework of National Taiwan Junior 
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we relied on that, ý we would be out of business by now. Only those exceptional few 
can receive state funding. " 
Traditional xiqu faced a fundamental problem that could not be solved by just funding 
, 
and recognition. The problem was to reduce the gap between the quality of waitai 
and juchang performances. Because of the nevAy emerged indigenisation trend and 
the increasing funding of Taiwanese xiqu, the gap between wailbi and juchang 
Gezaixi was in fact increasing. 
At this moment juchang Gezaixi looks very prosperous because of the 
governmental support and the general interest in Taiwanese culture. However, 
the environment is not as healthy as it seems to be. It was a steep learning 
curve when waitai Gezabd groups tried to do juchang performance. Their idea of 
'refinement' was quite simple: buying new costumes and making new sets. 
Instead of rethinking the art form, spending more time on rehearsal, allowing 
performance to develop further, or working with talents from other areas to 
enhance the quality... they focused mostly on 'material' issues. This seemingly 
prosperous, actually fragile juchang Gezaixi needs modernisation. (LIN 
MAO-HSIEN, 1999) 
The New Ying-ffing Gezaixi group was granted NT$120,000 by the CCA to tour 
Taiwan in 2001. Its director Ch'6n Wen-I (2001) also admitted that this kind of 
opportunity to be funded by the state was rare, and agreed that most state funding 
went to a few star-groups. Although he was proud of the fact that his group was 
'recognised'by the authorities, he did not think thatjuchang Gezaixi could make 
much difference to Gezaixi deyelopment. For the majority of Gezaixi performers, 
state funding provided them opportunities to perform in better conditions and present 
Gezaixi properly. They did not regard 'refining the art form' as their task or goal. 
The path transporting a rough but lively folk art form into the forum of high arts was 
not an easy one. The performing format of Beijing opera was borrowed. Furthermore, 
College of Performing Arts. However, this plan has been postponed. (LEE HUEMA, 2001) 
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when Gezaixi was put into the education system (Fuxing) in 1995, most of the 
teachers were from a Beijing opera backgrounda. Consequently, the trend of 
fingj6hua 3ýfijqf-L(becoming like Beijing opera) which was a deliberate effort of 
refinement, became obvious from the mid-1990s. (LIU NAN-FANQ 1999) 
After almost two decades of academics advocating 'indigenous culture', there was in 
fact very little action to put the ideas into practice. "Apart from a few star-status xiqu 
groups that were fostered as a showcase, the overall environment of indigenous 
culture is actually getting worse, not better 
... 
The need to put Taiwanese indigenous 
arts into the education system is urgent. " (CHIANG WU-CHANG, 1997) In contrast to 
scholars' views of the urgent need for governmental action, the Gezaixi trade 
generally regarded governmental policy as irrelevant The reality was that the market 
place was more important. Apart from their skills and local connections, the most 
important factor influencing the Gezaixi business has always been how the economy 
was doing. (CH'P-N WEN-1,2001; LAN CHLWHSIUNGý 2001) 
Summary 
In post-war Taiwan, traditional xiqu had faced difficulties at various stages, for 
example, the emergence of film and television and the impact of industrialisation. 
Taiwan's xiqu forms were driven out of the theatre and barely managed to sustain a 
meagre living in religious ceremonies and temple fairs. Only Beijing opera was 
provided for by the state. 
78 The strength of Gezabd was in its gezai (songs), not in theatrical movement. Because it is 
a fairly new art form, its performing style is still developing. In addition, many traditional 
Gezabd performers were trained in the performing groups, and there had never been any 
systernised training method. Hence, they had to rely on Beijing opera teachers or performers 
to develop Gezabd movement. 
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Even during the awakening of the indigenous culture trend in the 1980s, official 
cultural policy still hung on to a China-centric mentality. The KMT government started 
to include indigenous culture in cultural policy, and although this 'incorporative' 
strategy satisfied the urge of searching for cultural roots, it also conveniently 
allocated local culture within a China-centric cultural framework. Furthermore, the 
superior status of Chinese culture was maintained. 
After the lift of martial law and the emergence of Taiwanese awareness in the late 
1 980s, the importance of 'indigenous culture' became increasingly prominent in every 
respect, and the China-centric mentality gradually became out-dated. According to 
policy-makers (e. g. Ko Ch&ng-f&ng, Jung Pao-shan), the shift away from a 
China-centric focus was inevitable, because the upsurge of indigenous awareness 
was powerful among the Taiwanese and the demand for Taiwanisation was gefting 
stronger in the Parliament Thus, many policies were altered to respond to people's 
wishes or to win favour of the voters, such as the removal of the 'emblem of national 
culture' status of Beijing opera, juddi dissolution in the Armed Forces, and the setting 
up of Gezaixi and Hakka Caichaxi departments in the education system. 
Because of the low social status xiqu performers inherited from the past most of 
them longed for official recognition, and were actually 'grateful' for the recent 
changes. I am not saying that traditional xiqu performers were all passively 
manipulated by the state, or suggesting that they were unaware of the political 
situation and increasing opportunities. However, for those once regarded as the 
lowest of lower classes, their wish to be provided for by the state and their sense of 
honour at being recognised as a cultural emblem proved overwhelming. 
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In this chapter, I have looked at the history of xiqu and their current development in 
Taiwan. The policy to preserve and protect 'important xiqu heritage' has remained 
unchanged. However, the definition of what "raiwanese heritage' is has. 
Apart from bottom-up pressure, another crucial factor influencing cultural policy was 
the'rule-by-men culture'in Taiwan. Taking the influence of the 2000 Presidential 
election as an example, we can see how this rule-by-men culture influenced 
policy-makers, and moreover, determined the direction of policy. 
One year before the election, the business within the government did not go on as 
usual7g. Because this election was a close contest between three candidates, civil 
servants did not want to make any decisions that might contradict the future policy of 
the new ruling power. The CCA's policy and business in 1999 and 2000 remained 
unchanged, while they waited for future 'instruction. (HSIAO TSUNG-HUANQ 2000) 
According to many civil servants (e. g. Hslao Tsung-huang, Jung Pao-shan, Ko 
Ch6ng-fdng, Ko Chi-liang), they were prepared to have policy U-tums in every 
aspect, because it was expected that the DPP's political beliefs and 
Taiwanese-independence tendency would be carded out through their policies. 
After the DPP won the election, Ch6n Shui-bian's National Policy White Paper (CCA, 
2000a) showed that the new government was keen on cultural affairs. Because of 
Chdn's enthusiasm, the CCA was also eager to implement tasks that were set up in 
79 For example, the scheme of funding excellent performing groups was put on hold for more 
than a year. Ll Hui-na (2000), the manager of Creative Society Theatre, was told by the CCA 
in 1999 that they were not sure that the scheme would continue, or be replaced. The CCA told 
her that cultural policies would changed drastically if Lidn Chan (the KMT candidate) lost. 
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this While Paper (CCA, 2000a) Looking at the goals8o listed in the document, it was 
no surprise to see the'indigenisation'pdnciple would dominate Taiwan's future 
cultural policy. 
At a period when the anxiety of losing one's identity built up, the urge to building a 
new identity on a "blank subjectivity" became urgent. (LIAO CH'AO-YANQ 1995b; 
CH'lU KUEI-FEN, 1999) How to control the identity construction and memory 
creation became an important issue for all political forces. Ch6n Shui-bian's wish to 
get indigenous culture into the state apparatus displayed the intention of a tighter 
control. 
Xiqu was a good material for constructing Taiwan's tradition, history and cultural 
identity, because of its symbolic connections vvith the past and the masses. Therefore, 
Gezaixi was especially important in the indigenisation process to reconstruct 
Taiwanese history and memory, since it was the only xiqu that was born and bred in 
Taiwan. The tactic of using xiqu as the 'material' would not only construct an identity 
full of indigenous flavour, but also reinforce a historical memory tightly entvvined With 
official interests. Hence, traditional xiqu policy is no longer purely a policy dealing 
with xiqu affairs. Because of its association with historical memory and its 
instrumental usage in culture building, it has become an arena for competing 
discourses struggling to win it over. 
80 These tasks included: setting up national cultural institutions; promoting a special cultural 
zone in the capital; awarding young people with a 'cultural passport'; putting aboriginal culture 
on the international stage; establishing national language research institution; encouraging 
local history research and its publication; publishing a series of national books; pushing 
through more translation projects in Taiwanese literature; encouraging artists to work on site 
with local people, local industries or local government; and setting up a national institution for 
the most prominent artists. (CHN SHUI-BIAN, 2000: 115-118) 
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Chapter 6 
-- 
Contemporary Theatre in Taiwan 
6.1. Early modem theatre 
6.1.1. Beginning of introduction of western theatre 
The concept of western theatre 
- 
xiju MM 
- 
was foreign and new when it was first 
introduced to Chinese audiences during the 1900s. Compared with Chinese xiqu, 
which was considered 'an actor's theatre", western theatre was traditionally 
considered to be'a theatre of writers'. (ZHANG & GAI, 1986: 133; MA SN, 1994: 108; 
FU JIN, 1995: 255: YAO I-WEI, 1984: 55) 
When Chinese intellectuals were first exposed to western theatre at the beginning of 
the 20th century, they were fascinated by its ideals of reforming society, and inspired 
by its possible educational function. Because xiqu scripts were usually simple, and 
mostly'caizi-fiaren 2 in order to attract the masses, they were criticised severely by 
intellectuals such as Qian Xuantong JI]Z nu and Fu Sinian f6jVjIf as being 'illogical' 
and'vulgar. (MA SEN, 1994: 23-24) 
The first distinct theatre performance in the western style was organised by Chunliu 
She 401, an amateur theatre club of Chinese students in Tokyo. They put on the 
third act of La Dame aux cam6fias (by Alexandre Dumas) around 1906 
- 
190r. The 
' The main creator in Chinese xiqu was the performer, who created the performing 
conventions (both music and performing styles) and developed a personal repertoire. 
Comparatively, the play itself was not that important. 
2 Literally, caiziliaren 
--tT-fLk means'genius and beauty, and usually implies a simple 
stereotyped storyline: a romantic story in which a talented scholar and a beautiful lady meet 
and fall in love. This plot was common In Chinese traditional xiqu repertories. 
3 There were some disputes about the exact date. Some records show the first performance 
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performance not only drew attention among the Chinese community in Japan, but 
also won acclaim from Japanese theatre critics. This was the first generally 
acknowledged record of westem xiju performance in Chinese theatre history. Partly, it 
was significant because its members later became important pioneers, or active in, 
Chinese theatre, and partly because of its influence in the Chinese revolution. 
The Tongmenghur praised the Chunliu She for its contribution to the Chinese 
revolution, because many students joined the Tongmenghui (Tokyo branch) after - 
watching their second producbon, 'Heinuyutianlu(, M, 
-, 
ZZNF)ýU Uncle Tom's Cabin) in 
1907. This anti-slavery story sent an anti-imperialist message and inspired students 
to join in the revolution demanding for reform. (MA SN, 1994: 40; DU YON-CHIH, 
1980: 188) 
Inspired by Chunliu She, Wang Zhongsheng 
-T-U%t set up 
Chunyang She 4pjýit in 
Shanghai in 1907 and also put on'Uncle Tom's Cabin. However,, it was not a pure 
spoken-drama, but a mixture of western theatre and Chinese xiqu. It used Chinese 
xiqu music and arias, mixed with western stage lights, sets and modem costumes. 
(MA SN, 1994: 53) Later, this mixture was commercialised in Shanghai, and called 
'wenming xi 3ZO)IM'. 
In 1911, just before the Xinhai revolution 2jý-ýMOp succeeded in China, Ren Tianzhi, 
a member of Chunliu She, 'established the first professional theatre group Jinhua 
Tuan AftM in Shanghai and advocated revolutionary ideas. According to the famous 
was in 1907. Others believed it was performed for a Christmas charity fair in November 1906. 
ICHEN & DONq 1989: 38-39; MA SEN, 1994: 36; OUYANG YUQIAN, 1985a) 
Tongmenghui M,,, U* operated from 1905 to 1912, was the predecessor of the KMT It was 
lead by Sun Yat-sen, and advocated a Chinese revolution to overthrow the Oing dynasty. * 
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playwright Tian Han EBM(1985: 4), their performances won passionate public 
support, and triggered off widespread discussions on international justice and 
aroused resentment against foreign imperialist forces. 
Because western theatre was totally foreign to the Chinese, people referred to it as 
'xinju'(new drama) and to the Chinese xiqu as! fiujL/(old drama). In order to use its 
novelty Wthout losing xiqu audiences, Shanghai businessmen mixed the two 
together into a new product 
- 
wenming A Because of the novelty, it was 
commercially successful around the 1910s. (OUYANG YUQlAN, 1985b) According to 
Ouyang Yuqian (1985 b: 48), the founding member of Chunliu She, "Wenminpi was 
supposed to be a positive term 
-a 'civilised' and 'advanced' drama. This fancy term 
was originally used to promote and advertise new productions. " However, because of 
the organisers' eagerness for quick money, gradually, wenmingxi was disgraced by 
its vulgar taste and bad quality. (TIAN HAN, 1985; OUYANG YUQIAN, 1985b; DU 
YON-CHIH, 1980: 190-194) 
6.1.2. A theatre of new ideas and hope 
Since the Opium war of 1840-42, China had been constantly haunted by the fear of 
national doom (wangguo L-W) and race extermination (miezhong gfl)6. In the 1e 
century, China had become a semi-colonial region in which many imperialist powers 
vied for its spoils. At that time, foreign imperialist powers in China included Britain, 
5 It was In the revolution of 1911 that Chinese Nationalists, led by Sun Yat-sen. 
6 Although China has never been subjected to the kind of colonial rule exercised in India, 
China's semi-colonial status damaged the confidence of the Chinese. Especially after defeat 
in the Jiawu War, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, the Chinese felt the urgency to build up 
a stronger and more modem state. Influenced by Darwinism, Chinese intellectuals warned the 
Qing court of the danger of nation extermination. (LI KUO-CHII, 1994) 
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Germany, France, the United States, Italy, tsarist Russia, Japan, and Austria. ý 
Nationalism and patriotic awareness were awakened by painful experience. Tu 
Wei-ming described the embarrassing status that China faced: 
... 
from the imagined universally recognised culture centre, (the 'Central Country') 
to the humiliating status of backwardness in virtually all areas of human' 
endeavour. Responding to unprecedented exogenous forces threatening to 
reduce China to a mere geographic expression, nationalism emerged as the 
strongest Chinese revolutionary ideology in the twentieth century. (TU WEI- 
MINQ 1994: vi-vii) I 
The Chinese felt bitter and hostile towards foreign powers. However, despite a strong 
anti-imperialist mood, armed struggles such as the Boxer Rebellion? failed because 
of weak military forces. (LI KUO-CH'I, 1994) Intellectuals felt humiliated and longed 
for reform. The greatest challenge to the Chinese intellectuals since the Opium war 
has been to find a viable way of resolving the problems arising from the contact 
between Chinese and Western culture and society. (LIN YO-SHENGý 1996: 175) 
The desire to modernise China and the anxiety to catch up with all the advanced 
countries surfaced after the May Fourth Movement and became a continuous pursuit 
for the Chinese. Politically, it was an anti-imperialist movement; culturally, however, it 
was an anti-traditional movement, that brought new ideas into China and challenged 
the old way of thinking. (LIN YO-SHENQ 1996; HUANQ RAY, 1988) Many Chinese 
literature historians saw 1919 as the beginning of Chinese New Literature. (CHEN & 
DONQ 1989) Even some new literature works had already appeared before 1919 
and the May Fourth was not initially a literature movement the May Fourth indeed 
opened up the path for change in Chinese culture, and allowed challenge and 
7 In 1900, the Boxer Rebellion arose because of the mounting hostility towards foreign 
powers,. The Eight-Power Allied Forces got into Beijing, suppressed the rebels, and asked 
the Qing court for Boxer Indemnity. 
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creabon. (MA SEN, 1994: 80) 
The May Fourth movement has been regarded as the most important drivers of 
cultural and ideological enlightenment in modem Chinese history. Its legacy provided 
the Chinese a simplified rhetoric: "since China's backwardness... had deep roots in 
Chinese polity, society, and culture, a total transformation of Chinese-ness is a 
precondition for China's modemisation. "(TU WEI-M I NQ 1991: 5) Therefore, its 
influence urged generations of Chinese to pursue modernisation. It seemed to hold 
the key to open a beautiful New World 
-a modernised China. 
For many intellectuals, there was no better vehicle than theatre to arouse national 
awareness of China's semi-colonial status, to educate the ignorant, and to reform the 
crumbling old empire. Therefore, theatre was first used to advocate revolution, then 
the modernisation of society after the 1920s. After the May Fourth Movement, theatre 
became an issue that concerned intellectuals and writers. Many scholars got involved 
in play writing, not because of literary interests, but to advocate modem ideas. For 
example, Hu Shi 41A wrote his first and only play, Zhongshen dashi (g_4)C* A 
Great Event in a Lifetime) in 1919 to advocate liberal marriage. 
Wenmingxi was spurned and a new theatre trend emerged. A new generation of 
playwrights from academic and literary backgroundO rose and changed the prospect 
of Chinese theatre. (MA SN, 1994: 123) To them, theatre provided an arena in which 
to challenge old ideology and old-fashioned concepts with more scientific and logical 
ways of thinking. It was their way of delivering ideas, of being critical of the 
8 There were many scholars who were active in theatre, such as Ouyang Yuqian RMT-A 
Song Chunfang 5; r,, VIW, Chen Dabei PtI,, k, Xiong Fo)d P. 4%N, and Guo Moruo W". (DU 
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authorities, and of being creative. (MA SN, 1994: 37,128 
-29) '* 
In order to break away from the notorious image of wenminpi, intellectuals and 
writers who engaged themselves in the theatrical world called theirs 'amateur 
theatre. The term indicated the amateur status of their involvement, the purity of 
their spirit and works, and a creativity uncorrupted by commercial interests. They 
were devoted to realism, and imitated a realistic style in their new plays. Although 
there were many different styles of theatre in the early 20th century, realism 
dominated Chinese theatrelo. It seems that Chinese theatre activists submitted to 
Western realism in the hope of educating the people and reforming society. 
Amateur theatre was concerned mostly With literary values and social reform. At first, 
many translated plays were published", mainly classics of realist playwrights such as 
Anton Chekhov, George Bernard Shaw, and Eugene O'Neill. Among them, Ibsen was 
most influential. His works were constantly staged and studied. Following their 
examples, many Chinese intellectuals involved themselves in play wrifing to endorse 
12 the development of amateur theatre 
YON-CHIH, 1980; MASN, 1994: 80-108) 
9 The Chinese name for amateur theatre was aimeide ! RAn theatre. Uterally, airneide 
means 'bea uty-loving. Song Chunfang translated it from the French amateurto emphasise its 
unpolluted, non-professional nature, and artistic merit. The first amateur theatre group was 
Minzhong Ajushe NVA*qj_t in Shanghai, formed in 1921 and organized by Ouyang Yuqian, 
Chen Dabel, and'Xiong Fo)d. (MA SN, 1 994: 124) 
10 Realism dominated the theatre in China before the 1980s. It was especially Influenced by 
Russian tradition. (ZHOU LINGFEI, 1992: 369-383) Realist theatre in Taiwan was important too, 
especially before the 1980s. Apart from the Chinese realist theatre tradition, American 
modified realist theatre was also influential In Taiwan. (WANG MO-LIN, 1999) 
11 According to Ma Sdn (1994: 107). there were over 170 translated plays, from over 70 
Flaywrights in 17 countries published in China between 1917 and 1924. 
Hong Shen #tJW(I 935: 56) described how the situation changed after 1924. "The number of 
theatre dubs in school and amateur groups Increased day after day.. Because of its 
popularity, all the bookstores not only sold plays, but also were willing to print new plays. w 
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On account of the urge to change, it seemed logical to abandon all tradition and 
Chinese-ness. Traditional xiqu was considered a product of the old feudal society, 
and was criticised as anti-scientific and anti-democratic. Conversely, western theatre 
was recommended as the scientfic and democrafic modem art form. (rIAN HAN, 
1985: 4) In the pursuit of the modemisation of China, it was dear to the intelligentsia 
that theatre was a powerful vehicle that could easily influence the people, especially 
the illiterate masses, to create a modem and advanced China. 
In 1928, playwrights and theatre theorists gathered in Shanghai to celebrate Ibsen's 
10& birthday. After the celebration, they decided to unify the term for modem drama 
in Chinese. Song Chunfang, one of Chinese theatre! s pioneers, suggested the name 
huaju g4tqU (hua means Words', and huaju means'spoken drama'). It became a 
common term referring to westem-style theatre. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980) 
6.1.3. Left-wing theatre and the war 
Because of the dose links between the theatre circle and idealistic intellectuals, the 
huaju trade had had a close connection with Chinese Communism since the late 
1920s. (XIA YAN, 1985: 145) The direct link between theatre and Communism started 
when Xia Yan Ajjý, the underground Communist leader, who came back from Russia 
and organised a theatre group, the Shanghai Artistic Theatre (Shanghai yishu jushe 
±M§jjrLjfjq7Trj) in 1929. (ZHENG BOQl, 1985: 154) Its establishment was under the 
13 In that gathering, Song claimed that modem drama used oral language as the core of its 
performance. Therefore, he suggested using this term to differentiate it from the old xiqu. (DU 
YON-CHIH, 1980: 198) In effect, this term 
- 
huaju 
- 
also distinguishes itself from the previous 
theatre form 
- 
wenmingd. The term is still in use in Mainland China. However, the term huaju 
developed a different implication in Taiwan after the late 1970s. It became an opposite term to 
shiyanju jjf&Oj (experimental theatre) or xiao juchang /JNj#q* (little theatre). Now, the term 
in Taiwan refers to an old-fashioned theatrical form with a realist style. 
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direct order of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Xia Yan: 
-A-,, 
(1985: 144-145), the connection became concrete when they first proposed the idea 
of "proletarian drama" and delivered the idea through performances, 
Many intellectuals and writers either joined the Communist party, or at least 
sympathised with it, because they identified with the socialist ideal, and wished to ; 
form a modem and fair country. 
- 
In 1930, the Chinese Left-vving Writers Alliance was 
set up in Shanghai and openly espoused Communist ideas. After only two public 
performances, the Kuomintang (KMT) government sealed its studio and suppressed 
left-wing theatres. As a result, the Left-wing Theatre Alliance (Zuoyijutuan fiannwng 
. 
was formed to fight against the Mrs suppression, and many 
theatres turned to the left and encleavoured to "play for the workers and peasants". , 
(XIA YAN, 1985: 149 
-150) 
Because theatre at this period became political and socially critical, it gradually , 
dawned on the KMT that the potential influence of theatre should not be overlooked. 
The KMT also set up its own theatre-training organisation, the Canton Theatre 
Research Institute in 1929. The theatrical veteran Ouyang Yuqian 14 was its head. 
-, 
By the 1930s, - Chinese modem theatre was thriving. Many important classics were 
written at this time. (MA SN, 1994: 127-143) They included: Hong Shen's #kM, 
Nongcun sanbuqu (AtjE-flj%M Thlogy of the Counhyside); Cao Yu's Iff M Leiyu (Zifi 
Thunder Storm), Richu (F] W Suntise), and Yuanye (%(. U The Wildemess); Tian Han's 
Carnvn (adapted from the opera); and Xia Yan's Shanghai wuyan xia (-I--MMWF 
14 Although Ouyang was hired by the KMT to run the theatre institute, he sympathised with 
communism. After the KIVIT fled to Taiwan in 1949, he stayed In mainland China. 
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Under the Eaves of Shanghai). 
The boom was inteiTupted by the Lugouqiao IncidentI5 on 7 July 1937, the day that 
marked the beginning of Sino-Japanese war. The struggle between the right and the 
left was temporarily halted, as they united to fight against the invasion from Japan. 
Most theatre groups were based in Shanghai, and they gathered to form the 
Shanghai Theatre Association of National Salvation (Shanghai Ajujie jiuwang xiehui 
-EraM*ffaLLt91ft) to support the government. The 813 IncidentI6 happened one 
month later, and subsequently, Japan occupied Shanghai. People from the theatre 
and film industry, who stayed in Shanghai zujib". formed thirteen National-salvation 
Theatre Teams (jidwang yanju dui touring around China to dispense 
messages of resistance to the Japanese invasion. (DU YON-CH IH, 1980: 204) 
During the eight years of the War of Resistence (1937-1945), theatre became the 
most powerful tool to unite the country and disseminate an anti-Japanese spirit. (MA 
SN, 1994: 136-143; DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 204-206) During the wartime, it was 
impossible to find proper theatre venues. Theatre groups had to manage to perform 
on the street Jiefouju MEW[ (street theatre) was born to provide simple but straight 
forward entertainment and information. Based on current affairs, fietouju improvised 
their performances in order to inform the illiterate masses how the war was going. 
15 Lugouqiao &A* is a bridge near Beijing, also known as Marco Polo Bridge. On 7 July 
1937, the Japanese made an excuse that one of their soldiers was missing and insisted on 
entering Chinese territory to carry out a search. Being refused, the Japanese shot a Chinese 
lieutenant and occupied a suburb of Beijing. The result of this incident was that Japanese 
occupied Beijing and it marked the beginnin g of Japanese aggression against China. 
16 The 813 Incident happened on August 13 1937, one month after Beijing fell into Japanese 
hands. Shanghai was besieged and finally taken by the Japanese. 
17 Since the Opium War, many countries tried to seize Chinese territory and its natural 
resources. After China's defeats, these imperialist powers demanded to set up zujie(ME), a 
tract of land in Chinese cities or ports, supposedly on lease to, but actually seized by these 
powers, and put under their colonial rule. 
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Hence, fietouju was also called huobaoju rNN*g(living newspaper), and played an 
-,, 
important social and political role that no other art form could rival. 
6.2. Taiwan's early modem theatre 
6.2.1. Early development in Japanese rule 
Modem theatre in Taiwan under Japanese rule had a similar role as in China. Theatre 
in Taiwan, introduced by the Japanese, was taken as a tool with which to reform 
Taiwan and with which to advocate the polifical and cultural autonomy of the ý 
Taiwanese. just like the Chinese, Taiwanese intellectuals used theatre as the vehicle 
to advocate nationalism. 
The first theatre event held in Taiwan was performed by Japan's prominent theatre 
artist Kawakami Otajirou)lj-F-: ff=P5 in Taipei's Asahi-zagf3& theatre in 1911. 
(CH'IU WUN-LIANG, 1992a; HUANG KUO-SHU, 1988) Inspired by it, the Asahi-za 
organised the first Taiwanese theatre group, the Taiwan Dialects Reform Theatre in 
1912. However, it was not successful, (HUANG KUO-SHU, 1988: 37) and traditional 
x1qu still dominated Taiwanese theatrical activitY. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 289; 
MA SN, 1994: 199) It was not until 1921 when the Taiwan Cultural Association 
(Taiwan wenhua xiehui j": -3M3ZjtSjAr) -a self-organised union run by local 
intellectuals and gentry 
- 
was established that the situation changed. 
The goal of the Taiwan Cultural Association was to elevate cultural standards and 
promote Taiwanese nationalism and political autonomy under Japanese rule. By the 
means of constructing a new Taiwanese culture, they hoped Taiwanese national 
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consciousness would be awakened. Thus, the ultimate task in pursuing Taiwan's 
- 
autonomy and social reform would be achieved. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 293-95) 
Among all the measures taken to enhance Taiwanese culture, the Taiwan Cultural 
Association believed that theatre was the key for cultural enlightenment. They 
wanted theatre to replace the backward and superstitious xiqu, and to educate the 
ignorant (CH'IU KUN-LIANG, 1992a: 295; HUANG KUO-SHU, 1988: 39; DU 
YO N-CH IH, 1980: 210 
-212) Hence, the theatre movement was launched in 1923 as 
the locomotive of the nationalist movement Because of its mission to'enhance 
culture', it was called wenhuaju 3ZIaq 
- 
theatre of culture. 
Compared with the populist appeal of traditional xiqu, wenhuaju was considered an 
acfivity that belonged only to intellectuals and the upper classes. Moreover, because 
of its nationalist appeal and emphasis on 'artistic pursuit' 
, 
wenhuaju was cdticised as 
dogmatic and highbrow. (CH'lU KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 325-326) Although most 
scholars agreed that the significance of Taiwan's theatre lay mostly in its connection 
with Taiwan's nationalist movement, its influence was limited. 
According to many scholars (CH'IU KUN-LIANG; 1992a; HUANG KUO-SHU, 1988), 
a split within the Taiwan Cultural Association in 1927 obstructed the development of 
theatre. The strong and growing left-wing faction within the association criticised 
theatre for being "a game that belonged to the petit bourgeoisie" and which would 
"fritter away the fighting will of our young fighters". (CH'lU KUWLIANGý 1992a: 300) 
After the KotWnka Movement (the movement to make the Taiwanese subjects of the 
Japanese Emperor) was imposed in 1931, most theatre activities were put on hold, 
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(HUANG KUO-SH U, 1988: 44) apart from huangi4nju J21R*q (theatre of the royal 
-- , 
subjects) and qingnianju Wlf-*q(theatre of the youth). These two kinds of theatre 
were used as the Japanese mouthpiece to promote the'Japanese spirit and 
militarism, especially during the Sino-Japanese war. (CHILI KUN-LIANQ 1992a: 
301,326- 336) 
6.2.2. Post-war Taiwanese theatre 
When the Second World War ended, Taiwanese theatre groups were eager to get 
back to the stage again. The Tainan Student Union arranged the first post-war ,- 
performance in Tainan in September 1945, just after the Japanese surrendered on 
August 1 e. Both plays perf6rmed, Touzoubing ft, kQ-) and Minsheng zhi zhao (rfýL 
ZVI), mocked Japanese rule. 
Although western style theatre was not as popular as Gezaixi, many theatre groups, 
started to perform. For example, Taiwan yishu jushe - -I"MMWjjqa put on the new. [a 
plays, Ronggui (MM Going Home Gloriously) and Xetou de xuejYang zhi fian (MMIYj 
Rff, Ze,, The Love Affair of Street Shoemakers), on January TA 1946. To celebrate 
"going back to the mothedand", they chose to perform in Mandarin, the official 
national language of the ROC, even though most Taiwanese could only speak , 
Japanese and local dialects (Minnan yu, Hakka, or aboriginal languages). (DU, 
YO-CHIH, 1980: 213; Ll HSIAO-YANQ 1995) 
In June 1946, the Shengfeng Theatre Research Gathering put on two plays in 
Taipers Zhongshan Hall for five days 
- 
Bi (! t The Wall) and Luohan fuhui (MLIkh-ft 
Arhats Go to the Banquet). When they planned to restage the same production, they 
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were told that the plays were banned. The reason was because the authorities (the 
Ch'dn I administration sent by the KMT to take over Taiwan) suspected them of 
implying "the tyranny of harsh rulers" and of stirring class struggle. (LO SU-SHANGý 
1961: 337; Ll HSIAO-YANQ 1995: 38) 
Apart from local theatre activities, theatre groups from Mainland China were also 
introduced to Taiwan after 1946. The first theatre groups to arrive were juxuanduiM 
. 
1YR(theatrical propaganda teams). 18 These small groups belonged to different 
military units for entertainment and propaganda purposes. 
New China Theatre Group(Xin zhongguo jushe *rPWjjqjE) was the first professional 
group to come from the mainland. It came from Shanghai in December 1946, and 
was led by the theatre veteran Ouyang Yuqian. Even the problem of the language 
barrier was an issue, because not all members of a Taiwanese audience could 
understand Mandarin. The New China Theatre Group solved the problem by selling 
cheap scripts with the tickets to help the audience understand. (MA SN, 1994: 208) 
Its performances were popular among audiences and created an unprecedented box 
officesuccess. (LIHSIAO-YANQ1995: 39; LOSU-SHANQ1961: 345-349) 
Moreover, its professional standard had such an impact on Taiwan's theatre that it 
was regarded as" a demonstration of how far advanced the theatre in the motherland 
had developed". (DUYON-CHIH, 1980: 213) The prominent Taiwanese theatre 
18 The setting up of theatre groups in military units started in the Sino-Japanese war. People 
involved in theatre formed small theatre teams, and later some joined the army. This kind of 
group was called kangzhanjutuan (MTA*qPM Resisting Japanese invasion theatre group). (DU 
YON-CHIH, 1980: 204) Because of the war, theatre groups had established strong 
connections with the army and its propaganda sections. Many people from the theatre 
became members of the Artistic Working Team (yishu gongzuo dadui #WIT-f'FtK), under 
the jurisdiction of the General Political Warfare Department (M, ýýrjfMnw) in the Ministry of 
National Defence (MND). 
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activist and historian LO Su-shang (1961: 332) agreed that Chinese theatre, ,ý 
influenced the early development of Taiwan's theatre immensely. As a result, LO 
believed that he could see an alliance beginning to develop between the two sides. 
- 
6.2.3. Three problems 
However, because of the 228 Incident this alliance never really formed. Three crucial 
problems emerged hindering the development of post-war Taiwanese theatre: the 
language barfler, censorship, and the chilling effect of the 228 Incident (MA StN, 
1994: 209) 
Since theatre was an art form relying heavily on language, after fifty years' of 
Japanese occupation, the language barrier was the most obvious difficulty in terms of 
communication. Although some Taiwanese could write Chinese, most spoke only , 
Japanese and local dialects1g. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the essential principle to 
enable the KMT government to take over Taiwan was 'cle-Japanisation'. (YEH 
SHIH-7AO, - 1990) Therefore, strict language policy was imposed and both wrritten 
and spoken Japanese were banned after the 228 Incident Most Taiwanese who grew 
up under Japanese rule felt out of place and inferior. (YEH SHIH--rAO, 1990; LIU , 
CHIEH,, 1994; CHANG CHIN-CHIANG) 
According to Ma Sdn (1994: 208), the KMT authorities were especially cautious 
19 The Japanese started to set up public schools to teach Japanese in every county and city 
in Taiwan as early as in 1889. However, it was not until 1930 that the Japanese govemment 
officially abolished Taiwan's sishu UM(old-style private school, a place for Taiwanese to learn 
hanwen #,, Z- written Chinese). A total ban on Chinese leaming was imposed in 1937 when 
the Sino-Japanese war broke out. 22.7% Taiwanese could speak Japanese in 1932. This rose 
to 51 % in 1940 and to 71 % in 1944. ( HUANG HSOAN-FAN, 1993: 93) 
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about Taiwanese theatre activities. First of all, they suspected that there were still 
remains of the Japanese militarist influence in Taiwan. Secondly, because of the 
defeats that the KMT was experiencing in the civil war, they suspected a possible 
Communist influence. Although the Executive Yuan of the ROC had already 
abolished censorship in the mainland, the Ch'fin I administration unilaterally imposed 
the Regulation on Theatre Managemnt in Taiwan Province (Taiwansheng jutuan 
guanli guize 
-dMtj9PMWJMU) to control theatre activities. All theatre groups had 
to be registered before they performed in public, and all scripts had to be censored2o 
before staging. (MA StN, 1994: 208; Ll HSIAO-YANQ 1995: 42) 
Worst of all, most theatre activities were stopped after the 228 Incident. If there were 
any, they were organised only by the government and performed mostly by 
juxuandul, school theatre clubs, and touring theatre groups from the mainland. (LI 
HSIAO-YANQ 1995) The only exception was Xangjiao xiang 
Banana) performed on November 1" 1947 in Taipei Zhongshan Hall by Shlyan xiao 
jutuan This four-act farce described disputes and mimicked the 
misunderstanding between Taiwanese and mainlanders during the 228 Incident 
Fighting broke out among the audience between Taiwanese and mainlanders on the 
debut night The play was immediately banned on the second day. (1-1 HSIAO-YANQ 
1995: 42) 
20 When the New China Theatre was invited to Taiwan in 1946, they also experienced 
Taiwan's stringent bureaucracy and censorship. (LO SU-SHANQ 1961: 338) According to 
Ouyang Yuqian, (CHIAO'rUNa 1990b: 81) there were four governmental institutions in 
charge of censorship in Taiwan: the Propaganda Committee (xuanchuan weiyuanhuirLxgýjft 
ift), the Education Department Uiaoyu chu RffpR), the KMT (dangbu So, and the 
Headquarters of the Military Police Uingbei silingbu WtR JR Before any performance was 
put on, theatre groups had to go through each of these institutions to get permission. Among 
them all, the last was "the most powerful one and could ban any performance at the last 
minute, even without the other three's consent. ff (CHIA6 rUNQ 1990: 81) 
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After this rare performance, further critical or experimental performances were almost 
impossible. Most Taiwanese intellectuals, who once were active in theatre, were 
either Willed or imprisoned. Those who were not involved chose to keep silent to 
avoid trouble. (MA SN, 1994: 209) Because of the chilling effect of the 228 Incident, 
the antagonism between the Taiwanese and mainlanders became increasingly 
severe. Moreover, cultural development was directly suppressed, 'including the 
theatre. The environment for theatre was described as "barren and thin". (CHIAO 
TUNQ 1990b: 74) Taiwanese writers and intellectuals generally felt a sense of 
powedessness and subordination. Many gave up wirifing. Without Taiwanese wdters' 
involvement, the mainland playwrights dominated Taiwan's theatre for many decades. 
(MASN, 1994: 214) 
6.2.4. Anti-communist theme 
The theatre scene in Taiwan between 1947 and 1949 was mostly dominated by 
-ý 
touring theatre groups from China? ', and the juxuandui in the Armed Forces. - Soon 
after the KMT government fled to Taiwan in 1949, Taiwanese theatre became 
increasingly silent and inhibited. (YEH SHIH-rAO, 1987: 79) Taiwanese theatre was 
crushed before it could grow. (MA SLN, 1994; CHIAO'17UNQ 1990b) 
In the 1950s, Taiwan's cultural scene lay wasted. One crucial reason was that many 
of Chinese theatre's elite such as Ouyang Yuqian, Tian Han, Xia Yan, Cao YU, and 
21 After the 228 Incident, records'show that two Chinese theatre groups toured around Taiwan. 
The Taiwan Sugar Corporation invited the Audiences' Performing Touring Company 
(Guanzhong )dju yanchu gongsi luxing jutuan from Shanghai on 
November 1947. On this occasion, it was the first time that "Taiwan's rural villagers saw 
modem theatre performances". (DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 214); In 1948, the National Nanjing 
Theatre College was invited to perform at the Taiwan Fair. 
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WU ZuguangkIFTO_iý, did not come with the KMT government to Taiwan, because they 
either were active communists or sympathised with Communism. (CHUNG LEI, 1984: 
111-112) Alongside the stringent thought control, there was a vacuum in Taiwan's 
theatre scene. 
Many classical plays written by left-)Mng playwrights were banned, even though they 
were popular among Taiwanese audiences before 1949. Such plays included 
Nongoun sanbuqu by Hong Shen; Leiyu, Richu, and Yuanye by Cao Yu; Zhengqi ge 
(IEUV) and Fengyu ye guiten (MffiýW)Q by Wu Zuguang. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 
216) Consequently, there were almost no plays available for Taiwanese theatre 
groups to perform. In addition, new plays were also forced to be in line with the 
anti-communist national policy. (MA StN, 1994: 211) The crisis of juben huang (*qAz 
scarcity of scripts) occurred in the 1950s. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980) 
According to Ma S6n (1994: 211), apart from the above mentioned problems, theatre 
development was restrained by ideological considerations and language policy. Since 
most new plays were written in Mandarin, all the Minnan-yu-speaking audiences, 
performers and playwrights were unfamiliar with the grammar and speaking format. 
According to theatre theorist Ma Sdn (1994: 211-212). "it is fair to say that there was 
only Manclarin-speaking theatre in Taiwan after 1949, but no Minnan-yu theatre. " 
Apart from the language barrier, the idea of cultural warfare dominated the 
Taiwanese cultural scene in the 1950s. (HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997: 31; LI HSIAO-YANQ 
1995) Only three kinds of theatre activity remained: juxuandui in the Armed Forces, 
the wenhua gongzuodui (cultural team) of the KMT, and theatre clubs in the 
universities. (WU & JIA, 1985; CHIA I-TI, 1987: 82-97; MA StN, 1994: 210-211) In 
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addition, the Association of Chinese Literature and Art (ACLA) endeavoured to 
promote anti-communist artworks and to encourage 'the right kind of plays'. (Also 
see Chapter 1.5.1. ) By rewarding authors with publication and money, 69 new plays, 
which emphasised an anti-communist theme were published and received awards 
vAthin only 6 years (1950-56). (LI HSIAO-YANQ 1995: 44) 
In general, Taiwanese theatre in the first few decades of the post-war era was dull 
and lifeless. (HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997: 42) Du Y(in-chih (1980: 215) called theatre of 
this kind Wahluan xIjURAMM (theatre of suppressing the rebellion)', and Ma Sdn 
(1994: 211) termed it as'fangongxijL/ff-jf, 
-Mq(ant-communist theatre)'. In this 
period, only the universities' theatre clubs carried on the 'amateur theatre' tradition, 
even though their performances were crude and still remained in the old-fashioned 
, 
realist style of the 1930s. 
The IVIND also initiated preparation for cultural battle and set up the Grand 
Competition of Literature and Artistic Entertainment in the Armed Forces in 1953 to 
encourage ideologically correct huaju (spoken drama). Since 'anti-communism' was 
. 
the highest guideline in every aspect of Taiwanese life in the 1950s, it also affected 
theatre development. Private theatres were not commercially sustainable, because 
dogmatic performance had no box office interest. Hence, the lifeline of Taiwanese 
theatre was actually maintained by the theatre activities in the forces, even though 
artistic development and creation was discouraged. 
Apart from the censorship that limited creativity and prevented the unpredictability of 
freethinking, theatre activities were also discouraged by high taxation and the high 
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charges made for state-owned venues22. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980) In the 1950s and 
60s, the tax was so high that it took away 40% of total income from the box office. 23 
(DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 217-218) The policy of high taxation was like a punishment to 
the theatre for putting on plays. 
Generally speaking, juxuandui monopolised Taiwan's theatre scene until the 1960s. 
Partly, it was because private theatre groups could not afford regular performances, 
for both financial and ideological reasons. Partly, there was no space for creativity 
and artistic pursuit. Even though in 1955 there was a temporary booM24, the theatre 
environment was generally frail. 
By 1959, Taiwan's theatre had reached its lowest point. There were only eight private 
theatre groups registered, and very few had any performances. (DU YON-CHIH, 
1980: 219) The famous film director U Hsing 982: 127), who had thirty years 
experience in theatre and film, criticised the KMT government for not supporting or 
funding theatre. He believed that the governments passive attitude, and neglect of 
theatre, was an indirect way of discouraging theatre and silencing dissent 
22 There were no private theatre venues suitable for professional theatre performances, only 
those that belonged to the govemment. According to Du YUn-chih (1980), as early as 1949, 
theatre groups had already faced these difficulties and asked the government to change the 
regulations. Nothing was done and the situation continued. For private performances, they 
either hired cinemas or tried to get hold of government venues, usually through personal 
connections. Only those who had connections in high positions had a good chance of putting 
on performances. In general, venues were difficult to get hold of. 
23 The tax on theatre performance was higher than on any other kind of performances. 
According to Du YOn-chih (1980: 217-218), commercial theatre performances faced three 
different kinds of taxation: income tax, entertainment tax, and the venue tax. 
24 In 1955, theatre groups united and appealed for governmental support. They called for 
revival of the Chongqing spirit MMJV. Chongqing was the temporary capital of the ROC 
government during the Sino-Japanese war. It stood for a spirit of 'making the best out of poor 
conditions!. The KMT government gave its support and established the Spoken Drama 
Movement Committee (huaju yundong weiyuanhui to promote theatre 
activities. Although it tried to solve the problem of high taxation by demanding that theatre be 
placed into the same tax category as concerts and exhibitions, theatre development did not 
pick up as wished. The committee soon dissolved in 1956. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 217-218) 
353 
6.3. Development of little theatre 
6.3.1. Theatre in the 1960s 
Inspired by new trends and thoughts, new playwrights emerged in the 1960s. (MA 
StN, 1994: 261-271) Although their works did not have much chance of being staged, 
they wrote them as literary exercises. Among them, Yao 1-wei kA-IK and Chang 
Hsiao-fdng NMwere most influential (LI HSIAO- YANQ 1995: 46-47). Influenced by 
western trends at that time 
- 
the theatre of the absurd, Brechtian theatre, cruel 
theatre 
- 
they pioneered an untouched area. 
When Professor Li Man-kuei A came back from a visit to America and Europe in 
1960, she started to advocate the idea of little theatre e25. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 219) 
Because of her strong connection within the KMT and the Ministry of Education 
(MOE)28, she managed to get their support to promote theatre and set up Sanyi 
Theatre, the Huaju Appreciation Committee, and Little Theatre Promotion 
Committee. In order to foster young audiences, she also organised two annual 
theatre festivals on university campuses: the World Theatre Festival (focusing on 
world famous classical plays) and the Youth Theatre Festival (focusing on Chinese 
plays), funded by the MOE. Although this had little impact on theatre aesthetics, 
amateur theatre's tradition was maintained, and an alternative to the anti-communist 
25 This term 'little theatre' was first used by theatre scholar Song Chunfang in 1919 to 
describe non-commercial theatre. The idea of 'little theatre' that Li Man-kuel promoted in 1960 
was borrowed from Strindberg. However, Ll only referred to the 'size' of the theatre, not the 
anti-traditional and anti-realist spirit of Strindberg. (WU & CHIA, 1985: 226-236) Promotion by 
Song or Ll had little impact. When I discuss rraiwan's little theatre'later, I generally mean the 
avant-garde and experimental theatre that developed after 1980. 
26 Chi Wei-jan criticised Ll for being the cultural red guard for the KMT However, many 
believed that her endeavour had influenced and laid foundations for little theatre development 
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theatre was provided. 
In 1967, theCcultural Renaissance Movement was mobilised, and consequently 
stopped the thawing process of the long frozen cultural environment. Once again, 
culture was assigned a political mission, and change was discouraged. Taiwan's 
cultural environment was as static as "stagnant water'. (CHUNG MINGDER, 
1994: 106) 
Another big impact on theatre development was the arrival of television in the 
196OS27. Both actors and playwrights were recruited by television stations and the 
film industry. Taiwanese theatre was left almost in a vacuum. (MA SEN, 1994: 
213-218, DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 220-221) 
6.3.2. The rise of Lanling 
In 1980, Lanling Theatre Workshop gave its debut vAth their play 'Hezhuls New 
Match' in the firstExperimental Theatre Festival', and created a new trend in 
Taiwan's theatre development 
Hezhu's New Match was adapted from the Beijing opera play Hezhu's Match, and 
also drew upon many traditional xiqu tacUcs. Because of this skilful blending of 
techniques and styles, both Taiwanese modem theatre and traditional xiqu 
performers were inspired by the possibilities of mbcing the old With the new. (WU 
in the 1980s. (DU YON-CHIH, 1980: 219-220; MA SLN, 1994,1996) 
27 The three major television stations in Taiwan were: the Taiwan Television Enterprise Ltd. 
(M, established in 1962); the China Television Company (CTV, in 1969); and the Chinese 
Television System (CTS, in 1971). 
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Lanling's success had caught the attention not only of the cultural community, but 
also ordinary people. ý They had full houses, and the audiences were passionate and, 
- 
responsive. The painter and wifter Chiang HsOn exclaimed excitedly after its debut: 
"Lanling has found a way out from the long-term stagnancy. It is the first time I have 
ever seen such energetic and lively theatre in Taiwan. " (CHIANG HSON, 1982: 169 
-170) In Taiwan's rigid and formulated huaju (spoken drama) environment, Lanling 
brought in a breath of fresh air. Many called it "a miracle in Taiwan's theatre". (1-1 
OU-FAN, 1982: 139-140; WANG HSI-CHEN, 1980: 155) 
Lanling sent an important message to the long inhibited theatre environment that - 
theatre could be connected with reality and real life. Under the shadow of repression 
and censorship for more than thirty years, the new generation of Taiwanese theatre 
finally found a new way to express itself. It was commended as a "new mixture (of old 
and new theatrical elements) that resembled the life in the 1980's Taipei". (CHUNG 
MINGDER, 1996 b: 54) 
Liu Ching-min WIjUM, the founding member of Lanling, created the memorable figure 
Hezhu. Before she joined Lanling, she also played huaju. She found it'distant and 
pretentious"(1999). She recalled her experience in Hezhu's New Match: " For the first 
time, I felt something was alive when I stood on that stage. It was a totally different 
experience from huaju performance. I felt I had established a new relationship vvith 
the audiences. " (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999) 
It was not until then that Taiwan's theatre had finally broken away from heavy political 
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dogma and an old-fashioned huaju format, and had begun to explore new 
possibilities. Lanling's work may seem relatively conservative today and show clear 
traces of huaju influence, but nonetheless, their work made the search for new styles 
and new forms of expression possible. Lanling became a cultural phenomenon in the 
1980s, and marked the rupture with the huaju tradition. 
Before the 1980s, huaju was almost the only theatre style. When playwright Yao I-wei 
organised the 'Experimental Theatre Festival' in 1980, it was a direct response to the 
huaju tradition and its politicised tendencies. Yao I-wei's idea of 'experimental theatre' 
had three dimensions: an avant-garde theatre, an artistic theatre, and a theatre of the 
youth. (YAO I-WEI, 1982: 76-77) It allowed mistakes, embraced alternatives, and 
abandoned clich6 and convention. Even so, generally speaking, huaju was still the 
mainstream in the early 1980s. 
6.3.3. Early funding chaos 
According to Ko Chi-liang, a veteran policy-maker in the CCA, cultural subsidies 
before 1990 were basically given case by case. There were no standard criteria of 
whom, what, how and how much to subsidise. The decision was made by the 
judgement of civil servants who happened to be in charge of related areas. "Before 
the 1980s, these decisions had a strong element of tanqing consideration. " (KO 
CHI-LIANQ 1999) Renqing ),,. rfj is an interesting phrase in Chinese and is regarded 
as an important aspect of human relationships in Chinese society. Uterally, it means 
'human feelings'. It means that you should sympathise with, and be sensitive to, 
friends' and relatives' needs and feelings. Therefore, it is also used to indicate 'a 
favour given by you'to people who are related to you when they are in need. In this 
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case, Wo meant that there had been pressure coming from high positions asking for, 
renqing 
- 
funding for certain productions, 'inviting' certain artists and groups to ý 
perform in governmental festivals. 
Before the CCA was established, not only were non-governmental activities 
uncommon, but cases receiving state subsidies were also rare. Those who got 
funding were mostly people who had good connections in the KMT, or had relatives - 
in high positions. Because most plays were boring and dogmatic, even occasional 
huaju performances could not be maintained. More and more, huaju relied on , 
meagre subsidies from governmental institutions, such as the MOE, the Taiwan 
Provincial Government, the KMT, and the Chinese Culture Restoration Committee 
(CCRC). Getting funding depended heavily on personal connections and PR skills. 
(ICO CHI-LIANQ 1999) Therefore, this connection between huaju, official dogma, 
and the KMT was strong before the 1980s. That also explained why people in the 
huaju trade were usually associated vAth the KMT, or belonged to the armed forces. 28 
When the CCA was established in 1981, the CCA started to deal with funding, the 
pressure came mostly from statesmen or the KMT, asking for renqing and ý 
recommending 'appropriate' art works. Moreover, they demanded a stringent scrutiny 
that could detect 'unhealthy' and 'poisonous' ideologies. Because of the influence that 
some huaju people had within the KMT, pressure was imposed on civil servants to 
privilege huaju rather than experimental theatre. Moreover, most of them were very 
cautious about'problematic ideologies', and consequently keen on policing thought. 
(ICO CH'I-LIANQ 1999 ) The CCA would risk severe criticism if it subsidised 
28 Most of the old theatre generation came from the background of the Artistic Working Teams 
in the army. Such actors and playwrights included Wei Su UU, Ch'ang Fdng 'AfA, Lang 
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unconventional performances. 
Accusations were constantly made criticising theatre for offending public decency, 
disseminating 'incorrect ideologies or Communism, and encouraging a tendency 
towards Taiwanese independence. (SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999) 
The pressure from party reactionaries was most severe before the mid-1980s. If the 
CCA gave grants to any groups of this kind, it would be severely criticised for taking a 
laissez-faire attitude. (WO CHI-LIANGý 1999; SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999) Deciding 
whether to subsidise or not and how much money to give became a risky task for civil 
servants. (WO CHI-LIANQ 1999; SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999; HSUEH MAO-SUNQ 1999) 
Because huaju was promoted as part of literary tradition, and little theatre was 
categorised as 'performing arts', this division of duties caused confusion29 Wthin the 
CCA, and affected how civil servants dealt with theatre. 
Apart from the obstruction of reactionades, according to Su Kuei-chih 31(l 999), a 
Hsiung 05hR, U Man-kuel, Kung Ming 
-WAA and 
Chao Chi-pin jM14W'. 29 There were three main departments in the CCA: the first department dealt with regulations 
and national heritage; the second with literature, media and drama; the third performing arts 
and fine arts. The 2nd Department was in charge of theatre, as part of the literature tradition. 
However, the 3rd Departments took little theatre on because experimental theatre could not fit 
in the category of 'literature. Hence, confusion occurred. The confusion of division of tabour 
between the two departments continued until 1993 when Ch'dn Ch'i-nan became the deputy 
chairman, and reshuffled the labour division between departments. (SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999; 
WO CHI-LIANq 1999) Now, the 3rd Department Is in charge of all theatre activities. 30 At the height of the political theatre movement in the late 1980s, the 3d Department tried to 
ignore little theatre to avoid trouble. In contrast, the 2nd Department sympathised with the little 
theatre and started to take over. 31 Su Kuel-chih had worked in the CCA (2 nd Department), and dealt with literary affairs (including plays) since the mid-1 980s. She was also in charge of Parliamentary liaison. 
Although she was in charge of 'plays' (both huaju and written plays), she was sympathetic to 
little theatre development. By the late-1 980s, she worked closely with Dr. Chung Mingder and 
supported many little theatre activities. She was regarded as the most sympathetic official and 
became important for getting little theatre into the state funding system. 
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veteran civil servant in the CCA, another problem of early funding was caused by the 
vagueness of its goals. In these days, there were no criteria or guidelines to follow, 
and the award of funding was considered to be renqing. Even if sometimes the 
decisions were not made according to renqing consideration, criticism of unfairness ý 
still occurred. Su (1999) admitted, "Ideology mattered most among all 
considerations... Because it determined whether the production or the group would 
get subsidies or not, 'and how much. " In general, 'sound-minded'and uplifting plays 
found it easier to get subsidies; whereas, subversive, provocative, and disturbing , 
works found it harder. 
However, the so-called 'subversive and provocative ideology'was difficult to define. 
- 
What was the definition of 'subversion'for civil servants? Su Kuei-chih (1999) 
explained, "Things like swearing, insulting state leaders, denouncing Confucius, 
performing some indecent actions, or nakedness... were all difficult things for us to 
give money to and 'encourage'. " , 
However, the situation changed when funding became systematised. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, the political atmosphere changed and reactionary forces 
subsided. Huaju was considered old-fashioned and dogmatic, and could not easily 
get funding or opportunities for performance. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1994: 106) 
6.3.4. The development of Little theatre 
Even under strict censorship, little theatre groups mushroomed in the 1980s. The 
booming of little theatre was, in fact, a manifestation of a gradually opening society 
and a strong-growing Taiwanese culture. In general, the KIVIT government started to 
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shift cultural emphasis from China to Taiwan around this period. In addition, Taiwan's 
economy took off and the opposition grew stronger and more active. A new 
atmosphere developed, and consequentlyý Taiwanese modem arts started to flourish. 
Lading's emergence was part of the change. Its success was the outcome of two 
decades'of brevving social change. 
Little theatre had evolved in a different form to Li Man-kuei's simple idea. Although 
Taiwan's little theatre in the 1980s did not have a unified style or a shared set of 
beliefs, its multi-faceted character and experimental spirit was the key. 'Uttle theatre' 
after the 1980s referred to "a style, a fashion or even a (experimental and 
avant-garde) movement", (MA StN, 1996: 19) rather than just to'the size of the 
theatre venue (i. e. no more than two or three hundred seats)'. 
According to theatre scholar Chung Mingder, (1992: 11-12) the main characteristics of 
little theatre were: performing in a small and alternative space; small production; 
avant-garde and experimental tendencies; subversive and anti- establishment. Chi 
Wei-jan, a theatre director and Associate Professor in English Literature, defined little 
theatre as: "anti-tradition, anti-mainstream, anti-capitalism, and anti-bourgeoisie". 
(WU CHOAWCH'ýNQ 1996: 254) 
The size of theatre venue could not guarantee its experimental and artistic nature. 
However, its size and the type of space definitely provided some possibilities (as well 
as limitations) for certain performances and styles. For example, if the venue was 
small, the performance had to be simple. In unconventional spaces such as a street, 
harbour, classroom, park, warehouse, or the seaside, the performance had to break 
away from theatrical tradition, and thus the space released possibilities for 
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experiment Since these groups used free venues and produced on a very low 
budget, the box office pressure was much lower than in mainstream theatre, and 
-ý 
experiments were also more affordable. 
These unconventional spaces broke the division between the audience and the , 
performers. The possibilities of theatre were expanded, the relation between the 
observers and the observed also changed. The liberation from traditional theatre 
venues gave little theatre freedom away from the limitation of the proscenium stage, 
traditional performing methods, and written scripts. As James Roose-Evans said, 
"theatre should reflect not the everyday reality of naturalism, but rather those 
intimations that are beyond the reach of words. " (ROOSE-EVANS, JAMES. 1991: 1) 
Taiwanese little theatre in the 1980s finally stepped forward and broke away from the 
ghost of the 1930s huaju tradition. 
Since Lading's emergence in 1980, Taiwanese little theatre was generally 
categorised into three generations. Chung Mingder (1992,1994,1996a) called them 
the first generation 
-'experimental theatre' (1980-1985); the second-generation - ý- 
I avant-garde theatre' orpolitical theatre (1986 
- 
the early 1990s); and the third 
generation 
-'post-modern theatre'(the mid-1990s to present). 
This division has been used by many critics (e. g. U Shih-ming, 1996; Huang Hui-min, 
1997). Yet, there were different opinions about how to make this division, and what 
defined the transition from one generation to the next. Each division is slightly 
different according to the dividers' opinions on the priorities of theatre development 
Ma S6n (1996: 26-27,1994: 271-294) preferred to trace further back to the 1960s. 
He believed that modem Taiwanese little theatre inherited U Man-kuei's little theatre 
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tradition, and could only be divided into two generations: little theatre (1980-1989) 
alternative theatre (1990 onwards). 
In contrast to putting theatre development into historical order, theatre director, 
activist and critic Wang Mo-lin (1992: 129-154) insisted that Taiwan's little theatre 
only existed between 1986 and 1990. To him, 'little theatre'was a movement. 
Therefore, Lanling was too conventional to be included. Chi Wei-jan (2000) even 
opposed the idea of dividing Taiwan's theatre development into generations. He 
criticised Chung Mingder and Ma S6n for theorising theatrical progress into an 
academic discourse, which was a way of mythicising little theatre in order to build 
their own authority. Their division ignored the ruptures and anti-establishment 
character of post-war Taiwanese theatre history, and deliberately established a false 
unity between 'generations' that ignored the ruptures. 
in order to avoid implying (incorrectly) that each generation had the same character, I 
propose to divide little theatre development into four stages (1980 
-1985; 1986-1992; 
1993- 1999,2000 
- 
date) rather than into generations. I begin my discussion of little 
theatre from 1980, because the emergence of Lanling marked the first breakthrough 
in thirty years of a barren theatre environment I believe that there would be no base 
for little theatre to develop or counterattack if it were not for the foundations that 
Lanling laid. 
Dividing this development into stages, provides me the opportunity to distinguish the 
social and polifical backdrop of each period, and to recognise the changes of i 
different stages and their possible reasons. By doing so, I can not only avoid the 
mistake of segmenting a linear and diverse development arbitrarily, but also provide 
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a better way of examining the relationship between Taiwan's overall environment and 
theatre development 
In addition, most of the divisions devised by commentators on little theatre were 
made in the mid-1990s. According to my interviews in 1999 and the current 
developments in Taiwan, I found the newly emergent theatre after the mid-1990s 
playful, 'individualist multifaceted, and very 7aiwanese'. All the characteristics of this 
period related to preparation for the change to the next stage, to come after 2000. 
6.4. The first stage (1980-1985) 
6.4.1ý Experimental theatre festival 
The first stage of little theatre was fostered and encouraged in the Experimental 
Theatre Festival. Since 1980, the festival became an annual forum for creativity and 
experiment in theatre, and Taiwanese theatre started to boom. Within the five-year 
period (1980-1984), 34 new plays were produced32 and many new theatre groups 
were formed. Many talents, who later became established in the theatre trade, were 
fostered through this opportunity of Idal and error'. Some of them were 
established as theatre directors, playwrights and actors: for example,, Chin 
Shih-chieh : ýflt, Cho Ming *R)j, Stan Lai 401F) 11, Huang Ch'dng-huang X*, A, 
Wang Yu-hui 3jýVA, and U Kuo-hsiu 
-; V-M P,,,. In addition, some became critics 
(Huang Jian-ye XRV, Huang Mei-hsQ JQW-), academics (Ch'6n Ling-ling Knf4p, 
Ma Ting-ni f, 1Sj'Trt, Niu Chuan-hai 4: 11 Ira), film makers (Tsai Ming Liang 
32 Of 36 productions (in the Experimental Theatre Festival from 1980 to 1984), there were 
only two western scripts. The remaining 34 productions were all new plays. (WANG YU-HUI, 
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Chdstopher Doyle), and tradifional quyP arfists (e. g. Wang Zhen-quan 
At that time, there were very few artistic groups in Taiwan. When the KMT decided to 
promote arts positively, Lanling soon became the favourite group of governmental 
institutions and was very popular in festivale. Lanling was invited to tour around 
Taiwan's universities and culture centres, and performed in every festival. 
In 1981, the newly established CCA became the biggest patron of Lanling. Not only 
did Lanling become the CCA's star group, but was also chosen to run theatre training 
workshops for young people between 1984 and 1988. It played the role of the 
locomotive of Taiwanese little theatre for almost a decade. (MA SN, 1994: 276; 
CHUNG MINGDER, 1996: 36) Because of its influential status and connection within 
the CCA, Lanling became the most powerful theatre group in Taiwan before 1985. 
(CHN MEI-MAO, 1996b) 
Lanling's founding members Chin Shih-chieh and Cho Ming admitted that Lanling 
had never got over its sudden fame, or grown out of the shadow of Hezhu's New 
Match. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1996 b: 63-65,1989a) Moreover, because of the 
success of Hezhu's New Match, all festival organisers wanted to commission similar 
productionsý5 to attract box office success. (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999) As a result, the 
1996: 73; HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997: 55-57) 
33 Quyi fig means Yolk art forms!. It includes ballad singing, story telling, comic dialogues, 
clapper talks, etc. 34 Most festivals were held by the government, including the CCA, Taipei and Kaohsiung City 
governments, the Taiwan Provincial government, and the MOE. They had the budgets and the 
responsibility to hold festivals. Before the mid-1 980s, there was only one non-governmental art 
festival 
- 
the New Aspect International Art Festival, held by the New Aspect Art Promotion 
Company. 
35 For example, Lanling were commissioned to produce three new plays (Shehui ban ft-iftrz, 
Xuansi ren and Na dashi chuanqi In 1982, right after the success of 
Hezhu's New Match. They were all directed by Lanling's core members and the main creators 
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success of Hezhu's New Match in fact suffocated Lanling's creativity and future 
-- 
development. Different styles, alternative experiments, and more conceptual 
approaches were discouraged, because of the expectation of producing a similar 
'result' to Hezhu's New Match. It not only prevented other creators in Lapling from 
having the same opportunities to develop and grow, but also forced Lanling to repeat 
itself. Therefore, during ten years' of its existence, its emphasis was mostly on 'acting' 
and narrative structure. 
6.4.2. Altemative approach evolved from Lanling 
The same night that Hezhu's New Match was performed, their other work Baofu týft, 
(Baggage) caught less aftention. Compared with the former, Baofu was heavier and 
more difficult to understandAt emphasised body language and explored the potential 
of non-narrative structure. The strength was in its abstract form and its abandonment 
of language, which clearly transcended the limitation of spoken drama36. (TSNG 
HSIN-1, . 1982: 206; CHUNG MINGDER, 1990,1996) 
These two approaches, represented by Hezhu's New Match and Baofu, appeared as 
early as the end of 1970S when Lanling underwent two years of training. Huang ý 
Ch'iung-hua NYj* 
- 
one of the founding members of Lanling 
- 
pointed out the 
differences: 
There are two main creative directions (of Lanling): searching for theatre's new 
of Hezhu's New Match 
- 
Chin Shih-chieh and Cho Ming. 
36 It was the first time that Taiwanese theatre placed emphasis on body language. Many 
experiments that Baofu carded out had become the main concerns that little theatre tackled 
later on, such as deliberately abandoning dialogue and narrative tradition, developing a 
collective improvisation format, emphasising body language, and exploring theatre space. 
However, because abstract concepts were difficult to accept, this style of theatre seemed 
alien to audiences then. Without doubt, Baofu was not as popular as its counterpart, yet, its 
Influence was much greater in later years. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1990: 227) 
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possibilities from the elements of traditional Beijing opera; and experimenting 
with possibilities of body language to replace oral language. Chin Shih-chieh's 
Hezhu's New Match laid the foundations of the first direction; As to the 
experiment of body language, that was conducted by Dr. WU Jing Jyi and the 
inspiration of Poor Theatre laid the foundations for the latter. (HUANG 
CHIUNG-HUA, 1982: 34) 
The two different pursuits later became the main threads of Taiwanese theatre 
development. Around 1985 to 1986, a split developed. Liu Ching-min (1999) called 
1985 'the year of rupture', because the fissure between two different styles became 
clear with each going its own separate way. 
One route is represented by the core members of Lanling, such as: Chin Shih-chieh, 
Cho Ming, and Li Kuo-hsiu. It inherited part of the huaju tradition and developed a 
managerial format. Their concerns were mainly the audiences and market response. 
Their style was considered 'mainstream' after the mid-1980s. 
Since Chin Shih-chieh was the director of Hezhu's New Match, his works became the 
trademark of Lanling, which was a more conventional style with strong narrative 
elements. Thus, Lanling became more and more accessible for the audiences. Also, 
because of the experience of dealing with governmental institutions, it developed a 
fonnat of running theatre like a business. 
Following in their footsteps, many similar theatre groups had been set up and 
developed from little theatre to middle-size theatre. Similar groups included the 
Performance Workshop (led by Stan Lai)37, and the Pin-Fong Acfing Troupe (led by Li 
37 Stan Lai worked with Lanling Theatre Workshop in 1984 after he got his Ph. D. degree from 
Berkeley, California and came home to teach in the National Institute of Arts(NIA), Taiwan. He 
established the Performance Wbrkshop(jqAT-f'M) in 1985. The group was famous for 
improvisation and comic performances. 
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Kuo-hsiu)38. They were regarded as the most powerful theatre'grou'ps in the 1980s. 
(HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997: 58; MA SLN, 1994: 287-289,1991: 213-218) 
Another direction was represented by the marginalised members of Lanling, such as 
Huang Ch'bng-huang and Liu Ching-min. This style started off vvith ex p eriments with 
body language, and later on, expanded to explore physical possibilities, 
psychological expression, and sometimes, a subversive anti-authoritadan spirit. 
(CHUNG MINGDER, 1996: 46-47) This direction was developed by some 
marginalised Lading members. (WONG MO-LIN, 1992; CHUNG MINGDER, 1992) 
This kind of theatre is usually called 'non-mainstream theatre', 'avant-garde! theatre, '
'fringe', 'radical theatre', or, 'altemative theatre'. (CHI WEI-JAN, 1999; CHUNG 
MINGDER, 1989; MASN, 1996: 23) After the mid-1980s, such theatre groups 
started to sprout, including: U Theatre fj*5Q led by Liu Chinig-min in 1987), ' 
Notebook Theatre ý0ý&a*qpjq in 1985 and Renzi kT-tqllq Theatre in 1988 (both led by 
Huang Ch'dng-huang). 
6.4.3. The major patron in arts 
The post-war Taiwanese theatre had been kept in the domain of the state apparatus 
until the 1980s 
- 
either in the Armed Forces, or in the university theatre clubs. 
Because of the success of Lanling, many similar shehuijutuan fit-ftMW (literally 
meaning'theatre, groups from the societ)(, i. e. outside of the usual categories of 
military and campus theatre) mushroomed afterwards. 
38 U Kuo-hsiu first won his fame by playing the main comic figure in Hezhu's New Match. Ll 
Kuo-hsiu later established the Pin-Fong Acting Troupe (WAjqM, the English title was 
provided by the group) in 1986. Pin-Fong soon became a popular group and built its 
reputation on farce and comedies. 
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There were very few performances and most of them were organised by the state in 
the early post-war Taiwan. (LI SHIH-MINQ 1996: 82-83; MA SEN, 1991: 16) The 
pattern of funding theatre groups to perform for the governmental events started and 
soon became popular in the 1980s. The number of theatre groups mushroomed 
because of increasing opportunities to perform and to gain funding. This kind of 
working paftern of the cultural institutions buying programmes from theatre groups, or 
commissioning them to produce new productions for certain events or festivals, 
became the norm. 
However, Taiwan's cultural environment at this period was still unsound. It was 
impossible for artistic groups to support themselves merely by box office income. 
Furthermore, private sponsorship was almost unheard of in the early 1980e. (JUNG 
SHU- HUA, 1999; CHOU HUI-LINGý 1999a; CHUNG MINGDER, 1990: 222) 
Consequently, governmental events and funding was the only source of support for 
theatre artists. 
In addition, almost all the theatre venues were owned and run by governmeneo. 
Therefore, even with private money, it was almost impossible to put on any 
production without official approval. Because of this, when the number of little theatre 
39 The beginning of private sponsorship in Taiwanese theatre began in the late 1980s. For 
example, it was a big news when Cathay Pacific Airlines sponsored the PerforTnance 
Workshop in 1987. Soon afterward, the Pin-Fong Workshop received sponsorship from the 
7-11. Before then, pdvate sponsorship was mostly given to foreign companies toudng from 
abroad (e. g. Philip Morris sponsored the American Symphony Orchestra's Asian tour, which 
included Taiwan). 
40 Before 1980, there were only 3 performing halls in Taiwan. in the 1980s, many culture 
centres opened, but only two of them did not have a performing space. In 1991, the number 
of other kinds of performing halls increased to 9. (CCA, 1992: 60-61) In 1998, places suitable 
for artistic performances had risen sharply. Apart from those mentioned, there were 8 Shejiao 
guan (social educational halls jiftIft), 5 memorial halls, II performing rooms, and 15 
altemative spaces suitable for holding exhibitions and performances. (CCA, 1999: 100) 
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groups increased after the mid-I 980s, they tended to use unconventional spaces in 
order to save money, avoid trouble and censorship, and enjoy the freedom and 
convenience. 
By the mid-1980s, when all 24 culture centres were opened, there were many empty 
- 
performing halls and plenty of festivals waiting to be filled. The demand for 
performances was unprecedented. The pattern of the'one-show company'emerged 
to cope Wth the particular need. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1990: 221-223; HUANG 
HUI-MIN, 1997: 67) The so-called 'one-show company'was a phrase used to 
describe the temporary formation of a group for just one production. (CHUNG 
MINGDER, 1990: 
-221-223) When a pmposal was accepted and funded, a gmup of 
theatre people would foffn a'one-show compan)( for a particular event and produce 
an approved programme. When the production finished, the group vanished. 
Almost all theatre groups were run like this in the 1980s. Most theatres did not have 
studios to rehearse, or regular training, let alone a permanent office, long-term plans 
- 
for the future, or any managerial personnel or press officer. Therefore, everyone in 
this trade was a freelancer, 'and worked whenever a job opportunity came up. 
Not only was the lack of performance venues problematic, but also the fact that there 
was little appetite for arts among the public was an obstruction to progress. (CHIU 
HEI-YUAN, 1985: 80) According to a surveyý' undertaken by sociologist Chiu 
Hei-yuan (1985: 76 
-77) in 1980, the Taiwanese in general did not have the habit of 
going to the theatre. Only 8% of interviewees in the capital Taipei claimed to have 
41 The survey was conducted in 1980 to evaluate the results of newly built culture centres. 
The figures could only show part of the Taiwanese situation in eady 1980, when new cultural 
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gone to theatre once within the last six months. 
After the cultural environment started to improve in the 1980s, an ambivalent 
attitude emerged in Taiwanese cultural circles. On the one hand, they were thrilled by 
the freedom given to them after three decades of fight thought control and political 
interference. On the other hand, they wanted the government to support arts more 
actively, and to 'build' culture more aggressively in order to catch up Wth advanced 
countdes. 
When I started working as a reporter on theatre and the arts for the Central Daily 
News in 1982, the longing for a stronger cultural apparatus and the hope for forceful 
cultural policy were constantly expressed in cultural circles. Those involved in culture 
preferred forceful cultural construction and a powerful cultural institution. A group of 
influential artists and intellectuals strongly advocated the necessity of setting up the 
Ministry of Culture, including anthropologist Ch'en Ch'i-lu, composer HsQ Po-yQn, 
choreographer Lin Hwai-min, Dr. Wu Jing Jyi, and music anthropologist HsCj 
Ch'ang-hui. 
Having the same kind of mentality, the general assumption of theatre groups was that 
they needed and deserved the full support of the government. Such opinions were 
often expressed, both by the old huaju generation and the younger generation of the 
2161 century. (HUANG MEMSO, 1980: 233-236; CH'tN MEI-MAO, 2000a, 2000b) 
construction had just started. (CHlU HEI-YUAN, 1985: 71-107) 
42 The Improvement Fýoýarnrne for Cuffure, Education and Entertainment (Jiaqiang wenhua 
yu yule fangan was promulgated in 1978, and the CCA was established 
In 1981 to deal with cultural affairs and to plan for overall cultural construction. 
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Although the number of performances organised by pdvate promoters has increased I 
since the 199W3, the majority of artistic events today are still organised by the 
government. For example, government-held theatre events accounted for 81.46% of 
all theatre'performances in 1989; decreasing to, 76.99% in I 990; -and 74.20% in 
- 
1991. 
(CCA, 1992: 123-124) According to veteran art promoter Li Hui-na (2000), although ý 
the first private arts promotion company NewAspect was established as. early as the, 
late 1970s, it was not until the 1990s that privately organised performances became,; 
common.: Even so, the figure of government-held theatre events rose to 83.02% in 
1998. (CCA; 1999: 162) 
6.5. '7he second stage (1985-1992) 
6.5-1. Avant-garde theatre thrived 
c 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1980s saw the beginning of Taiwan's political reform. 
Around the mid-1 980s, Chiang Ching-kuo initiated radical party, reform; the ,-, 
-ý-, 
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was established;, the, 
-, 
Taiwanese Independence Movement was also vocal abroad and many leaders on the 
black list once" exiled were- trying to get back to the islandt On July ý,, 15,1987ý. martial: 
43 According to Cultural Statistics in 1998 (CCA, 1999: 41 
-45), the figure of performances (including: music, theatre, and dance) has risen since,,, l 989, It, rose from 6,051 performances 
in 1989 to 18,658 in 1998, although the proportion of gove'mment-(')rganised perform : ances 
decreased a little (73.14% in 1989,72.35% in 1994,76.15% in 1996, and dsing again to 
76.03% in 1998). All in all, the main buyer and promoter of performing arts was still the 
g9vemment., 
'" Since the early 1960s, increasing numbers of Taiwanese students who studied abroad 
organised the Taiwan Independent Movement around the wodd. In 1970, similar organisations 
in Japan, Europe, Canada, and the USA joined force under the name of Wodd United 
,. Formosans for Independence (WUFI). Since then, the Taiwan independent movement was 
mobilised by overseas Taiwanese, especially intellectuals. In February 1985, Hsl] Hsin7liang 
11ýffijj, and Hung Shdng-chd #LWrf established the 7aiwan Revolution Party' (later 
. 
Taiwan 
Nation-building Alliance) in the USA. One of the opposition leaders Shih Ming4d &9jim 
., 
started a hunger strike in June. The following March, HsQ Hsin-liang mobilised the action to 
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law was finally terminated*. All these changes took place within a very short period. 
Issues were discussed openly in a way that had never been possible before. 
By the end of the 1980s, Lanling had lost its grip on Taiwan's fast changing society. 
The little theatre 'locomobve'was weakening and could not keep up with the times. 
Their plays were full of the'haunted past, because of their employment of an unused 
language (Jingpianzf Mandarin with Beijing accent) or their use of a distant 
performing formula (Beijing opera) to represent Taiwan's modem society. According 
to linguist Huang HsOan-fan (1993: 4-7), Lanling's works demonstrated the 'past 
tense of Taiwan'- the Taiwan that had been overshadowed by China-centric ideology, 
a society which stayed in the past. Apart from Hezhu's New Match, Chinese Comedy 
in the Late 200 Centue was another example of a China-centric; play that failed to 
grasp the 'presence' of Taiwan, not only in the language it used, but also in its 
performing method and its ideology. 
In 1986, Taiwanm society had gathered enough energy to move forward; and 
theatre was also gearing up for drastic change. Wang Mo-lin called the year 1986 
"the beginning of the little theatre movement7. (1996: 101-117; 1992: 141-155) Many 
little theatre groups started to challenge the old narrative structures and huaid 
influences, including the usage of Beijing accented Mandarin, and its realistic style. 
Many felt that challenging old ideologies was the only way to explore new aesthetic 
qiandang huffa1; ffXPJ-r1j (move the Taiwan Revolution Party back to Taiwan) In order to 
support the establishment of the DPP and challenge the KMrs 'black list'. (CH'IU 
KUO-CHP-N. 2000) In September 1986, the DPP was formed. HsO Hsin-liang attempted to 
enter Taiwan and was arrested at the airport, which led to the Taoyuan Airport Incident. (Www. wufi. om. tw/events. htrn and HSO HSIWLIANGý 1995: 427) 
4" Taiwan's martial law was Imposed on May 20th 1949. 46The play was originally called Nanyiye wonvn shuo xiangsheng X-VZftfMM-jfijF(We 
Performed a Comic Dialogue That Night). Here, I used their own translation from the CCA's 
website: hftp: /Mww. pyberstaoe. com. tw/r*rtfoli 
. 
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It has been well documented that the second half of the 1980s turned out to be the 
most exciting and revolutionary era in Taiwan's theatre history.. (MA SN, * 1996; 
CHUNG MINGDER,,; 1990,1992,5,1996 b;, WANG MO-LIN,, 
-, 
1992) Partly,, this was 0 
because political issues could be discussed freely after martial law was lifted. Partly, - 
it was becauise-as'avant-girde theatre's did not rely on'state support or box officepq5ýj 
income, 'theý could be as provocativeand subversive as they liked: Partly; the, 
expectations f6rTaiwan's democracy -pushed young theatre members, to pursuep, n.; 
social reform for abI efter society. 'ýýfr,; ý--:,., 
rjý fiýAj 
The breakthrough in theatre at this stage was only made possible because of social 
and political lib6ration'. At happened on the street, outside of comfortable theatre qp- 
_r'! P 
venues, and broke away from conventional theatrical forms and traditional 
-narrative -:. -, 
structures: Inspired by the times and the exciting atmosphere, theatre embraced the 
changes wholeheartedly and joined forces with political and social movements. This 
chandi Was mobilised by the'university theatre clubs. In contrast to the traditional 
school diiaýiacl6bsýof th-61i Man-kuei period,, university students in the mid-1 980s f 
were not satisfied with merely going on stage to enjoy the buzz of acting. They were 
keeh to explore theatre aesthefiCS, 1 and used theatre as their arena to express ideas 
and debate issues., 
Moreover, in contrast to drama students Wthin an orthodox theatre discipline, 
univerifty itudints ^were leii-Inhibited 
_by 
theatocal conventions, and had more 
intellectual desire and aesthetic curiosity., As'a re's'ult, university campuses became,, 
the 'greenhouse' for avant-garde theatre. The cooperation betAi6en theatre activities 
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and the student movement in the universities became the nucleus of little theatre at , 
this stage. 
Starting from 1986, many little theatres were drawn into political campaigns, social 
movements, minority protests, and environmental activities. Among them, three 
groups were most influential: the Left Bank theatre, the Huanxu Theatre, and the 
Critical Point Theatre Phenomenon. 
'Left Bank! grew unplanned from a dramatised poetry-reading in the literature club of 
Tanchiang University in 198547 ; Huanxu Theatre was a theatre club of the National 
Taiwan University". All their members came from a literary background. Their 
interests lay in theatre aesthetics, and they adopted post-structuralist ideas to 
challenge the huaju tradition. 
The biggest contribution that Huanxu and Left Bank made was their innovation in 
theatre language. The Left Bank was interested in finding new possibilities of 
theatrical structure, exploring the relationship between physical language and verbal 
messages. (SHIH WAN-SHUN, 1988) Huanxu encleavoured to develop a new 
theatre that had "an anti-narrative structure and non-representational mise-en-scene, 
47 All the members of Left Bank(j'q2ýF_MjjqPjg) were members of Wenshe 3UELliterature Club) 
in the Tanchiang University. A poetry-reading started their connection with theatre. In June 
1985, their first work Wo yao chi wode pixie want to eat my shoes) was read 
out and performed in a students! flat. They formed a theatre group in 1986 and named 
themselves 'Left Bank'to indicate their wish to be marginal and anti-establishment. 
48 The main figures in Huanxu theatre (4MR) were a student couple 
-U Yung-; Ying 4E; -7?, 
9 and HsQ Nal-wei tý, 7ýJA. They organised a play and won the first prize in the university 
theatre competition in 1985. The group was then Invited to perform in the New Aspect Little 
Theatre in 1986 and called itself Huanxu. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1994: 115-121) Huanxu was 
active in the political theatre movement, and LI was especially active in the DPP campaign. In 
1992, partly due to lack of financial backup, and partly because the core members graduated 
from university, the group was dissolved. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992; WU 
CH'OAN-CH'ENql996: 218-220) 
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involving performer's presence, audience participation, and the relationship between 
theatre aesthetics and political changes". (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992: 149-173, 
1994: 118) 
Although the Critical Point Theatre Phenomenon was also a group initiated by 
university students, it differed from the other two and was unique both in theatre style 
and ideology. Its leaderrien Ch'i-yOan [11%Tu was a gay artist who had contracted 
AIDS49. He gave his debut Mao shi 
-EfýR(Hairy Corpse) in 1988, and aired the issue 
of homosexuality 
-a taboo in Taiwans society before the 1990s. After martial law was 
lifted, Tien Ch'i-yOan's works soon attracted passionate reactions from the gay 
community and liberal intellectuals, and made open discussion of homosexuality 
, 
possible. ýl Tien Ch'i-yUan's works were ideologically provoking and visually'ugle. He 
flaunted his homosexuality, and crificised oppressive Confucian culture. 
6.5.2. Political theatre movement 
When the political temperature rose and the social movement intensified between 
1987 and 1989, little theatre groups immediately joined forces with social and political 
activists, and launched the political theatre movement (CHUNG MINGDER, 
- 
1992: 
139) For the first time in post-war Taiwan, theatrical activities had finally engaged 
with social issues, and acted upon these concerns. 
49 rien Ch'i-yQan FElfat was an art student in the National Taiwan Normal University. He 
became well known in 1988 because his lecturers were unwilling to teach him in case they 
caught AIDS, even though they admitted he was gifted. He started his theatre group the 
Utical Point Theatre Phenomenon (W: RMj#qS*) following this, and became a symbolic 
9P ure in avant-garde theatre. In 1996, he died at the age of 32. 
When I worked at the United Daily News covedng theatre news, I interviewed him many 
times between 1988 and 1990. He said that his works emphasised the roughness and 
ugliness of life, and forced the audience to look them in the face without escaping or 
pretending. 
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Since the late 1980s, drastic changes in politics had shaken Taiwan as a whole. The 
undercurrent of longing for change was growing. Uttle theatre changed its focus from 
aesthetic subversion to social and political criticism. U Yung-p'ing, one of Huanxu's 
founders, explained their enthusiasm for being involved in polifical activities: "For 
many Taiwanese in the late 1980s, politics was the hope for the future... Many things 
needed to be overturned and make a change through political activities and political 
will. Therefore, joining in political campaigns was the way. " (WU CH'OAN-CH'tNQ 
1996: 223) 
The elections that took place on December 2"d 1989 were the first to be held since 
the DPP had been legalised. Although the DPP had little expedence of organising an 
electoral campaign, their candidates, standing for the first time, managed to vvin an 
average of 27.82% of all Legislator, mayor, and councillor seats. The KMT had only 
won an average of 61.33% of those same seats. For the first time in forty years, the 
KM7s total control of Taiwan had been shaken. In this very first battle, the 
involvement of 'theatre' played an important role. 
The Councillor candidate Ts'ai J6n-chien#f--M in Hsinchu City formed the first 
campaign theatre 
- 
Green Theatre. His original idea was to invent a new political 
language, which was a laughing matter at first among political rivals. (CHANG 131-YU, 
1989b) When it was proven effective and popular, many DPP politicians (such as 
Pdn Hsin-i ft-Wf& Hsieh ClYang-fing &Ki-1, and Ke Ching-sh6ng; "u: RA) adopted 
the tactics; LO Hsiu-Iian rS3ga sponsored the'Clean Election Theatre! touring around 
Taiwan to run an anti-bribery campaign; Yeh ChQ-Ian X4UNI set up'rYeh ChNan 
Theatre" to advocate her political views. She won great support from the voters partly 
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because of the theatrical appeal. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992: 265 
-266) Therefore, 
other DPP candidates even borrowed the group to help boost their popularity. 
Not only did little theatre use theatrical presentations to attract voters and make their 
points clear, political candidates also dramatised their approach to reinforce their 
image or put their points forward. For example, the Legislator Chu Kao-chdng ; ýA]ffi 
was famous for his "table show (shangzhuo show 
-EýM)"51 which started the , 
'parliamentary battle'within the Legislative Yuan. Although it damaged Taiwan's 
intemational image, (SHAPIRO, 1995b) at a time that the KMT occupied the majority 
of Legislative seats, by acting dramatically and drastically, Chu Kao-ch6ng made his 
point'heard', attracted attention and challenged the KMT domination. 
Another extraordinary dramatised event happened just before the 1989 election. Kuo 
Pei-hung nffi9A', the chairman of World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) 
who was on the KMT governments black list, slipped back to Taiwan to support the 
DPP election. He -showed up at the electoral hustings of Lu Hsiu-i gffO, 
-, who ran for 
Taipei County Councillor seat. Because the authorities had already heard the news 
that someone on the black list would show up and give a talk openly that night, 
hundreds of dot policemen were deployed to catch him. (LIN WEN-1,1989), 
On that evening (22nd November), Kuo Pei-hung showed up, as expected. After his 
talk, he walked down the stage into the crowds, and put on a black mask with'black 
51 Before all the older generation of legislators were forced to resign in 1992, the KIVIT still 
dominated the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. It was difficult for the opposition party, 
the DPP, to stop any pro-KIVIT or unfair acts being passed. The DPP had tried many tactics to 
slow down or Interrupt the process. Chu started off this trend using seemingly mischievous 
interruptions to achieve that purpose. He would rampage through the chamber, stomping on 
the tables, ripping out microphones, and flailing at those who tried to restrain him. He was 
called "the Rambo of the legislature" by the foreign media. (SHAPIRO, 1995b) 
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list written on the front. Suddenly, he disappeared in the crowds, because hundreds 
of the DPP supporters also put on the same black mask. The whole event happened 
within a few minutes and the police lost him. (CHANG BI-YU, 1989a) It was a well- 
designed political 'performance', getfing both the 'performers' and 'observers' 
involved, using costumes (black masks), and creating surprise by having hundreds of 
policemen approaching and trying to catch him. It was exciting and entertaining, and 
at the same time, its effect of challenging the 'black list was extraordinarily powerful. 
The whole incident was described as "slapping the KMT on the face". (MINSHI 
NEWS NETWORK, 2001) 
However, the goal of the political theatre movement was not limited only to elections. 
Little theatre provided an active force fighting for overall reform and social change. 
Apart from those already mentioned, many new theatre groups emerged, such as 
Notebook Theatre (1985), 425 Environmental Theatre (1985), Contemporary Taipei 
Theatre Laboratory (1986), Luo-ho Concept týjnq J&ffll 986), Zero Degree Theatre 
(1987), and U Theatre (1987). They launched theatrical campaigns fighting for 
democracy, human rights, social equality, and environmental issues. 
They tackled all sorts of issues that had never been touched or were not allowed to 
be discussed. For example, the event Diving Lanyu's Evil Sphits Away was the first 
'theatre of social action. (WANG MO-LIN, 1992: 108) It was organised and performed 
on Lanyu island by theatre activists in 1988 to protest against the dumping of nuclear 
waste there. 
Around the mid-1 980s, the student movement and little theatre were "two sides of the 
same coin". (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992: 256) A noticeable event happened in the 
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National Taiwan University (NTU). On the 7e anniversary of the May Fourth 
Movement in 1989, the NTU students'union, led by its chairperson Lo Wdn-chia a 
3U5, (later he became the right-hand man of the DPP president Ch'6n Shui-bian), 
formed the Ant-ghost Theatre and performed Totem and Taboo in the student activity 
centre. In the performance, they burnt the national flag and insulted Chiang Kai-shek, 
an action unimaginable before the late 1980s. The NTU authorities decided to punish 
Lo. As a response to this, l another performance 
- 
The sactifice of Lo, Mn-chia 
- 
was 
organised to protest against the high-handed punishment The event took place right 
in front of the Chiang Kai-shek statue in the NTU campus. This time, any students 
wanting to join in were welcome to mock Chiang Kai-shek. The performance had won 
the sympathy of many students, and its effectiveness drew them closer to little 
theatre, using theatre as the means to express criticism and demand democracy. 
(CHUNG MINGDER, 1992: 259-260) 
Starting from 1986, theatres were drawn into political campaigns, the social 
movement, minority protests, environmental activities, and the student movement. 
(CHANG BI-YU, 1994; CHUNG MINGDER, 1989b, 1992,1994) Theatre became so 
"politicised" that the period between 1986 and 1990 was described as "an era of 
political theatre". (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992; WU'PIEN-TU, 1991) 
6.5.4. Disillusion and decline 
In general, most Taiwanese theatres at this stage were dedicated to political and 
. 
social reform, in exactly the same way that left-vving theatre promoted the May Fourth 
Movement spidt, and Taiwanese intellectuals advocated the nationalist movement in 
the 1920s. Theatre scholars saw political theatre as the 'catalyst that made a stormy 
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sea stormier in the social reform movement of the late 1980s. (MA SN, 1996; 
CHUNG MINGDER, 1994; HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997) They also regarded highly the 
influence of the theatre at this stage in pushing the course of political reforms. 
(WANG MO-LIN, 1992; MA SN, 1996; CHUNG MINGDER, 1990,1992,1994) 
However, according to the interviews I carried out in 1999, many theatre veterans 
viewed it differently. They felt that theatre's involvement in political activities had cost 
them highly. Some felt bitterly disappointed, and were let down by politicians; some 
realised that they were driven into their involvement with historical events without 
consciously choosing or thinking properly. (LI HUAWHSIUNGý 1999; LIU CHING-MIN, 
1999; CHOU I-CHANQ 1999) 
The emptiness after the revolutionary mission had been accomplished made many 
theatre members feel lost. For example, Uu Ching-min, founder of the U theatre, did 
not believe that political theatre had made any difference. "Nothing had been learnt 
from that experience. If theatre groups did not join in the street protests and political 
campaign, the democratisation would still go on. The theatrical tactics adopted in 
political campaigns were only used to increase 'interesr, and were not essential. " 
(LIU CHING-MIN, 1999) According to her, theatre involvement was only a product of 
the times. 
Li Huan-hsiung, the founder of Left Bank, also described the whole experience as 
'empt/: "After the first power redistribution in the 1989 election and the student 
movement in March 1990, we suddenly sensed the emptiness of direct involvement 
in protests and political activities. If we were really interested in reform, we might as 
well throw ourselves into politics. " (1-11 HUAWHSIUNGý 1999) 
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Among them, some did join in the DPP directly and advocated opposition ideologies 
whole-heartedly. However, disappointment with politicians came about from working 
together in elections. (CHANG BI-YU, 1989b) For example, Chou 1-ch'ang52 joined 
the DPP in 1989, and was the first to organise theatrical performances in the DPP 
electoral campaigns. After years of cooperation and working experience, even he 
was appalled by politicians: "I am a DPP member, however, I am very disappointed. 
Frankly speaking, there is no cultural policy in the DPP, or genuine concern for, 
Taiwanese culture. Culture has always been taken as the vehicle to deliver their 
political message. " (CHOU I-CHANQ 1999) 
The disillusion led little theatre to reconsider its relationship with politics. To theatre 
people, not only had they wasted their time, lost confidence in politics, but also lost 
their original direction. This interruption slowed down the development of little theatre, 
and drained its energy In the early 1990s. 
The ways in which the theatre community and scholars looked at the political theatre 
movement and its significance seem contradictory. However, in my view, the change 
in Taiwanese society in the 1980s did not take place on its own. The political theatre 
movement was definitely one of the 'catalysts' for the overall change in Taiwan. It 
played an indispensable role in voicing dissent, - challenging the old KMT ideologies, 
and popularising Taiwanese consciousness. 
52 Chou I-ch'ang JM31E; was the founder of the Zero Degree theatre, and later established 
the Gang-a Tsui theatre =2TVIRMPM In 1991. He was very active in polifical theatre and 
the DPR He is still working in a DPP constituency (Panch'iao win City) and leads Gang-a 
Tsui Theatre for the city government. In recent years, he has dedicated his energies to 
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Furthermore, theatre changed the ways Taiwanese politicians presented themselves. 
In other words, it changed the culture of Taiwanese politics by dramatisation, shock 
effects, and the building up of highlights and suspense. Theatre later even 
transformed political actions into cheerful and colourful carnivals. It changed the 
boring and distant image of politics into something dramatic and exciting. 
The fading of the political theatre movement was inevitable. On the one hand, theatre 
groups felt the urge to break away from merely being the'polifical messenger. On 
the other hand, the politicians who took theatre as the medium for political discussion 
were also dissatisfied after a while. Some of them actually disliked theatrical 'tricks', 
and reckoned that theatrical considerations in fact obstructed their delivery of political 
messages. (CHUNG CHIAO, 1992: 354) The ambivalent relationship between the 
two finally brought the relationship of cooperation to an end. 
After the 1992 election, some theatre groups decided to withdraw from direct political 
involvement and contemplated what to do next, while some activists joined politics 
directly. People who were enthusiastic in politics eventually diverted their energy and 
joined in politics. According to Li Yung-plng, Huanxu's founder, "I was once confused 
by the roles I played in the political theatre movement a theatre performer, or a 
social reformer. I realised that if I wanted to put reform into action, theatre was not 
enough for me. " (WU CH'OAN-CH'NQ 1996: 219,225) Therefore, U joined the DPP 
first, then later became an active member and Legislator candidate of the People's 
First Party (PFP) in 2001; Lo W6n-chia was active in the DPP after he left the NTU 
and became Ch'fin Shui-bian's dght-hand man. 
Taiwanese old xiqu 
- 
Nanguan. 
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6.5.5. Polarised orientation 
Theatre activities not only developed actively on the street, but also grew in theatre 
- 
venues. Theatre venues increased drastically between 1984 and 1985.83.34% of 
Taiwan's theatre venues were opened after 198653. (CCA, 1992: 65 
- 
66) As a result, 
theatre groups mushroomed. There were roughly seventy to eighty litUe theatre 
groups between 1985 and 198954. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1990: 214) 
In parallel to the vigorous political theatre movement, the mainstream theatre was 
also growing. The counterbalance between huaju and experimental theatre in the 
early 1980s, had been replaced by mainstream and avant-garde theatre after 1986. 
The theatre environment began to change when the Performance Workshop broke 
box office records in 1985. Before Chinese Comedy in the Late 200 Century (Nanyiye 
women shuo xiangsheng), there had never been any performance run over a week. ý 
(MA StN, ' 1994: 287-288,299-300) It performed 20 days continuously in March 1985 
and was taken as'a record-breaking milestone, setting the example for well-marketed 
and commercially-conscious productions of the future. 
Even today, the run for each production is still short. According to the survey 
conducted by the National Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) in 1997, almost 1/4 
53 Apart from culture centres and state theatre venues, private venues also increased in the 
late 1980s. They included the New Aspect Theatre, Crown Theatre, Lanling Theatre, U 
Theatre, Performance Workshop Studio, Nostalgia Theatre, China Times Theatre, Youth 
Theatre, Shanpi Theatre(4tt), and Wisdom Plaza Theatre. (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992: 138) 
54 Ma M's figure (1994: 285-287) was much less than Chung's. Taipei Theatre Union had 
18 members in 1987, and there were at least 15 theatre groups outside of the union. It 
seemed to me that Chung's estimation was probably too optimistic, because many of them 
were either short-lived students groups, or were formed temporadly for street protests and 
political campaigns. Nonetheless, it did show how quickly little theatre grew at the beginning 
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(24%) of performing art groups put on only one performance per production, 14.5% 
two, and 10.5% three. Those who could put on more than 20 performances for each 
new production only took up 8% of all groups. (NCAF, 1997a: Chart: G4a-1) 
Unlike their counterpart, the avant-garde theatre that felt let down and manipulated in 
later years, mainstream theatre cashed in by using popular political issues to ensure 
box office success. (WANG MO-LI N, 1992) Apart from Chinese Comedy in the Late 
200" Centuty and its two follow-up productions, similar box-office hits capitalising on 
political topics included Wanfi changcheng (MIRIA, The Great Wall, by Pin-Fong), 
and Tahvan Diyi Taiwan First, by Godot). 
The success of Performance Workshop was a mixture of a popular approach and 
skilful marketing5s. It demonstrated the possibility for the theatre to sustain itself 
commercially. Therefore, the power of modem management and the desire to satisfy 
the audience's taste became a great concern for mainstream groups. Followed by the 
encouragement of the CCA56, marketing and management became increasingly 
important. 
Stan Lai was criticised for dressing up his cultural commodities with artistic appeal. 
(MINSHENG DAILY NEWS. 1987) Even so, in contrast to the sometimes abstract 
sometimes ideologically heavy little theatre works, it was obvious that mainstream 
of the 1980s. 55 The commercial intentions of Performance Workshop showed in many aspects. For 
example, it liked to recruit television actors and pop singers to its cast, focused on publicidy 
and PR work, and exploited current topics. These techniques were targeted at winning 
popularity and boosting income. Everything associated with the play became a cultural 
product. Not only was the play itself a product to be sold, its many by-products such as 
T-shirts, books, tapes and CD of the play were also eaming substantial incomes. CVVANG 
MO-LIN, 1992: 309-319) 
56 Since the beginning of the state funding system, the CCA has always emphasised fostering 
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plays were more accessible for ordinary audiences., ý 
.r-"-: "1 -1, . 1.1 ý" 
Similar groups emerged in the late 1980s, and gradually developed a more efficient 
management and PR style. The other groups included the Pin-Fong Acting Group 
(see footnote 37), the Godot Theatre (led by Uang Chih-min)57, 
- 
the Paper Windmill 
Theatre (led by Li Yung-ffing)58, and the Green Ray Theatre (led by Lo Pei-an)59. 
They all took up a mainstream theatre principle 
- 
producing haokan ff. V (interesting, 
watchable and nice looking)60 dramas 
- 
and adopted managerial tactics to become 
professional and business-like. 
These mainstream groups had set up a professional 'management model' in Taiwan's 
theatre, and borrowed western fund-raising models and PR techniques to find private 
sponsorship or donations. (MA SN, 1991: 213-218) These mainstream theatre 
groups moulded a 'modified' professional theatre management model in Taiwan. 61 
the long4erm managerial ability of artistic groups. 
57 Liang Chih-min was Stan Lai's student at the National Institute of Arts(NIA). Liang 
established Godot Theatre in 1988 and copied Lai's directing and managerial style. Godot 
Theatre overtook the Performance Workshop commercially in the late 1990s and was famous 
for its aggressive PR tactics. (CHOU I-CKANGý 1999; CHI WEI-JAN, 1999) 
58 LI Yung-fdng was a founding member of Lanling. He dedicated himself to children's 
theatre and established Paper Windmill in 1990. Later, U bought out several theatre groups to 
form the Paper Windmill Foundation, and established his theatre enterprise, which included 
several small groups, a production company, workshop, and theatre courses for children. 
59 Lo Pei-an 111LYC- studied theatre in America and his interests lay in the musical. He 
established Green Ray *)ý theatre in 1993, dedicated to localising musical form. 
60 Ch'dn Ch'i M1% the manager of Godot Theatre, expressed her opinions on mainstream 
theatre management in an interview, which demonstrated exactly the strategy of mainstream 
theatre. (UBERTY 77MES. 15/6/1996) She said that their main concern was how to present 
"haokan" OV(means both 'interesting to watch', and 'nice-looking) dramas for the 
audiences. 61 According to an argument between Chou Hui-ling (I 999a: 50-54) and Jung Shu-hua 
(1999: 37-49), Taiwan's environment is not sufficient or mature enough for a commercial 
theatre environment to develop in terms of legislation and market capacity. Her argument was 
based on Langley's definition (1990: 10) of 'commercial theatre'. Nonetheless, no matter how 
crude the Taiwanese theatre environment might seem, many groups tried to set up full-paid 
staff and a commercial managerial format. 
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Avant-garde theatre, on the other hand, did not have much chance to get state 
funding, private sponsorship, or box office returns. (OU YING-CHUAN, 1989; MA 
SýN, 1994: 290) They were often condemned for "acting wild in defiance of the public 
fWMS)", and "indulging oneseff in the name of experiment, opinion (huzuo feiwei MIt,, 
but in reality, making no sense at all for audiences. " (HOU CHI-PINQ 1992) 
At this stage, avant-garde theatre members were mainly students and enthusiasts. 
For them, financial rewards always came last. They dedicated their energy, spare 
time and own money to theatre. (LI SHIH-MINQ 1996) Chou 1-ch'ang (1999) 
explained, "Little theatre had built an anti-establishment and anti- government 
alliance in the 1980s. Even if they (the government) wanted to give us money, we 
would never take it. " 
In contrast to mainstream theatres, the way little theatres kept going in the 1980s 
was mosOy by the dedication and passion of its volunteers. Theatre activist and critic 
Wang Mo-lin (LIBERTY TIMES, 15/6/1996) called it'comrade theatre'. They placed 
emphasis on the comradeship within the group to push creativity further and to 
support each others artistic experiments. Therefore, material returns could be 
sacrificed for spiritual rewards. (WANG MO-LIN, 1999; 1-1 SHIH-MINGý 1996: 80-81) 
However, in the early 1990s, Wang Mo-lin (1992) declared that little theatre had died. 
He (1999) explained to me that he drew this conclusion because he regarded little 
theatre as a movement Once the characteristic of 'theatre of action' faded, he gave 
his verdict. Chi Wei-jan (1999) agreed Wth him and crificised little theatre for losing 
its 'counter-cultural' role. However, Chung Mingder (1996 a: 176-177) criticised Wang 
for being too narrow-minded in confining little theatre's role to that of a political 
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movement, and ignoring its other achievements, such as its educational and 
promotional function. 
As far as avant-garde theatre was concerned, I think Wang Mo-lin's verdict was fair. 
Since the revolution succeeded, it was only natural that this 'theatre of action' should 
die out After the 1990s, things started to change. 
6.6. The third stage (1992-1999) 
6.6.1. New generation emerged 
After 1992 when a new parliament was elected for the first time, the curtain fell on the 
final act of the political theatre movement. Many little theatre groups either dissolved 
or stopped performing. (LI SHIH-MINQ 1996) These changes indicated the end of a 
revolutionary era. Some of its members left and got into more mainstream theatres 
and lnstitutionsý2, some managed to get state funding, and some went into politics. 
Most political theatre activists concluded that the decline of liftle theatre was caused 
by disillusion and blamed themselves for being too naIve and idealistic in the late 
1980s. (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999; LI HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999) However, Wang Mo-lin 
believed, there were actually two crucial reasons undermining the progress of 
political theatre: 
Firstly, the National Theatre set up its own Experimental Theatre in 1990. This 
was the first move made by state apparatus to incorporate the radical force 
- 
little theatre. Secondly, theatre groups had only simple political ideas, could do 
no more than 'describe problems' or'declare social injustice'. It was the fatal 
62 Ll Huan-hsiung is now the Senior Manager of the Classical Music Department of EMI, 
Taiwan; Chou I-ch'ang runs a DPP county's theatre; Liu Ching-min leads the U Theatre, which 
has become a mufti-million dollar business. 
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weakness of Taiwan's theatre. They did not have their own political discourse or 
agenda. It was the lack of core ideologies* that failed then. (WANG MO-LIN, 
1999) 
Between 1992 and 1994, most political theatre groups were inactive. It was a period 
of transition, full of self-doubt and self-examination. Even the most active theatre 
groups withdrew from performance or participating in events, and started to put more 
effort on artistic development especially training. (CHN MEI-MAO, 1996a) For 
example, the U theatre recuperated and focused on developing a new body language 
and training system; Left Bank started its research on Taiwan's untold history in the 
20th century (e. g. interviewed victims of the 228 Incident). Most of all, they shifted 
concern from political issues back to their original interest: theatrical form. 
By the mid-1 990s, apart from some political theatre groups that remained, this 
recuperation period offered a good chance for a new generation to emerge. These 
younger members of the theatre did not have any particular political belief or 
historical interest They were mostly postmodernist, new-age youngsters who grew 
up with MTV, computers, video games and the internet. Their emergence brought 
e-generation culture into Taiwanese theatre. 
Some called it the'post-modem generation' (CHUNG MINGDER, 1992,1994; CHI 
WEI-JAN, 1999; CHN MEI-MAO, 2000a; LI HUAN-HSIUNG, 2000) indicating its 
multifaceted, fun-loving and non-uniform characteristics. Typical new groups were 
Taiwan Walker (started in 1991 by Ch'6n Mei-mao), Golden Bough Theatre (started in 
1993 by Wang Rong-yu), and Xi banzi. There was no single issue that concerned 
every group. Their interests differed from one to another, including topics such as 
sexuality, music, Taiwan's indigenous culture, body language, theatre forms, feminist 
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issues, and community development. Different characteristics showed not only 
between groups, but also, sometimes within a group. 
In general, there were three types of theatre at this stage: mainstream theatre (such 
as Performance Workshop, Pin-Fong, Godot), community theatreP (such as Sweet 
Com Field in Hsinchu, Nanfeng in Kaohsiung, Tainan Jen in Tainan, and Gongjiao in 
Taifung), and little theatre (such as U, Golden Bough, and Taiwan Walker). 
Compared vvith the first two, the little theatre was usually the most ignored category 
in state funding and least likely to be subsidised. However, the younger theatre 
generation held a much pragmatic attitude towards funding, which the theatre groups 
in previous periods would never adopt They were better and quicker than the 
previous generations at joining in the resource-sharing mechanisms, and fighting for 
support. 
For example, Taiwan Walker united some little theatre groups and formed a'Taipei 
Little Theatre Alliance' in 1996. They were supported by Ch'6n Shui-bian, then Taipei 
City Mayor, and took over an unused property owned by the City Government to set 
up Chungch6ng trhf6nchCj rPIE=ftR, a small venue suitable for little theatre 
performances. The city government provided them with not only funding to refurbish 
the venue, but also part of the annual budget to run the place. (CHN MEI-MAO, 
2000a) 
Wang Mo-lin said, 'The younger generation know how to play the 'game'. Once the 
63 The emergence of community theatre owed much to the growing awareness of 
Taiwanese-ness. In 1991, the CCA introduced a new policy to encourage community arts in 
response to the suggestions given in the First National Culture Convention in 1990. (SU 
KUEI-CHIH, 1999) Because of its character of involving local people and reflecting local 
issues, theatre was chosen to improve the local cultural environment. 
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name of 'Alliance'was provided, the legitimacy created by representing a group of 
people enabled them to get funding in an open and aboveboard manner, and take a 
bigger share of the state resources. " 
The attitude of accepting funding has generally changed, even among the 
once-rebellious and politically critical little theatre groups. Ll Huan-hsiung found the 
atmosphere vvithin Left Bank had changed, when he directed two works" in 1998. It 
was a completely different experience from ten years before. He said: 
The productions in 1998 cost ten times more than ten years ago; half of the 
budget was spent on personnel. In the past we worked over half a year and no 
one thought about getting 'paid'. Material reward was never an issue. For the 
younger generation nowadays, it is different There is no such thing as 
'comradeship' or'self-sacrifice' any more. (LI HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999) 
6.6.2. Indigenisation trend 
Little theatre in the late 1980s became a term indicating a theatre style not only 
subverting old values, but also challenging theatre conventions. Both the performing 
method of realist theatre and the Beijing-accent Mandarin, inherited from hualu 
tradition, were challenged. Taiwan's theatre started to introduce indigenous elements. 
First, change was made in the language. Minnan yu was used in many theatre 
productione. As well as this, theatre dealt with local issues and stories, and 
absorbed folk arts to increase local essence, or to emphasise locality. 
64 These two plays were Xugou fewng jjffjjRff(A Flight Over the Fictional Clouds) and Xing 
zhi anyong 2000 9_; 
_!, Offffj 2000 (Shimmering the Stars - Nights with Anarchist Ghosts from 1920s, Taipei). (LI HUMA, 2000) 
65 Using Minnan yu as the main dialogue began with Godot's Tahvan Fkst in 1989. 
Since then, many theatre groups have used Minnan yu in their plays. For example, New Cool 
Theatre which evolved from the Pailingying(OIZIK') Taiwanese Arts Research 
Group, dedicated themselves to promoting Taiwanese dialects. In addition, many other local 
languages were also used in theatre. 
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Most of all, the common character of the theatre at this stage was the transformation 
of body language., However, the impact of the body liberation was usually overlooked. 
Before the lift of martial law, many restrictions on the body were imposed, inhibiting 
people! s body language, behaviour, and dress codes. 
Many codes of conduct had been imposed as moral manners, either to inhibit or 
regulate daily behaviour, for example restrictions on students' hairstylee, manners 
of daily lifeF, or the uniforms that civil servants! o and members of the state 
apparatus were encouraged to wear (e. g. attendants in the banks or post office, or 
school teachers). Certain behaviour was classified as lascivious, such as shaking 
your legs, putting hands on other peopWs shoulders, flirting or eyeing people, raising 
voices or laughing loudly in public, making faces, or wearing revealing clothes. Those 
behaving in such a manner were described as loose in morals, or lacking education. 
Wang Mo-lin described the situation as the "body under martial IaWl. (1996) 
As a result, body language in Taiwanese arts was also inhibited and closely guided. 
For example, Dance Departments in higher education only taught Chinese ethnic 
dances to promote 'traditional Chinese culture'while Taiwan's aboriginal dances and 
folk dances were excluded. 
The promotion of the outdated realist huaju form was another example. (WANG 
66 In the past, students (before entering the university) had to follow hair regulations and wore 
dull and conservative uniforms. The boys needed to shave their heads, and all gids had a bob 
style, so short that it could not exceed the ears. As to student uniforms, gids' skirts should be 
longer than knee length, and boys were not allowed to wear flared trousers. 
67 Such regulations were promoted mostly through schools, such as The necessary 
knowledge of the modem citizen's life (promoted In 1968) or Examples of proper manners of 
rod citizenship (promoted in 1970). (Also see Chapter 2) 
It was common for civil servants to wear a Zhongshan suit(q3l-UR1) before martial law was' 
lifted. The Zhongshan suit is a kind of Chinese tunic suit, which was favoured by Sun Yat-sen. 
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MO-LIN, 1996: 106) Huaju format (both vocal and body languages, and acting 
method) dominated post-war Taiwanese theatre, film and television. It not only 
demonstrated how the Taiwanese should view themselves visually, but also 
influenced the ways in which the Taiwanese carried themselves physically, since 
there were no alternatives available. 
According to Wang Mo-lin (1992,1996: 101-117), the liberation of body in fact 
accelerated the liberation of mind. He believed, it was as important as political 
liberation. Especially because people hardly noticed that their bodies and behaviour 
were controlled and monitored by the state, the hidden politics of body language was 
even less noticeable. 
The trend of searching for a Taiwanese body language emerged in the 1990s. This 
trend was mainly inspired by Grotowski's concept of 'poor theatre" (CHN 
MEI-MAO, 1996a; HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997) and the growing Taiwanese awareness. 
U Theatre was the first theatre group trying to construct its subjectivity through a new 
body language. (Ll HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999; WANG MO-LIN, 1996: 108) Liu Ching-min 
studied with Grotowski in America in 1985, and was encouraged by Grotowski to find 
her own interpretation of Taiwanese body language. (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999) 
In the early 1990s, U Theatre had spent a long time exploring all different sources 
Civil servants usually wore them on official occasions. 69 What is a 'poor theatre'? In Grotowski's view, "theatre could e)dst without make-up, 
costume, d6cor, a stage even, lighting, sound effects, it could not exist without the relationship 
of actor and spectator. This essential act, this encounter between two groups of people 
... 
r1s] 
called Poor Theatre. " (ROOSE-EVANS. 1991: 147) Because of his belief in the power of 
actors, the training technique in Grotowski's poor theatre was most demanding on performers. 
For him, "Rhe] actor is a high pdest who creates the dramatic liturgy and 
... 
guides the 
audience into the expedence... Actors must leam to use his role as if it were a surgeon's 
scalpel to dissect himself. " (ROOSE-EVANS. 1991: 147) 
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fmm folk art, such as Taiwan Cheguxi ftýM(cart-clrum xJ), Beiguan A, Tai chi, 
bajiajiang "W, and Zen contemplabon. In 1993 they gradually developed a 
stylised performing method dravving inspiration from Cantonese Lion-dance 
drumming techniques. According to Ch6n Mei-mao (1996a: 132), U's use of 
drumming was similar to a collective ritual ceremony. Not only did it easily place the 
performers into a state of trance, but also excited the audiences into a condition of 
ecstasy. ''I. I. I; *1 
Inspired by Grotowski, many little theatre started to adopt folk art and traditional xiqu 
performing techniques, and indigenised GrotowskFs training method. Taiwan Walker 
started to add Tai-chi, acrobatics, and a lot of elements of common peopWs 
entertainmenel to its training. Golden Bough Theatre borrowed the performing 
method of Cheguxi and Gezabd techniques; Gang-a Tsui Theatre transformed itself - 
from learning xiqu techniques enriching its performing ability into a modem Nanguan 
group dedicated to this old xiqu form; Mei Deng Feng Theatre used local pensioners 
to play their own life stories; Tainan Jen Theatre, New Cool Theatre and Fun Theatre 
all emphasised the use of Minnan yu. (CCA; 2001c; CHtN MEI-MAO, 1996a) 
The rise of community theatre was another way of expressing Taiwanese awareness 
in theatre. In 1991, the CCA provided five local theatre groups NT$ 2 million each to 
encourage professionalism. (SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999) Many theatre people from Taipei 
70 Performers, with painted faces, paraded along with the touring Gods (mostly they 
accompany the Wufu Emperor HQt; 0, but sometimes the local god of the land ±tjý as 
well) acting as their guards in religious parades and ceremonies. They dress like generals, 
dancing and pacing in a formulated manner (qixing bu the Plough steps), sometimes in 
a trance condition. (CHOU MING, 2000) 
71 Taiwan Walker deliberately used many elements of 'common people's entertainment'. For 
example, they recreated the huache show/strip show (see chapter 5 footnote 53) scene or 
local entertainment (usually mixed with erotic dance and gestures); imitated dodgy vendors in 
temple fairs selling medicines with sexy assistants and sexual performances; or sometimes 
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were attracted to the countryside to set up new groups in order to get funding 72 
. 
Although this scheme stopped in 1995P, community theatres had taken roots locally, 
and become an important part of the Taiwanese theatre scene. Indigenous culture 
and local concerns have now become easier to express. 
All these changes in theatre indicated the urge to find a unique way to represent the 
Taiwanese. By drawing inspiration from folk arts and the xiqu tradition, and building 
up a Taiwan-centric mentality, Taiwan's theatre tried to construct Taiwanese 
subjectivity, and move Taiwan from its peripheral place to the centre. 
6.6.3. Individualism and playfulness 
The original concerns of the late-1 980s 
- 
human rights, democracy, social justice, 
freedom of sexuality 
- 
were replaced by self-interest issues in the 1990stheatre. Ma 
Sdn criticised little theatre at this stage for "losing its grounding", and mocked it for 
"shocking for shock! s sake". (1996: 25-26) Huang Hui-min described their 
characteristic as "playful, jolly, funny and individualist. (1997: 68) Li Huan-hsiung 
(1999) felt that the younger theatre generation could not open up new dimensions, 
nor add depth to discussions of issues such as sexuality, feminism, and Taiwanese 
identity. Instead, their works showed a more personal aspect. (LU HSI EN-MA,. 1 995) 
They did not care about'reform', 'social justice', or any ideological issues. Chi 
Wei-jan (1999) concluded that what they were after was pure'fun'. Because of this 
used working class language, etc. (CCA, 2001c) 72 For example, Sweet Corn Field in Hsinchu was set up by theatre graduates from the 
National Institute of Arts; Tait'ung's GongJiao Theatre was set up by Lanling veteran Cho Ming. 73 Ch'6n Chi-nan, the deputy chairman of the CCA, objected to this scheme. He thought it 
encouraged refinement, which was not the CCA's intention. (SU KUEI-CHIH, 1999) Therefore, 
the scheme was replaced by the Community Construction Movement. 
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fun-loving nature, everything was like a carnival., ,- 
-- .--. 
- ,, ý-,, i'' ý '- 
They especially liked joint perfoffnances (chuanyan $M) to celebrate their 
differences and particular interests, such as homosexuality, bad taste, and specific, 
. 
cultural interests. (MA SlIN, 1996: 25-26; HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997: 66-69) In 1994, 
Tianmimi EVE caf6 theatre held theJanuary, Liftle Theatre in Tianmimi' event. After 
this, - little theatre festivals became a fashion, such as the Crown Mini Festival (1994); 
Man-man, Woman-woman, New Culture 
- 
Homosexual Special (1995); Fourth 
,, 
Grade Superstar Festival (1995); Taiwan Comrades74 Festival (1995); and the , -, 
Gengxin Festival (1997). They were described by Chi Wei-jan as having a fancy but 
hollow approach. "For the younger generation, holding performances was like 
, 
organising dababai)izff-ff (grand temple worship) and having orgies. The goal is to 
'have fun'. Therefore, these events were big, flashy, vulgar, loud, yet empty. " (CHI ;-, 
WEI-JAN, 1999) 
Generally speaking, little theatre had lost its anti-institutional,, non-mainstream, and 
counter-cultural position. (CHI WEI-JAN, 1999) The combination of carelessness, 
bad taste, sex and nudity, loose collage, and shock effect, demonstrated a seemingly 
post-modem chaos. Alongside the strong-growing indigenisation trend and 
fragmented foreign concepts, Taiwan's theatre showed a strange hybddity's. It was 
described as'altemative% (HUANG HUI-MIN, 1997)'post-modemisf, (CHUNG 
74 After the issue of homosexuality had been aired and gradually accepted around the early 
Mr, 
-I, -1990s, homosexuals started to call themselves tongzhi ,,, - comrades. 75 The concept and training method of Poor Theatre' became influential in Taiwan's theatre 
from the late 1980s. Alongside this revolution in body language, the post-modemist concept 
was also introduced by Chung Mingder in the mid-I 980s. Taiwan's little theatre had freely and 
unselectively absorbed and used fragments of western theatre trends. Consequently, it 
showed an unintentional post-modem chaos in theatre works. Ma Un (1994) called it "the 
second wave of theatre westernisation". 
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MINGIDER, 1996a) or even as the "little-little theatre of individualism". (WANG 
MO-LIN, 1996: 111-112) 
6.7. Money rnafters 
6.7.1. Incorporation conspiracy 
The subtle changes of losing its ant-establishment nature and counter-cultural 
position had a lot to do with the construction of the state funding system. In Wang 
Mo-lin's view (1999), there were two stages of little theatre's incorporation by the 
state. When the National Theatre set up Experimental Theatre to attract avant-garde 
theatre76, Wang Mo-lin (1999) believed, it was a'passive move'forlittle theatre to join 
in the establishment. 
In October 1994, the Renjian Festival )J1,111JR, held by the CCA and the China 
Times, was considered the watershed for the development of little theatre. (WANG 
MO-LIN, 1999; CHOU I-CH'ANQ 1999) It was the first time that the state apparatus 
and mainstream media had ever got involved in'promoting little theatre'77 
. 
Wang 
Mo-lin (1999) saw it as the second stage of incorporation, and the key threshold of 
little theatre development. 
76 Apart from the big theatre hall, the National Theatre also has a small black-box theatre, 
which was the best venue for experiments at that time. It started to hold an 'experimental 
theatre festival'in the early 1990s, which provided money, a venue, and all administrative 
support for experimental performances. Hence, it attracted applications from avant-garde 
9 oups. 
Five little theatre groups were invited: Critical Point Theatre Phenomenon, Taiwan Walker, 
Unicorn Performing Workshop Stalker Theatre %, YAAjqP! g, and Big and 
Small Theatre (dada xiaoxiao Yiren guan tt/jvj\j5),, M)- 
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Because of this festival, the issue of whether joining in and receiving funding denoted 
being incorporated vvithin the state was debated intensely in cultural circles., Of 
course, all the involved groups denied that they had been incorporated. However, the 
'incorporation conspiracy' (shoubian lun 
-a conspiracy theory of being 
incorporated by the authorities and the establishment) had been raised. This 
particular festival was regarded as the beginning of little theatre's surrender to money 
and the state. Also, their enthusiastic participation indicated their desire to get into 
the mainstream, and their anxiety to be recognised. 
During the festival period, many little theatre groups criticised those who joined in, 1, 
and protested outside of the venues holding banners accusing participants of being 
- 
incorporated and being bought off. - Even so, after the avant-garde theatres, 
experienced the sweetness of funding, many started to take initiatives to get into the, 
system of their own accord. Wang Mo-lin (1996: 115-116,1999) described it as the 
desire to "fuquan MM(regain the power)", because "little theatre did not want to be 
-- , 
marginalised any more". ý --- 1ý e. ý', 
The same year, many avant-garde groups united with mainstream groups setting up 
the 'Arts Alliance! to protest the secretive procedures of setting up the National 
Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF). They demanded an open and transparent, 
,,,: 
process of state funding, and asked for their fair share and involvement. (WANG 
MO-LIN, 1996: 115) In Taiwan's Modem Theatre Symposium held in 1996, the issue 
of 'incorporated theatre'was still the most controversial and heated topic. Even in the 
interviews I conducted in 1999, people in little theatre were generally uneasy of 
talking about it. (LI HUAWHSIUNGý 1999; CHOU I-CH'ANGý 1999; LIU CHING-MIN, 
1999) It had become the most common accusation among theatre groups and a long 
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unresolved confusion shadowing the theatre community. 
6.7.2. Culture network woven by the state 
In the late-1980s, the Legislators started to pay attention to state funding. According 
to Su Kuei-chih (1999), who was in charge of Parliament liaison, the most important 
issue for the Legislators was'how the subsidies were given'. Therefore, it was not an 
issue of how much money was spent, or whether it was enough or not, but how the 
money was distributed. Consequently, decision-making vvithin the funding 
mechanism became a political consideration, e. g. how to subsidise, who should 
decide, and what kind of art forms and ideologies were preferred 
The first official funding system was the Scheme to Foster Intemational Performing 
Groups imposed by the CCA in 1992. According to Li Huan-hsiung's analysis, " It was 
originally designed to foster the mainstream theatre; in other words, to suppress the 
possible surviving space for little theatre... (and) squeeze little theatre out of the 
market by helping mainstream theatres to grow stronger. " (1999) It was true that all 
the subsidised groups from the 1980s to the early 1990s were established 
mainstream groups, such as Lanling, Performance Workshop, Cloud Gate, and 
Contemporary Legend Theatre Workshop. In 1995, the CCA changed the selecting 
criteria of the scheme, spanning all kinds of groups, including community theatre and 
avant-garde theatre. After this, it became possible for avant-garde theatre to get 
funding, even though its proportion was small. 
Whenever little theatre faced the dilemma of taking funding, it was common to 
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self-justify by saying: "if Tien Ch'i-yQan took ie8, 'so could we". - (CHI WEI-JAN, 1999) 
, 
It was an action that little theatre in the 1980s would never have taken. Suddenly, not 
only did the younger generation of theatre fight to get funded, but those once 
rebellious political theatre activists also strove for state resources. 
The desire of fuquan (regaining the power) moulded the characteristic of little theatre 
after the mid-1990s. By the late 1990s, getting state funding became the norm. 
Instead of worrying about the accusation of 'being incorporated', the mainstream 
theatre ideology crept in and influenced how little theatre operated. Because of the, 
- 
desire to get funding, audience taste and official emphasis (such as: indigenous 
culture) became increasingly important. " (WANG MO-LIN, 1999)'ý, 
The construction of Taiwan's cultural apparatus and funding system was ý*-i-z, 
--, 
accomplished around the mid-1 990s. (See Chapter 4.6.2. ) The CCA and the NCAF 
-z 
were in charge of cultural resource distribution at central government level. Apart 
-- 
from the local cultural apparatus7g,. the Community Construction Movement also built 
a local cultural network nation-wide. Wang Mo-lin (1999) said with great suspicion, 
- , 
"Look at how perfectly the whole cultural system has been constructed and functions 
at eve I ry level. State apparatus has spread a dragnet from which there is no escape. 
- 
How can any'One scape from this? " 
.: 78 'rien Ch'i-yIJan had a high profile in little theatre. When,, rien joined the Renjian Festival in 
1994, he was severely criticised. However, he denounced the 'incorporation conspiracy'. In 
1996, his group (Critical Point Theatre Phenomenon) was chosen by the CCA as the 
International Performing Group. Since'rien's works had always been controversial and 
shocking, little theatre groups used his case to justify them taking money from the authorities. 
79 The Cultural Affairs Department of the Taiwan Provincial Government was set up on May, 
15 th 1997. Its establishment was clearly stated as Yocusing on promoting"and fostering '' 
Taiwan's culture and Taiwanese artists', (HONG IVING-CH'I, 1998; CULTURALAFFAIRS 
DEPARTMENT, 1997: 4-5) and also a deliberate act of cultural de-centralisation. 
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His observation was close to the fact Artists became dependent on state funding. 
According to the CCA's survey, (LIN KU-FANQ 2000: 134) among all the listed 
excellent performing groups, 31.27% of their financial sources came from 
- 
government funding. Box office incomes only accounted for half (54.06%) of their 
income. 
6.7.3. Money and recognition 
By the end of the 1990s, little theatre generally felt that there was no reason to 
'refuse' what they deserved to receive. Especially after the state subsidy structure 
was built, little theatre felt that they had finally earned their recognition and funding. 
Most groups believed that taking subsidies did not mean that they endorsed the 
dominant ideology or were controlled by the state. (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999; CHOU 
I-CH'ANQ 1999) However, their uneasiness about accepting funding was shown, by 
- 
'finger-pointing' at others, and emphasising their independence. 
For example, Liu Ching-min said: " It is governments responsibility to support the 
arts... I have never felt that I have to compromise what I did or wanted to do... (and) 
they cannot'touch'us any more, not like the old days. 
- 
" (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999) This 
kind of aftitude was shared by many (such as Chou I-ch'ang, Li Huan-hsiung, and 
Chi Wei-jan). They said that the state had never interfered since the 1990s, but rather 
only provided money"for the sake of public good". (CHOU I-CHANQ 1999) "if there 
was any impact on the theatre, I would say it was only financial, not ideological. " (1-1 
HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999) Chi Wei-jan also agreed, "The state had no influence on the 
theatre. The rule of the (resource-clistribution) game is 'I take the money and forget 
all about it'. " (CHI WEI-JAN, 1999) 
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Apparently, 'they all felt that little theatre did not care what the authorities thought and 
official opinions would not affect their works either. As to my questions about indirect 
. 
interference, their replies were the same: "I have never experienced any. " (1-1 
--, ý, -- 
HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999; CHOU I-CHANQ 1999; CHI WEI-JAN, 1999; LIU 
CHING-MIN, 1999) 
In contrast, the younger generation actually embraced the funding system. For 
example, the process of setting up Chungch6ng trhfC-nchO, an old property, 
- - 
belonging to the Taipei City Government that was turned into a theatre venue. In 
- 
order to gain support and finance to run the venue, Ch'6n Mei-mao, the chairman of ,, 
Taipei Little Theatre Alliance, had communicated extensively with city government ,-ý 
officials through personal emails. Between 1998 and 1999, he had written 6 to the 
Mayor Ma ing-chiu, 9 to the head of Culture Bureau Lung Ying-fai and 8 to 'Y 1: 1 
the head of Government Information Bureau Wu Huei-mei q,, VX. (CH'tN MEI-MAO, 
2000b) In these emails, Ch'bn Mei-mao not only pleaded forcefully for money and 
government support but also invited them, quite humbly, to attend performances and 
events held in the venue. -Iý 
Another typical attitude of the younger generation towards funding was demonstrated 
by the young director Hong Hong AM., He emphasised in a conference that the way 
out for W6)(s little theatre was "to attack and capture (the resources)" rather than "to 
reject and scorn". (WU CKOAWCH'ýNQ 1996: 265) 
In contrast to its previous rebellious image, 'Iiftle theatre after the mid-1 990s 
appeared to be "grateful" to the authorities and was proud of being subsidised. For 
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example, newly selected as an Excellent Performing Group in 1999, A banzi Theatre 
was thrilled, and claimed on the CCA web-site Cyberstage: Tahvan that being 
selected was "an honour'. Furthermore, "Xi banzi was finally recognised by the CCA 
in 1999 for our long-term endeavour, and won the Excellent Performing Group 
status... This honour encouraged us to have an even higher sense of responsibility 
and enthusiasm in promoting theatrical art. " (CCA, 2001 c) 
Among all the theatre veterans, the most interesting example was Wang Mo-lin. In 
many of his books, articles and interviews, he had been critical of the possibility of 
little theatre losing its independence. However, Wang joined in the game in 1998 for 
his production Tsou, Oedipusýo and claimed that he was 'playing the system'. (1-1 
HUAWHSIUNGý 1999) Although the others jokingly mocked him as'losing his 
virginity', he was genuinely proud of'playing the system'when I interviewed him. 
My production has set up a model for cultural exchanges between two sides of 
Taiwan Strait. I took money from both governments and I feel great. Originally, 
the performance was only staged on the mainland. It was Lin Ch'C-ng-chih [then 
chairwoman of the CCA] who wanted to show it in Taiwan as'part of her cultural 
achievement'. I did not ask for it; they came to me. It was different from the other 
productions that relied totally on state subsidies... However, Lin was clever to 
use me 
- 
the most righteous artist. (WANG MO-LIN, 1999) 
Even though some suspected a hidden agenda behind officia-I subsidies, no one was 
prepared or willing to give them up. There was only a small proportion of people who 
were aware of, and anxious about, the danger of taking subsidy. Even so, they could 
not afford to lose out since "everyone else was taking advantage of the system". (LI 
HUAN-HSIUNQ 2000) 
80 "Tsou, Oedipus" combined the story of Oedipus with the myth of the Tsou tribe -ffa(one of 
nine tribes of Taiwan's aborigines) and was played by aboriginal actors from two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait. It was staged first in Beijing from October 4thto 1 ()th 1 997. In 1999, the CCA 
bought the programme and put it on at the National Theatre. 
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However, Men state funding shifted its emphasis in 2001 to 'professionalism' (in 
other words, commercial theatre), they changed their tone. 
6.7.4. Who gets the money and why? 
Before a complete state funding system was finally constructed in the mid-1990s, the 
case-by-case, patchy state subsidies of the past were given according to ideological 
considerations. Therefore, before the little theatre was politically correel and 
. 
legitimised as 'avant-garde theatre', they were regarded as 'trouble-makers'. Su 
Kuei-chih explained: "Because little theatre seldom had written scripts, it was difficult 
to judge whether subsidy should be given or not... The best principle at that time was 
to'ignore'little theatre by encouraging productions with written scripts and a- 
reputation of 'healthy' and righteous ideology. " (1999) 
Because of the uncertainty, little theatre seldom got subsidy, even though they were 
not politically critical. While the political atmosphere loosened in the 1990s, the 
cultural apparatus had also made a U-turn on their policy and emphasised 
'indigenisation'. They started to notice the influence of little theatre and wanted to 
encourage the 'righteous groups' and 'correct ideologies' that could fit in this new 
focus. In order to vVin little theatre over into state control, the state funding system 
became better organised and more open. This move made the state increasingly 
important, becoming the biggest sponsor for little theatre. 
The distribution of state resources manifested the direction and focus of state cultural 
81 Uttie theatre in the late 1980s advocated free speech, democracy, social justice, and 
human rights. In the 1990s, the era embracing political freedom and celebrating Taiwanese 
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policy. No matter how open and fair the state funding system seemed to be, there 
would always be selection involved, Once there was a selection, there would be 
value judgement and ideological preference. Consequently, the kind of theatre and 
style that was most likely to get funding not only demonstrated the official preference 
at that time, but also determined the trend of productions seen in the theatre. For 
example, the selection criteda of the Scheme to Foster Intemational Perfwning 
GroUpS82 showed the official attitude of using the performing arts to explore 
diplomatic relationships. 
Originally, the scheme was set up to foster mainstream groups representing Taiwan, 
internationally. Among eight performing groups, there were only three theatres 
- 
one 
huaju group (Zhonghua Hansheng Theatre), one mainstream theatre (Performance 
Workshop), and one little theatre (U Theatre). Most of the selected groups were well 
established (such as Cloud Gate Dance Company). This situation lasted for 3 years. 
When the scheme was modified to include more groups, the number of theatre 
groups increased to five, most of which were still mainstream theatre (Performance 
Workshop, Pin-Fong, Paper Windmill, and newly emerged community theatre 
Taifung Theatre). The U was the only'little theatre'83 on the list. 
In fact, from 1992 to 2000, the number of theatre groups had increased almost five 
times, from 3 groups in 1992 to 14 in 2000. The number of little theatre groups did 
awareness, the ideology that little theatre advocated had become politically correct. 82 The Scheme to Foster Intemational Performing Groups was the most important and 
influential funding system in Taiwan's cultural environment supporting artists on a long-term 
basis. (LIN KU-FANQ 2000) Later, because of the shift of official emphasis, the scheme has 
been modified three times. However, it remains one of the most important schemes fostering 
the arts. (Also see Chapter 4.6.2. ) 
83 The U Theatre started as a little theatre group and worked hard on its method for training 
the body. However, over the years, the scale and business of the U grew dramatically. For 
many little theatre groups, whether or not the U should be categorised as 'little theatre'was a 
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not grow with the increasing budget or the growing number of subsidised groups. 
Because of their small box office returns and less commercial approach, their need- 
-- 
for financial support was desperate. However, money was put in mainstream theatre, 
rather than little theatre: Even though little theatre was regarded as the 'pioneer in 
, 
theatre aesthetics, (CHUNG MINGDER, -1992; WANG MO-LIN, 1992) it was obvious, 
that little theatre was not the priority in cultural policy.,. 
4,! 
"'>. "',! '' 
For example, over the years, the budget for the scheme and the number of % 
performing groups grew many times. However, not only did the meagre budget for 
little theatre go mostly to the U Theatre, but also the money spent on little theatre, 
- 
was actually reduced year after year. In 1995, when the scheme opened up more 
opportunities for more groups and styles, there was still only one little theatre (U 
. 
theatre) on the list, taking up less than 1/4 (24.21%) of the total theatre budget. (LIN 
KU-FANQ 2000: 107-111) ' 1.1. -.. ý, ýtý, 
What is more, the U had already become part of the establishment and thus its 
- 
status as a little theatre was in dispute. (CH'tN MEI-MAO, - 1996a) In 1996, the 
- -, 
Critical Point Theatre Phenomenon 84, was selected for funding. It was the first time 
- 
that little theatre had been awarded this 'status!. Symbolically, it was the beginning of 
the little theatre joining in state funding voluntarily, and of the state apparatus ý,, - 
accepting little theatre into its domain. (WANG MO-LIN, 1999) 
In 1998, when the scheme was changed to encourage 'excellence!, twelve theatre 
disputed issue. (CHEN MEI-MAO, 1996b; CHI WEI-JAN, 1999; LI HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999) 
84tien Ch'i-y0an's new work'Bai Shut jj*(White Water) gained him international fame in 
1994. Because of that, his group, Critical Point Theatre Phenomenon was included on the list. 
However, he died of AIDS in 1996 and the subsidy was stopped in 1997 because of the 
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groups were on the list, including five from mainstream theatre, three from 
community theatre, two from children's theatre, and two little theatre groups. Out of 
, 
NT$ 20.2 million that were spent on the theatre, little theatre took up only 15.34% of 
theatre budget (9.9% of the budget going to U and 5.45% to Golden Bough)., In 1999 
and 2000, the little theatre category included three groups: U, Golden Bough, and A 
banzi. However, excluding the well-established U, less than 10 % of the whole 
theatre budget was spent on little theatre. 
Many little theatre groups complained about the privilege of the U and claimed that it 
was not alittle theatre'group. (CHI WEI-JAN, 2000; CHEN MEI-MAO, 1996b) It was 
criticised for taking the little theatre quota of state funding and for turning into a 
'cultural model'85 similar to Cloud Gate and Contemporary Legend. Since 1993, the 
U willingly joined in many state celebrations such as the National Day parade, and 
. 
the Presidential inauguration ceremony. Hence, its close connection With the CCA 
and the state became even more problematic. 
Why was the U chosen as the cultural model? It was a decision based on political 
considerations. Its artistic achievement was recognised by its counterparts86, but 
most importantly, its artistic pursuit was timely 87 
. 
The CCA started to fund their Su M 
(Tracing Back) project around 1989. It was at first described by its artistic director Liu 
company's "uncertain future development". (LIN KU-FANGý 2000: 135) 
85 The goal of the scheme was to foster artists to represent Taiwan internationally. U was 
chosen when the scheme started in 1992. The chosen groups were considered able to 
present modem Taiwanese culture. Eventually, the scheme tried to "improve the diplomatic 
relationship as a whole". (LIN KU-FANQ 2000: 9-10) 86 Chi Wei-jan (1999) thought that U had strong sense of 'de-colonialism'; Huang Hui-min 
(1997: 87-88), Wang Mo-lin (1996), Ch'dn Mei-mao (11996), and Chou I-ch'ang (1999) all held 
U's artistic achievement in high esteem. 
91 Since 1989, U had endeavoured to absorb the quintessence of folklore and religious rituals 
of Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia. Their indigenous origin and ritual-like character have 
created a new style in Taiwanese performing methods. (CH'tN MEI-MAO, 1996a: 1131- 132) 
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Ching-min as'a project to "find the modem Chinese body language". (CHANG BI-YU, ý 
1989c) After two years of Su project, the CCA selected the U as one of the 
- 
'international performing groups'. It was chosen not because of its unique training 
method and gradually increasing reputation, but for its emphasis on the search for 'a 
modem Chinese body language. 
Around the mid-1 990s, the U started to change track and its goal was modified to 
'search for a Taiwanese body language'. (LIU CHING-MIN, 1999) 
As far as the state apparatus was concerned, the U was worth this investment. Not 
only were its training methods based on Taiwanese and Chinese folk arts, its focus 
on Taiwanese body language'also fitted in the current political trend. Hence, it was 
no surprise that U was the favourite 'little theatre' group, chosen to represent Taiwan. 
After many years' state funding, U had in fact developed into a multi-million Dollar 
.- 
business, which did not fit the 'little theatre' definition anymore. 
Another typical example of why state funding was given to little theatre was Left 
Bank! s production Zhang Qflang Wci=P5 in the 'Experimental Theatre Festival', of 1992. 
It was the only production for which Left Bank received full funding in fifteen years. 
Left Bank was told that the production was funded fully because it accidentally fitted 
in the theme of that year 
-'the Year for rehabilitating the 228 Incident'. (LI 
HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999) Little wonder that little theatre protested that state resources 
were extremely thin on the ground, unless there was some political consideration that 
would be 'useful' for the authorities. 
Although the funding list might vary each year, the tendency of funding mainstream, 
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conventional, and established groups remained. In addition, the rTaiwanisation' trend 
also took its toll on the cultural environment and became the dominant element in, 
funding criteria. Consequently, within a few years, the number of community theatre 
groupsP8 increased faster than little theatre. 
No matter how small a portion that little theatre took from state funding, compared 
with mainstream art forms and groups, the degree of its influence was much greater. 
Even meagre subsidies could make substantial differences. However, very little 
money was spent on little theatre. "Most funding was given to'established 
companies'- mainly mainstream and commercially sustainable theatre. I cannot see 
the need to subsidise them. " (CHOU I-CHIANQ 1999) 
According to Ch'dn Mei-mao (2000a), little theatre had always been treated unfairly 
. 
in the system. On average, less than 5% of the CCA's annual budget was available 
to little theatre in the 1990s, the same as twenty years ago. (WU CH'OAN-CH'ftNQ 
1996a: 262,265) 
6.8. Transition to the fourth stage 
6.8.1. Commercialisation 
It seemed to many of my interviewees that the idea of possible state interference or 
control was absurd. However, their fear of commercial interference was much more 
strongly acknowledged. 
88 Community theatre was encouraged even before the Community Construction Movement 
was launched. There was one community group (rait'ung Theatre) in the Scheme to Foster 
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Liu Ching-min (1999) admitted that she could ignore official opinions, but not the 
pressure from private sponsors. "Accepting governmental subsidy is different from t 
taking money from the private sector. Without any doubt we need to take their 
-- 
opinions and needs into account. " Chi Wei-jan (1999) also warned, "a greater threat 
is hidden behind the seemingly carefree surface. Both private sponsorship and the 
- 
speculation of audience taste could have undermined their creativity and 
independence. Commercialism has become the real threat for Taiwanese theatre. "7 
"ý - "I , -I 
Originally, audiences' reaction and box office returns were the two major concerns for 
the mainstream theatre. However, these concerns have gradually become the priority 
for almost all theatre groups in the 1990s. The pressure of boosting box office income, 
aftracUng audiences, and gaining recognition was immense, especially for new 
theatre groups. Severe competition within Taiwan's limited market worsened the , 
situation. Many groups adopted marketing strategies in order to compete for. -- 
relatively small audiences. (CHI WEI-JAN, 1999) As a result, consideration of how to 
attract audiences became more important than aesthetic pursuits. For example, what 
did audiences want from a performance? Who were the most likeable performers? 
What was the hottest topic addressed in this production that would attract audiences? 
What were pleasures that the audience had in theatre that would not be gained from 
watching TV or cable? 
Searching answers, every group developed its own promotional style and techniques. 
Performing Workshop formulated a combination of farce, famous comedians, and 
heavy PR pampaigns to achieve record box office; Pin-Fong, Green Ray and Godot 
International Performing Groups in 1995. By 2000, the number grew to four. 
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theatre groups set up subsidiary groups, in order to tour around remote areas, 
perform cheaply, and make their names known island-wide (LU CHIEWYINGý 1999); 
Green Ray held seminars on the internet for their fan club (CHOU HUI-LINQ 1999b: 
30); Paper Mill held children's theatre workshops in order to foster a basic fan club 
from an early age, and extended its business as a production company organising 
official festivals and events. (1-1 YOANG-FLNQ 2001) 
Amongst all, Godot Theatre was considered the most ruthless in terms of the tactics 
it adopted to expand audiences. It created its own web-site, set up an on-line box 
office and chat-room. Furthermore, Godot even let the audiences vote for the 
outcome of the new production and choose their favourite actors. (CHI WEI-JAN, 
1999; Ll HUAN-HSIUNQ 1999) 
For many theatre managers, fund-raising and private sponsorship were important, 
and writing proposals was a basic survival skill. The senior Gezaixi group director Liu 
Chung-yQan (LIN KU-FANGý 2000: 144) complained about this'proposal culture'that 
dominated the Taiwanese theatre community. Lacking the ability to present a 
well-written proposal would be fatal in terms of getting funding. 
6.8.2. Waging war 
When the DPP President Ch'6n Shui-bian took office in May 2000, he assigned 
pianist ChC-n Yu-hsiu and Lo Wdn-chie to chair the CCA, in charge of constructing 
89 The CCA chairwoman Ch'dn Yu-hsiu WW* was a DPP member and the wife of the DPP 
Legislator Lu Hsiu-I a P,, 
-. 
The Deputy Chairman Lo Wdn-chia was the leader of the student 
movement in the NTU in the late 1980s. During the 1990s, Lo became Ch'8n Shui-bian's 
personal advisor and spokesman during Ch'dn's Taipei mayor tenure. Their appointment 
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a new culture for the new government The first major cultural policy that the new 
. -, 
-,, 
government imposed was to modify the funding scheme, encouraging the 
-I 
professional management of artistic groups. 
After five months' consultation, the Schen7e to Foster PL-rfbiming Groups was 
announced in October 2000 and took away the emphasis on 'excellence'. Instead, 
-- 
the purpose of the new scheme, according to the CCA deputy chairman Lo WC-n-chia, 
was to foster a professional performing arts environment and its artists. The selection 
criteria of the scheme stipulated the companies must have at least three years history, 
one artistic director, at least have 3 full-time employees, and the ability to have at , 
least one production and certain number of performances each year.,.. (CCA, 2001 d) 
When the scheme was announced, some expressed their worries, because the little 
theatre, 'which was operated on the basis of comradeship rather than being 
managerially-oriented, would lose out in this new scheme. (CHI WEI-JAN, 2001) 
- 
Their worries were proven correct. 
The CCA announced the chosen groups of the new scheme in January 2001. Its total 
budget increased from less than NT$ 83 million in 2000, to over NT$120 million in 
2001. The number of subsidised groups also rose from 65 to 71. In theory, artists 
should have been very happy. In reality, little theatre was totally defeated. It angered 
the little theatre community and stirred up debates., - 
(especially Lo's) demonstrated the importance of cultural affairs for the new government. Lo 
left the CCA in February 2001 to run for Legislative election. Dr. Wu Mi-ch'a krI%, Z9,, assistant 
professor in the History Department of the NTU, took over. He was also an active member in 
the DPP and the Taiwan Association of University Professors (-dzM Alotaiffl. 
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What was going wrong? Out of 35 theatre applications, there were 16 theatre groups 
chosen, mainly mainstream commercial theatre. Even the most favoured U was 
almost excluded. The convener of theatre adjudicators, Ma S6n, announced at the 
press conference that the result was not satisfying even for the adjudicators 
themselves. However, they had to follow the criteria set by the CCA. His analysis of 
why little theatre was left out was that the new regulations placed priority on each 
group's 'managerial ability' (60% of the assessment). Moreover, he implied that the 
little theatre had low artistic standard (40% of the total mark) which failed them in the 
process. (TS'Al JO-CHIN, 2001a) This sort of comments 
- 
little theatre was crude 
and poor 
- 
was a familiar criticism from the theatre people who had a traditional 
drama background. (HOU CH'I-P'INQ 1992; OU YING-CHUAN, 1989) 
This remark stirred up a heated debate. (YO KUO-HUA, 2001; CHI WEI-JAN, 2001; 
MA SEN, 2001; TS'Al JO-CHIN, 2001b; CHUNG CHIAO, 2001) Many condemned 
the adjudicators for being prejudiced and argued that they had never seen any little 
theatre work. In addition, their definition of 'artistic standard' was questionable, 
because most adjudicators came from a similar background and had a similar 
'preference' for mainstream theatre. It was obvious that little theatre would be 
marginalised and driven out of the framework of 'resource distribution'. 
Moreover, the question of 'how the adjudicators were chosen' was raised. Since most 
of them came from a literary background, many had strong connecfions with the 
huaju tradition. Worst of all, one of the adjudicators, Huang Ying-hsiung XXX, was 
the head of a newly chosen group (Gengxin Experimental Theatre). (CHI WEI-JAN, 
2001) Little wonder that little theatre groups were furious about their biased position 
and challenged their professional judgement. After being criticised, Ma S&n 
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complained that it was unfair to attack him, "it is nonsense for them to blame the 
referee for losing the ball game". (MA SN, 2001) 
Finally, the angry protests of the little theatre pressed the CCA to hold a meeting to 
explain itself, to apologise and to pacify little theatre by offering other funding 
opportunities. Chairwoman Ch'6n Yu-hsiu also promised that the CCA would 
reconsider the scheme the following year. (TSAI JO-CH IN, 2001 b) 
The dispute between reactionary forces and the young radical theatre groups 
developed further into a debate on theatre aesthetics that is still on-going. The little 
- 
theatre groups united within a few days and petitioned the CCA, pressing Ch'6n 
Yu-hsiu to reconsider the scheme. More importantly, it triggered a heated debate 
causing little theatre to rethink its counter-cultural role, and the meaning of 'little 
theatre'. After furious email discussion and media debate, members of the little II 
theatre proposed to rename themselves the 'micro theatre', in order to redefine their 
anti-establishment position. (WEI YING-CHOAN, 2001) An aesthetic battle was 
., 
declared against the dominant and mainstream theatre tradition, as was the need to 
examine its own tendency to move gradually towards conformity and incorporation., 
Summary 
The development of contemporary theatre in Taiwan embodied the change in the ý 
cultural environment and manifested the complicated love-hate relationship between 
artists and the state. On the one hand, because the theatre responded to cultural 
-- 
policy enthusiastically, governmental promotion, including funding and official 
recognition, could directly influence and indirectly encourage the development of 
, 
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certain artistic trends, art forms, and styles. For example, because money was 
poured into communities, community theatre boomed as a result. On the other hand, 
external factors such as political and social conditions, cultural change, or bottom-up 
protests, could also pressurise official policy to change. For example, the antagonism 
towards China re-ignited with the 1994 Qiandao Lake Incident, and was intensified by 
the missile threat in 1995. Consequently, the emphasis of cultural policy shifted 
swiftly from a China-centrism to indigenisation within two years. 
Since the state funding system was set up, it was obvious that only two kinds of 
theatre were subsidised: the mainstream theatre that most policy-makers could 
recognise and make sense of, and the non-mainstream theatre that scholars such as 
Dr. Wu Jing Jyi, Dr. Chung Mingder and Dr. Ma S6n recommended as 'artistic! or 
intellectual. The selection criteria of state funding demonstrated what kinds of theatre 
were officially approved and supported. Apart from the populist approach of the 
mainstream theatre, the selection of the academics showed another bias. These 
scholars were mostly established drama theorists, or professors in theatre 
departments. Their 'selection' manifested their literary preferences and tastes. Their 
position enabled them to reproduce their values and reinforce discourses that they 
proposed and disseminated. 
In the cultural circuit, cultural regulation is an official attempt to produce meanings. 
By funding or supporting selected artists, the state encouraged cultural communities 
to produce officially desired artworks and to reinforce the representation system that 
the authorities wanted to create and maintain. It was not only whom and what they. 
chose that mattered, but more importantly, what the authorities did not choose and 
why. It was a subtle trap, which was invisible to most people. 
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Once the funding network was constructed, the cultural apparatus gained more 
power to decide what kinds'of meaning could be produced. Compared with the 
totalitarian control in the 1950s and 1960s, this was much more subtle and indirect, 
but more effective and yet invisible. 
Because cultural policy has become so important in formulating the 'meanings' that 
no modem state can do without the cultural apparatus becomes the best patron for 
the arts, more tolerant and less demanding than commercial sectors. However, the 
sudden change of funding regulations in 2001, the Schem to Foster FL-ffofming 
-- 
Groups, was a good example of how the state tried to influence the meaning 
production process through funding. When the state apparatus set up its own 'artistic 
standard' and official priorities, arfists finally realised that state cultural control was 
always there., 
All interviewees scorned the suggestion that they might be influenced by the , 
authorities. Most of them did not give a second thought about why they were chosen 
to be funded, why the others were not and what were the differences between them. 
The 'selection' made between different values, ideologies, and styles was a subtle 
but conscious process of choice and exclusion. In fact, all cultural policies 
- 
giving 
funding and recognition, setting up funding systems and cultural institutions, 
encouraging certain kinds of art forms and styles, and giving official recognition 
- 
could have a crucial impact on framing the cultural framework. Once a group or artist 
was funded, it was difficult to avoid conforming to or taking up official values both 
directly and indirectly. 
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Of course, cultural communities were not simply passive receivers of top-down 
policies. For example, the development of theatre from the mid-1 980s demonstrated 
its ability to challenge the official line, to advocate social and political change, and to 
initiate actions to make a difference. Apart from the example of the political theatre 
movement, the joint protest against the new Scheme to Foster PL-rforming Groups in 
2001 also displayed little theatWs power to subvert top-down policy, and resumed 
their critical role. 
Through the actions of joint protest and making alliances, little theatre leamt to use 
its potential power to challenge the official line. After their forceful campaign, little 
theatre pressurised the authorities to reconsider the scheme, or at least prevented 
the authorities from imposing policy wilfully. Their successful experience of 
networking and cooperating on the intemet empowered them to rejoin the struggle for 
cultural hegemony and reconsider their course. At this moment, a war to seize the 
right to interpret and establish Taiwanese modem theatre aesthetics is being waged, 
a fight to win discourse in theatre. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this research, I have been concerned Wth the politics of cultural policy, and how I. - 
the processes of meaning production have influenced our sense of belonging, 
-i 
shaped our values, and regulated our conduct and ways of Iffe. Through the 
examination of how culture was regulated in Taiwan, I looked not only at the cultural 
., 
change in Taiwan, but also intended to gain a general understanding of the role of 
cultural policy in the culture-building process. 
During the course of this research, I have noticed that similar changes in cultural 
policy and a greater official emphasis on constructing culture and cultural identity 
have also appeared elsewhere, e. g. in the UK. Cultural regulation has become a 
crucial public arena for different political camps to seize hegemony and Win the right 
to write culture. Although this thesis is concerned with the relationship between 
cultural policy and identity change in Taiwan, I also found a universality in Taiwan's 
case. 
This research has two aspects. One concerns the shiffing Taiwanese identity, and the 
other, the politics of cultural policy and its potential on culture building. Before this 
research, Taiwan's cultural change and volatile identity crisis in the 1990s had never 
been examined. Issues such as how cultural hegemony was gained and how the 
I 
indigenisation trend came about were never tackled. The changing nature of cultural 
policy and its possibility to produce meaning had also been overlooked. 
Before the 1980s, a centralised military regime in Taiwan was effectively maintained 
by stringent cultural control, a forceful education system, and successful economic 
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development. People in Taiwan were taught to believe that they represented the 'true 
Chinese'and that the ROC was the only legitimate Chinese government It was not 
until the 1980s that the old KMT ideology was challenged, and the search for 
Taiwanese identity became an important issue for the greater majority of people in 
Taiwan. 
As communication across the Strait increased, the gap between 'us' and 'them' 
became obvious. Even so, the majority of people in Taiwan ten years ago still 
perceived themselves as 'Chinese'. (See Appendix 1) The situation started to change 
in 1994, when for the first time the figure of those who identified themselves as 
'Taiwanese' outnumbered those considering themselves'Chinese". 
In the debates on Taiwanese identity during the early 1990s, the most common issue 
was 'who are the Taiwanese'. Many debates argued a notion of Taiwanese identity on 
the basis of race, history, political regime, geographical connection, and culture. It is, 
in fact, constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth. In other words, 
cultural identity is 'a positioning' rather than 'an essence. (HALL, 1990) Because 
some took Taiwanese identity as'a fixed origin', (CHANG MAO-KUI, 1993) searching 
for the same fixed identity was an impossible task. The ever-changing nature of 
cultural identity was overlooked in this debate, and the possibility of its being 
culturally constructed was also ignored. 
Theoretically, this ever-changing positioning can be influenced, modified or even 
1 This number of people who identified themselves as 7aiwanese' had increased dramatically. 
It outnumbered the group who considered themselves 'Chinese' in 1994 for the first time, and 
soon became the dominant group in 1996. (See Appendix 1) 
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reconstructed. It is exactly the complexity and flexibility of 'cultural identity' that 
makes the debate on Taiwanese identity complicated and confusing. During an 
unpredictable and uncertain period such as the 1990s, Taiwan's cultural policy could 
, 
have played a crucial role in maintaining the old ideology, or constructing a new 
identity and dominant discourse. Yet the KMT government failed to address this 
issue or to make use of the rising opportunity of the transition period. In 2000, the 
KMT lost not only cultural hegemony, but also political leadership. 
This reversal of cultural identity in the mid-1 990s not only demonstrated how a new 
identity was constructed; but also displayed the shift of 'position' and the replacement 
of different versions of narratives of the past. This journey of searching for and 
building Taiwanese identity became an indigenous cultural revolution. Consequently, 
it triggered the overturn -of oldvalues and reversed cultural hegemony. Although the 
focus of this research was placed on cultural policy, the purpose was to find out how 
change in culture came about. There are several factors that I identified that led to 
identity reversal and the overthrow of old discourse. 
Firstly, cultural change usually takes place in a period of crisis, especially where 
external hostility is a factor. Under the threat of crisis, people would be most likely to 
act as an entity, uniting under a shared goal and fighting against whatever the 
'enemy' might seem to be. This happened several times in Taiwanese history. For 
example, because of the military threat from the PRC in the 1950s and 60s, the KMT 
successfully implemented thought control to reinforce national security and launched 
the anti-Communist campaign to unite people in Taiwan. 
When Taiwan suffered diplomatic setbacks and international isolation in the 1970s, a 
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trend of searching for cultural roots emerged. Taking advantage of this, the KIVIT 
government encouraged this trend to reinforce Chinese cultural roots, and took it as 
the ideological cement with which to build 'national confidence'. The impact of the 
Qiandao Lake Incident (1994) and the PRC's missile threat (1995-96) was another 
example. Not only did the support for the old China-centric ideologies subside 
dramatically within two years (1994-96), but also Taiwanese awareness thrived. In 
response, cultural policies since the mid-1990s emphasised indigenous culture. 
Secondly, big changes that come about in culture rely mainly on changing meaning in 
the cultural circuit a process of establishing a new discourse and becoming 
dominant. In the struggle of gaining the power to produce meanings, both 
intellectuals and the education system play an indispensable role because of their 
involvement in producing knowledge and reproducing values. Since knowledge not 
only produces meanings, but also regulates social practice, constrain behaviour, and 
constructs 'a regime of truth', it is the site that all social forces strive to occupy and 
control. 
In TaiwarYs case, the process of Taiwanisation in the 1990s was a successful 
example of producing new meanings in the struggle for cultural hegemony. Before 
martial law was lifted in 1987, anything related to Taiwan had always been taken as 
subordinate or inferior to China, and the issue of Taiwanese independence was an 
inconceivable taboo. In the mid-1980s, huge change in Taiwanese political, 
economical and social spheres had fundamentally shaken and challenged the old 
KIVIT discourse. An opportunity for establishing a new representation system arose. 
However, the cultural apparatus could not cope with the change, nor take the chance 
to transform the once dominant discourse. The CCA only maintained its daily routines, 
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and missed the opportunity to create new meanings and grasp hegemony at the 
crucial moment in the late 1980s. 
Although intellectuals started to question the Mrs authoritarian rule and demand 
Taiwanese independence as eady as in the 1960s and 70s, it was not until the 
mid-I 980s that KMT ideology was seriously challenged. Academic advocacy for 
political reform and the intense debate over 7aiwanese identit)( among intellectuals 
laid the foundations for a discourse of Taiwanese subjectivit)( to emerge. When the 
old discourse was cast into doubt and a new opportunity for change appeared, in 
contrast to the inactivity of the cultural apparatus, competing discourses fought on 
and prevailed. 
Through the heated debates on Taiwanese identity, a new representational system 
was created and gradually accepted as'true'. This new'regime of truth' overturned 
old values, changed China-centric identities, pressurised policy U-turns, and shook 
the old political hegemony. Hence, the issue of Taiwanese independence has 
become a political agenda, the China-cenbic focus in all government policy has been 
removed, and Taiwanisation has become politically correct and the norm in every 
aspect of life. Even the KMT openly flaunted its Taiwanisation tendency in 
policy-making. Two competing camps seemed to voice a similar message, and tried 
to seize the hegemony by claiming the ownership of 'indigenisation'. Finally, the 
indigenisation trend has become the hegemonic discourse, and changed how 
Taiwanese identify themselves accordingly. 
In order to overturn the old discourse and popularise the new, other than the, 
advocacy and elaboration of the academics, the education system Is equally 
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important for the dissemination and reproduction of this 'regime of trutlY. Therefore, 
calls for educational reform and changes in national curriculum are made to reinforce 
this new discourse. I believe that all the changes in Taiwan in the last decade were 
made possible because of the profound involvement of intellectuals. After several 
decades' struggle, they finally seized the power to produce meaning and helped the 
opposition win the hegemonic struggle vAth the help from the educational system and 
intellectuals to reproduce the regime of truth. 
Thirdly, political hegemony can only be won when the cultural hegemony is fightly 
grasped. From a sociological point of view, culture is inscribed by, and always 
operated within, the play of power. Moreover, meaning and meaningful practice are 
constructed vvithin discourse. Before seizing political hegemony, in order to foster 
national-popular consensus and popularise it as 'common sense', the battle of 
cultural hegemony must first be won. 
For example, the Opposition in Taiwan started to advocate indigenisation and 
Taiwanese awareness in the 1970s. However, it was not until the communication 
across the Strait increased after 1987, that people in Taiwan started to sense their 
'othemess'to people in China and form a consensus (of indigenisation) in the 1990s. 
Consequently, this awakening of Taiwanese consciousness and the 1996 missile 
threat accelerated the Taiwanisation trend. This change of identity not only 
pressurised the authorities to comply with the indigenisation trend, but also supported 
the DPP in the presidential election to become the ruling party in 2000. 
Another example of winning cultural hegemony was the cooperation between the 
Opposition and political theatre. Before the strife between mainstream and 
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non-mainstream factions ended in 1993, in my view, the battlefield had already been 
cleared, and prepared by the political theatre movement in the late 1980s. Uttle 
theatre raised questions, broke taboos, inspired spectators, raised awareness of 
Taiwanese consciousness, and acted as the vanguard for the political struggle 
between two competing discourses of identity. 
Fourthly, I believe that Taiwanese cultural policy in the 1990s has been transformed 
to a form of 'subjective regulation Q, especially under the impact of globalisation. In 
contrast to its dominant and coercive nature in the past (such as censorship, 
restrictions on mass media, standardised textbooks, language policy), cultural policy 
since the 1990s has made state control seem insignificant. The cultural apparatus 
made alliances by including different political interests, luring dissidents with funding 
and recognition, and dravving in big players in this field by encouraging commercial 
productions. In order to make use of cultural industry as state cultural capital and 
regain control in the network society, cultural policy had to change. 
Instead of imposing oppressive restrictions, the new strategy of cultural policy is to 
set up a kind of self-motivating and self-disciplinary mechanism. For example, the 
funding of the U Theatre not only manifested the official line 
- 
encouraging 
indigenisation 
- 
but also direcHy encouraged other groups to follow voluntarily. 
Similarly, the new emphasis on managerial ability in the funding system directly 
manifests state support for a commercialisation, rather than artistic pursuit. Another 
example was the increasing funding of Gezaixi, the only Taiwan born and bred xiqu 
form. Instead of fostering all Taiwanese xiqu forms as a whole, the state chose to 
2 Subjective regulation is a form of 'regulation by culture'. (HALL, 1997a) Instead of 
constraining behaviour, this forin of regulation tries to produce new subjects and endeavours 
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support those Gezaixi artists who performed in the 'most tradifional style'. (LIN 
MAO-HSIAN, 1999) This principle was set up not only to construct a sense of ý 
historical continuity, but also to distinguish the uniqueness of Taiwanese traditional 
culture through an art form having no direct cultural connection with China. 
The new tactics were especially effective in Taiwan when state funding was 
systematised and a web of cultural apparatuses were set up island-vAde to provide 
funding and promote official 'excellence'. On the surface, cultural policy is designed 
to provide support and foster the arts. It seems that the state respects artistic 
freedom and is less demanding than private sectors. The possibility of state 
interference seems fairly small. However, through regulating, funding, and 
encouraging selected art forms and artists, cultural policy can maintain control, 
increase cultural capital value, and reinforce the selected ideology in a subtle way. 
Lastly and foremost, I believe that the indirect influence of cultural policy has 
generally been overlooked both by artists and policy-makers. Cultural policy is the 
most conscious action initiated by the state to build culture. Therefore, it is not just 
drawn up for administrative purposes, but is the means for the state to invent tradition, 
rewrite history, reproduce meanings, and construct culture that it desires and will 
benefit from. Within this framework, the state weaves the cultural environment into a 
tightly entWined ideological web. 
Although Taiwan's case is unique in terms of historical background and cultural 
character, there are universalities in the formation of cultural policy and its role in 
national culture building, e. g. the way in which cultural policy is formulated and 
to get its members to regulate themselves subjectively. 
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implemented, its tendency of being instrumental, the growing need to make alliance 
vAth commercial sectors, and its influence on constructing culture and cultural identity. 
For the state, cultural policy has become the most effective and yet hidden tool with 
which to discipline people, to form consensus, and to fight against the uncontrollable 
global influence vvith the comfort of a more secure, indigenised identity. I am not 
suggesting that top-down policies have had absolute influence on identity formation, 
or are entirely instrumental. Nonetheless, because the politics in cultural policy is 
usually hidden and rarely noticed, my research challenges the naivety of taking it as 
a purely administrative and managerial concern. 
The composition of cultural policy has changed in order to maintain its hegemony. 
The influence of cultural policy is invisible and its interference is subtle. It has 
become a mixture of regulation and commerce, an alliance between policy and 
market forces, in order to restrain the unwanted and promote the desirable. The 
selection criteria in state funding have predetermined the framework of a cultural 
environment that the authorities would like to build. Consequently, this world that we 
see, live in and interact vvith, becomes the only world and the unquestionable 'truth'. 
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Appendix 11 List of Interviewees in 1999 
Traditional Theatre 
Chung Ch'uan-hsing 2-fq* 
Head of Fuxing troupe, 
Head of Beijing opera Department in National Taiwan Junior College of 
Performing Arts (NTJCPA) 
23/11/99 11.00pm-1.00am (telephone interview) 
Wu Hsing-kuo q9QM 
Beijing opera actor, 
Artistic director of 'Contemporary Legend Theatre 
14/11/99 1.00pm 
- 
4.30pm (interviewed in Taipei) 
Liao Ch'iung-chih jX3jjjV, 
Gezaixi actress; 
Artistic director of Xinchuan Gezaixi group "Vff-MM; 
Senior teacher in National Taiwan Junior College of Performing Arts 
(NTJCPA) 
11/11/99 2.15pm 
- 
4.45pm (interviewed in Neihu NQ campus of NTJCPA) 
Lin Mao-hsien #j%ff 
Folklore scholar, 
Associate professor in Chingi University 
26/11/99 2.30pm 
- 
6.00pm (interviewed in Taipei) 
Cheng Rom-shing #50KI 
Professional musician in Hakkas music, music theorists; 
Principal of NTJCPA 
23/11/99 9.30am 
-12.00pm (interviewed in Mucha *N campus of NTJCPA) 
Yang Ll-wen G-It3:, r; Ch'iu YO-ling ý5: ffjllj; Ts'ao Ya-Lan IMM; Tai Lien-i JReff, 
Four final-year students in the NTJCPA Gezaixi department 
11/11/99 5.00pm 
- 
6.00prn (interviewed in Neihu NM campus of NTJCPA) 
Contemporary Theatre 
Wang Mo-lin 
Art critic; Artistic director of 'Body Phase Studio' 
18/11/99 12.30pm 
- 
3.30pm (interviewed in National Theatre, Taipei) 
Chou I-ch'ang JQ; jA 
Theatre activist film-maker, 
Artistic director ofXangzhicuishiyanjutuarf ýIZýIjVJR*jfW(Jiangzhicui 
Experimental Theatre 
15/11/99 3.00pm 
- 
5.30pm (interviewed in Taipei) 
Chi Wei-jan kiElrAj, 
Associate Professor in English Department, National Taiwan Normal 
University; 
Founding member and director of 'Creative Society Theatre' flljfý 
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10/11/99 12.00pm-3.00pm (interviewed in Taipei), I- ý 
-ýi 'ý 
Li Huan-hsiung 
Founding member and director of Left Bank Theatre 
Director in Creative Society Theatre Company 
Senior Manager of Classical Department, EMI Taiwan 
16/11/99 2.30pm 
- 
5.30prn (interviewed in Taipei) 
LIU CHING-MIN §PjjNW 
Founding member of ' Lan Ling Theatre Workshop'; 
Artistic director of U Theatre 
13/11/99 7.30pm 
- 
12.00am (interviewed in her house in Hsintien 
Policy Maker 
Wo Chi-liang fq1ta 
Currently, the director of the preparatory office of National Traditional Arts 
Centre (1998-date) 
First president of the Kuo Kuang Chinese Opera Company and the 
principal of Kuo Kuang Performing Art Experimental School 
W&); (1995-1998) 
Director of 2"d Department of the Council of Cultural Affairs (CCA) (1982 
-1995) 
30/11/99 2.30prn 
- 
5.00prn (interviewed in National Traditional Arts Centre) 
HsOeh Mao-sung ffafAm ' 
Section chief of performing arts division of the 3d Department (CCA) 
990-1994); 
Bianzhuan QfW(senior officer) in CCA (1994-date). 
17/11/99 2.30prn 
- 
4.45prn (interviewed in CCA) 
Jung Pao-shan HINP? 
Stage designer, 
Chief of Production Division of the Kuo Kuang. Chinese Opera Company 
Chief of Production of National Theatre (Taipei) 
9/11/99 11.00arn 
- 
3.00prn (interviewed in Kuo Kuang) 
Ko Chdng-f6ng fITA ICO CHNG-FNG 
Deputy director of Social Education Department, Ministry of Education 
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-10.30am &14/12/99 10.30am - 11.20am (telephone 
interviews) 
Su Gui-zhi UWA 
Head of curriculum in the NTJCPA (1995 
- 
date) 
Section chief for literature and theatre (1989 
- 
1994) 
14/12/99 4.00pm 
- 
6.45pm (in Mucha campus of NTJCPA) 
Media 
Li Yu-ling 
-ýV-MfAp Senior reporter in United Daily news 
18/11/99 10.00pm 
- 
11.30pm (telephone interview) 
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